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Transforming Cities examines the profound changes that have characterised 
cities of the advanced capitalist societies in the final decades of the 
twentieth century. It analyses ways in which relationships of contest, conflict 
and co-operation are realised in and through the social and spatial forms 
of contemporary urban life. In particular, this book focuses on the impact 
of economic restructuring and changing forms of urban governance on 
patterns of urban deprivation and social exclusion. It contends that these 
processes are creating new patterns of social division and new forms of 
regulation and control. 
Contributors analyse innovative strategies of urban regeneration, the shift 
from Fordist to post-Fordist cities, new patterns of possession and disposses-
sion in urban spaces, the production of cultural representations and city 
images, the evolution of novel forms of political power, emerging patterns 
of policing and surveillance, the development of partnerships between 
public and private agencies, the mobilisation of resistance by urban 
residents and implications for the empowerment of communities and 
individuals. 
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Social exclusion and the 
reinvention of partnership 
Nick Jevvson and Susanne MacGregor 
THE THEMES OF THE VOLUME 
This collection of essays focuses on aspects of the profound transformations 
that have characterised cities of the advanced capitalist societies in the final 
decades of the twentieth century. It analyses ways in which relationships of 
contest, conflict and co-operation are realised in and through the social 
and spatial forms of contemporary urban life. These processes, it is 
contended, are creating new patterns of social division and new forms of 
regulation and control. More specifically, contributors analyse innovative 
strategies of urban regeneration, the shift from Fordist to post-Fordist cities, 
new patterns of possession and dispossession in urban spaces, the produc-
tion of cultural representations and city images, the evolution of novel 
forms of political power, emerging patterns of policing and surveillance, 
the development of partnerships between public and private agencies, the 
mobilisation of resistance by urban residents and implications for the 
empowerment of communities and individuals. Taken together, the essays 
give an account of the impact of economic restructuring and changing 
forms of urban governance on patterns of urban deprivation and social 
exclusion. 
The chapters are all derived from papers delivered at the British 
Sociological Association Annual Conference for 1995, which was organised 
around the theme 'Contested Cities: Social Process and Spatial Forms'. The 
study of urban sociology has recently undergone its own revival - rescued 
from, on the one hand, overspecialisation and mundane description and, 
on the other, theoretical paradigms that denied sociological significance to 
the city as a social form. Renewed vigour and conviction among scholars are 
evidenced in the liveliness of the BSA conference on which this volume is 
based, increased publications in the field and moves towards new over-
arching theoretical syntheses. The chapters that follow offer, then, a 
distinctive approach, seeing change through the critical eye of sociology. 
The ways urban spaces are generated in social relationships, and the ways 
social relations take distinct spatial forms in cities, are key processes which it is 
the task of urban sociology to analyse. In this perspective, cities are conceived 
not merely as sites or arenas of social interaction but as built spatial entities 
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which incorporate and constitute the constraints and opportunities of a wide 
range of social relationships. This theme is introduced by David Harvey in the 
first chapter in this volume - expressed in the notion of 'framing cities' - and 
is sustained in the chapters which follow. 
The chapters offer remarkably topical discussions of cities and urban 
policies in the 1990s whilst, at the same time, locating current trends in a 
broader context. They reflect the more sceptical approach which now 
characterises academic and policy debates about cities, as the after-effects 
of the excesses of the 1980s become only too apparent. They also link 
macro and micro level analyses. Middle range and grand theorisations are 
complemented by careful investigations of particular cities. They also bring 
together writing and research which have tended to be compartmentalised; 
for example, discussions of local government have been separated from 
discussions of leisure and pleasure, crime and policing and other social 
processes. When the sociological imagination focuses on the city itself as a 
social and spatial form, more holistic analyses emerge. 
A FRAMEWORK OF ISSUES 
The renewal of theoretical and empirical work in urban sociology has been 
brought about by a recognition of the significance of cities within the forms 
and dynamics of western capitalism. A transformation of capitalism - and, 
thus, simultaneously a transformation of cities - has been taking place in 
the second half of the twentieth century. These changes have generated a 
series of crises and conflicts, including the decline of manufacturing and 
the growth of unemployment, polarisation between the socially excluded 
and the better-off (although increasingly insecure) middle classes, increas-
ing disillusion and dissatisfaction with traditional political parties and 
political classes, the deleterious environmental impacts of current systems 
of production and distribution, and the failure of available ideologies (both 
welfare statism and neo-liberalism) to come up with effective policy 
solutions Oacobs 1992: 8). The interrelated processes entailed in these 
changes, and their associated social divisions, provide a framework of issues 
for the investigation of urban forms and relationships - and, hence, for the 
chapters in this volume. 
Restructuring employment and restructuring cities 
An increasingly flexible and deregulated labour market characterises the 
1990s as companies have responded to technological innovation and global 
competitiveness. There has been a significant decline in the proportion of 
people employed in full-time and permanent jobs whilst the numbers of 
those working part-time, on short-term contracts and in self-employment 
have grown. Women now make up nearly half of the employed workforce. 
Subcontracting, out-sourcing and so-called 'non-standard' forms of 
employment have become integral features oflabour markets. The services 
sector has waxed while manufacturing has waned. Pursuit of economies of 
scale has been replaced by an emphasis on small-batch production and 
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niche marketing of goods and services. In many contexts large-scale, 
hierarchical organisations have given way to small and medium-sized 
enterprises with flatter managerial structures. 'The demand for workers in 
skilled high technology based occupations as well as in low paid and labour 
intensive sectors such as hotels, catering and retail distribution looks set to 
grow' (Taylor 1996: 208). The impact on urban forms of such transforma-
tions in labour markets and labour processes has given rise to the notion 
of a post-Fordist city. Such a city is characterised by a regime of flexible 
accumulation that creates new spatial and social relationships ( cf. Harvey 
1989a; Savage and Warde 1993). 
Awareness of these •trends has been added to prior concerns about the 
decline of cities which dominated the 1970s. The symptoms of decline 
noted then were loss of population, loss of employment, fiscal problems 
resulting from the erosion of the tax base, disproportionate numbers of 
poor households concentrated in poor areas (characterised especially in 
the USA by housing abandonment, arson, vandalism, high crime rates, 
drug dealing, and dependence on welfare), and a concentration of 
minority ethnic groups in separate areas of the city. The gloomy prognoses 
which derive from these accounts were challenged in the 1980s by views 
which heralded the revival of city centres, sometimes focused around 
cultural institutions, the arts, leisure and consumption activities (Bianchini 
1989 and 1990). Yet alongside these booming developments, in other areas 
there has remained decline, distress, disparity of income and lifestyle and 
divergence of values and opportunities. New kinds of low-paid, insecure 
and low-status jobs are generated by the demands of tourists, gentrifiers, 
concert-goers, conference delegates and other affluent urban consumers. 
Landscapes of consumption and of devastation exist side by side, and in 
intimate relation with one another (Zukin 1991). 
Globalisation, post-Fordiat cities and social 
exclusion 
The restructuring of urban employment relations has been a global 
process, generating new international divisions and connections between 
capital, labour and resources. Of central importance has been, as a result 
of financial deregulation and the explosive growth of electronic commu-
nications, the speedy movement of money within and between world 
markets. There has been a world-wide social and spatial reorganisation of 
economic activities and a restructuring of capital, resulting in new 
functions for financial markets and challenges to established political 
institutional 'containers', such as the nation-state (Sassen 1994). This has 
led to a reordering of the significance and influence of cities across the face 
of the planet. New patterns of wealth and poverty, dispersal and centr?.1-
isation, control and subordination have been created. Profound shocks 
have been felt in all parts of the world and many human lives disrupted, 
posing particular difficulties of adaptation for western societies, coming as 
they did after a uniquely stable period of steady economic growth in the 
decades following the Second World War. 
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A key characteristic of this transformation is its pattern of uneven 
development. Massey insists that the concept of uneven development refers 
'to more than the fact that there are more jobs in some places than others, 
or even that there are better jobs in some places than others' (Massey 1994: 
86). She stresses that an important element of uneven development is the 
spatial structuring of the relations of production in capitalist societies -
unequal relationships which imply positions of dominance and subordina-
tion (ibid.: 87) - and that analysis is incomplete without recognition of this 
spatial ordering. On the ground, this results in some regions/countries/ 
cities monopolising control functions, while other regions/ countries/ cities 
are locked into subordinate roles. The key point is that 'the overlapping 
and interweaving of all these spatial structures is the basis for a spatial 
division of labour' (ibid.: 90). Thus, for example, the picture of Britain 
described by Massey is one where the North remains dominated by branch-
plant structures, with an increasing proportion of these being responsible 
to headquarters outside the UK. Along with this have gone other changes 
which impact on local economies and local social relations, especially 
increasing subcontracting, casualisation and contracting out (hollowing 
out of core functions). These transformations, she argues, have exacer-
bated the north-south divide: '[n] orth and south are locked in very 
different ways into international spatial structures and the international 
division oflabour' (ibid.: 97). She continues: 
The economy of London and the south-east is in many ways more in 
competition with and linked to other international metropolitan 
regions and world cities than it is with the rest of the UK ... In 
contrast, the factories of the north are linked into, and in competition 
with, similar factories in similar regions in Europe, and also to some 
extent in the Third World. 
(Massey 1994: 97) 
Within c1t1es, polarisation of the labour market is also evidenced in 
increasing spatial segregation. 
It has become commonplace to describe these transformations in terms 
of processes conveniently, if misleadingly, labelled as 'globalisation'. More 
sceptical writers have challenged the sweeping nature of this analysis - and 
the pessimistic conclusions that seem to follow for political action. Authors 
such as Will Hutton ( 1995) and Paul Hirst and Grahame Thompson ( 1996) 
have argued that the role of the nation-state, while altered, has not been 
eroded to the extent that the globalisation argument would imply. Hirst 
and Thompson argue that '[g]lobalisation has become a fashionable 
concept in the social sciences, a core dictum in the prescriptions of 
management gurus and a catchphrase for journalists and politicians of 
every stripe' (Hirst and Thompson 1996: 1). They offer instead a 'scepti-
cism about global economic processes and optimism about the possibilities 
of control of the international economy and of the viability of national 
political strategies' (ibid.). The term 'international' is used deliberately by 
these writers rather than 'global' to indicate that 'most companies trade 
from their bases in distinct national economies' (ibid.: 185). 
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Nevertheless, competition between localities for inward investment has 
increased, with cities and regions seeking to project themselves on a global 
stage in order to attract capital investment. This, in turn, often entails 
creating a distinctive civic image that, it is hoped, will establish the city as 
an attractive niche for some aspect of transnational economic operations. 
Such images may emphasise environmental features, educational and 
cultural institutions, scientific prowess, historical heritage, attitudes of 
residents, and so on. City boosters may feel that investment in prestige 
projects, cultural spectacles or international events will help foster a 
positive image, resulting in competition between urban localities to build 
conference centres, sponsor tourist attractions and host sporting contests 
(cf. Harvey 1989a; Biancini 1991; Mulgan 1990). In these circumstances the 
ambience and style of the city become economic assets. Some cities have 
long established advantages in this regard; others have to be more creative 
in inventing, or re-presenting (King 1996), their charms. 
In post-Fordist cities there is at the same time a growing concern with a 
phenomenon now labelled 'social exclusion' - a new name for the old. 
problem of poverty. This concern has, to a significant degree, been 
stimulated by fear of rebellion and disorder. The dominant discourse in 
contemporary politics now focuses on issues of social integration and 
disintegration. The upbeat account of transformation has been challenged 
by those who draw attention to increasing inequality and poverty in 
contemporary societies. Post-Fordism has been accompanied by de-
industrialisation, the growth of unemployment (particularly long-term 
unemployment), and social exclusion. Social exclusion involves detach-
ment from social and political participation and from the labour market. 
These tensions are crystallised in contemporary cities, as social divisions are 
compounded by spatial segregation. Sociology's traditional task, of employ-
ing careful investigation to draw attention to the dark side of progress, 
becomes of renewed importance. 
There is growing concern that policy responses to these enormous 
challenges are inadequate. One in three children in Britain lives in poverty, 
14 million people are on low incomes ( 4.5 million of whom are in work) 
and welfare expenditure itself is at a historic high point. Across Europe 
some 20 million people are unemployed. Yet there is marked reluctance 
among political parties to talk of redistributive social policies. In many 
countries - including Germany, France and the UK - there is growing 
uncertainty about the possibility of retaining welfare state arrangements. 
Indeed, social exclusion may itself be the result of the restructuring and 
dismantling of the welfare state, reflecting transformations in forms of 
urban and national governance. According to Lord Dahrendorf, there 
should be three principal objectives of current policies: prosperity, civility 
and liberty. The challenge for contemporary cities is whether they will be 
able to square the circle - attain all three in equal measure. In particular, 
with regard to social exclusion, the urgent tasks are to retrieve the excluded 
and to prevent future exclusion. 
The development of appropriate policies requires better understanding 
of the social processes which lead to social exclusion - and here social 
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scientists may make a contribution. Research is needed that demonstrates 
the dynamics through which people gain access to opportunities, or are 
denied them. A structural analysis would show how poverty is inherent in 
cities rather than being accidental or self-inflicted. The revival of interest in 
social networks is welcome here in helping to analyse these social processes 
and showing how different processes operate in different arenas. Profiling 
and mapping techniques can give publicity to social trends, and give a 
picture of the landscape of social exclusion, but these techniques are only 
as good as the data they utilise and need to be approached with care. 
Poverty is a socio-spatial phenomenon and research and theory must make 
this central to their accounts. 
Governance~ control and urban policies 
Governance can be defined as 'the control of an activity by some means 
such that a range of defined outcomes is attained' (Hirst and Thompson 
1996: 184). As such, governance is not just the province of the state and may 
include a wide range of activities. It has been argued, however, that there 
is now an urgent need to redesign public policy and social provision in the 
light of the massive transformations characterising late twentieth-century 
capitalism: 
Today ... [w]e live in an era of breathtaking change. We live in a 
global marketplace, which puts enormous competitive pressure on 
our economic institutions. We live in an information society, in which 
people get access to information almost as fast as their leaders do. We 
live in a knowledge-based economy, in which educated workers bridle 
at commands and demand autonomy. We live in an age of niche 
markets, in which customers have become accustomed to high quality 
and extensive choice. In this environment, bureaucratic institutions 
developed during the industrial era - public and private - increasingly 
fail us. 
(Osborne and Gaebler 1993: 15) 
In the context of social change and the fear of disintegration, the 
dominant questions surround the possibility of coherent and integrated 
governance, the knitting together of the myriad of agencies involved in the 
governing process and the salience of democratic processes. A distinctive 
and central element in modern politics remains the claim of the state to 
exclusive control of a definite territory (Hirst and Thompson 1996: 170). 
However, transformations in international economic relationships and 
enhanced vigour of locally based social movements have, to some degree, 
challenged this claim. Hirst and Thompson hint that in the post-Fordist 
age, governance may come to parallel features of the former shape of 
politics in the Middle Ages, where 'political authorities and other forms of 
functionally specific governance (religious communities and guilds for 
example) had existed in complex and overlapping forms that made parallel 
and often competing claims to the same area' (ibid.: 171). The new political 
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world is one of 'complexity and multiplicity oflevels of types of governance' 
(ibid.: 183). 
In these circumstances, identifying and explaining relationships 
between government and non-governmental forces in policy formulation 
and implementation becomes of renewed interest and importance. 
Osborne and Gaebler (1992) argue, in their influential and best-selling 
book, that the 'one-size-fits-all' approach to government and services no 
longer works, nor is it what people want. They see this as an opportunity to 
reinvent government, through allowing an entrepreneurial spirit to trans-
form the public sector. The redistributive and public investment projects of 
welfare states have also been challenged by constraints from international 
financial markets, limiting the interventions available to national govern-
ments. Privatisation, deregulation and the growth of market-based services 
have further reduced the role of direct state provision and fostered the 
notion of the 'enabling state' ( Cochrane 1993). 
Some commentators have seen in this a reduction of the scope of 
national governments to one more akin to local government. Local 
governments 'cannot make war or peace; they ·cannot issue passports or 
forbid outsiders from entering their territory; they cannot issue currency; 
and they cannot control imports or erect tariff walls' (Peterson 1981: 4). 
What has for a long time been true of city politics also becomes the case for 
national politics; that is, public policies can only be explained by looking at 
their place within the larger socio-economic and political context. So, 
ironically, in this new era much can be learnt by national governments from 
studying what happens at the city level. 
In the context of changing forms of governance, the redefinition of 
poverty as social exclusion reflects a perception that the political problem 
is one of unruly social categories, unacceptable behaviours and no-go areas. 
For example, in a wide-ranging discussion of drugs policy in American 
cities, Elliott Currie has outlined the implications of a punitive response to 
a 'collapsing economy and an increasingly depriving and fragmented 
society' (Currie 1993: 161). He argues that: 'The overuse of incarceration 
may strengthen the links between street and prison and help to cement 
users' and dealers' identity as members of an oppositional drug culture' 
(ibid.). Social exclusion may produce a variety of responses: opposition 
(through crime, terrorism or milder forms of political protest); retreat and 
apathy ('welfare dependence', mental illness); or separatism (Farrakhan-
like social movements). Crucially, the growth of such responses challenges 
the very legitimacy and effectiveness of governance and demands a political 
response from the included. 
The partnership approach to governance 
At the same time as an increasingly entrepreneurial form of government 
has taken hold, entailing new styles of management and accounting for 
public finance, there has arisen a new approach to governance; that is, 
'partnership'. The reasons for the promotion of partnership to the top of 
the political agenda have much to do with the economic restructuring of 
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local economies and deep-seated changes in the machinery of government 
at both local and national levels (Bailey et al. 1995). Stoker has observed: 
While significant differences persist from country to country, it is 
clear that the need for some form of public-private co--0peration 
exists in all advanced societies. Growing competition between cities 
for investment, and the role of business interests in local decision 
making have increasingly shaped the urban terrain. Decentralisation 
and shifting responsibilities within the state, increased financial 
constraints, and the development of privatised services utilising both 
profit and non-profit organisations have also created additional 
complexities for local governments. Urban governments are increas-
ingly working through and alongside other interests. 
(Stoker 1996: 269) 
Partnership is increasingly seen 'not only as an essential adjunct of policy 
but as the most important foundation of the government's strategy towards 
urban areas' (Bailey et al. 1995: 1). 
The explanation advanced by Bailey et al. for the growth of partnership 
approaches emphasises the end of the post-war consensus; Thatcherism, 
with its stress on deregulation, the role of the free market and privatisation; 
reactions to the effects of Thatcherism in the form of riots, protests and 
rising crime; and the questioning of neo-liberalism by some business 
leaders influenced by notions of corporate social responsibility. However, 
socially responsible business leaders are in limited supply and pressures to 
seek greater efficiency and profitability override other considerations. 
Indeed, the very pursuit of efficiency by individual enterprises is a cause of 
many of the social problems which public policy has to address. Companies 
and agencies externalise their costs by dumping the expenses of rationalisa-
tion or changing production methods - such as pollution, sickness and 
unemployment - onto the wider society. What may be rational for an 
individual company can be very irrational for the public and others 
affected. 
From the mid-l 980s, the loss of power and finance by local authorities, 
and the growth of 'quangos', resulted in a series of uncoordinated ad hoe 
initiatives, some of which were actually counterproductive. The local policy 
vacuum left by the withdrawal of the local state was increasingly filled by 
proponents of a partnership approach, equally attractive to local author-
ities and businesses trying to manufacture a new role for themselves. 
Partnership represents a particular form of a new urban regime, 
emerging in remarkably similar forms in cities around the world. As 
defined by Keating, an urban regime is 'a set of arrangements through 
which policy decisions are made, encompassing formal structures and 
informal relationships among political and economic elites comprising the 
governing coalition' (Keating 1991: 7-8). Harvey sees these public-private 
partnerships as part of the new entrepreneurialism which reflects the 
transformation of urban governance in late capitalism (Harvey 1989b). 
Governance itself becomes speculative in execution and design, patterned 
by flexible specialisation. It is also a response to the impact of neo-
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liberalism on social life, a recogmtion of the need to deal with the 
problems of social disintegration and poverty which have accompanied 
deregulation and restructuring. Alarm about rising crime, urban riots and 
social discontent fuels fears that these conditions might give rise to 
political opposition, especially in the form of extreme social movements. 
The legitimacy of the political system is, thus, threatened by increasing 
social exclusion. 
Partnership is an attractive concept to government, because it commits 
other interests to regeneration (such as the private sector and the local 
community), it diffuses responsibility for success or failure, and ensures 
that relatively low levels of public expenditure can be used to lever large 
amounts of private investment. Finally the debate and potential conflict 
about means and ends normally associated with such programmes is largely 
transferred to the agencies within the partnership and thus is relatively 
excluded from wider public debate (Bailey et al. 1995: 39). 
Most literature on partnership in urban studies has concentrated on its 
role in encouraging cities to compete one with another. Less attention has 
been given to the innovative social policies which accompany, and are 
designed to be compatible with, the new economic policies. The key 
objective is to create a stable environment within which business can 
operate. The new policies absorb and implement management practices 
which have spread from the private sector into public life during this phase 
of capitalist transformation. Social provision and public policy can be seen 
to alter to match the general development of the social relations of 
production. 
A key issue within this restructuring is whether a place will be allowed for 
democratic procedures. Integration is the key objective and this may be 
attained by various methods, of which the democratic form is only one. So 
a crucial question for the partnership approach is to what extent it can 
deliver accountability, along with a balancing of efficiency and equity. 
Without a firm base in democratic principles and practices, partnership 
could become a system for co-opting institutions into an extended system 
of repressive control (Cohen 1985; MacGregor 1995). Crucial questions, 
therefore, include: which interests, and which players, will be included in 
partnerships and which will be left outside? Who will be the leaders within 
partnerships? Whose agendas will prevail? 
Chapters in this book indicate various ways in which attempts are being 
made to knit together members of partnerships, in the interests of 
effectiveness and integration. Moreover, partnerships may be directed 
towards the goal of harnessing and controlling competing players in the 
urban scene. There is abundant evidence that, when the state withdraws, a 
benevolent hidden hand of the market does not automatically take over. 
Indeed, one might go so far as to say there is no such thing as the market: 
there are only employers, political parties, tenants groups, trade unions, 
police forces, professional bodies, churches, local authorities - all making 
claims to decision-making about the allocation of resources within a given 
area. What partnership is about is the building of coalitions of interest, or 
alliances, among these groups in the name of the wider interest of the city 
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as a whole. Within these constellations, there remains a key role for a public 
power - the national state and local government, for example, especially 
through the rule of law - to mediate between these plural groups. 
There is a need for more detailed empirical studies of the place of 
partnerships within restructured urban institutions, organisations and 
relations. Regulation as a process needs to be studied using imaginative 
methods, 'pluralistic evaluation', perhaps, which will highlight the pro-
cesses and texture of regulation, showing 'the socially embedded, socially 
regularised nature of class struggle' Qessop 1995b: 310). 
There is, of course, another sense in which the term 'partnership' may 
be used: that is, with respect to concepts of social partnership, which 
describe a settlement between government, employers and unions, working 
together to develop public policy. This continental European conception is 
rather different from that which has developed in British and American 
cities, where trade unions have been generally excluded from these 
arrangements. Interesting and innovative as such ideas may seem, in the 
British context they fly 'in the face of so much custom and practice and 
history in industrial relations that one has to wonder how successful' the 
promotion of such ideas may be (Robert Taylor, speaking at Unions 95 
conference). Employers in Britain reject the concept and, according to 
Taylor, employers would not be influenced into a social partnership unless 
they had to operate 'in a legal and political climate where they have to 
co-operate, where they have to seek partnership' (ibid.). For this legislation 
would be needed. 
THE CHAPTERS 
The chapters are grouped into four sections. Part I, 'Framing the City', 
provides an overview and theorisations of transformations occurring in 
contemporary urban forms and ways oflife. 
David Harvey presents a perspective that identifies themes which are 
reflected in all the chapters which follow. He reminds us of the centrality 
of cities and urban social relations to the condition and prospects of the 
human species: the footprint of the city on the earth is now more massive 
than ever (cf. Girardet 1992). He makes the case for the importance of 
locating sociological studies in the city, the place where wider social 
processes are condensed, rarefied and exaggerated. Harvey sees 'the city' 
not as a mere site for contest but as the framework within which debate 
about the future can take place. He argues for placing concepts of the 
urban and of democracy at the centre of social and political theory. He goes 
on to explore the role of relationships within communities in the 
democratic process - in particular the conditions under which the 'militant 
particularism' of localised causes and campaigns can be generalised into 
more universal processes of struggle. 
Bob Jessop also recognises the importance of'state' and 'ideology' in the 
analytic framework to be applied to the city. Like Harvey, he argues for a 
revived awareness that people make their history but not in conditions of 
their own making. Jessop explores the interconnections between the 
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re-imagmmg, and re-imaging, of local economies and the re-design of 
urban governance mechanisms. These he places in the context of develop-
ments in global economic and political interdependencies. He suggests 
that the effectiveness of entrepreneurial strategies rests upon a 
re-imagining of the city as an economic, political and cultural entity. This, 
in turn, is closely linked to the emergence of new forms of public-private 
partnerships and networks. Jessop argues that in newly dominant political 
arrangements, characterised by a hollowing out of the nation-state, social 
policy and human need have been subordinated to the demands of capital 
and business. 
John Lea focuses on crime control, an issue often disregarded in 
regulation theory. He questions the historical accuracy of some representa-
tions of Fordism. He reminds us that the Keynesian Welfare State was itself 
productive of social disorder. This is an important antidote to current 
discussions, which can all too easily portray a golden age ofFordism and the 
welfare state. The assumption that the post-war years were characterised by 
effective incorporation and stability can lead to an exaggeration of the . 
extent of current collapse. This, in turn, raises questions about the extent 
to which conflict and disorder are integral to the current situation and 
whether there is a crisis of control. Lea asks whether the concept 'post-
Fordism' 'describes the emergence of a new, stable mode of development 
... or ... simply grasps the symptoms of a deepening capitalist recession'. 
Rosemary Mellor, in a particularly lucid account of changing regenera-
tion strategies in Manchester, outlines the policy agendas which have 
emerged in this period. She examines the commodification of leisure as a 
strategy of urban renewal - in particular, the part played by an emerging 
heritage industry, cultural institutions and recreational attractions in 
successive waves of speculative development in the city during the 1980s 
and 1990s. Her chapter highlights the role of business leaders, various 
agencies and the local authority in the management of local partnerships. 
She also outlines the impact of these developments on the poor in the city 
and the emergence of new patterns of exclusion. Her account shows how 
circumstances within cities are tied in to wider processes of capitalist 
development but she also emphasises that they reflect the particularities of 
conurbations and regional economies as well as the strategies chosen by 
political elites. 
A long-standing theme of urban sociology has been that of charting the 
lives of city residents and identifying their lived experience in the urban 
environment. This tradition has particularly sought to reveal, measure and 
highlight the plight of the poor and the oppressed, by means of generating 
and analysing qualitative and quantitative data. Part II, 'Mapping and 
Measuring City Life', comprises chapters that focus on specific aspects of 
division, poverty and inequality in contemporary cities, with particular 
reference to race, gender and class. Social and economic changes impact 
on different groups and cities in different ways. A key concern of these 
chapters is to map some of these changes and variations. The examples 
discussed here reflect wider trends in the development of mature capitalist 
societies while also illustrating the importance of national and local 
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particularities, especially with respect to political arrangements. Individ-
ually and collectively, these chapters enable us to glimpse aspects of the 
complex and cross-cutting web of constraints and opportunities created by 
global and local urban processes, analysed in Part I of the book, in the lives 
of disadvantaged and marginalised urban residents. 
The chapter by Gerry Mooney and Mike Danson opens with a review of 
theories of inequality, the 'dual city' and polarisation. While profound 
social and economic changes lie behind the transformation of cities, 
particular government policies have also played a significant part. These 
can be, and are, contested. The authors' case study of Glasgow illustrates 
the parallel development of regeneration processes with growing social and 
spatial divisions. However, they criticise the frequently used concept of the 
'dual city'. They argue that evidence concerning the extent and growth of 
poverty in Glasgow questions the idea of a concentrated and well defined 
'underclass' living in separate areas. 
Peter Ratcliffe also questions conventional categories and concepts 
which have assumed a taken-for-granted character in much social analysis. 
He draws upon data derived from the 1991 Decennial Census to explore 
patterns of housing tenure and ownership among Britain's ethnic minority 
populations. His detailed and sophisticated analysis generates results that 
lead to a revision of much conventional wisdom about the location of 
ethnic minorities within housing markets. It also reveals how complex 
interrelationships between ethnicity, class, household formation and stage 
in the life cycle shape patterns of advantage and disadvantage. 
Jayne Mooney's chapter also challenges commonplace understandings 
in her analysis of violence in the city. She draws upon the findings of the 
North London Domestic Violence Survey, conducted in the London 
Borough of Islington. In the same tradition of careful social investigation, 
she demonstrates the gendered nature of the incidence, location and 
experience of violence in the city. She formulates and comments upon a 
series of hypotheses that address the assumptions and assertions of four 
different theoretical schools: new administrative criminology, left realists, 
family violence theorists and radical feminists. Her empirical data enable 
her to evaluate key elements of each of these perspectives. 
Similarly, Janet Foster questions another common assumption - that of 
the collapse of community in the city. It is frequently suggested that local 
authority and other publicly owned housing estates are particularly prone 
to a dearth of community ties and neighbourliness. Foster's chapter reports 
the findings of a research study, based on participant observation and 
interviews, on a 'difficult to let' estate in London. Many aspects of the estate 
might be expected to inhibit neighbourliness, including adverse aspects of 
the physical environment and the turn-over in the tenant population. 
Nevertheless Foster discerned established networks among residents -
mediated by class, ethnicity and gender - providing practical services and 
emotional support. 
Part III, 'New Forms of Regulation: Partnership and Empowerment', 
focuses on political developments. In analysing new forms of governance, 
it explores issues surrounding specific strategies of urban regulation and 
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regeneration, including the notion of partnership. These chapters consider 
the extent to which such processes empower local communities and 
residents. A theme which comes through very clearly in these chapters is 
the consistency of the approach being adopted in different areas of public 
policy, illuminating with empirical material the theories developed in the 
earlier chapters by Harvey, Jessop, Lea and Mellor. Strikingly similar 
institutional arrangements and forms, expressed in analogous languages 
and rhetorics, are being deployed in different areas of urban governance. 
Although individual case studies report a degree of confusion or uncer-
tainty within specific partnerships, when viewed comparatively a common 
pattern can be discerned in programmes concerned with health, poverty 
and policing. These similarities support the view that a distinctive mode of 
regulation is under construction. 
Chris Collinge and Stephen Hall review the development of regime 
theory and the theory of hegemony. These are compared and then 
evaluated through the prism of a case study of urban governance in 
Birmingham. The authors describe the emerging shape of local govern-
ance as the 'networked, privatised local state form'. Their analysis describes 
the complex range of participants and alliances within partnerships. They 
also show how the growth of non-elected quangos and agencies, linked to 
private businesses and companies, undermines democratic accountability. 
They conclude that both neo-Marxist and neo-pluralist paradigms have 
much to offer and that theoretical analysis can be advanced by developing 
a dialogue between them. 
Mike Sheaff examines the development of partnerships as responses to 
poverty and division. His chapter is based upon a study of programmes to 
promote health within some of the most deprived areas of Britain, located 
in the city of Plymouth. Urban environments have long been conceived as 
a prime site for intervention in the struggle against illness and disease. 
However, the terms of such interventions have also been a battleground; for 
example, are the sick to be seen as authors of their own misfortunes or as 
victims of their material and social circumstances? Sheaff shows how urban 
partnerships devoted to the promotion of health may put the emphasis on 
community empowerment or authoritarian discipline, personal responsi-
bility or social reform, individual counselling or collective development. He 
refers to the rise of a new discourse of rights and duties around these 
themes of partnership and community. He warns that: 'The view that rights 
are contingent upon personal behaviour can evolve into a far uglier form 
of authoritarianism.' 
Robert Moore's chapter focuses on poverty programmes in Liverpool, 
within the context of European policies and initiatives. He stresses, as do 
Mooney and Danson, that poverty is no longer a problem of the margins 
but is a core feature of contemporary society. He suggests that earlier forms 
of the local state often consisted of exclusionary coalitions. Those who were 
not well served included women, ethnic minority groups, the poor, the 
unemployed, the disabled, the different and the deviant. He sees some 
potential in the new forms of partnership which might bring in groups 
previously left outside, such as the voluntary sector and community 
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representatives. However, his account of events in Liverpool raises ques-
tions about the circumstances under which it is possible to forge effective 
partnerships. His analysis highlights that communities are not homo-
geneous or unified entities; sometimes they contain rivalries, conflicts and 
disagreements that influence outcomes. In addition, deeply ingrained 
distrust of outside bodies on the part of historically disadvantaged and 
exploited local groups may also represent an obstacle. 
These textured, locally based studies suggest that 'politics matters'. An 
underlying theme is that changing forms of governance present opportun-
ities for resistance, innovation and participation, along with attempts at 
more effective social discipline. Gordon Hughes is especially critical of 
approaches which neglect the role of countervailing forces. His chapter 
reports on a study of changing strategies of policing and crime prevention 
in an English Midlands county. Hughes contends that what he calls 'radical 
totalitarianism' gives insufficient attention to empirical evidence and 
underestimates the scope for local resistance: 'the story which unfolds ... 
is not a simple one of unified local resistance to centrally developed trends 
but nor is it one of supine obedience to the centralist agenda'. He 
emphasises, however, that the new arrangements are by-passing democratic 
structures of representative government. 
Part IV, 'The Politics of Exclusion and Resistance', considers ways in 
which local communities and other groups of city dwellers seek to mobilise 
potential sources of support and create alternative identities. These 
chapters explore how, in the context of transformations in their lives, urban 
residents seek to shape the future of the cities they inhabit. 
The chapter by Mike Beazley, Patrick Loftman and Brendan Nevin 
reviews responses to large-scale urban developments in Vancouver, San 
Francisco and Birmingham. Their analysis suggests that talk of public 
involvement has merely been a thin veneer over determinedly pro-growth 
policies, in which local political elites have colluded to drive forward urban 
development. Despite national and local differences, they tell a depress-
ingly familiar tale across their three examples. They report that the needs 
of deprived communities are routinely neglected or swept aside in the face 
of massive regeneration projects, some of which are ostensibly devoted to 
alleviating poverty and social exclusion. They conclude that: 'The challenge 
to local democracy to represent more fully the needs and interests of 
socially excluded groups could hardly be a more vital one.' 
Ethnic community identities may comprise one of the bases on which 
resistance is mobilised. However, growing ethnic difference in contempo-
rary cities can, under certain circumstances, be a source of contention and 
conflict that threatens to overwhelm democratic processes. As Hindess has 
pointed out, 'bitterly divided communities cannot accept the logic of 
majority rule or tolerate the rights of minorities' (1992: 163). The chapter 
by Wendy Ball and James Beckford examines ways in which political 
activities within a large English city are, at least in part, shaped by ethno-
religious community ties. They explore ways in which minority groups are 
incorporated into, or excluded from, the political process, focusing 
specifically on issues surrounding school-level education. The chapter 
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illustrates some of the developing bases of community identity, and local 
political and cultural mobilisation, in contemporary cities. 
Mike Geddes concludes the collection by giving further attention to the 
issue of exclusion from democratic processes. He stresses, as have others, 
that all the social changes described have presented severe tests for 
traditional patterns of political representation. However, like Robert 
Moore, he sees some grounds for optimism in the fact that 'the empower-
ment of local communities is now an accepted dimension of the partner-
ship approach'. These new structures do undermine conventional local 
representative government but they also open up new political spaces, 
within which previously marginalised voices may be heard. While not 
offering a clear vision of an alternative to increasing surveillance and 
regulation, Geddes' chapter encourages attention to the development of 
new approaches which might encourage the survival and expansion of 
democratic forms. 
Geddes' chapter thus brings the collection full circle to the issues raised 
in David Harvey's opening discussion. Harvey calls for transformations 
which will transcend particularities and encourage a negotiation of 
'universalities through which to talk about how the cities of the future 
should be'. It is the hope of the editors of this collection that this volume 
can contribute to that 'long revolution'. 
CONCLUSION 
The chapters in this collection explore a number of dimensions, or 
meanings, of the theme 'transforming cities'. They analyse the direction of 
contemporary changes in the economic, political and cultural relationships 
and spaces that comprise cities. They identify and evaluate the policies and 
procedures of those who currently seek to shape and guide the transforma-
tion of cities. They examine the struggles which surround attempts, by 
various social groups and classes, to redefine or reinvent images of 
particular cities and of urban life in general. These issues, in turn, raise 
questions about what kinds of urban transformations are desirable and, 
crucially, what democratic forms facilitate popular participation in deter-
mining these ideals. 

Pa rt I 




Social process and spatial form 
David Harvey 
At the beginning of this century, there were little more than a dozen or so 
cities in the world with more than a million people. They were all in the 
advanced capitalist countries and London, by far the largest of them, had 
just under 7 million. At the beginning of this century too, no more than 7 
per cent of the world's population could reasonably be classified as 'urban'. 
By the year 2000 there may be as many as 500 cities with more than a million 
inhabitants. The largest of them (like Tokyo, Sao Paulo, Bombay and 
possibly Shanghai) will boast populations of more than 20 million, trailed 
by a score of cities, mostly in the so-called developing countries, with 
upwards of 10 million. Sometime early next century, if present trends 
continue, more than half of the world's population will be classified as 
urban rather than rural. 
The twentieth century has been the century of urbanisation. There has 
been a massive reorganisation of the world's population, of its political and 
its institutional structures and of the very ecology of the earth. 
These observations immediately suggest some fundamental questions. 
First, given these transformations, why is it that the urban so frequently 
disappears from our discussions of broader political-economic processes 
and social trends? Most of the writing about our recent history has failed to 
take into account this massive reorganisation and its consequences. The 
urban rarely appears as a salient category in our analyses. The crucial 
categories seem to be those of modernisation, modernity, post-modernity, 
capitalist and industrial society. So what has happened to the category 
'urban'? This question is important because the qualities of urban living in 
the next century will define the qualities of life for the mass of humanity. 
And all political-economic processes we observe are mediated through the 
filter of urban organisation. Discussions of contemporary politics, for 
example, often proceed as if a concept like that of 'democracy' can remain 
unaffected by urban transformations when, plainly, there is a huge 
difference between democracy in ancient Athens and democracy in 
contemporary Sao Paulo. 
If we think about the likely qualities of life in the next century by 
projecting forward current trends in our cities, most commentators would 
end up with a somewhat dystopian view. We are producing marginalisation, 
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disempowerment, alienation, pollution and degradation. It might be said 
that this is nothing new and that, in the nineteenth century, conditions 
were even worse. In the past, however, urbanisation and the consequences 
of urbanisation were taken rather more seriously than they are today. In the 
late nineteenth century, the bourgeoisie at least had some notion that cities 
were important places and, therefore, that urban reform was necessary. 
This generated a bourgeois reform movement - from Birmingham to 
Chicago - which included figures such as Jane Addams, Octavia Hill, 
Charles Booth, Patrick Geddes, Ebenezer Howard and many others. All of 
these had some vision for the future and a clear grasp of the need for 
reform. The nineteenth century faced the difficulties of the urban in a very 
positive and powerful way. It blended socialist sentiments, anarchist ideas, 
notions of bourgeois reformism and social responsibility into a pro-
grammatic attempt to clean up the cities. The 'gas and water socialism' of 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries did a great deal to 
improve the conditions of urban life for the mass of the population. There 
are many contemporary analysts who, armed with the insights of Foucault, 
will assert that these innovations were merely about social control, which 
indeed in part they were. But having acknowledged this point, I think we 
have also to recognise that a significant proportion of the population found 
itself living in better circumstances as a result. Moreover, inherent in these 
interventions was a visionary notion of an alternative city - a city beautiful 
with facilities and services that would, indeed, pacify alienated populations. 
Some of that concern would be helpful to have back in our cities right 
now. In the past, capital regarded cities as important places which had to 
be efficiently organised and where social controls needed to operate in 
some sort of meaningful way. We now find that capital is no longer 
concerned about cities. Capital needs fewer workers and much of it can 
move all over the world, deserting problematic places and populations at 
will. As a result, the coalition between big capital and bourgeois reformism 
has disappeared. Moreover, the bourgeoisie itself seems to have lost much 
of its guilty conscience about cities. It has, I think, concluded there is little 
to fear from socialist revolution, and so has attenuated its engagement with 
reformism. Increasingly the wealthy seal themselves off in those fanciful, 
gated communities - which are being built all over the United States - that 
enable the bourgeoisie to cut themselves off from what their representatives 
call by the hateful term 'the underclass'. 'The underclass' is left inside the 
ghetto, along with drugs, Aids, epidemics of tuberculosis and much else. In 
this new politics, the poor no longer matter. The marginalisation of the 
poor is accompanied by a blase indifference on the part of the rich and 
powerful. 
This blase indifference is a matter of great concern. Accordingly I would 
like to highlight some fundamental questions and beliefs about the role of 
the city in political, economic, social and ecological life. In defining that 
role, we are also formulating a notion of the kind of cities we would like to 
construct into the next century. 
I would like to begin with a fundamental methodological question: what 
is the relationship between process and form? This relationship is con-
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tained in the title of this conference and I think it is worth while to think 
a little bit about it. In my own work - from the standpoint of historical, 
geographical materialism and very strongly in the dialectical tradition - one 
of the rules of engagement which I have always tried to follow is to say that 
process takes precedence over things. We should focus on processes rather 
than things and we should think of things as products of processes. From 
this standpoint, we have to ask some fundamental questions about the 
nature of the categories we use to describe the world. Most of the categories 
we use tend to be 'thing' categories. If instead we examine dynamics and 
processes, we may try to do so by conceiving them as relationships between 
pre-existing things. But if things too are not pre-existing, but are actually 
constituted in some way by a process, then you have to have a rather 
different vision. This transformation in our way of thought seems to me 
absolutely essential if we are going to get to the heart of what the city is 
about. 
Tony Leeds, an urban anthropologist, towards the end of his life wrote 
this: 
In earlier years I thought of society ... as a structure of positions, roles, 
statuses, groups, institutions and so on, all given shape ... by the 
cultures on which they draw. Process I saw as 'forces', movement, 
connection, pressures, taking place in and among these loci or nodes 
of organisation, peopled by individuals. Although this still seems 
largely true to me, it has also come to seem a static view - more 
societal order than societal becoming . . . Since it does not seem 
inherent in nature ... that these loci exist, it seems unacceptable 
simply to take them as axiomatic; rather we must search for ways to 
account for their appearances and forms. More and more, the 
problems of becoming ... have led me to look at society as continuous 
process out of which structure or order precipitates in the forms of 
the loci listed above. 
(Leeds 1994: 32) 
This, then, is a conceptualisation in which process takes priority over things 
and which focuses on the way in which things get precipitated out of 
process. 
Two terms or words deserve closer examination in our discussions. One 
is 'urbanisation' - which we can convert into the 'urban process' or the 
'urbanising process' or the 'urbanisation process'. The other is a 'thing-
type' word - 'the city'. It is important to consider the relationship between 
the urbanising process and this thing called the city. Now, from a dialectical 
standpoint, the relationship between process and thing becomes compli-
cated because things, once constituted, have the habit of affecting the very 
processes which constituted them. The ways that particular 'thing-like 
structures' (such as political-administrative territories, built environments, 
fixed networks of.social relations) precipitate out of fluid social processes 
and the fixed forms these things then assume have a powerful influence 
upon the way that social processes can operate. Moreover, different fixed 
forms have been precipitated out at different historical moments and 
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assume qualities reflective of social processes at work in particular times 
and places. The result is an urban environment constituted as a palimpsest, 
a series of layers constituted and constructed at different historical 
moments all superimposed upon each other. The question then becomes 
how does the life process work in and around all of those things which have 
been constituted at different historical periods? How are new meanings 
given to them? How are new possibilities constructed? I suggest that 
attention to this relationship between process and form will help us 
understand why the urban has been neglected and, furthermore, will 
enable us to change completely the terms of the debate. 
In this vein, I want to suggest that the reduction of the urban - or the 
portrayal of the city as a minor feature of social organisation - can only 
occur when particular assumptions are made about the nature of space and 
time or space/time. There are three different ways of understanding 
spatiality or space/time that are worth noting here. The first way is the 
absolute notion of space/time - attributable to Newton, Descartes and Kant 
- in which space and time are mere containers of social action. They are 
passive, neutral containers. These passive, neutral containers simply allow 
us to locate the action which is occurring. I would like to suggest that there 
is a parallel here with thinking that conceives of cities as passive, neutral 
containers of processes and contests. These ways of thinking focus on 
contestations occurring within the city- the city happens to be the mere site 
of a process of contestation (over gender, race, class or whatever). A 
radically different approach is one which sees the city not so much as a site 
of contestation but as something to be constructed and in which the 
contestation is over the construction, or framing, of the city itself. What 
would that imply about notions of space and time? 
There is a well-known alternative to the absolute view of space/time: that 
is, the relative view attributed mainly to Einstein and worked on by others 
since. In this view, space and time, although they are still containers, are not 
neutral with respect to the processes they contain. Metrics of space and time 
can and do vary depending upon the nature of the processes under 
consideration. In geography, this idea has been adapted to think of 
different ways of measuring and mapping distances. Physical distance is 
different from distance measured in terms of the cost or time taken to move 
between points and in the last two cases the space described is not 
necessarily Euclidean. Different metrics yield different maps of the space-
time co-ordinates within which social interaction occurs. 
A third perspective on space/time that I have employed - indeed it was 
incorporated in Social justice in the City more than twenty years ago - is a 
relational view. The relational view is primarily attributable to Leibnitz and 
is laid out in its most explicit form in the Leibnitz/Newton, Leibnitz/Clarke 
correspondence. This view is that space and time do not exist outside of 
process: process defines space/time. Each particular kind of process will 
define its own distinctive spatio-temporality. Our studies should, therefore, 
aim to explain the way in which different processes define spatio-
temporality, and then, having defined that spatio-temporality, find them-
selves bound by its rules in certain kinds of ways. Moreover, our cities are 
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constituted not by one but by multiple spatio-temporalities, producing 
multiple frameworks within which conflictual social processes are worked 
out. 
From this standpoint, we have to take very seriously the notion which 
Giddens uses, and which most of us for a long time have argued for; namely, 
that space and time are not simply constituted by but are also constitutive 
of social processes. This is also true for the urban. The urban and the city 
are not simply constituted by social processes, they are constitutive of them. 
We have to understand that dialectic in order to appreciate how urbanisa-
tion is constructed and produces all of these thing-like configurations 
which we call cities - with political organisation, social organisation and 
physical structures. We have to appreciate better the centrality of that 
moment of urban construction, which is fundamental to how the social 
process operates. In exactly the same way, we have to take seriously the idea 
of that moment of construction of spatio-temporality, which then defines 
how the system itself will operate. From this standpoint, it is possible to 
reposition the urban as fundamental in contemporary debates. At the same 
time we transform our notion of urbanisation. We would abandon the view 
of the urban as simply a site or a container of social action in favour of the 
idea that it is, in itself, a set of conflictual heterogeneous processes which 
are producing spatio-temporalities as well as producing things, structures 
and permanencies in ways which constrain the nature of the social process. 
Social processes, in giving rise to things, create the things which then 
enhance the nature of those particular social processes. 
One outcome may be that we find ourselves stuck for a very long time 
with a particular kind of social process. An example would be nuclear 
power. Once nuclear power stations exist all sorts of things follow. If a 
nuclear power station goes on the blink, can you imagine calling a town 
meeting to discuss democratically what to do about it? The answer is no, you 
can't. In these circumstances, we are immediately driven back to the realms 
of expert knowledge and expert decision-making. So a thing has been 
created which for as long as it lasts - which is going to be a very long time 
- is by its very nature going to be basically undemocratic in terms of the sort 
of social process that supports it. Here is a social process that has defined 
a certain spatio-temporality for the next 10,000 years, which in turn implies 
perpetuation of a certain kind of social order if it is not to unravel in highly 
destructive ways. 
We have to be thinking in these kinds of terms about the nature of cities. 
What kinds of cities we create, how we create them, how flexible they are, 
how adjustable they can be: these are the questions we need to ask in order 
to understand better the relationship between process and thing. Our aim 
and objective should be to liberate emancipatory processes of social 
change. In so doing, however, we must understand that liberatory impulses 
and politics are always going to be contained and constrained by the nature 
of things which have been produced in the past. 
This, then, is my first major point. We have to reconceptualise the urban 
as the production of space and the production of spatio-temporality, 
understood as a dialectical relationship between process and thing. 
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The second major point I would like to make concerns the currently 
widespread invocation of the word 'community'. It too entails an explora-
tion of process/thing relationships. One of the aspects of much contempo-
rary debate about the urban which I find particularly striking is the 
tendency when faced with all sorts of difficulties again and again to reach 
into this bag called 'community', on the assumption that 'community is 
going to save us all'. Community, endowed with salving powers, is perceived 
as capable of redeeming the mess which we are creating in our cities. This 
mode of thinking goes all the way from Prince Charles and the construction 
of urban villages through to communitarian philosophies that, it is 
believed, will save us from crass individualistic materialism. 
There is here too an issue about the relationship between the thing 
called community and the processes which constitute it. What kinds of 
processes constitute community? Is a community, once constituted, going 
to liberate or imprison further social processes? A lot of community 
construction projects are, in the end, a recipe for isolation. They isolate 
groups from the city as a whole. They move them towards a fragmented 
notion of what the urban process is about. Here I find myself in agreement 
with Iris Marion Young when she says: 
Racism, ethnic chauvinism and class devaluation I suggest, grow partly 
from the desire for community ... Practically speaking, such mutual 
understanding can be approximated only within a homogeneous 
group that defines itself by common attributes. Such common 
identification, however, entails reference also to those excluded. In 
the dynamics of racism and ethnic chauvinism in the United States 
today, the positive identification of some groups is often achieved by 
first defining other groups as the other, the devalued, semihuman. 
(Young 1990: 321) 
What, then, are the implications of current notions of community? In 
answer, I would like to propose a dialectical view of relationships between 
process and community. 
I think it is important to acknowledge that a lot of community activism 
is absolutely fundamental to many forms of social struggle. As a form of 
mobilisation of power of people in place it can sometimes be extremely 
important and extremely useful. Community activism can simply be a way 
of containing discontent but it can also be a very important moment in 
more general mobilisation. In this context, we have to think about the 
construction of community not as an end in itself but as a moment in a 
process. Here I refer to critiques of the nineteenth-century thinking which 
I described earlier. There were two flaws in that thinking. The first was the 
belief that, somehow or other, the proper design of things would solve all of 
the problems in the social process. It was assumed that if you could just 
build your urban village, like Ebenezer Howard, or your Radiant City, like 
Le Corbusier, then the thing would have the power to keep the process 
forever in harmonious state. The problem of these thinkers was not that 
they had a totalising vision or subscribed to master narratives or indulged 
in master planning. Their problem was not that they had a conception of 
CONTESTED CITIES/ 25 
the city or the social process as a whole. Their problem was that they took 
this notion of thing and gave it power over the process. Their second flaw 
was that they did much the same with community. Much of the ideology 
that came out of Geddes and Ebenezer Howard was precisely about the 
construction of community. In particular, the construction of communities 
which were fixed and had certain qualities with respect to class and gender 
relations. Once again, the domination of things seems to me to be the 
fundamental flaw. 
What then is the significance of community mobilisation? The concept 
I wish to use here is the one that Raymond Williams tentatively suggested, 
and which he then shrank away from, but which I want to resurrect. It is 
what Williams calls 'militant particularism'. This idea suggests that almost 
all radical movements have their origin in some place, with a particular set 
of issues which people are pursuing and following. The key issue is whether 
that militant particularism simply remains localised or whether, at some 
point or other, it spills over into some more universal construction. 
Williams suggested that the whole history of socialism had to be read as a 
series of militant particularisms which generated what he described as the 
extraordinary claim that there is an alternative kind of society, called 
socialist, which would be a universal kind of condition to which we could 
all reasonably aspire. In other words, in this view foundational values and 
beliefs were discovered in particular struggles and then translated onto a 
broader terrain of conflict. It seems to me that the notion of community, 
viewed in this way, can be a positive moment within a political process. 
However, it is only a positive moment if it ceases to be an end in itself, ceases 
to be a thing which is going to solve all of our problems, and starts to be a 
moment in this process of broader construction of a more universal set of 
values which are going to be about how the city is going to be as a whole. 
The third major point I am going to make is this: until very recently there 
was almost no mention of cities in the ecological literature. Cities were 
always regarded as the high point of the pollution and plundering of planet 
Earth. The environment was equated with nature; it was certainly not the 
built environment of cities. There is something curious about ecological 
rhetoric here (although I am probably misrepresenting some of the current 
thinking because it is getting a bit more sophisticated). Ecological rhetoric 
is committed to a totalising perspective in the sense that, quite rightly, it 
perceives that everything relates to everything else. However, it has also 
failed to address the environment of cities and the 50 per cent of the 
world's population that are living in urban circumstances. 
Why is it that we tend to think of the built environment of cities as 
somehow or other not being the environment? Where did that separation 
come from? Again it comes back to the notion that there is a thing called 
a city, which has various qualities and attributes, that is not part of a process. 
It seems to me that we have to think of environment and environmental 
modification as a fundamental process which we have always been engaged 
in and will always continue to be engaged in. The environmental modifica-
tion process then has to be understood as producing certain kinds of 
structures and things, such as fields, forests and cities. That environmental 
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modification process cannot be separated from the whole question of 
urban living. There is, it seems to me, nothing particularly anti-ecological 
about cities. Why should we think of them that way? When does the built, 
constructed environment end and 'the natural environment' begin? Where 
does society begin and nature end? Go and look in a field of wheat and say 
where nature begins and society ends. You can't do it. 
Here too, then, there is a dichotomy which works its way through our 
thinking, which we have to challenge, in which the relationship between 
processes and things is fundamental. We have to pay serious attention to the 
nature of the ecological modification process, and understand it not as 
something which is simply resident in nature. For example, one of the 
major ecological variables at work in the world right now is money flow.Just 
think of what would happen to the ecosystems of the world if the money 
flow stopped. How many ecosystems of this world are actually supported by 
money flow? Vast areas of the world would undergo radical ecological 
change if the money supply or commodity exchange was suddenly cut off 
or stopped. Some radical ecologists appear to relish such an outcome, as a 
transformation back to some ecologically sustainable condition in which 
the alienation of self from nature can be overcome by human beings 
treading far more lightly on the surface of the earth. But I believe we must 
pursue a much more positive ecological politics. Ecological transformations 
are an inevitable facet of how human beings live their lives and construct 
their historical geographies. Urbanisation is an ecological process and we 
desperately need creative ways to think and act on that relation. Conversely, 
it is impossible to talk of ecological politics without concomitantly examin-
ing urban processes in all their complexity and fullness. 
We have to move the urban, and the urbanising process, into a more 
central position in our debates and discussions about ecological, social, 
political and economic change. From this standpoint, there are a number 
of myths that we have to confront and contest. 
The first myth is the simple idea that when we have got the economy 
right then we can spend money to get our cities right. This sort of thinking 
takes the view that cities are relatively unimportant: when we have got 
enough money and we have organised ourselves right then we can spend 
a little time fixing them up. From my perspective that is entirely the wrong 
way round. Getting things economically right in our cities is the path 
towards economic change and economic development, even to economic 
growth. To treat the cities as the secondary feature of this whole dynamic 
is essentially wrong. 
The same is true with respect to social relations. We should not wait upon 
some great political revolution to tell us how to reorganise our cities in a 
socialist or eco-feminist or some other way. No, what we have to do is to work 
on the nature of the social relations in the cities. If there is going to be a 
revolution, it is going to be a long revolution, located within the urban 
process. That long revolution of social relations is going to have to comprise 
a steady working out, over a long period of time, of transformations. Here, 
I think again, community mobilisation and the transformation of militant 
particularism have a vital role to play, enabling us to find the universal 
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concerns that exist within a realm of difference. There is a certain dialectic 
here of unity and difference, universal and particular, which has to be 
worked out. We should not retain the notion of community as particularity 
or difference. We have to transcend those particularities and look for a 
negotiation of universalities through which to talk about how the cities of 
the future should be. 
The point is not to see cities as anti-ecological. Cities are fundamental 
ecological features in themselves and the processes that build cities are 
ecological processes. The world of ecology and that of cities are part and 
parcel of each other; what we have to do is link them together much more 
strongly, in a more programmatic way. It is only in those terms that we can 
really push towards a full understanding of the theme of this conference -
'contested cities'. This issue is not simply about contestation inside cities but 
more importantly concerns contests over the construction and framing of 
cities - especially what they are going to be in the future. 
2 
THE ENTREPRENEURIAL CITY 
Re-imaging localities, 
redesigning economic 
governance, or restructuring 
capital? 1 
Bob Jessop 
The principal forms, functions, and policy mechanisms oflocal and regional 
economic strategy in advanced western capitalist societies have undergone 
major changes during the last two decades. There have been major shifts in 
cities' roles as subjects, sites, and stakes in economic restructuring and 
securing structural competitiveness. These shifts are reflected in increased 
interest in, and emphasis on, the 'competition state' 2 at the national (and, at 
least in Europe, supranational) level and the 'entrepreneurial city' at both 
regional and local levels. The distinctive feature of 'competition states' and 
'entrepreneurial cities' is their self-image as being proactive in promoting the 
competitiveness of their respective economic spaces in the face of intensified 
international (and also, for regions and cities, inter- and intra-regional) 
competition. 3 There is wide variety in understandings of the dynamics of such 
competition, sources of competitive advantage, and the most suitable 
strategies for securing such advantage. The timing and causes of these 
changes in understanding and policy also vary widely across nations, regions, 
and cities. 
This chapter does not discuss specific cases.4 Nor does it offer a much-
needed typology of 'entrepreneurial' strategies or review their underlying 
views of competitiveness. Instead it examines four general aspects of recent 
changes affecting cities: (a) the re-imaging oflocal economies and/or their 
states in and through discourses about the 'entrepreneurial city'; (b) the 
link between this re-imaging and re-design of urban governance mecha-
nisms; (c) the links between these twin changes and alleged trends towards 
globalisation and triadisation of the capitalist economy and the emerging 
primacy of geo-economics over geo-politics; and (d) the general structural 
context in which these interconnected changes in cities' overall economic 
role are occurring. Although my focus here is on their discursive aspects, 
these changes must also be related to material contradictions and tensions 
in existing forms of economic regulation and/or governance that help to 
sustain the resonance of the new discourses. 5 Moreover, although I note the 
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seeming plausibility of these narratives, this does not mean that they are 
true (even if they are associated with 'truth effects') nor that changes in 
governance informed by them will be successful. 
SOME THEORETICAL PRELIMINARIES 
My approach to the topics mentioned in the introduction is shaped by three 
main theoretical currents: the French regulation approach, neo-Gramscian 
state theory, and critical discourse analysis. I consider the economy in an 
inclusive sense; that is, as an ensemble of socially embedded, socially 
regularised, and strategically selective6 institutions, organisations, social 
forces, and activities organised around (or at least involved in) the self-
valorisation of capital in and through regulation. This approach has 
important implications for the analysis of competitiveness in so far as it 
shifts attention from comparative to competitive advantage and also 
radically extends the economic and extra-economic factors which are 
relevant to the latter. This in turn extends the scope for entrepreneurship 
as applied to cities as well as firms ( cf. Benko and Lipietz 1994; Best 1990; 
Castells and Hall 1993; Porter 1994; Sabel 1989). The state is also 
considered 'in its inclusive sense' (or, as Gramsci also put it, 'political 
society+ civil society'). For present purposes it is considered as an ensemble 
of socially embedded, socially regularised, and strategically selective institu-
tions, organisations, social forces, and activities involved in realising the 
'collective will' of an imagined political community.7 Two key theoretical 
implications of this approach are the problematic boundaries of the state 
apparatus and the dependence of state power on forces beyond the state in 
the narrow sense. This suggests in turn that the political sphere can be seen 
as the domain where attempts are made to (re-)define a 'collective will' and 
to (re-) articulate various mechanisms and practices of government and 
governance in pursuit of projects deemed to serve it. 
This chapter also emphasises the constitutive role of discourse in all lived 
social relations. This has obvious implications for the re-imaging of 
economic spaces and local governance. Just as national states can be seen 
as but one specific form of imagined political community, so the 'national 
economy' is only one possible imagined space of economic activities. 
Accordingly, rather than seek objective criteria which identify the necessary 
boundaries of an economic space (on whatever territorial or functional 
scale), this issue is more fruitfully considered in terms of the imaginary 
constitution of the economy. This involves its discursive construction as a 
distinctive object (of analysis, regulation, governance, conquest, and/or 
other practices) with definite boundaries, economic and extra-economic 
conditions of existence, typical economic agents and extra-economic 
stakeholders, and an overall dynamic (cf. Barnes and Ledubur 1991; Dz.ly 
1993). Economies may be distinguished in different discourses for different 
purposes8 and these discourses are always liable to contestation. Struggles 
to constitute specific economies as subjects, sites, and stakes of competition 
typically involve manipulation of power and knowledge in order to establish 
recognition of their boundaries and geometries. 
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Narrating the entrepreneurial city/region 
A recent observation by Margaret Somers provides a useful entry point for 
making sense of changing urban and regional economic strategies from a 
discourse-analytic viewpoint. In a paper on ontological narrativity, she notes 
that 
it is through narrativity that we come to know, understand, and make 
sense of the social world, and it is through narratives and narrativity 
that we constitute our social identities ... all of us become to be who 
we are (however ephemeral, multiple, and changing) by being located 
or locating ourselves (usually unconsciously) in social narratives rarely 
of our own making. 
(Somers 1994: 606; emphasis in original. Cf. White 1987) 
From this perspective, the current consensus on the need for 'entrepre-
neurial' cities can be interpreted as a product of convergent public 
narratives about the nature of key economic and political changes affecting 
post-war Europe and North America - narratives which have been persua-
sively (but not necessarily intentionally) combined to consolidate a limited 
but widely accepted set of diagnoses and prescriptions for the economic 
and political difficulties now confronting nations, regions, and cities and 
their respective populations. Like all narratives, these have three key 
elements: (a) a selective appropriation of past events and forces; (b) a 
temporal sequence with a beginning, middle, and end; (c) and a relational 
emplotment of the events and forces and their connection to some 
overarching structure which permits some causal and moral lessons to be 
drawn (cf. Ewick and Silbey 1995: 200). Thus we find selective narrations 
of past events and forces which generate a distinctive account of current 
economic, social, and political problems - the resolution of which is now 
deemed to require decisive changes in the purposes, organisation, and 
delivery of economic strategies focused on the urban and/ or regional levels 
and infused with some kind of entrepreneurial spirit. The entrepreneurial 
city or region has been constructed through the intersection of diverse 
economic, political, and socio-cultural narratives which seek to give 
meaning to current problems by construing them in terms of past failures 
and future possibilities. These narratives are often connected with com-
plementary discourses (both narrative and non-narrative in form) that are 
mobilised to contextualise these changes and reinforce calls for action. In 
sum, although the rise of the entrepreneurial city or region as subject, site, 
and stake in economic competitiveness was not pre-scripted in the overall 
dynamic of capitalism, nor has it been a pure accident or chance discovery. 
It has been constructed in and through public narratives. 
The appeal of these narratives depends on their resonance with ( and 
hence their capacity to re-interpret and mobilise) the personal (including 
shared) narratives of significant categories (or groups) of those who have 
been affected by the contingent development of the post-war economic and 
political order. For some, these personal narratives concern economic and 
social exclusion and experiences of unwanted market and/or state failures; 
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others may have experienced unwanted economic and social success which 
they ascribe to their own entrepreneurial talents, risk-taking, flexibility, or 
self-improvement. Such experiences provide an important field of dis-
cursive intervention for 'policy entrepreneurs' in die private and public 
domains. The effectiveness of these public narratives in promoting govern-
mentalising or regularising practices which support the 'entrepreneurial' 
city depends in turn on their links to wider cultural and institutional 
formations which, in Somers's words, provide 'a web of interlocution' 
(1994: 614). In this context a central role is played by the discourses of the 
enterprise culture, enterprise society, innovative milieux, networks, stra-
tegic alliances, partnerships, governance, and so forth. And their overall 
plausibility depends on meta-narratives which reveal linkages between a 
wide range of interactions, organisations, and institutions and/or help to 
make sense of whole epochs (cf. Somers 1994: 619). The geo-economic 
meta-narratives of the crisis of Fordism and globalisation-triadisation have 
a key role here, as do geo-political narratives about the end of the Cold War, 
communist collapse, and the economic threats to national survival from 
East Asia. 
Given this linkage between meta-narratives and personal stories and 
their mediation by institutional narratives, the 'entrepreneurial city' has 
proved to be plausibly emplotted and is currently the dominant response 
to urban problems. Indeed, as Eisenschitz and Gough (1993) argue, there 
is a marked convergence among major political currents in Britain on 
endogenous local economic development initiatives. In this context it 
should be noted, of course, that such 'bootstraps' strategies need not be 
neo-liberal in form or content. For many alternatives have been proposed: 
besides property-led or more general market-led initiatives dominated by 
business interests, we also find strategies which are more neo-corporatist, 
neo-statist, or even community-based in governance structure - albeit still 
more or less closely dependent for success on market forces. What these 
initiatives share is the entrepreneurial concern to create 'new combina-
tions' of economic and/or extra-economic factors which will further urban 
and regional competitiveness.9 Such 'new combinations' (or innovations) 
could aim to secure dynamic (or strong) 10 competitive advantages for a city 
( or region), or else to gain some static ( or weak) comparative advantage. 
The former comprises economic, political, and social innovations intended 
to enhance productivity and other conditions of structural competitive-
ness; 11 the latter includes modifications in formal and substantive reg-
ulatory, facilitative, or supportive measures12 aimed at capturing mobile 
investment (a deregulatory race to the bottom) as well as simple image-
building measures with the same purpose (boosterism). Similar trends can 
be found elsewhere (e.g., Eisinger 1988; Ettlinger 1994; Fosler 1988; 
Gaffikin and Warf 1993; Harvey 1988; Hirsch et al. 1991; Keating 1993; 
Leitner 1989; Mayer 1994; Preteceille 1990; Przeworski 1986; Stewart and 
Stoker 1989; Stohr 1989, 1990). The persuasiveness of this sort of 
entrepreneurial narrative is closely linked in turn to the parallel discursive 
constitution of specific sites of economic activity as 'natural' ( common-
sensical, taken-for-granted) units of economic management, regulation, or 
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governance. In the post-war boom years the tendency was for this site to be 
seen as the national economy; more recently views of 'naturalness' have 
bifurcated in the direction of the global and local economies - subse-
quently synthesised in some strategic contexts in the idea of 'glocalisation '. 
The rise of the entrepreneurial city or region in the geo-economic space 
of Atlantic Fordism clearly depends on quite specific narrative accounts of 
the crisis of its post-war mode of economic growth and its social mode of 
economic regulation. The plausibility of these narratives depends in turn 
on their resonance with personal narratives rooted in experience and more 
general meta-narratives about the significance of long-run economic and 
political changes. That these institutional and meta-narratives have such a 
powerful resonance at present does not mean, of course, that they should 
be taken at face value. All narratives are selective, appropriate some 
arguments, combine them in specific ways. It is important to consider what 
is left unstated or silent, what is repressed or suppressed in official 
discourse. Moreover, given that there are always various plausible narra-
tives, one must also consider the differential capacities of their narrators to 
get their messages across and secure support for the specific lessons they 
entail. It is also important to consider how the plausibility of competing 
narratives is shaped by the structural biases and strategically selective 
operations of various public and private apparatuses of economic, political, 
and ideological domination. Public narratives do not compete for influ-
ence on an even playing field but are subject both to discursive and 
structural selectivities13 as well as the need to establish some resonance with 
personal narratives. Such concerns take us well beyond a concern for 
narrativity, of course, into the many extra-discursive conditions of narrative 
appeal. A further set of important issues concerns the relevance of these 
various narratives to class, gender, and race; their implications for eco-
nomic and social exclusion within cities and among regions; and their role 
in more general attempts to hegemonise public and private discourse in the 
interests of specific accumulation strategies or political projects. Unfortu-
nately these issues cannot be addressed here (but see, for example, Bakshi 
et al. 1995; Beynon et al. 1989; Massey 1994; McDowell 1991; Pollert 1991). 
Emplottlng the rise of the entrepreneurial city 
Narratives are constellations of relationships (connected parts) embed-
ded in time and space, constituted by causal emplotment . . . It is 
emplotment that permits us to distinguish between narrative on the 
one hand, and chronicle or annales, on the other. In fact, it is 
emplotment that allows us to construct a significant network or 
configuration of relationships. 
(Somers 1994: 616-17) 
The rise of the 'entrepreneurial city' has been variously emplotted. But two 
broad paradigms predominate: the geo-economic arid geo-political - with 
the former, at least in this regard, being primary ( cf. Altvater 1994; Luttwak 
1990; Sum 1996). 
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Among the key themes in geo-economic meta-narratives are global-
isation and/ or internationalisation; the rise of new technologies; the crisis 
of the post-war mode of growth, its associated regional policies and growth 
pole strategies and characteristic mixed economy of welfare and social 
redistribution; the competitive threat posed by East Asian economies; and 
the increased salience of ecological problems whose scope does not 
coincide neatly with national boundaries. These economic, technological, 
and ecological factors are said both to have undermined the borders of the 
national state, thereby rendering it anachronistic, and to have exposed all 
national economies to greatly intensified global competition that is difficult 
to evade and thus exerts downward pressure on 'unproductive' public 
expenditure. The prime goals of post-war economic policy (full employ-
ment, stable prices, economic growth, and a sustainable balance of 
payments) can no longer be delivered in and through the national state. 
This in turn undermines the national state's capacity to deliver redis-
tributive social welfare and limit the degree of social exclusion. In this sense 
the post-war economic and political regime has failed and, if cities and 
regions are to escape the consequences of this failure, it is essential to 
modify economic strategies, economic institutions, modes of governance, 
and the form of state. These must be re-designed to prioritise 'wealth 
creation' in the face of international, inter-regional, and intra-regional 
competition since this is the prior condition of continued social redistribu-
tion and welfare. Such narratives lead, inter alia, to the discovery of the 
entrepreneurial city as a new phenomenon and its presentation as 
inevitable on practical, if not normative, grounds. In turn this forecloses 
discussion and debate over alternative ways of defining and resolving 
current problems. 
Key geo-political themes bearing on the 'competition state' and 'entre-
preneurial city' include the end of the Cold War, the approach of the Pacific 
Century, and the rise of so-called 'tribal' identities. The Soviet communist 
collapse and the end of the Cold War are said to have replaced the struggle 
between capitalism and communism as competing world systems by 
struggles between competing versions of capitalism. Thus competition 
between national states is redefined in favour of civilian economic and 
technological issues rather than military concerns; and security discourses 
are reoriented towards environmental risks, sustainable development, and 
control over transnational migration flows. This is reflected in the reor-
ientation of foreign policy towards technological, economic, and ecological 
issues and the increased salience of foreign affairs in many fields of 
domestic policy. Such changes help to explain the rise of the 'competition' 
state at supranational (e.g., European) and national levels. Moreover, for 
reasons suggested in the dominant geo-economic narratives about the 
changing forms of competition and the importance of structural com-
petitiveness, this discursive reorientation also requires a more active, 
supply-side oriented role for regional and local states. In this sense geo-
political factors are also mobilised by the central state to promote 
entrepreneurial cities and regions as key contributory elements in securing 
the international competitiveness of national economies. This is reinforced 
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by reinvigorated 'tribal' identities which are oriented to regional rather 
than national identities. Furthermore, once the sovereign national state's 
traditional role in defence is downgraded, many of its other functions may 
also be displaced to other political levels. In short, given these changes in 
geo-politics as well as the increased importance of geo-economics, the 
'region state' (Ohmae 1991) and/or 'transnational territory' (Sassen 1994) 
are said to become more important for many purposes than the national 
state (cf. Horsman and Marshall 1994; Kennedy 1993; Luttwak 1990). 
RE-DESIGNING URBAN GOVERNANCE 
On both geo-economic and geo-political grounds, the national state would 
seem, in Daniel Bell's now classic aphorism, too small to solve the big 
problems, and too big to solve the small problems, in today's world (Bell 
1987). It is no longer so obviously the taken-for-granted primary actor in 
international or domestic politics. In turn this is prompting not only the 
expansion of supranational and subnational forms of government but also 
the search for new forms of governance able to overcome the problems 
linked to pure market or hierarchical, bureaucratic solutions. Experiments 
with new forms of economic governance for the new urban regimes are 
intelligible in this context. 
Post-war forms of urban government are often ill-equipped for pursuit 
of the new entrepreneurialism and are increasingly interpreted as part of 
the problem of poor economic performance. This is reflected in continu-
ing experiments to find new, more appropriate forms of articulation of 
regulation and governance in response to narratives which ascribe part of 
the blame for failure and crisis on previous models of urban politics and 
local economies. This can be illustrated from a recent paper by Fosler, an 
American local economic development adviser. He refers, as do many 
others, to the emerging local economic development paradigm which 
emphasises the role of a reinvigorated, market-driven, private sector in 
securing economic growth in a Schumpeterian growth dynamic. But he also 
notes that this requires the development of institutions to shape and 
execute the state's responsibilities in this regard. Thus he writes that: 
the new institutional capacities include a conceptual reorientation of 
the economic role of governance; the ability to generate and apply 
knowledge across a broad range of policy areas; fashioning new 
mechanisms and approaches to leadership and decision-making; 
redesigning systems and strategies for getting results; and creating 
more effective means of performance assessment and accountability. 
(Fosler 1992: 4) 
He also notes that the range of these new state responsibilities cannot be 
satisfactorily handled within a single state agency: there needs to be a range 
of agencies. Nor can they be satisfactorily handled by the state alone. 
Instead the strategic reorientation of the state requires that: (a) governance 
as an instrument of economic performance must combine a top-down, 
long-term strategic vision and bottom-up, market driven, performance-
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oriented action; and (b) a new generation of organisational intelligence 
and new mechanisms of organisational and agency co-ordination are 
developed which can display market features but also offer means of 
effective performance quality assessment and accountability. What is 
required, in short, is a strategy for institutional change (Fosler 1992: 9-13). 
These arguments illustrate the broad consensus which has emerged on the 
need for new institutional arrangements. But what precise forms of 
're-inventing' and/or restructuring of local government are required to 
effect this change in governance is still unresolved ( on re-inventing, see 
Osborne and Gaebler 1993). Some of the problems posed by the re-design 
of economic governance are considered in my concluding remarks. 
CONTEXTUALISING THE ENTREPRENEURIAL 
CITY/REGION 
One way to interpret the rise of 'entrepreneurial' cities and regions is to 
relate it to other contemporary societal trends. Here it is certainly worth 
noting how this phenomenon corresponds to and reinforces other changes 
in the organisation and exercise of economic and political power. As I have 
already indicated above some major geo-economic trends that help to 
contextualise 'entrepreneurial' cities and regions ( see also Jessop 1993), 
the following comments focus on the broader political significance of the 
rise of such cities and regions. 
The loss of taken-for-grantedness in the nature of the national economy 
and the national state is reflected in three often identified changes in the 
organisation of the national state's economic activities: (a) a shift from 
nationally determined, locally relayed, welfare-oriented measures of eco-
nomic and social redistribution to (supra-)nationally facilitated, locally 
determined, wide-ranging supply-side intervention in the local and 
regional economy in its most inclusive, socially embedded, socially regu-
lated sense; (b) a shift in economic governance mechanisms from the 
typical post-war bifurcation of market and state to new forms of network-
based forms of policy co-ordination which cross-cut previous 'private-
public' boundaries and involve 'key' economic players from local and 
regional as well as national and, increasingly, international economies; and 
(c) an associated shift from an allegedly Fordist, Keynesian, welfarist policy 
paradigm to one stressing flexibility, innovation, and entrepreneurship. It 
is these changes in their combination at the local or regional level that are 
often condensed into the contested concept of the 'entrepreneurial city'. I 
now consider them in more detail, noting their import for the changing 
nature of cities and regions. 
First, there is a general trend towards de-nationalisation of statehood. This 
structural trend is reflected empirically in the 'hollowing out' of the 
national state apparatus with old and new state capacities being reorganised 
territorially and functionally on subnational, national, supranational, and 
trans-local levels. One aspect is the partial loss of de Jure sovereignty by 
national states in certain respects as policy-making powers are transferred 
upwards to supranational bodies and their rules and decisions become 
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binding on national states. This trend is especially clear in the European 
Union but is also visible under NAITA and other intergovernmentally 
organised regional blocs. Another aspect is the decentralisation of author-
ity to subordinate levels of territorial organisation and/ or the development 
of transnational but interlocal policy-making. 
Entrepreneurial cities or regions are significant in this context in two 
analytically distinct ways. On the one hand, there is the enhanced role of 
regional or local states in economic development and, on the other hand, 
the development of transnational linkages among regional or local author-
ities, involving what is sometimes called 'paradiplomacy' (Dommergues 
1992) or 'intermestic' politics (Duchacek 1984). As the first aspect is amply 
covered elsewhere in the scholarly literature, I will focus on the second. 
Cities and regions now engage in their own forms of foreign economic 
policy in such diverse fields as industrial policy, research and development, 
technology transfer, market development, tourism development, labour 
markets, etc. Such activities meet the Schumpeterian criterion of'entrepre-
neurial activity' to the extent that they seek 'new combinations' to derive 
strong and/or weak competitive advantages. In Europe the authorities and 
agencies involved operate supranationally at the EU level as well as 
transnationally and often bypass their national state when doing so, thereby 
reinforcing the tendency towards 'hollowing out'. In seeking to strengthen 
their political influence in these regards they also aim to develop a critical 
mass of diverse agencies involved in economic decentralisation at different 
administrative levels: the city, network of cities, administrative area, region, 
state, and the European Union level (cf. Dommergues 1992: 11-12). The 
European Commission itself has for some time been cultivating links with 
regional or local authorities as well as governance agencies to enhance its 
own power vis-a-vis national governments. It promotes the formation and 
consolidation of specific regions (including internal cross-border regions, 
'virtual regions' based on similar interests rather than contiguity, and 
regions extending beyond the EU into Eastern and Central Europe) 
through its own direct interventions and its promotion of territorial and 
functional partnerships (cf. Murphy 1993; on virtual regions, see Boisier 
1994). This can be seen in the 'Europe of the Regions' strategy in so far as 
the EU is currently allied with subnational regions in identifying possible 
economic and political spaces for a new political settlement based on 
subsidiarity rather than sovereignty. Although the funds available for such 
EC-sponsored activities are small compared with national resources (let 
alone compared with the magnitude of the problems involved), they have 
a major symbolic import and wield significant political (if not economic) 
leverage (cf. Tommel 1992). 
Second, there is a general structural trend towards the de-statisation of 
political regi,mes. This is reflected empirically in a shift from government to 
governance on various territorial scales and across various functional 
domains. Governments have always relied on other agencies, of course, to 
aid them in realising state objectives or projecting state power beyond the 
formal state apparatus. At stake here is the reordering of the relationship 
between government and governance within the overall political system 
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and, in conjunction with the first trend, major trans-territorial and 
international governance mechanisms at regional and local level. Thus this 
trend typically involves a movement away from the central role of official 
state apparatuses in securing state-sponsored economic and social projects 
and political hegemony towards an emphasis on partnerships between 
governmental, para-governmental, and non-governmental organisations in 
which the state apparatuses are often little more than primus inter pares. 
Although this trend typically involves a loss of decisional and operational 
autonomy by state apparatuses (at whatever level), it can also enhance their 
capacity to project state power and achieve state objectives by mobilising 
knowledge and power resources from influential non-governmental part-
ners or stakeholders. 
This trend is clear not only on the international and national level but 
also in the restructuring of regional or local governance. For example, local 
authorities in Britain are developing new initiatives for the promotion of 
endogenous economic development based on enhanced structural com-
petitiveness at the same time as special purpose agencies have proliferated 
and there is growing separation between the commissioning and provision 
of local services (Clarke and Stewart 1994: 164-5). Likewise, turning from 
institutional arrangements to more substantive aspects of local politics, 
local states in Britain and elsewhere are becoming a partner, facilitator, and 
arbitrator in public-private consortia, growth coalitions, etc., and thereby 
losing their overall co-ordinating role for and on behalf oflocal community 
interests. 
And, third, there is a general trend towards the internationalisation of the 
national state and its sub-governments. This apparently paradoxical tend-
ency refers to the increased strategic significance of the international 
context of domestic state action and the latter's extension to a wide range 
of extra-territorial or transnational factors and processes. It involves a 
change, in short, in the overall balance of the state's strategic orientations. 
This is reflected in economic and social policy, for example, in so far as the 
prime object of economic and social intervention by the national state has 
changed from the well-balanced domestic performance of the 'national 
economy' to its overall 'international competitiveness' understood in very 
broad terms. This can be seen in the tendential shift from the Keynesian 
welfare concerns of post-war European national states to less state-centred 
Schumpeterian workfare concerns in an emerging 'post-national' political 
regime. These concerns are reflected in diverse policies to promote 
permanent innovation, an enterprise culture, and labour market flexibility 
as well as to subordinate social policy more generally to the perceived 
imperatives of international competition. Neo-liberalism is, to repeat, only 
one empirical manifestation of this trend. 
Whilst this trend is very clear in the transformation of the national state, 
it also applies to local states. For these, too, must take account of the 
changing international context of their economic activities. This is 
reflected, inter alia, in the attempt to combine endogenous economic 
development with inward investment as well as to engage in export 
promotion and/or import substitution activities in a continually changing 
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international economy. In addition, of course, intranational as well as 
international rivalries are involved in the inter-local competition for 
inward investment, reskilling, etc. 
EXPLAINING THE RISE (AND FALL?) OF THE 
ENTREPRENEURIAL CITY 
Clearly, in seeking to contextualise the re-imaging of the city and the 
re-design of urban governance, I have already begun to prepare an 
alternative (but not wholly dissimilar) narrative. The present section builds 
on this to provide a more general account of the discursive rise of the 
entrepreneurial city in two ways. The first involves expanding the account 
of the crisis of the national economy and national state; the second involves 
considering the possible competitive advantages of new forms of economic 
strategy and/ or economic governance to the resolution of this crisis in the 
interests of capital. There is no obvious stopping point in regard to the first 
exercise and my expanded account is still far from complete. And the 
second exercise requires more detailed discussion of the limits of these 
strategies and governance mechanisms (and hence a discussion of possible 
causes of their subsequent fall) than can be given here. In both respects, 
therefore, the following comments must be seen as initial steps towards a 
research agenda rather than final conclusions. 
Although most national economies have long been organised around 
major urban economies14 and also integrated into pluri-national pro-
ductive systems (such as colonial systems or Atlantic Fordism), the various 
urban and pluri-national economies associated with Atlantic Fordism were 
primarily managed in and through the national state. Thus, as objects of 
political management, the complex field of economic relations was 
handled as if it were divided into a series of relatively closed national 
economies. Urban and regional policy was primarily redistributive in 
character, pursued in a top-down manner, and concerned to equalise 
economic and social conditions within such national economies (cf. 
Chisholm 1990; Stohr 1989). Likewise, international economic policy was 
oriented to co-operation to underwrite the smooth operation of national 
economies. In this sense the typical post-war national Keynesian Welfare 
State can be distinguished from preceding state forms, such as the 
mercantilist, liberal constitutional, or imperialist state; and also from 
emerging state forms oriented to the management of recently rediscovered 
or newly formed regional economies on various subnational and supra-
national scales, including localised cross-border linkages. Thus the post-war 
national economy and its associated national state emerged as a specific 
historical moment in the changing dynamic of economic 'reproduction-
regulation'. It would be very interesting in another context to explore the 
narrative constitution of this state form. 
With the continued internationalisation of Atlantic Fordist economies 
and the emergence of East Asian economies, however, it became harder to 
achieve the national economic objectives of the post-war Keynesian Welfare 
State. Efforts were initially made to secure these objectives through resort 
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to planning and/ or corporatist concertation of national economies as well 
as to increased central and local government intervention in managing 
crisis-induced uneven economic development in various cities and regions 
within a national economic context. The general tendency for these 
policies to fail further undermined the taken-for-grantedness of the 
national economy as an object of economic management and heightened 
the resonance of new narratives of international competitiveness, eco-
nomic flexibility, entrepreneurialism, and decentralised forms of govern-
ance. This tendential shift was reinforced in so far as regional and local 
economies were increasingly seen to have their own specific problems 
which could be resolved neither through national macroeconomic policies 
nor through uniformly imposed mesoeconomic or microeconomic poli-
cies. This indicated the need for new measures to restructure capital in 
regard to these newly significant economic spaces. In turn, this prompted 
demands for specifically tailored and targeted urban and regional policies 
to be implemented from below, with or without national or supranational 
sponsorship or facilitation. Another major phenomenon accompanying the 
economic crisis of Atlantic Fordism was the emergence of new social 
movements with strong roots in crisis-prone cities. These movements also 
helped, often unwittingly, to create the conditions for the emergence of the 
'entrepreneurial' city or region. Thus, in some cases, the preferred means 
to roll back the state has been active sponsorship of the so-called 'third 
sector' (located between market and state) alongside other forms of 
decentralised public-private partnerships; in others, the central state has 
simply passed the buck to local government by requiring localities to solve 
their own problems by involving as many different local stakeholders and 
partners as possible. 
It is this increasing pluralisation that helps to explain the recent growth 
in experiments with different forms of governance in 'entrepreneurial' 
cities and regions. In broad terms governance can be defined in contra-
distinction to both the market and the state as a form of co-ordination 
involving the self-organisation of inter-organisational relations. The most 
general case for this shift away from pure market exchange and govern-
ment hierarchy can be couched in terms of the evolutionary advantage15 of 
the self-organising logic of inter-organisational relations where a plurality 
of interdependent but autonomous organisations, each controlling impor-
tant resources, need to co-ordinate their actions to produce a joint outcome 
which is deemed mutually beneficial. The complex problems of economic 
regeneration in a turbulent environment mean that market solutions and 
formal, rational-legal solutions are deemed inadequate. In this sense the 
current expansion of networks at the expense of markets and hierarchies, 
and of governance at the expense of government, is not just a pendular 
swing in some regular succession of dominant modes of policy-making. 
Instead there has been a shift in the institutional centre of gravity ( or 
'institutional attractor') around which policy cycles operate due to real 
qualitative shifts in the basic problems which current regularising or 
governmentalising policies must address. For, given the major transition 
from Fordism to post-Fordism (linked additionally to new technologies, 
BOB JESSOP/ 40 
internationalisation, and regionalisation), there is increased importance 
attached to micro-level governance and the supply side. Analogous trends 
are prompted by the crisis of the national state - with a proliferation of 
cross-border and multi-tier problems which can no longer be contained or 
controlled by individual national states nor resolved in and through neo-
realist anarchy. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The theoretical approach adopted here involves two related claims. First, 
there is a close link between economic strategies and economic discourses 
since it is only in and through the latter's mediation that problems are 
identified, policies pursued, and crises resolved. Second, an essential 
element of the regularisation of economic activities within a given accumu-
lation regime is an effective mode of meta-governance; that is, a specific 
articulation of government and governance mechanisms able to 
(re-)regularise functional and territorial aspects of the imagined economy 
in question. Both claims concern the restructuring of capital as well as the 
re-design of urban regimes. It is in this context, I suggest, that we can begin 
to make sense of the twin facts that: (a) the city is being re-imagined - or 
re-imaged - as an economic, political, and cultural entity which must seek 
to undertake entrepreneurial activities to enhance its competitiveness; and 
that (b) this re-imag(in)ing is closely linked to the re-design of governance 
mechanisms involving the city - especially through new forms of public-
private partnership and networks. This is evident in the wide range of self-
presentational material emitted by cities and/ or agencies involved in their 
governance. Rather than being competing accounts of what is happening 
in the contemporary city, therefore, the re-design of governance appears as 
an integral part of the re-imaging of the city as well as of the restructuring 
of capital. This also implies that the failure of such re-designed forms of 
governance has adverse consequences for the image of the 'entrepreneur-
ial city' and its continued ability to compete in the 'global marketplace'. In 
this regard it is important to note that, following the narrative of market 
failures used to justify the Keynesian Welfare State and the narrative of state 
failures used to justify the revival and extension of governance, one can 
begin to see the emergence of problems of governance failure. For many 
current proposals intended to create and consolidate 'entrepreneurial' 
cities and regions lack the governance mechanisms needed to permit their 
effective implementation. Too often their main (if not sole) material 
existence takes such forms as consultants' reports, outline proposals, non-
binding agreements, glossy brochures, more or less regular conferences, 
meetings, or seminars, cultural exchanges, databases, and information 
centres. In other cases there has been a proliferation of small-scale 
partnerships with limited co-ordination, insufficient resources, and, often, 
conflicting goals. There is greater emphasis on civic boosterism and 
deregulatory place-marketing than on public-private partnerships seri-
ously oriented to structural competitiveness in a post-Fordist age and able 
to consolidate the socially embedded, socially regulated conditions for 
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dynamic competitive advantage. It is in this context that the issue of variant 
forms of capitalism ( and their associated forms of governance) is returning 
to haunt the neo-liberal approach to regional and local economic develop-
ment in Britain. 
NOTES 
The present chapter arises from an ESRC research project on local governance, grant 
number L311253032. It has benefited from discussions with colleagues and students at 
Lancaster University, and with participants in the ESRC programme on local governance. 
The usual disclaimers apply. 
2 A term introduced by Cerny ( 1990). 
3 Elsewhere I describe this shift as the trans1t10n from the Keynesian welfare to the 
Schumpeterian workfare state (Jessop 1993, 1994). I refer here to 'entrepreneurial cities' 
because this term has entered lay accounts and is more readily related to narrative and 
discursive questions. 
4 Editorial constraints prevent inclusion here of case material on Britain. Results from my 
ESRC-sponsored research on the Thames Gateway and Greater Manchester will be 
published elsewhere. 
5 I have attempted this elsewhere (.Jessop 1993, 1995a). 
6 In a regulationist context, strategic selectivity refers to the differential impact of the core 
structural (including spatio-temporal) features of a labour process, an accumulation 
regime, or a mode of regulation on the relative capacity of particular forces organised 
in particular ways to successfully pursue a specific economic strategy over a given time 
horizon and economic space, acting alone or in combination with other forces and in the 
face of competition, rivalry, or opposition from yet other forces. Cf. on the state, Jessop 
(1990: 260) and passim. 
7 Anderson (1991) regards nations as 'imagined' communities; states, regions, cities, etc., 
are likewise 'imagined' entities. 
8 For example, there are marked differences between positive and negative place-
marketing, depending whether the aim is to attract inward private investment or to 
mobilise public funds for urban regeneration. 
9 Entrepreneurship, according to Schumpeter, an emblematic thinker for contemporary 
capitalism, involves 'new combinations' to create new business opportunities. 
10 Here I draw on Cox's distinction between 'strong' and 'weak' competition: the former 
refers to potentially positive-sum attempts to improve the structural competitiveness of 
a region through innovation, the latter to essentially zero-sum attempts to secure the 
reallocation of existing resources at the expense of other regions. \Vhereas weak 
competition is socially disembedding, strong competition involves the territorialisation 
of economic activity (cf. Cox 1995: 218). 
11 For a discussion of the concept of structural competitiveness and its dimensions, see 
Jessop etal. (1993). 
12 These terms are defined inJessop (1982: 245-55). 
13 On discursive selectivity, see Hay (1996); on structural selectivity, see Jessop (1990). 
14 See especially Jacobs (1984). 
15 This evolutionary advantage should be understood in Schumpeterian terms: the capacity 
to innovate and learn in a changing environment. 
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POST-FORDISM AND CRIMINALITY 
John Lea 
INTRODUCTION 
The aim of this chapter is to bring some aspects of the recent debate on the 
transition from 'Fordism' to 'post-Fordism' to bear on the issuesofcriminality 
and crime control. The latter is an area generally ignored by recent debates in 
social theory about the dynamics of contemporary social change. 'Fordism' 
and Regulation Theory in general derive from studies of the labour process 
and capital accumulation. Notable attempts to extend the analysis to the level 
of the state Uessop 1990, 1994b) have generally focused on welfare and social 
policy. If it is useful to speak of a transition to the 'post-Fordist welfare state' 
(Burrows and Loader 1994), it may be possible to identify similar dynamics at 
work in the area of criminal justice and crime control. In what follows I shall 
firstly elaborate a model of the classic Keynesian Welfare State (KWS) in the 
context of the expanding post-war economy and explore some of its 
implications for crime and crime control. Secondly, I shall identify some 
problems and instabilities in the classic welfare state model in the area of 
crime and crime control, which.might be identified as contradictions to be 
resolved by any transition to a new form of economy, state, social structure. 
Finally I shall attempt to examine some of those changes and developments as 
they are identified by post-Fordism and critically assess their implications for 
crime and crime control. 
THE POST-WAR BOOM AND THE CLASSIC WELFARE 
STATE 
The period of post-war stable economic expansion is conventionally 
defined as the period from 1950 until the early 1970s. The characterisation 
of this period as Fordist refers to the development of a mass consumption 
market adequate to expanding production through rising labour pro-
ductivity and mass production line systems as pioneered by Henry Ford. 
Market demand was stabilised through rising wages negotiated by well-
organised but 'responsible' trade unions, Keynesian demand management, 
and the welfare state as a set of universal social rights to minimum income, 
housing, health and education. But Fordism was more than simply a set of 
economic arrangements. 'Post-war Fordism has to be seen ... less as a mere 
system of mass production and more as a total way of life. Mass production 
meant standardisation of the product as well as mass consumption; and that 
meant a whole new aesthetic and a commodification of culture' (Harvey 
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1989a: 135-6). An integral part of Fordism concerned social homogenisa-
tion around common patterns of consumption and lifestyle. Rising wages, 
it was widely believed, were accompanied by a narrowing of income 
inequalities (Crosland 1956) and a meeting of working-class and middle-
class lifestyles around nuclear-family-oriented consumption patterns dis-
placing older identities based on work, class cohesion and community. Old 
class conflicts would fade as the technical solution of social and economic 
problems heralded the 'end of ideology' while work was simply a means of 
income for individuals to 'maintain their relatively prosperous and rising 
standard of living and for their inclination towards a family centred style of 
living' (Goldthorpe etal.1968: 150). 
The implications of such an ideal typical state of affairs for crime and 
crime control are clear. Firstly, the elimination of major social inequalities 
would enable democratic criminal law and criminal justice agencies to serve 
all sections of society alike. A new popular consensus around crime control 
could parallel that around universalist social welfare rights. The consolida-
tion of shared values through mass consumption, mass education and social 
mobility would, in turn, standardise sensitivities to violence, concepts of 
harm and victimisation, around those deployed by criminal law and 
criminal justice agencies. One example of the dynamics of such a process 
could be identified at the level of the new suburban 'neighbourhood' which 
would articulate middle-class notions of space in which 'interpersonal 
relations are unnecessary at the street level and the command over space 
does not have to be assured through continuous appropriation' (Harvey 
1987: 271-2). Middle-class lifestyles appropriate space through mobility -
cars and telephones - by contrast with the traditional working-class 
community where 
Exchange values are scarce, and so the pursuit of use values for daily 
survival is central to social action ... The result is an often intense 
attachment to place and 'turf' and an exact sense of boundaries 
because it is only through active appropriation that control over space 
is assured. 
(Harvey 1987: 271-2) 
For the traditional working class the defence of local space was a defence 
of networks of mutual aid and direct appropriation of use values - often 
involving local 'criminal' economies. Thus while the traditional community 
was hostile to outsiders - the police in particular - as a threat to the direct 
domination of space, 1 the middle class, being concerned simply with 
external threats to property and the 'tone' of the neighbourhood view the 
state 'as basically beneficial and controllable, assuring security and helping 
keep undesirables out, except in unusual circumstances (the location of 
"noxious" facilities, the construction of highways etc.)' (Harvey 1987). 
Thus Fordism and the welfare state would complete that long process of 
penetration of the police into working-class communities, begun during 
the second half of the last century (Brogden 1982; Cohen 1979; Storch 
1976), and establish a consensual basis for the criminal justice system, and 
for societal reactions to crime. 
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Meanwhile the elimination of poverty and bad housing would remove 
the main source of crime. Urban renewal would gradually eliminate the 
traditional working-class community with its own moral economy of 
offenders and victims - in which concrete communal knowledge of events 
(e.g., shared notions of legitimate and illegitimate violence in specific 
situations) could provide alternative descriptions and solutions to those 
provided by criminal law and its agencies. The persistence of generalised 
juvenile delinquency in older working-class areas, for example, was to be 
seen as rooted in the nature of traditional working-class culture. This was 
the interpretation of the juvenile crime problem which had been followed 
by Mays (1954) and other British studies. 'The evidence of all the English 
studies appears strongly supportive of . . . [the] ... theory that the bulk of 
delinquency represents straightforward adolescent conformity to the 
expectations of lower class culture' (Downes 1966: 113). In this way 
delinquency could be seen as an essentially residual problem, a question of 
areas of economic and social structure which had yet to be incorporated 
into Fordism and the consequent cultural homogenisation around con-
sumption and family-oriented norms. Once these communities had been 
reconstructed then residual working-class criminality would assimilate to a 
middle-class experience of crime as consisting overwhelmingly of disrup-
tions to normal social interaction by mainly marginalised or isolated 
individuals. Whether such pathology needed to be dealt with by welfare, 
medical treatment, or punishment was largely a technical matter upon 
which experts could decide (Wootton 1959). The important point was that 
the systematic social bases of crime had been removed and all that was left 
were individuals. That the juridical legal subject presupposed free will while 
the welfare client was assumed to lack it was less important than that they 
were both varieties of the individualisation of social problems. 
Such a view of the effects ofFordism and the KWS is of course simply the 
extrapolation of one tendency. There was indeed a relative consensus 
around criminal justice and crime control during the 1950s and early 1960s, 
as witnessed by the relative paucity of legislation in the area and social 
survey findings indicative of a cross-class consensus concerning generally 
positive attitudes to the police (Reiner 1992). Crime, although it began its 
exponential rise from the mid-1950s, was low by present standards. The 
social stabilisation and cohesion of Fordist welfare state society was to some 
extent reflected in the proportionate decline of incarceration in the face of 
non-supervisory and non-disciplinary- in the Foucauldian sense - forms of 
penality such as fines and community service. As Bottoms remarked: 
The implication would be that the penal project of the classical 
reformers failed at the end of the eighteenth century because it did 
not in itself produce order ... and there was insufficient social control 
exercised elsewhere in society to make the classical juridical project 
possible. In modern states, however, such power does exist, and so the 
schemes of classical penality render themselves as more realistic 
possibilities, at least for some crimes and some offenders. 
(Bottoms 1983: 195-6) 
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Fordism and the KWS were, in other words, the main agencies of the social 
control which made possible an extension of the classical juridical project. 
For Bottoms non-custodial penality is not to be seen as 'spreading the net' 
of disciplinary power (see Cohen 1985) since Fordism and the KWS have 
already completed this task - although as we shall see, in contradictory 
ways. 
CONTRADICTIONS OF THE FORDIST WELFARE STATE 
As Bob Jessop has noted (1994a), talk of 'post'-Fordism presupposes an 
identification of contradictions within Fordism that produce, and are 
resolved by, the transition. In fact there are two problems. It is firstly 
necessary to consider the extent to which Fordism was an accurate 
characterisation of British society during a substantial part of the post-war 
period.2 At the level of economic development, the declining performance 
of the British, relative to other capitalist economies, is well known and the 
weak performance of the Fordist mass production industries has been 
noted (Overbeek 1990). Jessop considers that Britain only achieved a 
'flawed Fordism' which ultimately has affected the ability to move to a 
successful post-Fordism ( 1990, 1994b). The tendencies to homogenisation 
in terms of class structure, income distribution and consumption patterns 
were shown, by the early 1960s, to have been grossly exaggerated (Titmuss 
1962; Nicholson 1967). 
However, it became clear that Fordism itself contained some important 
fissile tendencies at the level of economic and social organisation. The 
expansion of mass production industries generally involved the movement 
of skilled workers out of the older industrial and inner city areas. The 
remaining poor were decreasingly situated in cohesive working-class 
communities, with their networks of social support, and more in polarised 
isolated housing estates where they had been 'left behind' as more skilled 
elements of the working class had moved out of the area. The experience 
of poverty was increasingly one of isolation and individualisation. Para-
doxically, rising crime was one result of the breakdown of the very 
traditional working-class communities whose indigenous criminality had 
attracted the attention of sociologists like Mays ( 1954). An obsession with 
alleged criminogenic features of these communities glossed over the fact 
that while they may have sanctioned elements of social crime - such as 
pilferage from work or shoplifting - they also exercised control over many 
forms of interpersonal violence and victimisation.3 Indeed the very process 
of incorporation of such communities into a Fordist culture heightened 
criminogenic tendencies. While mass production and consumption failed 
to consolidate social homogenisation in terms of income and class, the 
diffusion of a Fordist culture and expectations of mass consumption was 
more successful and resulted in an increase in relative deprivation. 
Fordism, in other words, achieved an 'Americanisation' of mass culture, 
the criminogenic effects of which had been previously studied in some 
detail by American subcultural theorists (Merton 1957; Cloward and Ohlin 
1960; Cohen 1955) grappling with the earlier development of Fordism in 
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North America. In Robert Merton's classic formulation, anomie as a source 
of criminal and deviant behaviour became an inbuilt structural contra-
diction in Fordist culture in which 'a system of cultural values extols, 
virtually above all else, certain common success-goals for the population at large 
which the social structure rigorously restricts or completely closes access to 
approved modes of reaching' (Merton 1957: 146). Meanwhile, in his review 
of British subcultural studies, David Downes had noted the paradoxical 
effects of the incorporation of 'traditional' communities with their more 
insulated field of aspirations (Runciman 1965), into the mass-consumption-
oriented (Fordist) culture. He noted that 
the very measures proposed to cut down on delinquency might seem 
to aim at promoting status-consciousness and - by inference - status 
frustration, thus providing the necessary base for the emergence of 
delinquent motivations on 'American' lines. By breaking down 
working class conservatism, the main force for aspiration-control 
would be removed. 
(Downes 1966: 268) 
As post-war capitalist expansion began to decline with the resultant growth 
in poverty- which could only now be conceptualised as relative deprivation 
or inequality (Townsend 1979) - it is hardly surprising that crime 
continued to rise.4 
There is a second area in which the development of the KWS introduced 
problems and conflicts in the area of crime and its control. I refer to what 
might be termed the 'widening and deepening' of criminality. In the work 
of Habermas ( 1976, 1987), for example, the welfare state is seen to exercise 
simultaneously a stabilising and destabilising effect on social relations. This 
is because 
while the welfare state guarantees are intended to serve the goal of 
social integration, they nevertheless promote the disintegration of 
life-relations when these are separated, through legalised social 
intervention, from the consensual mechanisms that co-ordinate 
action and are transferred over to media such as power and money. 
(Habermas 1987: 364) 
Thus the welfare state, particularly the KWS, aimed at social integration 
through the granting of social rights. Even where these rights aimed at 
preserving traditional family structures, by displacing taken-for-granted 
consensus - for example, around patriarchal family values - to political and 
economic structures of rights and welfare provision, they enabled the 
politicisation and critical questioning of such values. This process, in 
Habermas's view, lies behind the development of new social movements. 
These can be of two types, 'offensive' and 'defensive' (Ray 1993). The 
former aims at the repoliticisation and reclamation of the life-world 
through the discursive justification of values, while the latter attempts to 
restore traditional authority in the only form that it can now be re-imposed; 
that is, conservative political ideology. The feminist movement is the 
obvious example of the first and the New Right of the second. 
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As far as crime is concerned there are two implications. Firstly, legal 
relations and criminal justice intervention can follow on the heels of 
welfare and social rights. Once the relations of family members are 
de-traditionalised, then hidden areas of family violence can be opened up 
as relations between offenders and victims as legal subjects, and the 
stronger intervention of criminal justice agencies, demanded. In such a 
context, at least a proportion of violence by men to women or children, in 
family situations can be seen as individualised attempts to restore tradi-
tional unspoken authority relations, while conservative social movements 
attempt the same through political channels. In this sense the personal is 
political and crime is politics. The KWS not only failed to solve the 
traditional class problems of poverty and inequality, but the shifting of 
identity formation from work to consumption, celebrated by the theorists 
of homogenisation and 'civic privatism' (Almond and Verba 1965) as a 
form of depoliticisation, had the contrary result of widening social conflict 
from 'class' to the private sphere. Criminal justice itself becomes politicised 
in a double process. Key social relations of the private sphere are 
deconstructed as relations between offenders and victims, while, simultane-
ously, the latter become blurred such that the distinct identity of the 
offender and the victim, as required by the criminal law and the process of 
criminal justice, fade into a 'continuum of violence' (Kelly 1988). 
A final set of issues concerned the relationship between the criminal 
justice system and the welfare state as alternative strategies for guaranteeing 
rights and dealing with social problems. Firstly, the very presence of the 
welfare state further contributes to the 'denaturalisation' of crime by 
establishing a tactical division of labour between welfare and criminal 
justice agencies about who should deal with particular problems and 
individuals (Pitch 1995). This leads to competition between 'welfare' and 
'.justice', and their associated bureaucracies, over who should deal with a 
particular set of problems - as in the case of juvenile delinquency, drugs, 
etc. The consequence is further politicisation of criminal justice - as in 
movements for 'back to justice'. The competition with welfare leads to a 
tension within criminal justice between a formal legitimacy based on due 
process and the rule oflaw and one based on output criteria of effectiveness 
in dealing with social problems. As Foucault remarked, concerning the way 
in which characteristically modern institutions aimed at regulation and 
surveillance displace those based on law and right: 
I do not mean to say that law fades into the background or that 
institutions of justice tend to disappear, but rather that the law 
operates more and more as a norm, and the judicial institution is 
increasingly incorporated into a continuum of apparatuses (medical, 
administrative and so on) whose functions are for the most part 
regulatory. 
(Foucault 1979: 144) 
Thus criminal justice institutions such as police and prison systems start 
to look increasingly 'inefficient' in solving the problems of crime. Highly 
politicised 'offensive' social movements demanding a return to traditional 
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notions of punishment and responsibility run into growing cynicism about 
the effectiveness of criminal justice as a solution to social problems. Even 
Conservative Home Secretaries succumb to the view that the prison is an 
expensive way of making bad people worse. 
A decade ago many followed Habermas (1976) and Offe (1984) into 
identifying a legitimation crisis at the heart of the Fordist KWS in parallel 
with its gathering economic crisis. Certainly there was no shortage of 
elements of such a crisis in the areas of criminal justice. As social 
polarisation increased, criminal justice agencies found themselves engaged 
in classic activities of generalised repression of the new marginalised in the 
inner cities. The latter achieved episodic cohesion in recourse to the streets, 
articulating demands for fairness and justice. Meanwhile new social 
movements demanded widening of the concepts of justice and appropriate 
procedures - such as revisions to legal notions of provocation and 
responsibility and the criminalisation of new forms of violence. These were 
joined by a growing critique of criminal justice in terms of its efficiency. The 
prison was joined by the police as institutions which 'fail to deliver' under 
conditions of continually rising crime and exploding prison populations. 
Yet the dynamics oflegitimation crisis are quite unclear. Habermas could 
speak of a growing demand for the 'discursive justification of values', yet 
how, precisely, this would lead to movements and pressure resulting in a 
social or political crisis in western capitalist states was never spelled out 
(McCarthy 1978; Ray 1993). The ambiguity was illustrated by the appeal of 
the theme oflegitimation crisis to members of the New Right who observed 
'a breakdown of traditional means of social control' (Crozier et al. 1975), 
and the need for a reassertion of authority by mobilising new bases of 
conservative support and the ending of the civic privatism of the middle 
classes. Fear of crime, the 'underclass', and criminogenic potential in any 
departure from traditional forms of socialisation was of course a key theme 
in such mobilisation. Meanwhile, attempts on the left to articulate a more 
precise concept of hegemonic crisis (Hall et al. 1978) tended both to read 
crisis symptoms too widely (for example with respect to increased class 
struggle in the early 1970s) and to misread strategies of consolidation (as 
with 'moral panic' about crime) as evidence of the exhaustion of hege-
mony. The real source of change in direction lay undoubtedly in changed 
economic conditions after 1970. In this context we can approach the issue 
of a transition to post-Fordism. 
POST-FORDISM: A NEW FORM OF REGULATION OR 
DEEPER CRISIS? 
The key question concerning the adequacy of the concept of post-Fordism 
is whether it describes the emergence of a new, stable, mode of develop-
ment overcoming the limitations of Fordism or whether in fact it simply 
grasps, at an empirical level, the symptoms of deepening capitalist recession 
and confuses these with a new form of stability. This issue goes to the heart 
of the debate on the underconsumptionist tendencies associated with some 
varieties of regulation theory (Brenner and Glick 1991). If, for example, 
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the expansion of mass consumption was what enabled stable post-war 
development (Aglietta 1979), then a new regime of 'flexible accumulation' 
(Harvey 1989a) involving flexible production systems catering for market 
diversity, and a return to smaller enterprises, might overcome the limita-
tions of existing mass consumer markets. An alternative view would find the 
original cause of post-war expansion in the destruction of capital during the 
Second World War combined with a temporary post-war stability of the 
international monetary system. The expansion of consumption into new 
mass-produced commodities is seen as a consequence, rather than a cause, 
of profitable production. The current crisis is not a matter of the 
exhaustion of markets as such, but of over-accumulation of capital.5 From 
this perspective what is central to the present transition is capital's 
determination to replace the KWS with a regime of low wages, impotent 
unions and highly flexible labour with a strong emphasis on women and 
ethnic minorities. Simultaneously much Fordist production is being 
'decentralised' to low wage, politically authoritarian Third World areas. 
'Post-Fordism' can be another name for the fact that in order to restore the 
conditions for profitable accumulation, capital must intensify its attack on 
the working class. It is only a new form of stability in that, if successful, the 
conditions for profitable accumulation will be eventually restored and the 
expansion of markets will result from the normal process of capital 
accumulation (Brenner and Glick 1991). From this perspective, diversifica-
tion of production and consumption is entirely secondary. It is not the 
'discovery' of new niche markets that replaces an exhausted Fordist mass 
consumption, but the restoration of profitability through the 'discovery' of 
a low wage, flexible, diversified working class. Much of the so-called post-
modern diversity of lifestyles is a cynical inversion of this growing social 
polarisation. 
So we are in transition to a condition whose contours we cannot yet fully 
specify. For this reason it is best to concentrate on the dynamics of 
transition itself rather than attempting the specification of an 'ideal' type 
of a stable post-Fordist mode of development. In the remainder of this 
chapter I shall therefore select a number of themes from the post-Fordist 
debate and attempt to assess their stabilising or destabilising effects in the 
area of crime and crime control. 
THE GLOBAL CITY 
A useful focus for many of the processes associated with post-Fordism is its 
impact on urban structure (Esser and Hirsch 1994). Issues such as the 
rediscovery of flexible low wage labour and the decentralisation of Fordist 
production to the Third World finds a focus in the literature on the 'global 
city'. Theorists such as Manuel Castells (1989) and Saskia Sassen (1991) see 
large cities like New York, Los Angeles and London moving towards a post-
Fordist type of social structure characterised by the growth of highly 
polarised socio-economic relations. 
The growth of high income employments in the financial sector are 
largely disconnected from the organic life of the city. In the classic capitalist 
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city, even when part of an imperialist economy which dominated the world, 
the bankers and industrialists had some relationship with the urban 
working class. The function of the city was to allow capital and labour to 
combine and reproduce. In contrast, the global city is simply a convenient 
site for activities which could be located anywhere, since they concern not 
production but the increasingly computerised transfer of funds. Con-
sequent upon this is the segregation of high income professionals who earn 
salaries determined by global rather than local market forces. Such 
professionals are cut off from local communities by segregated and 
guarded walkways; their presence generates little employment for locals 
except in the informal and consumption sectors and results in what Mike 
Davis called the 'militarisation of public space' (Davis 1990). The mirror 
image of the growth of footloose information-based sectors is the decline 
in Fordist manufacturing and its stable middle income communities. This 
is accompanied by the growth of an informal sector of low-wage flexible 
labour, especially in manufacturing enterprises that compete with Third 
World cheap labour, in newly privatised city services and in firms catering 
for the conspicuous consumption needs of the information and financial 
sectors. The growing pool of long-term urban unemployed increasingly 
inhabits the informal sector. 
This scenario, which of course by no means represents all cities, is a 
backdrop against which to observe new trends in crime. Crime rates 
continue to rise, but what is specific to post-Fordism is changes in the 
organisation and functionality of various types of crime. We have noted that 
Fordism is contradictory. On the one hand, crime is assimilated to a general 
model of individualisation and marginalisation from normal social rela-
tions; the perfection of the juridical model. On the other hand, the 
'widening and deepening' process rediscovers criminality in the normal 
processes of family life. The global city is the context for an intensification 
of this contradiction: a re-fusing of the normal processes of social and 
economic life with various forms of criminality. 
Much of this concerns changing forms of organised crime, or the 
criminal economy, which takes on a new functionality in the 'flexible 
accumulation' of the informal sector. Under Fordism organised crime 
tends to follow a Mertonian dynamic as a route to social mobility essentially 
in parallel to legitimate structures. Under post-Fordism it becomes fused 
with them in more complex ways. As far as the informal sector is concerned, 
the method of organised crime (the willingness to use violence to achieve 
business goals) becomes especially appropriate as a form of 'resocialisation' 
of labour into new post-welfare state, post-trade union working conditions. 
'Class consciousness no longer derives from the straight class relation 
between capital and labour, and moves onto a much more confused terrain 
of inter-familial conflicts and fights for power within a kinship or clan-like 
system of hierarchically ordered social relations' (Harvey 1989a: 153). The 
'archaic' forms of organisation appropriate to the insecurities of the 
underworld, such as the role of ethnic and family loyalties (Reuter 1983), 
are precisely those of the new 'sweated labour' activities of the informal 
sector. 
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Organised crime is itself, of course, a form of economy, as in the drugs 
trade. The 'social crime' of early capitalism is turned on its head from the 
criminalisation of the working-class defence of traditional moral economy, 
and to the control of the latter by crime. The drugs economy, finding its 
labour force in the ranks of the permanently unemployed, brings together 
all the elements of the global city: that is, a major form of employment in 
the informal sector, linked, through a global division of labour and money 
laundering, to the financial sector. Thus Castells notes that 
booming criminal activities, particularly related to the drug traffic ... 
generate income and a kind of employment for some sectors of the 
ghetto population ... [but are] ... not limited to the underclass. In 
fact, the money laundering activities that are a substantial part of the 
drug economy lie behind the flourishing of many ephemeral busi-
nesses, from restaurants to art galleries, that blossom and disappear in 
the space of a few months ... Ironically, these money laundering 
processes epitomise the oft praised flexibility of the new economy. 
(Castells 1989: 214) 
Such crime becomes simultaneously more organised and more disorga-
nised. Traditional professional 'project' crime - such as armed robbery - is 
becoming deskilled and relatively unplanned (Matthews 1995: 179) while, 
through the drugs trade, such 'disorganised organised crime' itself 
becomes globalised. Unlike traditional, neighbourhood or city-based orga-
nised crime, drugs involve a global division of labour (in production or 
distribution, banking, etc.) and, particularly in cities concerned mainly with 
distribution, may become 'disorganised' and appear superficially as lacking 
any large-scale organisation (Dorn et al. 1991). Also, unlike traditional 
organised crime, there is less concern with status, with the achievement of 
legitimate social goals by illegitimate means (Massing 1992). The entrepre-
neurs of global organised crime are increasingly shadowy figures shunning 
publicity or reputation. Partly a matter of the enhanced effectiveness of law 
enforcement agencies, this also reflects the growth of organised crime as 
not merely a route to capitalism but increasingly as one of its leading 
sectors.6 
WORKFARE AND THE •HOLLOWED OUT" STATE 
The issue of the state brings us to the third theme. Post-Fordists such as 
Jessop (1994b) identify two processes at work. Firstly, the transition from 
the welfare to the 'workfare state' and, secondly, a process of 'hollowing 
out' of the state. The first is a fairly straightforward and familiar theme of 
the abandonment, under the impact of capital's need to reorganise the 
working class, of the relative autonomy of welfare policy from economic 
policy. The workfare state is aimed at guaranteeing labour flexibility, 
creating an attractive 'business environment' through vocational training 
and removal of restrictions on land use rather than guaranteeing universal-
istic social rights and involves a shift to vocational training and innovation. 
This is not really a fundamental change in the relationship between state 
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and economy in the sense that, during the Keynesian period, demand-led 
public contracts for welfare facilities - hospitals, schools - were seen as 
economic stabilisers maintaining predictable levels of effective demand. 
Now the state has to assist in the dismantlement of the gains of the previous 
period. 
This has a number of implications for crime and its control. Obviously 
a dismantling of welfare 'citizenship' under conditions of income polarisa-
tion has criminogenic consequences through the removal of a cushion to 
relative deprivation. Attempts by vocational training schemes to secure a 
downward revision of expectations further reinforce criminogenic cynicism 
among the unemployed. But more fundamentally, there is a parallel 
between the transition from welfare to workfare and changes in the role of 
the state in the control of petty crime. If the growth of non-custodial· and 
non-supervisory punishment (Bottoms 1983) exemplified some of the 
characteristics of the Fordist KWS period, such a tendency has been 
displaced by a de facto return to the prison, and to supervised non-custodial 
'punishments in the community'. Bottoms's argument that the growth of 
non-supervised alternatives to custody presupposed that basic disciplinary 
functions were being exercised elsewhere, no longer holds. The growth of 
the permanently unemployed, the need to break down notions of social 
rights in favour of flexibility and 'responsibility', places new tasks on the 
agenda of social control. While the juridical relationship of criminal justice 
in many ways conflicted with the modes of operation of the welfare state -
particularly around the notion of individual responsibility - in other ways 
the two were compatible. The social control and integration produced by 
Fordism and the KWS were foundations on which juridical responsibility 
could be imposed. 
The transition to post-Fordism (that is, the dismantling of Fordism) 
involves a return in some respects to pre-Fordism, to the generalised 
surveillance and disciplining of the working class. Crime control thus 
becomes 'actuarial' (Feeley and Simon 1992, 1994), concerned with risk 
assessment, incapacitation and the management of delinquency. This takes 
a juridical - as opposed to a welfare - form, as it did in the early nineteenth 
century (Garland 1985). But the object is less that of preparing the new 
working class, through the experience of penal discipline, for the 'responsi-
bility' required by labour for capital - factory discipline - and more that of 
introducing new flexibility, dismantling social rights and keeping the 
'underclass' under control. The relationship between the workfare state 
and actuarial criminal justice continues to be that of reciprocity; the 
criminal justice system picks up those who are unwilling to bend to the new 
flexibilities of the workfare state. But since the workfare state increasingly 
sheds older welfare-guarantee functions, the criminal justice system increas-
ingly also picks up those who simply cannot find work, rather than those 
actively refusing it. This reinforces the actuarial element in criminal justice 
(see below). 
The 'hollowing out of the state' thesis involves the fragmentation of the 
old Keynesian planner welfare state, linked to a national economy and 
social citizenship, in two directions. Firstly, globalisation, or a loss of 
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functions to global and supra-regional bodies, as economic processes can 
no longer be regulated at national level. This theme, which will not be 
pursued further here, has obvious implications for the development of 
international police agencies seeking to regulate multinational crime. 
Secondly, a process oflocalism, often combined with privatisation, in which 
regulatory functions are decentralised down from the national state to 
'entrepreneurial' cities and regions which, at the economic level, compete 
for investment opportunities in new forms of partnership with local capital 
or other cities which cut across national boundaries. The 'hollowing out' 
process is made possible on the one hand by a collapse of Fordist 
corporatist, welfare and economic planning functions centred on the 
national state and on the other by 'flexible accumulation' and the 
establishment of new local state-private and inter-regional linkages that 
bypass the national territory. Privatisation and localism go hand in hand. 
Such a process has a number of implications for crime and crime 
control. Local delivery of welfare state services is classically held to have 
weakened the basis for clientalism and organised crime by forcing client 
groups to articulate their claims in terms of universalistic categories of 
centrally administered need. Robert Merton saw the welfare state as a factor 
in the decline of American 'machine' politics: 'it was a basic structural 
change in the form of providing services, through the rationalised 
procedures of what some call "the welfare state," that largely spelled the 
decline of the political machine' (1957: 194). This is a one-sided view. 
Co-existence between powerful organised crime syndicates, big business 
and the planner state is now well understood (Ruggiero 1986). Never-
theless, a combination oflocalism and privatisation can be seen to offer new 
opportunities. Weakening of central supervision, and the subcontracting of 
services minimises accountability and may allow organised crime groups to 
repossess from the state some of their classic 'protection' functions. 
At the level of crime control and criminal justice agencies, the actuarial 
tendency, precisely because it is concerned with generalised containment, 
can be privatised. There is a tendency to return to eighteenth-century local 
forms, as in the 'rebirth' of private policing Qohnson 1992). Private-based 
property protection, crime prevention arid insurance schemes reinforce 
the polarisation of the city. They displace democratic or centralised 
bureaucratic forms of accountability - discourses of rights and justice - in 
favour of accountability to decentralised groups of customers. The last 
residues of a common welfare state citizenship fragment with the privatisa-
tion - alongside the militarisation - of public space. In a similar way 
criminal justice agencies begin to develop their own local criteria and 
strategies for managing disorder. Police forces function locally as semi-
autonomous micro-criminal justice systems. This, inter alia, provokes a 
continual expansion of informal cautioning, in many cases resulting in a 
decline of reported crime rates reflected in traditional centrally recorded 
criminal statistics.(Matthews 1995). Once established as a major employer, 
organised crime eventually becomes a major source of stabilisation and 
social control and reassumes some of its traditional functions of protection 
and dispute resolution. 
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However it would be wrong to interpret this process, as do some 
functionalist accounts of 'post-modernisation', as a withering away of the 
state, in which de-differentiation through new local public-private combi-
nations is carried out to such an extent that the 'very notion of "the state" 
as a separate and autonomous institutional entity intimately linked with the 
notion of "politics" and "public sphere" and clearly separated from the 
domains of economy, societal community and culture, is increasingly 
problematic' (Crook et al. 1992: 104). Jessop, for example, is careful to 
distinguish 'hollowing out' from a process of demise, stressing that the 
maintenance of social cohesion 'still depends on the state's capacities to 
manage ... conflicts' (1994a: 274). The matter can be put in stronger 
terms: the national state - and to some extent the supranational state -
appears increasingly in a 'Leninist' guise as 'marching bodies of armed 
men'; that is, the central core of force, the agency of last resort for the 
containment of resistance. 
CONCLUSION 
It might seem hazardous to draw conclusions from such a brief attempt to 
relate some of the themes from the debate around a transition to post-
Fordism to issues of crime and crime control. The emphasis has been on 
seeing in 'post'-Fordism less the emergence of a new form of stability than 
a characterisation of the as-yet-to-be-resolved crisis conditions of late 
twentieth-century capitalism. However, the present phase of capitalist 
development may be a unique, slow and protracted crisis following the long 
post-war boom. Thus the need for capital is less to devise a sudden or 
'episodic' strategy to restore profitable accumulation in traditional sectors 
than to develop new forms of economy and social control insulated from 
previous gains of the KWS. In this sense post-Fordism, as the concept of a 
social formation in 'slow crisis', may offer a useful direction of develop-
ment. 
NOTES 
Echoed, in a different way, by the aristocracy and the very rich with their contempt for 
bourgeois universalistic notions of law and criminal responsibility and for the agencies 
of criminal justice - vide the impenetrable wall of silence thrown up to protect Lord 
Lucan who 'only' murdered a servant. 
2 This is distinct from the argument that the whole concept of Fordism as a distinct stage 
of capitalist development is spurious (cf. Clarke 1990; Brenner and Glick 1991). 
3 When one considers the continuous decline in crime from 1850 in 'traditional' working-
class communities it might have seemed more appropriate to investigate these areas in 
terms of their successful social control of crime rather than their pathological features. 
This reveals the ideological nature of much sociological investigation. 
4 The question of organised crime throws an interesting light on the dynamics of Fordism 
and anomie. The 'American' form of organised crime, as typified by Cosa Nostra, 
provided in many respects a classically 'Mertonian' solution in the form of surrogate 
routes to social mobility for social groups assimilated to the aspirations of Fordist mass 
consumption but excluded from its achievement (Bell 1961; Cloward and Ohlin 1960). 
ln Britain, Fordism combined with a more consolidated KWS and high levels of 
employment kept syndicate crime localised in traditional communities even if some of its 
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members emulated the flamboyant characteristics of American mobsters (Hobbs 1988; 
Pearson 1985). 
5 The issue goes to the heart of Marxist political economy and cannot be debated here. For 
a discussion see Mattick ( 1969). 
6 This tendency can be seen writ large in the former USSR where the formation of a new 
business class is virtually indistinguishable from the growth of organised crime (Handel-
man 1994). 
4 
COOL TIMES FOR A CHANGING 
CITY 
Rosernary Mellor 
Manchester may be cool, it may be fun, it may be action packed and 
spilling over with cultural innovation, but it is still a city in touch with 
its roots. 
( Triangle, April 199 5) 
The maintenance of the provincial city centres as symbolic cores to their 
regions has been a consistent strand in British urban policy. In cities in 
declining regions, as is Manchester, play and spectacle are increasingly the 
crucial elements in reconstituting the city centre. In imprinting fresh style 
on a city whose claim to fame was as 'Cottonopolis', there has been a policy 
shift from a welfare agenda, in which the poor of the inner cities had a 
modest priority, to a business/growth agenda in which the city centre itself 
takes centre stage. 
This account covers the emergence of a heritage industry in the 1980s, 
the period of heady speculation about the role of Manchester in the new 
Europe associated with the property boom of 1988-9, the accommodation 
of urban Labour leadership to the expectations of partnership after 1987, 
and also the emergent culture of urbanity extolling the merits of associa-
tion in the city's public spaces. The reclamation of central space for a 
lifestyle whose motifs are bars, boats and bistros ( or, rephrased, youth and 
success) has parallels in many other North American, West European and 
UK cities (Harvey 1989a; Castells 1994). 
THE CITY OF MANCHESTER 
The city controlled a world market in cotton textiles for a century. It also 
became the financial hub of the North of England, then one of the world's 
wealthiest industrial regions. By the beginning of the twentieth century, it 
was a wealthy commercial city fronting an industry and a region. In its 
twilight, with the exaggeration proper to a local man, it was to be termed 
'the last and greatest of the Hanseatic towns - a civilisation created by 
traders' (Taylor 1976: 208). 
The weaknesses in the regional economy were apparent long before the 
recession of 1979-82. Low levels of investment, a ravaged post-industrial 
environment, the image and reality of the cities and towns, as well as its 
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location peripheral to Europe, had been remarked upon in reports over 
the previous two decades (North West Regional Planning Council 1974; 
Rodgers 1980). But from 1978 to 1988 the North West Region experienced 
a net loss of 300,000 industrial jobs ( 32 per cent of the stock in 1979), and, 
as well, 70,000 in public services (Clark et al. 1992: 79-80). The stock of jobs 
in Greater Manchester alone had diminished by 23.5 per cent between 1965 
and 1984 (GMRIPU 1985), but the mass redundancies continued through-
out the 1980s. There were 500,000 redundancies (in layoffs affecting ten or 
more workers) in the period 1979-88 for a workforce that in 1988 totalled 
1.2 million. Compulsory notifications ceased in that year. 
For decades the city centre of Manchester had dominated commercial 
labour markets in the conurbation. There were 167,000 employed in its 1.5 
square miles in 1961, approximately 14 per cent of the employment total 
of Greater Manchester. This had fallen to 98,000, 8.6 per cent, by 1977 
(Manchester City Council Planning Department 1980b). There was then 
evident a massive erosion of the urban core economy. The basis of the 
decline was fivefold: the city had ceased to be the nerve centre for world 
trade in cotton textiles; its role as provincial business centre was diminish-
ing; it was no longer efficient in servicing the region; its industries were 
closing; it was ceasing to be the town centre for the local population, which 
itself was much depleted by clearance. 1 Despite, or perhaps because of, a 
property boom before 1972, 20 per cent of commercial office space was 
vacant in 1977. The labour force was to retract further as printing presses, 
warehouses, and insurance companies decentralised in the next decade. 
The demands of an ageing infrastructure, inefficient transport system, a 
dependent population, falling revenue, rising costs, and, as well, a pattern 
of spending inherent in regional status, are not peculiar to Manchester. 
They are burdens faced by the administrations of all core cities in Europe 
and North America. The political fragmentation of the Manchester 
conurbation may exacerbate the problems. The one comparative study 
concluded that in Manchester - with few affluent residents in the inner 
core, no effective public transport system, and 'strong' suburbanisation of 
office development - there were particular problems for the city centre 
(GMC 1985). Subsequent policies have been framed within this context of 
European disadvantage. 
THE REGENERATION OF THE CITY CENTRE 
Phase I: "1984-9 
Regeneration strategies can be considered in two phases: before and after 
the collapse of the property boom in 1990. In the first phase, the major 
achievements were undoubtedly the establishment of the museums at 
Castlefield and the promotion of an urban heritage park; the reconstruc-
tion of Central Station, closed since 1969, as an exhibition centre and mass 
forum ( G-Mex); the reopening of the two oldest theatres, investment in five 
(now twelve) large city centre hotels; and the tourist attraction at Granada 
Studios (which had 750,000 visitors in its opening year, 1988). All these 
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were subsidised. An economy with the panache of a holiday camp, 
complementary to the business centre, was being promoted in the archaic 
shell of the old city centre. 
In effect a heritage industry (Hewison 1987) was implanted in the city 
centre. The accreditation of the artefacts of the city's past with value was a 
total reversal of the previous policy of demolishing 'Cottonopolis'. Since 
1980, archaeology ( the reconstruction of the Roman fort), industrial 
history (the conversion of the world's oldest passenger station and its 
warehouses into a fine industrial museum), architecture (the renovation of 
the palatial mercantile headquarters of the textile firms into hotels), and 
the ambience of canal and riverside have all been promoted as conferring 
that aura of historic particularity on an otherwise inaccessible and 
uninviting environment. Local enthusiasts had been key figures in the early 
stages in demonstrating the palatability of 'heritage'; as decisive were the 
activities of local entrepreneurs. One particular investment - the conver-
sion of the most splendid of the textile headquarters into a hotel by a local 
estate agent- showed its commercial potential. 
The interests in regeneration of the city centre were many. There was 
central government, pledged to the social and political reclamation of the 
inner cities; the construction industry, deterred by the cost of greenfield 
sites and finding access to them slowed by planning controls; the financial 
institutions with substantial long-term investments in city-centre property; 
individuals and trusts adding to their property portfolios; established city 
businesses (including the banks) with freehold or long leasehold interests 
at stake. As well, there was the local authority, deprived of central 
government support,2 facing diminished local revenue and influence. By 
1989, there was a fledgling coalition of public agencies and private interests 
with an alternative vision of urban life and labour in a modernised city. As 
the agenda was set by the need to regenerate markets in property it 
inevitably marginalised those whose access to markets was restricted. 
Manchester's assets were 'heritage' and space for recreation. Lefebvre 
commented presciently that 'leisure is becoming an industry of prime 
importance. We have conquered for leisure the sea, the mountains and 
even the deserts. There is now a process of reintegration of space at the 
heart of the cities' ( 1970: 265). His remarks have been partially confirmed 
twenty years later in this particular city. Manchester does not have a 
Pompidou Centre, but the strategies of the business-led growth coalition 
increasingly hinged on attracting leisure industries and tourism thereby 
securing an extra card in the bidding for business investment. The 
intriguing novelty was this symbiosis between business and leisure. 
Manchester had been a city in which one did business, not one where 
there was licence to revel. That it was becoming a place of 'spectacle and 
play' was symptomatic of a profound urban revolution. Throughout the 
decade, despite the recession, opportunities for entertainment and eating, 
for real ale and clubbing, proliferated. And the developers and develop-
ment agencies were increasingly using holiday motifs - bars, boats and 
bistros - augmented by theme parks and theatres. The economic develop-
ment officer for the local authority suggested in 1988 that the city was to 
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revert to 'how it had looked before the industrial revolution'. It was to be 
a backdrop to a new industry offering a ritualised experience of a city, 
complete with town crier! 
The promotion of the arts, the heritage industry itself, the alternative 
lifestyles of artists, media professionals and the young, all presume new 
canons of cultured living in the cities. In Manchester, there was slow 
acceptance of the need to promote the arts both as an industry providing 
employment and as a stimulus to business or leisure investment (CLES 
1989). It was then doubtful whether the promotion of the cultural 
industries would favour upper-income cultural aspirations. Perhaps the 
weakness of the Halle Orchestra, once the city's declaration of worth to a 
national audience, symbolised the shift to a pluralistic urban culture. 
Presence at its concerts had had a ritualistic significance in the rhythms of 
the bourgeois community whose working and social life had focused on the 
old centre (Taylor 1976: 210). With the fading of that class as the old 
economy unravelled, the orchestra had to compete for audience and 
sponsorship in a market dominated by popular culture. 
The last element in the regenerative strategies being explored was that 
of the '24-hour city'. The planning philosophy which had separated the 
public domain of work, commerce and industry from the private domain 
of home and leisure in a city of 'separate spheres' (MacKenzie and Rose 
1983), since its articulation by the founders of the town-planning move-
ment in the first decades of the century, was being challenged by a 
philosophy of urbanity. In the round-the-clock city a multiplicity of activities 
was to derive mutual benefit from proximity. The high costs of site 
recapture necessitated maximum yield from relatively low yield activities 
such as restaurants and flats. In effect, its instillation in property develop-
ment is comparable to the introduction of three-shift working in the mills 
a generation previously. It is also a design strategy capitalising on the 
advantages of urban location in comparison with the suburban business 
park. 
Throughout the decade there was a conspicuous reversal to privatism. 
Sociability in the cities was increasingly public, in the street, weather 
permitting. It has been argued that for minority and marginal groups in 
particular 'there is no identity without visibility, and the city spectacle 
encourages self-definition in its most theatrical forms' (E. Wilson 1991: 
120), but milling in the crowd was becoming the social experience. Being 
seen in public is also an extension of the career. Work and leisure, whose 
separate spheres had been zealously pulled asunder by land-use planning, 
were to be reintegrated. Business and leisure, enjoyment and profit, day 
and night, are synthesised in this conception of the 'good' city. 
In all this there was inconsistency and incongruency with everyday 
realities. First of all there was tension between the promotional rhetoric and 
the capacity to realise the setting for this urbane lifestyle. The city's 
infrastructure was old, and the revenue of the statutory agencies limited. 
The city population is poor and its needs manifold.3 There was also a 
mythical element in the promotional campaigns: this urbane vision 
presents promenades as more important than motorways, bistros than 
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conference catering, and public assoc1at10n in the crowd as more sig-
nificant than private transactions. The designation of defunct tracts in the 
city centre as public arenas was to be the rationale for regeneration 
strategies which had to reincorporate a degraded environment into a 
modern city. Urbanity masks the development realities: expensive land, 
high costs of site recapture and marketing difficulties. 
Phase II: "'1989-94 
At the end of the decade the central city, like others in the UK, experienced 
an extraordinary stake-out by property interests. Local place-
entrepreneurs, construction firms, regional property companies and 
national developers, with the backing of banks, institutional funds and 
foreign investors, as well as local charitable trusts, were all staking a claim 
to the anticipated gains from the regeneration of what had become a most 
depressed property market. Speculation on the crest of the British property 
boom through 1988/9 resulted in gross exaggeration of values and prime 
office rents approaching those of Frankfurt. 4 There was every evidence of 
disconnection between what Lefebvre (1970) and Harvey (1977) had 
termed the 'primary and secondary circuits of capital' as the region's 
industrial economy showed little sign of recovery.5 The expressed aim was 
the conversion of Manchester into a regional centre for North Britain 
within Europe. 
The speculative dynamic of the property boom left little mark on the city 
centre. The main effect was on Salford Quays, where, as in London's 
Canary Wharf, much remained unlet (August 1994, 800,000 square feet; 
April 1995, 710,000 square feet). The recession (which led to losses of £9.1 
million for the development corporation) terminated hopes of a spec-
ulatively led renaissance of the business centre. The two large schemes 
under construction in 1994/5 (adding a further 680,000 square feet and a 
320-bed hotel) were linked to the two subsidised landmark developments 
- the Arena at Victoria Station and the Concert Hall complex alongside the 
Metrolink system. Nor have the leisure promotions been more successful: 
Granada's 'Media City' on the banks of the Irwell and a Dan Dare 'Space 
City' downstream, remain developers' dreams. Accordingly, the develop-
ment corporation had to focus on residential conversion and tourism. 
The sluggishness of property markets since 1989 is a more accurate 
reflection of the structural weaknesses in the regional economy than the 
previous euphoria. It is the only region in mainland UK to show consistent 
falls in GDP for twenty years; it also has the greatest rate of employment loss. 
The rate of decline has been aggravated by the termination of investment 
in nuclear energy and the defence cuts. Overseas contracts for the public 
utilities and the expansion in the many small 'high-tech' firms generate 
wealth, but this is insufficient to compensate for the loss of employment in 
the larger plants. Recorded full-time employment in both region and 
conurbation continues to decline and cuts in the finance sector aggravate 
job losses (GMLPU 1993, 1994, 1995). The ten local authorities that make 
up Greater Manchester constitute one of Europe's weakest urban econo-
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mies with labour markets characterised by long-term unemployment and 
low pay. Undoubtedly there is a significant underground economy: expan-
sion in the production of counterfeit goods complements the export of 
stolen cars, construction equipment, computers and antiques, as well as 
trade in drugs. 
Nevertheless, in 1991 the city centre was still, in a qualitative assessment 
by professionals from other centres, rated as being the largest 'allround' 
business centre outside London (Wood 1991). Despite competition from 
Leeds and Birmingham, it retained the prestigious specialisms of stock-
broking and overseas banking. In consequence, prime rents remained 
stable in the recession- and institutional interest in investment in the office 
core may even exceed demand. At the heart of a poor region, within a local 
authority with the greatest concentration of poor people outside London, 
encircled by a wasteland of blighted commercial property, is a sought-after 
business district with its sustaining luxury services. This 'free-standing 
specialised service sector' (Sassen 1994: 66), embedded in the poverty belt, 
remains a crucial element in the prosperity of the outer rim of the region. 
It is one of the many nodes in the complex of professional businesses which 
service the national economy. As long as that can be sustained, there is 
restricted prosperity for both city and region. Its support, and that of 
corporate and institutional investment, has been the overriding aim of 
government since 1987. The nexus between state and the 'secondary circuit 
of capital' is national rather than local as in the US (Fainstein 1991). 
Local partnership 
The reassertion of business interests in urban policy by the Conservatives, 
along with the new competitiveness of regions and cities within Europe, has 
resulted in an unprecedented authority for the 'new managerial-
technocratic-political elite' (Castells 1994: 26). In Manchester impatience 
with the local authority's inability to promote the city resulted in the rise of 
a self-designated 'Manchester mafia' of local influentials emerging from 
different factions of the regional business elite (Peck and Tickell 1995). 
Before 1990, comparison of the 'pro-growth coalitions' of the North 
American cities with the nascent partnerships between business organisa-
tions and local Labour parties was far-fetched. The structural parameters of 
British municipal politics - the dependence of local government on 
national mandate and resources, the detachment of local firms and their 
managers from the locality, and the strength of Labourism and its 
indifference if not hostility to local business interests - all pointed to the 
limits to the reconstitution of a 'business class' and its involvement in urban 
policy-making. There are limits to localism in Britain. All the trends in 
industrial and commercial organisation over the previous thirty years had 
furthered the integration of the national economy and polity. Localities 
have lost their bosses and their structural integrity as places with recognised 
elites. 
The American model of local politics as being dominated by pro-growth 
alliances is a particular one. However, in the UK too, local businessmen 
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have been co-opted to the 'quangocracy', urban policy has been levered 
from social welfare towards business growth, and local authorities have 
been propelled into promotion complementary to business interests. The 
corporatism implied by partnership between public and private sectors is 
now a reality. This is reflected in the considerable literature on local politics 
and research on local regeneration strategies ( see Harding 1991). How 
long 'elite localism' would survive the removal of government patronage is 
another matter. 
While seeking to protect commitments to welfare policies (notably pre-
school provision and neighbourhood centres),6 council leadership in 
Manchester has, since 1991, wholeheartedly advocated 'Euro' strategies. 
Endorsement of the Olympic Bid in 1993 (resulting in accusations of 
excessive promotional expenditure by local MPs) was the most blatant 
symptom of acceptance of the prestige model of urban regeneration. The 
sports facilities were conceived as the flagship developments which would 
re-present the city. Heightening the city's profile in the global marketplace, 
as 'an International City of outstanding commercial, cultural and creative 
potential' (Manchester City Council 1994) has become a criterion of 
successful local management. Of necessity the 'back-stage' neighbourhoods 
of the city have been relegated on the policy agenda in return for uncertain 
long-term benefits to that abstract value - the city's image. How much this 
is worth without the social investment to make the city a comfortable place 
to work, do business, live, and bring up children, is not openly debated.7 
A concatenation of circumstances contributes to public acquiescence. 
First, the media and youthful public back the 'new' city. In particular, there 
was fervent support for the Olympic Bid, a populist cause. Secondly, there is 
no contest over occupancy or the symbolism of the terrain. The city centre is 
not a cherished European city but a run-down tract of redundant commercial 
space. The conversion of the derelict leftovers of the city's past into popular 
uses such as theme parks or nightclubs can be interpreted as social gain for 
mass culture. Thirdly, the local authority has balanced competing claims to 
expenditure from 'welfare' as well as 'growth' lobbies within its constrained 
budget. Fourth, there is the dislocation of inner Manchester. The institu-
tional strengths and community ties of the former working-class city were 
broken by suburbanisation, clearance and redevelopment, and, finally, the 
death of the manufacturing economy. Colonial migrants to the inner city 
experienced all these ruptures to community organisation (Parry et al. 1987), 
repeated in the 1990s. Marginality in housing markets means vulnerability to 
exogenous development, transience and reliance on outsider advocates from 
the churches and local authorities. In a cosmopolitan poor city marginality 
has not 'become an increasingly strong presence through the new politics of 
culture and identity' (Sassen 1994: 124), nor is there any indication that it will 
become so. 
The Inner city neighbourhoods 
Inextricably locked into the problem of the city centre is that of the inner 
city; that is, the region's poor living in districts which envelop its 
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commercial core. The linkage is long-standing: as regions industrialised, 
the slums in and around their core business district housed the poorest of 
the poor, looking to the rough jobs in its services for employment. These 
notoriously unhealthy neighbourhoods - densely built, tightly occupied 
and heavily polluted - had therefore a symbiotic relationship with the 
regional centres which was broken by the withering away of the stubbornly 
traditional8 central economy with its demand for poor workers. Its 
restructuring - from the handling of goods to that of people - dis-
advantages the uneducated, men, and people of colour. The so-called 'skill 
mismatch' - in reality a shortfall in acceptability- between inner-city labour 
force and central-city labour market is a recent phenomenon. 
Unemployment levels in the inner city neighbourhoods are high,9 as are 
welfare dependency rates. More than 60 per cent of households are reliant 
on housing benefit. The effect of urban renewal programmes has been to 
provide a superficially pleasant environment in some of these inner 
districts. The more recent housing is brick built, to conventional designs, 
landscaping can be luxuriant, school buildings are modern and shopping 
provision is improving, though there is a dearth of banks or other financial 
agencies. In environmental terms Manchester's inner city is not a terrible 
place in which to live. Forty years of municipal redevelopment have had 
effect. However, vandalism, arson and theft blight all community facilities, 
crime is intrusive, and poverty dictates the rhythms of everyday life. 
Explanations of inner city poverty by reference to deindustrialisation, 
most recently by WJ. Wilson (1991, 1993), overlook the role of the city 
centre economy as the place for unskilled and casual labour. And, 
according to Sassen, the advanced service sector generates demand for the 
unskilled (1988, 1991, 1994). However, in Manchester the consensus is that 
those who live in stigmatised neighbourhoods do not have equal access to 
service work (post-code discrimination) and those who are categorised as 
black, irrespective of skill or qualifications, find barriers. The city centre 
workforce of Manchester, like that of Liverpool (Dennis 1988; Moore 
1992a), but unlike that of London, is conspicuously white. City-centre 
employers may put a premium on acceptability much, or more than, 
suitability or skill Uenkins 1986). The critical dimension is the slackness of 
the regional market in which 'employers can pick and choose, both in 
recruiting and promoting. They exaggerate the skill, education, and 
experience requirements of their jobs. They use diplomas, or color, or 
personal histories as convenient screening devices' (Tobin 1972). Black, 
and other inner city, residents will not benefit from central city regenera-
tion because of the bar against their employment in service work. 
Evidence of benefit of prestige developments to inner city populations 
is hard to ascertain. The conventional methods of evaluation have either 
looked at labour force recruitment to specific projects (Loftman and Nevin 
1992), or the aggregate statistics for unemployment and welfare depend-
ency in the locality (Department of Environment 1994). The first cannot 
take account of the effects of the development on other employment 
opportunities; the second overlooks the consequences of mobility in and 
out of adjoining districts. If the stock of poor households is continually 
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replenished by others (Ward 1988) because inner cities have the regional 
reserve of undesired housing, no development strategy can affect the 
concentration of inner city poverty. The broader question of social benefit 
to the local population is avoided. What value will the 'leisure-domes' be to 
Manchester's children being brought up in households without a wage-
earner (37.5 per cent in 1991) unless they can see that they have access to 
either the facilities or (the relatively few) jobs generated? Current 'spot' 
treatment of the fabric of the city accentuates the previous spatial and social 
discontinuities,jeopardising the security, and therefore economic viability, 
of the privileged spaces. Property crime is a considerable difficulty at 
Salford Quays and other developments outside the core. 
Currently every stratagem open to the local leadership is being deployed 
to tie the city centre into a cosmopolitan circuit of work and play which will, 
at the same time, maximise its appeal to regional markets. The functional 
relationships of the inner city are very different. It constitutes a regional 
pool of low cost housing, a staging post for newcomers to the city, a place 
where poor people feel at home, and the site of informal industries such as 
drug-dealing and prostitution, as well as food-processing and clothing. The 
circumstances that brought this stigmatised space in proximity to the city 
centre have gone. While some of this space, notably Hulme, may be 
integrated into the 'Euro-city', the discontinuity between cosmopolitanism 
and poverty will remain. 
The cool revolution 
The opening photograph in the souvenir book of Manchester (Redhead 
1993) shows open-air tables outside one of the twenty-five city centre cafe-
bars listed in 1994. These, catering for a clientele ranging from the faded 
academic to the seriously 'cool', from the pin-striped to the 'cosmo-chic', 
(Greenhalgh 1994) have come to epitomise the 24-hour city which the 
growth alliance is pledged to promote. A revolution in style is being 
effected. Few could have envisaged adoption of the 'non-stop 24 hour city 
centre' (Central Manchester Development Corporation 1993b). Revelry in 
the public realm of the city centre has been tightly regulated for centuries. 
The people lived to a common rhythm of work and play regulated by 
religious and judicial systems, and common understandings of the time as 
well as the place for licentious pleasure. Underpinning the demand for 
reform in the 'closeted, prohibitive and therefore unwelcoming feel' 
(Stewart 1992) to British cities long remarked by foreigners (Schinkel 
1993), are critical changes in attitude to city centres and in urban clientele. 
The promotion of 'a new vision of the city which will also emphasise its 
nature as a means of communication, a place where people meet, talk and 
share experiences' (Mulgan 1989: 264) became a strategy of the Left which 
culminated in a model of a 'European' city with 'intense public life'. 
Architects and others disseminated the vision of cities 'where the com-
monest sounds are voices, footsteps and the buzz of the electric tram' 
(Rogers and Fisher 1992). Accordingly, in Manchester, Albert Square has 
been stone-setted in emulation of the central squares of Hamburg or Milan, 
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and the streets pedestrianised fifteen years ago are being refurbished. The 
City Council sponsors public festivities - fun-days, carnivals, fiestas, and 
fireworks; there is an annual festival of the arts; the city was City of Drama 
1994. There is much to see. 10 Increasingly, the local authority is a manager 
of spectacle, a more engaging role than that of mundane service delivery. 
Civic spectacle complements other shifts in the social profile. Through-
out the 1980s there was a sense of youth cultures bubbling under the 
surface of the conventional city. These culminated in 'Madchester' - the 
bubble of pop promotion that brought Manchester international repute 
from 1990-2 as the place to be. The mood was brilliantly evoked: 'Why 
Manchester? Where else could I go? There's nowhere in the world ... my 
God, I've got to get to Manchester ... so much to answer for. Day-trippers, 
sightseers, tourists, ravers, rovers, adventurers, scallys, op-kids, fugitives; all 
pouring into town' (Champion 1990: 12-13). Night-life is not without its 
problems: the lead club (Hacienda) had to close for part of 1991 because 
of gangland violence, and in 1994 ten clubs were closed down or stopped 
running black music nights because of protection rackets (Evans 1994). 
The expansion of the university sector (to 52,000 students in 1994) has 
given demographic force to the image. Young money floods into the city-
centre stores and clubs. In addition, the city has become known for its 
alternative cultures, and in the past three years has rapidly moved to the 
position of the gay centre for Northern England. By 1994 there was a 
promotable gay 'village', centred on the thirty-five listed enterprises in the 
city centre, with an annual festival drawing very large crowds. The 
entrepreneurs who colonised dead space in an accessible fringe to the 
down town have nevertheless had to contend with restrictive policing. 
The demographic profile of the inner core of the urban region is 
changing, and while the dimensions of class and race remain important, 
the other dimension of urban differentiation - lifestyle - is becoming more 
prominent (Shevky 1972). Increasingly the urban core is either an 
appropriate address at a given stage in the life-cycle, or the place to be 
different. In consequence there is a sharp social distinction emerging 
between city and suburbs which is not that of class or even race. 
Analysis 
The transformation of city centre Manchester into the 'cool' or 'vibrant' 
playground can be understood as part of a general process of reconquest 
of space in the urban cores (Zukin 1988). In the cycle of property 
investment the moment has come for reclamation of previously developed 
land and buildings: a rent-gap has opened between potential, or spec-
ulative, values and the values conferred by previous use. The role of the 
state agencies has been to facilitate a transition which will further the 
restructuring of the regional economy which led to the demise of the 
archaic city centre. The urban core economy is now dominated by two 
sectors - the knowledge industries and the professional and business 
service core - and it is the workforce of the former which is colonising the 
centre. In Manchester an urban bourgeoisie of merchants and local 
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businessmen which once worked and relaxed11 in the city centre has been 
replaced by a distinctive 'class fraction' which may work, relax and even live 
there (Wynne and O'Connor 1995). It is not therefore a process of 
gentrification so much as regentrification ( one replicated in the older 
suburbs). The signal feature is the blatancy of the redefinition of urban 
policy to this end. The 'Manchester script' (Quilley 1995) has now been 
honed to perfection by the journalists and public relations consultants, and 
is articulated freely by politicians or other advocates of the 'cool' city 
experience. 
The new cultural norms mark out the city centre as the setting for 
civilised appreciation of the city, its arts, and heritage. It is designated as 
the focus of the cultural industries on whose promotion, it is argued, city 
economies will increasingly depend (Bianchini 1989, 1991). Promoters can 
call on the ideas of a range of cultural entrepreneurs: the proclamation 
of cafe society and the delights of the urban promenade and the public 
square, the acclaim for the urban 'village', the linking of sustainability and 
central city living, the excavation of the texts ofBaudelaire, Benjamin and/ 
or de Beauvoir. These are all symptoms of active cultural business. The 
revalorisation of deserted downtowns requires a redefinition of taste and 
of the symbols of cultural standing, if high-cost and - by suburban 
definition - ugly and inconvenient buildings in insecure settings, are to 
find a market. 
However, very little investment directly services the professional/ 
business core to the core economy. Much of city centre entertainment and 
spectacle has middle mass appeal, and so many of the cultural industries, 
in particular the labyrinthine music industry with its 'postmodern hobos' 
(Terry 1995: 37), tell a different story - that of the clubs, old clothes-stalls 
and music stores. The urban cores are being colonised by the young and 
a-familial, poor and less poor, searching out abandoned and undesired 
abodes and the opportunities for enjoyment on their own terms. 
None of the writers on gentrification take into account the effects of the 
second 'demographic revolution' in which longevity, affluence and state 
support for education and household independence result in a differ-
entiation of opportunities in the life-course. City experience is becoming a 
statement of 'a-familiality' and urban living marks different stages in the 
life-cycle, typically those of youth and disruption to familial life. There is 
therefore evident a neat reversal to the Chicago School's proposition that 
city life leads to disorganisation and that, consequently, urbanism is 
denoted by the attrition of the family. In consequence the population of the 
inner core of British cities such as Manchester is a particular amalgam of 
opportunist lifestyle seekers and necessitarian survivors (Seeley 1966). It is 
this that gives central-city life its flavour of diversity and risk. 
The majority of those who use the city centre do not live in the inner 
core. Many are drawn there by the 'mobilisation of the spectacle' identified 
by Harvey (1989a) as the novel feature of contemporary cities. While he 
overlooked the entrenched role of what Castells had termed the 'ludic 
nucleus' (Castells 1977: 225) in the urban cores, Harvey did highlight the 
capitalisation of 'spaces of representation ... constructed spaces for ritual' 
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(1990: 262) and the ensuing shift into fantastic architecture. In contrast to 
previous urban societies with the open spectacle of street, square or church, 
that in the contemporary city is being commodified. And, in addition, the 
spontaneity of play is being channelled into crowd spectacle. In urban 
design the mass promenade, 'one emblem of a society which clings to the 
public realm as an important realm of personal experience' (Sennett 1986: 
218) becomes the centre of attraction. A theatrical building may substitute 
for history, custom or geography to draw the crowd. 
In a declining city, such as Manchester, the generation of spectacle is also 
a product of relentless and demeaning competition. Cities, as investment 
outlets, are players in·a global marketplace which can only increase 'the 
capitalisation of the locality' (Urry 1982: 469). The growth alliances have 
a common goal - that of stretching potential resources in heritage and local 
customs to put 'their' place on the map. The corollary of globalisation is a 
drive for the bold statement, the search for the vital element, the one 
building that can be recognised subliminally, world-wide. The fun, the 
magical moments of time out in the city, cannot be shown in publicity or 
distilled in the submission for investment, and so the spectacular building 
is substituted as icon. 
The work of 'making places in placeless times' (Robins 1991: 38) is 
demeaning because any memorable artefact or tourist-worthy quirk of 
tradition has to be hawked across the world. It is also demanding for it may 
have to overcome the dynamics of the place as it has become. The Olympic 
Bid campaign was unable to overcome the historically entrenched image of 
Manchester as dirt and pollution, poor living, work and rain, everything a 
sportive crowd wants to forget. Similarly the promoters of the city centre 
have to contend with media constructions of urban crime and pathology. 
The two districts of Manchester most likely to be identified by the national 
public are the notorious ones of Hulme (once the 'worst housing estate in 
Europe') and Moss Side ('Bronx of Britain') adjacent to city centre and 
university. And the local drug wars have given the city the tag of 
'Gunchester', one difficult to dislodge when street crime and violence are 
rife. 12 If Manchester's city centre is to front the region as a place of success 
and pleasure, its own history as the core of a poor city will have to be 
overcome. 
One incubus from the past is the social ecology of the city. Unlike 
continental cities the poverty belt envelops the city centre. These districts 
were notorious for their poverty ninety years ago (Hunter 1901: 116), and 
because of the circumstances of their rebuilding as slum clearance estates 
took on the additional stigma of 'inner city'. The regional centre is socially 
eclectic - extensively used by local poor as well as the young, and the 
regional majority. It is the shopping centre, marketplace, source of 
entertainment and relaxation for the inner-city populations. The Cali-
fornian precedent of the 'fortress' city (Davis 1990) cannot be followed 
without redesigning the city's public spaces and the allocation of more 
resources to their policing. The privileged minority in Manchester have to 
navigate the city centre as they do the urban terrain - with trajectories of 
avoidance and disregard. 
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The poverty belt is as it is because poor people have always lived there 
(Mellor 1984). They did so, in large number, because of the demand for 
rough labour in the city centre as well as the availability of cheap housing. 
Now their presence is an impediment to the 'reintegration' of space at the 
heart of the city. The contrast between this still to be privileged space and 
the space of the poor is less acute than that of the American cities but it is 
also less defensible. British cities are relatively permeable and current 
policy is to retain that characteristic (Manchester City Council 1995). And 
while the business core can be protected, the urban playground, by 
definition public space, cannot. 
However, the ultimate limit to the 'city of the future' - vibrant, 
cosmopolitan, entertaining and happening -will be the regional economy. 
If this is further depleted then it will become ever harder for the 
professional business core to retain its critical mass as the commercial 
centre into which insurance funds and others invest. The second limitation 
will be the counter-magnet of the suburbs: the city centre will become 
increasingly irrelevant to the economic and social life of the region except 
as 'a kind of liminal zone where some of the rules and restrictions of 
routine life are relaxed' (Lash and Urry 1994: 235). The third limitation 
will be that of the poverty belt. To the stigma of association has to be added 
the risks of work and play in the 'cool' city. 
NOTES 
l The population of the local authority district fell from 710,000 in 1951 to 420,000 in 1991; 
that of the innermost six wards by 75 per cent; some 79,000 dwellings were cleared 
between 1956 and 1980, only 39,000 being replaced in the city (Manchester City Council 
Planning Department 1980a). 
2 Cuts in the rate support grant and allocation for housing investment from 1979-89 had 
deprived the City Council of £1,500 million (at 1989 prices) (City Executive's Office,July 
1989). 
3 The borough, Manchester City, had a higher proportion of welfare-dependent house-
holds than any other local authority district in Britain in 1994. In October 1994 an 
estimated 42.3 per cent were receiving housing benefit. 
4 Financial Times, I 7 November 1989, The Economist, 21 October 1989 and Daily Tdegraph, 
19 December 1989. Prime rents had trebled between 1981 and the end of 1989, 
increasing by 90 per cent in 1988/9 to reach £14.50 per square foot. 
5 In 1988 it was 'forecast to fare the worst of all regions, suffering the biggest fall in 
employment ... output growth barely half the national average and a growing exodus of 
the population' (Cambridge Econometrics Economic Research Centre 1988). See also 
The Economist, l April 1989, in which the North West was ranked eighth out of eleven UK 
regions for growth. 
6 The Manchester Labour Party has been more cautious than those of Birmingham and 
Sheffield. The former's spending of £380 million on the International Convention 
Centre and the National Indoor Arena, as well as refurbishment of the city centre, 
1986-92, is argued to have been a contributory element in the underfunding of the city's 
education and housing budgets (Loftman and Nevin 1992). 
7 The letters page of the local newspaper is the only forum. The irony of bidding for the 
Olympic Games whilst unable to maintain park tennis courts was remarked on in 1992/3. 
Quite small sums of money can make a great difference to local life: a £25,000 grant to 
the Manchester Schools FA, or a similar sum for a playground, close to the £9 million 
velodrome in East Manchester, where 'residents are extremely angry to see the only 
facility for children in the area under threat at a time when millions of pounds are being 
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poured into the area in the name of regeneration and the Olympic bid' (MEN, 19 March 
1993). 
8 A procession of horse-drawn lorries and wagons traversed the city centre from Salford 
Station to the warehouse district to the south of the business centre twice a day because 
the cotton merchants kept to the practice of inspecting yarn and cloth at each stage of 
the process of manufacture at the city centre warehouses ( Official Guide to Manchester City 
1950, and oral evidence). 
9 Registered unemployment peaked at 20.3 per cent for the local authority area in January 
1993. The rate in October 1994 was 17.3 per cent, twice the national average. Male 
unemployment rates were more than 29 per cent in ten wards (all but one in the inner 
city). Six were areas of Afro-Caribbean and South Asian concentration; four out of five 
wards with the highest levels of women registering were areas of non-white concentration 
( Unemployment and Welfare Benefits Bulletin, no. 13, 1994, Manchester City Planning 
Department; 1991 census). 
10 The Tourist Board reported that the city was sixth in the UK tourism league with 330,000 
overseas visitors in 1993 (and also 1994), an increase of 47 per cent 1984-92 (Manchester 
Evening News, 14July 1994, llJuly 1995). 
11 The day of the independent textile merchant had a definite rhythm: office in the 
morning, coffee, dominoes or backgammon, lunch through the middle of the day in one 
of the large coffee houses, back to the office before returning home to the suburbs in 
the evening (oral evidence). 
12 In one neighbourhood alone there have been an estimated 1,000 street attacks in a year. 
Pickpockets work the crowds in the city centre, bag snatches are common, bus passengers 
are the target for violent thefts; the car parks require extra protection. Attraction of the 
leisure pound has to be tempered by caution (as in the cryptic advice to cruise along a 
particular section of one canal only in the mornings (Central Manchester Development 
Corporation 1993b; emphasis added). The risk is that of banditry by young men. 
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BEYOND "CULTURE CITY' 
Glasgow as a "dual city' 
Gerry Mooney and Mike Danson 
INTRODUCTION 
One of the main arguments emerging in urban studies in recent years is 
that social and economic changes, together with government policies, have 
led to the creation of various marginalised groups, or further excluded 
sections of the population long considered disadvantaged, primarily 
located in declining urban areas. Within the contemporary city social and 
economic polarisation has been accompanied by a corresponding reorgani-
sation of the urban spatial structure, so that emerging 'post-industrial' cities 
contain within them groups who have 'lost-out' through economic trans-
formation (Wilson 1987). This in turn has prompted claims of a 'dual city'. 
Castells has argued that the dual city image has long been a classic theme 
of urban sociology (Castells 1989: 224). However, of late the dual city 
metaphor has become a popular means in academic and media circles of 
describing urban spatial change and the growing divide between rich and 
poor, or affluent and 'socially excluded'. 
In many American studies in particular, the dual city is interpreted 
primarily in terms of an impoverished inner city contrasting with affluent 
middle-class districts located, though not exclusively, in suburban areas. 
'Elite enclaves' are thus contrasted with areas housing 'marginalised' social 
groups (Winchester and White 1988). The prevailing image is one which 
portrays the inner city as home to the poor or the new 'underclass', an area 
where 'urban problems' are contained. Sharkansky has argued that one of 
the dominant characteristics of modern American society is the develop-
ment of cities with 'two sides': 
Their attractive side includes productive manufacturing, innovative 
service industries, striking architecture, and experimental programs 
on the frontiers of social policy. Their unattractive side features slum 
housing, grinding poverty, widespread crime and attendant social 
programs that seem unable to cope with people's needs and occa-
sional disorder that threatens the political fabric. 
(Sharkansky 1975: 71) 
While these dualist models are more developed in American studies, it 
is becoming a convenient tool for describing the contemporary urban 
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landscape and for urban analysis in a European context. Here we wish to 
consider the applicability and usefulness of the dual city notion in the 
context of the 'regeneration' of Glasgow in recent years. We focus on 
Glasgow as it has been widely regarded as the model of urban renewal in 
Britain, having successfully navigated the path from a declining industrial 
to a reinvigorated post-industrial city. Further, in the context of Glasgow, 
ideas of a dual city take a different form from those depicted in the vast 
number of studies: while a distinction is still drawn between the 'affluent 
city' and the 'deprived city', for the most part the 'deprived city' is defined 
as the large post-war housing estates located on the perimeter, which have 
been largely bypassed by Glasgow's 'regeneration'. This is not to argue that 
spatial divisions are a new feature of cities such as Glasgow. As in many other 
British cities, historically spatial divisions existed between different parts. In 
Glasgow such divisions were accentuated in the post-war period by the rapid 
development of large 'peripheral estates' and in many accounts of 
Glasgow's regeneration it is these estates which represent, to borrow 
Sharkansky's phrase, the 'unattractive side' of modern Glasgow (for 
example, Keating 1988, 1989; Pacione 1986, 1990, 1993). 
In seeking to explore the dual city notion we begin by considering its use in 
previous studies. We turn then to focus on Glasgow and examine the 
particular ways in which the dual city idea has been used there, drawing on 
academic studies, media coverage of Glasgow's regeneration and local 
authority programmes for the 'deprived segments'. We conclude by question-
ing the usefulness of the dual city notion, examining the spatial patterns of 
poverty and disadvantage which characterise the city in the mid-1990s. 
THE DUAL CITY IDEA 
The dual city notion is by no means novel but has tended to re-emerge in 
different historical contexts in attempts to grasp the complexity of urban 
social and spatial patterns. However, several developments are responsible 
for its renewed popularity. The uneven impact on urban areas of global and 
national processes of economic change are widely regarded as increasing 
the economic and social marginalisation of particular social groups and the 
abandonment of much of the urban (industrial) landscape. In several 
American studies (Mollenkopf and Castells 1991; Savitch 1988; Sassen 
1991) this process has been interpreted in the framework of a post-
industrial transition. Mollenkopf and Castells, for example, claim that New 
York City has undergone a post-industrial transformation in recent years. 
While some groups have clearly benefited from the expansion of well-
paying service jobs, they also highlight the negative aspects of this post-
industrial shift in terms of the growth of poor quality employment. 
Sassen has further emphasised the impact of processes of work informal-
isation on the social structure of 'global cities' such as New York (Sassen 
1991). Occupational polarisation is accompanied by growing segregation 
on the basis of ethnic background whereby the less skilled and others 
unable to compete in the new labour market are concentrated in the less 
desirable areas and poorer housing. 
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The growth of poverty over the past two decades has become a major 
characteristic of urban areas. Augur (1993) has argued that in the United 
States there is an increasing 'urbanisation of poverty', the product of a 
combination of economic decline and government policies which have 
drastically reduced the scope and level of services for disadvantaged groups 
in American cities. This point is also taken up by Kantor who interprets the 
development of dual cities as a consequence of political failure to respond 
to those processes which generate urban inequalities (Kantor 1993). 
The dual city idea has gradually entered debates about urban polarisa-
tion in Europe. The notion has been explored in investigations of poverty 
in Amsterdam (Van Kempen 1994) and in Hamburg (Dangschat 1994) with 
both studies questioning its adequacy as an analytic tool and highlighting 
its vagueness. 
In Britain it is the residents of run-down inner-city districts and large 
local authority housing estates who are regarded as socially excluded. 
MacGregor argues that these areas have become central, not only to much 
of the contemporary discussion of social and spatial polarisation but also to 
the very language of urban poverty itself. 
Urban poverty, the underclass, the inner-city and the outer estate -
these terms become associated with drugs, prostitution, a walk on the 
wild side, living on the edge - stepping over the boundaries of 
normality and correctness. 
(MacGregor 1994: 67) 
For Robson, these processes of polarisation suggest that the future for 
many of Britain's major cities is bleak: 
The gloomy prospect that cities face is one of living with the ghetto, 
of the physical containment of the urban underclass, who might form 
10 per cent of the national population but perhaps one-third of that 
of the big cities. Unwanted, allowed to develop a subculture which sets 
them apart from mainstream society, such an underclass must form a 
recurring threat to the achievement of economic affluence for the 
majority. One increasingly plausible response may be that of contain-
ment. And where better to contain than in the run-down housing 
estates on the fringe of large city centres, or in the girdle of deprived 
populations lying outside the central city. 
(Robson 1989: 22-3) 
The key organising concept which serves to link debates about urban 
poverty and polarisation is the 'underclass'. It is unusual for sociological 
concepts to enter into popular discourse, but the notion of an underclass 
is clearly an exception. In both academic studies and literary works alike, 
not to mention in a wide body of journalistic writing, versions of the 
underclass thesis have been used to give expression to a wide range of 
popular fears, and moral panics over contemporary social 'problems'. 
The resulting image is one which portrays an increasingly divided city: a 
relatively affluent and increasingly suburbanised white (and growing black) 
middle class on the one hand and a poor black underclass, economically 
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and socially isolated in inner city ghettos. Cities are thus becoming more 
economically polarised and spatially segregated with a widening divide 
between those who have benefited from the new job opportunities in well 
paying sectors, and those who are forced to rely upon casualised employ-
ment. Interwoven with this are inequalities deriving from divisions of race 
and gender. The divide is generally portrayed as between the rich and poor, 
between those who have been able to participate in the consumer booms 
of recent years and a growing population who are both welfare-dependent 
and socially excluded. 
The dominant view is one which claims that economic transformation 
and social change are producing an increasingly isolated mass of poor 
people, cut-off from and largely bypassed by centres and processes of 
economic growth. The outcome is the creation of two cities in a shared 
spatial context: one for the rich and one for the poor; a city doing 'well' and 
one doing 'poorly', and a dramatically widening gulf between the two. 
THE REPRESENTATION OF GLASGOW AS A 
DUAL CITY 
The apparent success story of Glasgow's attempts in recent years to 
restructure its economic base and reverse decades of economic decline has 
placed it increasingly in the academic and media spotlight. Glasgow was the 
place to visit to explore successful place-marketing; cultural-led urban 
regeneration programmes and public-private agency partnership at its 
most successful. 
However, the spotlight did not fall only on the 'Miles Better Campaign', 
the National Garden Festival in 1988 or the European Year of Culture in 
1990. The national British media, some sections of the international press, 
policy-makers and several academics, while praising policies applied in 
Glasgow, were also increasingly drawing attention to the 'problems' of those 
areas neglected by the image-makers and bypassed by urban regeneration. 
For many it was the 'problems' of the peripheral housing estates which 
required particular attention. 
Glasgow's 'outer' (or 'peripheral') estates were a product of slum 
clearance programmes and the need to tackle severe housing shortages in 
the 1930s, 1940s and 1950s. Starting with Pollok in the mid-l 930s, for the 
next twenty-five years a series of large public-sector estates were con-
structed. The biggest estates, at Castlemilk, Drumchapel, Easterhouse and 
Pollok, were the main recipients of the slum clearance population who were 
rehoused within the city. At their peak in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the 
four large estates accommodated around 200,000 people, almost exclu-
sively in social housing. One outcome of these housing and renewal 
programmes was the creation of a new layer of spatial segregation, 
superimposed on those patterns of residential divisions laid down in 
previous periods. 
From being the solution to Glasgow's housing problems in the immedi-
ate post-war period, by the late 1960s the peripheral estates were figuring 
on the table of deprivation indicators. While in the early 1970s this was 
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largely confined to areas of declining industrial activity and districts with 
private-rented housing along the Clyde, by 1981 the four large peripheral 
estates had become significant locales of 'multiple deprivation'. This was 
reflected in the large number of estates identified as Areas of Priority 
Treatment by Strathclyde Regional Council at this time. During the 1970s the 
spatial distribution of urban deprivation in Glasgow had significantly 
changed, partly as a consequence of urban renewal and slum clearance 
programmes in the inner city, which led to dramatic falls in inner-city 
populations (Pacione 1993). Glasgow's outer estates were built at a time of 
relative economic growth and increased state housing provision. But by the 
late 1960s and 1970s, its economic base had dramatically declined, 
reflecting the long-term de-industrialisation of the economy. Lee highlights 
the ways in which the changing (and declining) economic fortunes of 
Britain's older industrial cities impact on outer estates. His comments 
about Liverpool's overspill estates apply directly to Glasgow: 
The residents of its hurriedly constructed and under-serviced outer 
estates, like Kirkby, Speke, and Halewood, were decanted from the 
inner-city as part of the Fordist processes of urban restructuring 
during the long boom. They now live lives in which many are deprived 
both of a livelihood in the capitalist economy and of support from a 
welfare economy devastated by the effects of the urban fiscal crisis. 
(Lee 1989: 69) 
For Pacione, results of the 1991 census confirmed arguments that the 
'urban crisis' was becoming particularly acute in such estates (Pacione 
1993). In contrast to other parts of Britain where the inner city remained 
the key 'deviant' area, home to the urban underclass (MacGregor and 
Pimlott 1990), in Scotland it was the peripheral estates dotted around the 
main cities which had become the 'problem spaces' (although to some extent 
outer estates in English cities were beginning to figure in accounts of urban 
deprivation). By the mid- to late 1980s, when Glasgow's regeneration was 
well under way, opponents of the regeneration strategy and media 
commentators alike did not have far to look to highlight the other side of 
culture city. 
How was the dual city/two city idea expressed in the Glasgow context? 
From the late 1980s it is possible to identify this notion in both national and 
local newspapers, on national and Scottish-based television, in several 
academic accounts of Glasgow's regeneration and in studies of rising 
poverty levels on Clydeside. Oflate it has begun to emerge, albeit implicitly 
in some instances, in economic strategy reports produced by public 
agencies in Strathclyde (for example Glasgow City Council 1991; Glasgow 
Regeneration Alliance 1993). In 1992 Glasgow's new image was shaken by 
the publicity given by the media to a gangland murder trial which lasted for 
several months. The two city idea was grasped by sections of the media keen 
to explain the co-existence of 'Merchant City', a renewal area adjacent to 
the city centre which is seen as representing the 'new Glasgow', along with 
gang 'warfare' and rising crime. This also characterised some newspaper 
accounts of violence in the city in August 1995. But in the main the dual city 
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idea has been grasped by those eager to account for increasing levels of 
poverty at a time of economic change and substantial private sector 
investment in the city. 
It was Keating in The City That Refused To Die (1988) who was among the 
first to popularise and apply the notion in a Glasgow context. Previously 
Keating and Boyle (1986) had explored Glasgow's 'dual economy': a 
situation whereby large-scale city centre renewal and inward investment was 
in marked contrast to the underfunded peripheral estates. While the 
populations of these estates were largely characterised by poor health, 
unemployment, low skills and a life of poverty, there had been little 
opposition to the growing social and spatial divide within Glasgow. The 
reason Boyle later provided was stark: 
Glasgow's poor are simply no longer part of the city. In economic, 
political, or social terms, their alienation from the city is now almost 
complete. Years of isolation bred hopelessness; the response of the 
very poorest has been to withdraw into a personal world of survival, 
far removed from city centre renewal, waterfront housing, and new 
shopping centres. 
(Boyle 1990: 129) 
This theme had also been taken up by Keating. He saw Glasgow as a 
prime example of an economically 'stagnating city', with few growth 
sectors. Urban restructuring and renewal programmes, while improving 
Glasgow's image, had heightened social and geographical inequalities, 
increasing the isolation of the populations of the outer estates. 
[The] result is a 'dual city', with few dynamic sectors and a consider-
able revival of downtown amenities ... but, overall, with a stagnant 
economy, considerable social distress, and a growing housing 
problem. 
(Keating 1989: 516) 
Large public sector housing programmes in the post-war period had 
created a spatially divided city, wherein outlying estates would be largely cut-
off from inward investment in the city centre. As opposed to the entrepre-
neurial dynamism of the core, the peripheral estates could be seen as a 
'welfare city', where the majority of the residents survived either on welfare 
benefits or on poor quality, low paid employment. But this 'dualism' would 
be further exacerbated by policies which saw these estates in isolation from 
the wider Glasgow and Strathclyde economies. 
The idea that the peripheral estates represented a 'welfare city' was also 
expressed by Pacione in his study of the changing pattern of poverty in 
Glasgow. Pacione saw the outlying estates as typically 'cashless societies', 
characterised by high levels of welfare-dependency (Pacione 1990: 308). 
The conditions prevalent in this city stood in marked contrast to those 
which characterised Glasgow's 'other city'. 
While Keating, Boyle and Pacione sought to avoid a 'blame the victim' 
type of argument, and argued that the 'problems' of the peripheral estates 
had to be seen in relation to the overall economy of Glasgow, their 
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uncritical use of some of the concepts and terms characteristic of much of 
the underclass debate allows for different interpretations of their argu-
ments. Despite the call for regeneration programmes to be extended to 
include the peripheral estates, the language of dual city or two cities allows 
the problems in the peripheral estates to be seen as residual, particularly by 
the policy-makers. The print and television media were quick to pick-up on 
some of the emotive language following from the dual city argument and 
the wider debate emerging in Britain about the underclass and social 
polarisation. A number of articles appeared in both the Glasgow-based 
press and national press which applied the dual city idea with renewed 
vigour. The following extracts are indicative of many of the press reports 
which appeared around this time: 
But hidden behind the logoed smiles of the Glasgow's Miles Better 
campaign is another Glasgow, a city in deep economic crisis, and a city 
haunted by the reality of growing poverty ... Glasgow in 1988 is a tale 
of two cities and two competing economies. 
(Sunday Times, 7 August 1988) 
So much of the new Glasgow remains irrelevant to so many. On the 
surface the city is going great guns but for a substantial slice of the 
population the city which is miles better is a mirage. They can see it 
from their peripheral estates where they are sentenced by Glasgow's 
new social imbalance to live under economic house arrest. They can 
look on but they cannot touch. For them the Glasgow which is miles 
better is miles away. 
(Glasgow Herald, 5 December 1988) 
Easterhouse, with Castlemilk, Drumchapel and Pollok, the other 
'peripheral estates' which ring the city, is cut-off from Glasgow's 
much-mooted renaissance, its residents trapped in a spiral of poverty 
and economic decline. Boom time in the centre has thrown poverty 
on the margins into stark relief. In Glasgow, the last decade's 
deepening divide between rich and poor is probably at its sharpest. 
(Independent, 24April 1989) 
When urban poverty is concentrated at a city's heart it cannot easily 
escape notice by those who have avoided it directly. Exported to the 
literal margins of conurbations it can be easily unnoticed ... All 
around the periphery of Glasgow, and other Scottish cities it might be 
added, are large districts with daunting problems of social and 
economic deprivation. 
( Glasgow Heraul, 5 January 1990) 
Glasgow, for all the strides made in the 80s, is still teetering on the 
brink. In real terms it remains one of Britain's more impoverished 
cities. And unless the momentum for change and renewal is main-
tained, there is a danger it will slip back down the ladder. Or merely 
perpetuate its existence as a tale of two cities, with a confident up-beat 
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centre - and away from the bright lights, a hinterland of unemploy-
ment, run-down housing schemes, and chronically under developed 
urban 'black holes'. 
( Glasgow Evening Times, 3 July 1991) 
Again the predominant themes which tended to emerge from these 
newspaper reports were ones which focused on welfare 'dependency', 
'cashless economies', 'deserts of despair', 'hopelessness' and the growing 
concentrations of single-parent families. Numerous other articles pro-
vided human interest stories of the 'hell' of living in Glasgow's outer 
estates. Indeed the Sunday Times, when devoting space to Charles 
Murray's arguments about an emerging British underclass, highlighted 
Easterhouse in particular as an example of a council estate 'consistent 
with reports from inner-city Washington and New York' (Sunday Times, 
26 November 1989: 30). 
One of the main ideas to emerge from these reports, and in a number 
of television programmes broadcast during 1990, was the growing margin-
alisation of the outer estate populations, cut-off from processes of eco-
nomic regeneration. Thus the peripheral estates were not only peripheral 
in geographical terms, but were peripheralised economically, socially and 
politically. The picture which dominated tended to stereotype the periph-
eral estates as uniformly run-down and deprived. The two Glasgows - the 
'old' (here depicted by the not-so-old peripheral estates) and the 'new' (as 
represented by Merchant City, tourist attractions and new shopping 
centres) -were starkly counterposed. 
While thus far these ideas have not been wholly accepted by the policy-
makers who drive Glasgow's regeneration programme, there is some 
evidence that the two city notion has begun to influence a number of public 
and private sector agencies which are operating in the city. In 1991 Glasgow 
City Council's Planning Department warned of the long-term consequences 
ofignoring the outer estates, which could undermine the regeneration of the 
entire city (Glasgow City Council 1991: 10). This perspective has emerged 
explicitly in arguments made by the Glasgow Regeneration Alliance (GRA) 
(G. Mooney 1994). This Alliance, which comprises four public sector 
agencies, was launched with the promise of a £1.5 billion investment package 
for 'disadvantaged areas', including the peripheral estates. Continuing 
population decline had left Glasgow with an 'unbalanced social structure', 
increasingly marginalised in deprived areas. For the GRA, Glasgow's long-
term economic revitalisation was dependent upon utilising the resources of 
such areas. Further, the threat to Glasgow's new image which such areas 
posed, particularly to the growing tourist trade, was also highlighted as a 
major cause for concern. The four large peripheral estates offered consider-
able land development opportunities together with abundant labour sup-
plies. Easterhouse and Pollok were adjacent to the existing and planned 
motorway network and thus were 'strategic gateways' to the city offering 
economic development opportunities. 
Despite claims that the GRA was committed to 'unlocking the full 
potential' of disadvantaged areas throughout Glasgow, it is not difficult to 
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identify the attractiveness of the peripheral estates in terms of their land 
development potential. In other words it was not the space occupied by the 
peripheral estates which was redundant, but sizeable chunks of their 
populations. 
Population decline in the outer estates during the 1980s and early 1990s 
had led to proposals that at least one estate should be completely 
demolished, with the population being rehoused in the 20,000 empty 
council houses spread across Glasgow. While such proposals were not fully 
developed, the thinking that lay behind them illustrates the extent to which 
over the past 10-15 years the outer estates have come to be regarded as the 
key urban problem in Glasgow. Claims that they have become in some sense 
'surplus' to requirements have not been hard to find, particularly in press 
coverage. By the early 1990s the idea that the peripheral estates had 
become 'outcast Glasgow' or Glasgow's 'second city' had been clearly 
established. 
What emerges from this discussion is the language of much of the 
underclass debate. While references to the underclass in the Glasgow 
context have been few in number thus far, ideas of dependency, exclusion, 
marginalisation, hopelessness and despair have dominated the accounts of 
the emerging socio-spatial divide in the city. The portrayal of the peripheral 
estates in particular as uniformly depressed and welfare-dependent has 
been widely reported. Such views tend to regard these areas as residual 
problems. But how adequate are such claims and how far is the problem of 
poverty a problem of - or confined to - peripheral estates? 
THE GEOGRAPHY OF POVERTY IN STRATHCLYDE 
Glasgow is the major city within the Strathclyde Region of central Scotland. 
In Strathclyde Region the long-established 'Social Strategy' is based upon 
a spatial social policy implemented through the concept of 'Areas of 
Priority Treatment' (APT). These are defined using a number of indicators 
which have been identified as being closely correlated with poverty. Other 
social indicators tend to confirm the results delivered by these statistics and 
recent analyses testify to the validity of using these proxies (Strathclyde 
Regional Council 1994). 
Analysis of the 1991 Census of Population suggests that the extent of 
relative poverty and deprivation appears to have become more widespread 
in the decade 1981-91, requiring a broadening in the coverage of APTs. 
The notion of priority treatment has been reduced, though, by this 
depression in the living standards of many in the working class across the 
metropolitan area of Glasgow, the Glasgow conurbation and the wider 
Strathclyde Region. However, in its strategic role the Council has continued 
to promote the concept of APTs on the grounds of the persistence of 
concentrations of poverty; in Glasgow and Paisley especially, multiple 
deprivation has become even more focused on specific areas in the last 
decade (Strathclyde Regional Council 1994). Nevertheless, the Region 
highlights a more dispersed and varied deprivation in the rest of Strath-
clyde, with many of the poorest living outside the worst areas of poverty. In 
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other words, poverty has become deeper and more widespread throughout 
Strathclyde, questioning the idea of a spatially concentrated and well-
defined underclass. 
Although the Regional Councils in Scotland have been abolished under 
local government reorganisation in 1996, the reappraisal of the area-based 
approach to social strategy is of importance to more than the authority 
itself, as many other agencies have adopted this method of focusing on the 
deprived, enumerated by communities and households. Given the rigour, 
the well-established acceptance of the methodology, and the availability of 
the analysis, the Strathclyde Region approach to measuring the extent and 
distribution of poverty and multiple deprivation has been adopted here 
also. If an underclass or dual city does exist, then unique concentrations of 
multiple deprivation would be expected and so the APT definitions hold 
promise in the pursuit and identification of an excluded people. 
The 1980s witnessed a major restructuring in the Clydeside economy, 
with 44 per cent of manufacturing and 5 per cent of service jobs 
disappearing from the city over the decade. Unemployment, however, is not 
highly correlated with the other principal indicators of poverty, such as lone 
parents, elderly or disabled. As the poor earn their poverty, suffer from 
debilitating illnesses, struggle to raise a family single handedly, or carry 
these burdens into old age, so they may be concentrated with similar 
people, but not exclusively or comprehensively with all such groups. 
As in previous Censuses, the figures for 1981 and 1991 show that while 
the city has continued to suffer from relative multiple deprivation, the old 
industrial districts on the periphery of the conurbation have also deteri-
orated since 1981. The populations of Glasgow, Renfrew and Inverclyde are 
over-represented compared with the share expected from a simple count of 
their residents. In total, 12 per cent (280,000) of the Regional population 
live in the areas of severe deprivation designated as Priority 1 or 'Major 
Social Strategy Initiative Areas'. All of the Glasgow APTs are included in the 
priority areas of the government quangos and public/private sector 
partnerships in Clydeside, including Scottish Homes and the Glasgow 
Regeneration Alliance. In none was unemployment below 27 per cent, lone 
parents headed up between 35 per cent and 52 per cent of households, 
while the lives of 13-21 per cent of the non-elderly population were limited 
by long-term illnesses. 
Few of the Priority 2 or 'Smaller Social Strategy Urban Initiative Areas 
and Priority Rural Areas' have instances of the very worst Enumeration 
Districts (EDs), the smallest local units of the Census, but any degree of 
concentration of poverty is to be found in Glasgow city. The Priority 3 areas 
are either 'Urban Programme Eligible Areas' or 'Other Deprived Rural 
Areas'. As the local authority document notes, however, some elements of 
deprivation in the latter are not addressed by the Census (for example, 
access). 
The Census has confirmed the city's position as the centre for poverty 
and deprivation in the region. On a range of indicators (unemployment, 
lone parents, overcrowding and vacancy rates), Glasgow appears as the 
worst district in Strathclyde, non-elderly illness being the exception. 
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Glasgow has 50 per cent ofEDs in the worst 10 per cent in Scotland and 87 
per cent of the worst 5 per cent in Strathclyde. In dynamic terms, 
comparing the City with its wider Region suggests that couples tend to move 
out to the suburbs when they are newly married or otherwise ready to start 
a family, a standard pattern of mobility. 
Unemployment is appreciably higher in the city. Although 'race' is 
a poor indicator of deprivation in Scotland, the relatively low numbers 
of ethnic minorities in Strathclyde are concentrated in the city (21,500). 
While a higher proportion of the elderly have a limiting long-term illness, 
the differential is greater for younger age groups. A much higher 
proportion of households have no car, again a common large-city 
phenomenon. 
Other non-census indicators show that age-specific death and morbidity 
rates are higher in Glasgow than elsewhere in the region, UK and indeed 
Europe. Wage and income data suggest a higher dependence on the 
benefit system and basic pensions, with a greater proportion of jobs in low 
paying sectors. The proportion of the relevant population receiving free 
schoel meals, income support, housing benefit or clothing grants are all 
highest in Glasgow in a list of Districts in the Region. 
Together these data suggest that Glasgow has suffered and continues to 
suffer from the aftermath of decline and stagnation. Moreover, the large 
expansion in the new service sectors of the 1980s (banking, insurance and 
finance, personal services and public and private administration), all 
promoted as key elements of the post-industrial city and as compensation 
for the haemorrhaging of skilled manufacturing employment, has over-
whelmingly benefited commuters outside the city. Nearly half of all jobs are 
now taken by residents of the dormitory suburbs, of satellite towns, and of 
other regions within daily travelling distance. 'Trickle-down' processes of 
regeneration are difficult to discern in this evidence. Yet mobility out of the 
city and the widespread levels of multiple deprivation throughout Strath-
clyde suggest that Glasgow is not simply home to a new regional underclass, 
made redundant by the restructuring of the last quarter century. To 
determine how concentrated the poverty is within Glasgow, it is necessary 
to look at the peripheral estates and renewal areas of the city. 
Between 1981 and 1991, population loss was especially severe in the 
peripheral estates (PEs) (30.4 per cent) and the renewal areas (RAs) in 
general (20.5 per cent) compared with under 4 per cent in the rest of 
Glasgow, suggesting a relative move from the poorest areas into the wider 
city. This in itself undermines the notion that a permanently excluded 
underclass exists with limited mobility to the rest of the community, or that 
poverty is concentrated in certain areas, or is dominant in those areas, or 
therefore in those areas alone. 
As to the composition of the respective areas, the proportion of all 
households with children is highest in the PEs (39 per cent), lower in the 
RAs as a whole (30 per cent) and only 22 per cent in the rest of the city. The 
proportion of lone parents has increased across the city. There is a 
significant concentration of lone parents in poorer areas, with 70 per cent 
of all lone parents in the city living in RAs, half in the PEs alone. 
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Another group subject to poverty and deprivation are the single elderly, 
yet these are under-represented in the poorest areas: 12 per cent in PEs, but 
with similar proportions in the RAs (17 per cent) and in the wider city ( 18 
per cent). This demonstrates that the deprived communities are themselves 
of different histories and structures. Older industrial districts are deprived 
because of the redundancy of their populations' skills and networks in the 
1970s, with induced and institutionalised immobility concentrating poverty 
locally. The new concentrations of single parents in some parts of some 
peripheral estates, for instance, are created no less by economic, housing 
and family interactions, but give rise to different areas of multiple 
deprivation. 
Critically, therefore, the areas where the poor live cannot be explained 
simply in one dimension; by extension, there is not a class defined by 
different criteria from the rest of the working class, rather they are a 
heterogeneous set of the population that is often concentrated in particular 
parts of the city, region and nation. Many of their number can be found 
beyond the 'areas for priority treatment'; that is, the areas defined as having 
the worst problems of poverty and deprivation. 
CONCLUSION 
The conclusion which is drawn from the analysis of poverty and deprivation 
in contemporary Glasgow presented here is not one which lends support 
to the dual city model. In this respect our conclusions follow those made 
by other critics of the two city notion. This is not to deny however, that there 
is an uneven distribution of poverty in the city or that poverty is 
concentrated in certain areas. What is being contested is the usefulness of 
the dual city argument for our understanding of such distributions and the 
processes which contribute to it. While there is an important distinction to 
be drawn between simplistic uses of the dual city notion, exemplified by 
press reports, and more sophisticated sociological accounts (for example 
Mollenkopf and Castells 1991), they tend to suffer from similar problems. 
The language of the two city/ dual city argument is one which is seriously 
flawed by definitional and conceptual difficulties. Despite the continuing 
use of concepts such as polarisation, underclass, exclusion and margin-
alisation, we are little clearer about the underlying factors which are viewed 
as contributing to such processes. In this respect the dual city perspective 
and its implicit arguments about growing socio-spatial polarisation are 
plagued by ambiguity and vagueness (Fainstein et al. 1992; Hamnett 1994; 
Marcuse 1989; Van Kempen 1994; Woodward 1995). 
In discussions of the emerging 'tale of two cities' in Glasgow, the 
attention which the peripheral estates received does not relate directly to 
the levels and proportions of poverty to be found there. In part this is a 
consequence of reluctance to define adequately the areas or social groups 
concerned. Further within peripheral estates there is a marked differ-
entiation between the various component parts in terms of unemployment, 
poverty and deprivation. This is almost completely neglected in the 
dominant picture of these estates which has emerged in recent years which 
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stereotypes the estates as homogeneous enclaves of 'despair' or 'hope-
lessness'. 
It is also evident from the analysis of the spatial distribution of poverty 
in Strathclyde that the situation throughout Glasgow is deteriorating relative 
to the rest of the Region. Only in two other Strathclyde Districts - Renfrew 
and Inverclyde - is there an increase in the concentration of poverty. This 
raises a major problem with the dual city concept - that of scale (Van 
Kempen 1994: 996). Suburban areas have continued to prosper, largely at 
the expense of other parts of the region. Such a pattern may then justify the 
fears of politicians that there will be a continuing population exodus from 
Glasgow as a whole with an increasingly welfare-dependent population and 
an even more 'unbalanced social structure'. 
That the dual city model fails to capture the complexity of social and 
spatial divisions within the urban setting is apparent in many of the studies 
mentioned here. Mollenkopf and Castells, for instance, question the 
continuing use of the term for implying a simple dichotomy between rich 
and poor areas (Mollenkopf and Castells 1991: 405). Despite this, Castells 
in particular has continued to utilise the notion. The dual city, he claims, 
is the fundamental urban dualism of our time: 
It opposes the cosmopolitanism of the elite, living on a daily 
connection to the whole world ... to the tribalism of local commu-
nities, retrenched in their spaces that they try to control as their last 
stand against the macro-forces that shape their lives out of their reach. 
The fundamental dividing line in our cities is the inclusion of the 
cosmopolitans in the making of the new history while excluding the 
locals from the control of the global city to which ultimately their 
neighbourhoods belong. 
(Castells 1994: 30) 
But the continuing use of the dual city idea obscures more than it 
illuminates our understanding of the dynamics which underlie the divide 
referred to by Castells. What are the links between growth and decline and 
poverty and affluence in urban areas? Much of Glasgow's economic 
regeneration has been founded upon the growth of relatively low paid and 
temporary employment, increasing the proportion of the population who 
have only a tentative hold on the labour market. 
Despite the arguments that the peripheral estates are essential to the 
long-term economic future of the city, at present the dominant representa-
tion is one which sees such areas as residual problems. In this respect the 
dual city notion gives rise to a 'poor versus the rest' type of argument which 
serves to obscure the fundamental relations of power and profit in the 
modern city (Marcuse 1989: 707). Following from this, Beauregard is right 
to highlight the politics of the dual city representation: 
All dualities are political statements. They convey a hierarchical posi-
tioning that reinforces prevailing relations of power and privilege and 
they do so in a historically contingent and rhetorically embedded way. 
(Beauregard 1993: 227) 
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The peripheral estates have become symbolic of the 'dark side' of 
contemporary Glasgow: the' city of despair' in contrast to the' city of hope and 
splend(fUr' (Van Kempen 1994). But such symbolic representations tell us 
little about the realities of an economically depressed city. In this respect, 
then, it is not only the idea of a 'city of despair' which is problematic. With 
its declining position on the European periphery, and rising levels of 
poverty and deprivation, can we speak of Glasgow as a 'city of hope and 
splendour' either? 
6 
•RACE', HOUSING AND THE CITY 
Peter Ratcliffe 
INTRODUCTION 
The analysis which follows stems from a growing concern at the apparent 
inability of the literature, both beyond the discipline and within it, to 
provide a convincing theorisation of the structural position of Britain's 
minority populations within the housing market. Given that large-scale 
post-war migration from Africa, the Caribbean and the Indian sub-
continent began in the 1950s, and that significant numbers of black citizens 
had settled in Britain many decades earlier (Fryer 1984; Hirn 1991; May 
and Cohen 1974), this is somewhat surprising. Within the obvious confines 
of such a brief chapter, I shall endeavour to sketch out the basis for a 
re-evaluation of existing debates, and demonstrate how newly available 
empirical data can provide insights into the value (or otherwise) of various 
substantive theoretical positions. 
'RACE", ETHNICITY AND HOUSING INEQUALITIES: 
THE KEY DEBATES 
If we are to analyse inequalities in housing, we need to be clear about (a) 
the bases of these inequalities, and (b) the groups of people or households 
who are to form the focal point for comparison. As to the first of these, 
there are a number of dimensions; principally, tenure, dwelling type, 
location, structural condition, amenities and overcrowding levels. Although 
apparently unproblematic, variations in definition and modes of data 
collection almost inevitably create problems for a comparative analysis, as 
is demonstrated below. It is, however, the identification of comparator 
groups which raises the key sociological questions. 
Although there is much confusion in the literature as to the appropriate-
ness of various 'race'/ ethnic group categorisations (not to mention 
underlying theoretical debates concerning the ontological status of 'race' 
- Bulmer 1986a; Mason 1995) there is little disagreement about the existence 
of major inequalities in the housing market. Thus, the 'Black-Caribbean' 
population is characterised as traditionally exhibiting a much lower level of 
owner-occupation than the general population (and other minority groups, 
with the notable exception of the 'Bangladeshis'), and a correspondingly 
higher dependence on the social housing sector. For a variety of reasons, 
the least favoured property types and locations have tended to be a 
consistent feature of these lettings (Henderson and Karn 1987; Phillips 
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1986; Simpson 1981). Despite this, Black-Caribbeans have scored quite 
highly on basic amenities largely on the grounds that, irrespective of 
structural condition, public sector housing will almost inevitably have such 
things as a fixed bath, running hot water and an inside WC. 
The 'South Asian' groups, once again with the exception of the 
Bangladeshis, have been characterised as having far higher rates of owner-
occupation than the general population, and a correspondingly low (if 
gradually increasing) presence in the social housing sector. Rather than 
painting a positive picture of achievement, most commentators point to the 
fact that many of these dwellings are amongst the very worst of the housing 
stock, and are often either in a serious state of disrepair, or are actually unfit 
for human habitation (Karn et al. 1985). The clear exceptions are twofold. 
On the one hand, there is the growing (predominantly 'Indian') middle 
class who tend to own rather better quality property (though still usually in 
close proximity to the inner urban areas). On the other are the Bangla-
deshis who, as a relatively recently arrived migrant group, and a predom-
inantly poor one at that, have tended to become concentrated in poor 
quality local authority property, such as in Tower Hamlets in East London 
(Phillips 1986). Although segregation levels have in general been much 
higher for all South Asian groups, as compared (say) with the Black-
Caribbeans, the Bangladeshi levels have been exceptionally high (Peach 
1996); high both with respect to the majority White population and to other 
minority groups (except at times the other predominantly Muslim group, 
i.e. the Pakistanis). 
Explanations of these differentials, in the UK at least, have invariably 
talked in one form or another about either the constraints faced by migrant 
groups, or the choices they have made in providing a roof over their heads 
(Rex and Moore 1967; Dayha 1974; Ballard and Ballard 1977; Karn 1977 /8; 
Ratcliffe 1986; Smith 1991). The more convincing contributions to the 
debate have attempted to balance the two sides of the equation, accepting 
the force of the argument that migrants of all groups had both individual 
and collective aims (and political strategies), whilst clearly living and 
working in a society which was (and is) endemically racist. Dissatisfaction 
with the apparent sterility of much of the choice-constraints-based lit-
erature has, however, led some to look for more sophisticated forms of 
analysis. Sarre et al. (1989) suggest that a development of Giddens's 
structuration theory might provide a way forward. This ostensibly permits 
a dynamic, dialectical analysis, highlighting the interplay between material 
conditions, institutional forms and structural forces (though it could be 
argued that ultimately it simply produces a more elaborate version of 
previous, well-rehearsed arguments). 
The key sociological questions appear to be largely evaded, however. In 
claiming, for example, that 'ethnicity explains' housing market location via 
the notion of choice, we need to ask what is meant by 'ethnicity' and in what 
sense this 'explains' observed patterns. It seems at best implausible that 
'ethnicity' as a conflation of cultural and religious traditions, and/or a 
sense of 'group identity and belonging' (say), would influence attitudes 
towards housing tenure. However, first-hand experience of the workings of 
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a housing market in a migrant's country of origin, may. But, then, the 
underlying social relations of production and exchange arguably have little 
directly to do with 'ethnicity'. And to isolate and prioritise 'ethnicity' as an 
explanatory factor seems to beg the question as to the relative significance 
of factors such as class, gender, age/position in life-cycle, household size/ 
structure, and so on. As to 'explanation', we are able to provide little more 
in practice than a collective characterisation which then serves as a 
representation of the summation of individual actions. 
On the constraints side of the equation, we have a negation of 'ethnicity' 
as a mode of explanation, and its replacement by individual or collective 
acts of discrimination, 'institutionalised racism', and/or the 'racialisation' 
of the housing market. These accounts portray the migrant essentially as 
victim of external forces, and deny, or at least downplay, the efficacy of 
agency on the part of the individual/household. In its 'purest' form, 
therefore, this constitutes a highly deterministic mode of explanation, and 
lacks the capacity to account for the widespread variations in housing 
position of households with differing ( and even the same) ethnic heritage(s). 
To suggest, as some commentators have, that 'different racisms' are at work, 
does not seem to present a fruitful line of enquiry (though it is undoubtedly 
the case, for example, that discrimination can take different forms and have 
uneven effects). In practice, the constraints are seen to be of greater or 
lesser significance in the light of an individual's gender, class position, and 
so on. Also, in practice, even those who adhere to the 'choice' agenda, 
acknowledge the existence of discriminatory mechanisms, some (e.g. 
Ballard and Ballard 1977) even admitting that these factors are logically 
prior to the individual choices of minority households. 
The present chapter seeks to add to the theoretical literature, but not 
through an extension of existing, ultimately arid, conceptual debates. 
Employing (necessarily brief) summaries of detailed analyses of 1991 
Census data ( to be published in full elsewhere - Ratcliffe forthcoming), it 
aims to demonstrate that large-scale secondary data on factors such as 
tenure, dwelling type, amenities and levels of overcrowding can be used to 
interrogate existing theoretical debates. Having said this, there are natu-
rally many features of the housing scene which are not covered by the 
Census, and there are certain problems with the Census data itself. 
SECONDARY DATA ANALYSIS AND HOUSING 
DIFFERENTIALS 
Perhaps the key issue is the interpretation of 'ethnic group' deployed by the 
Census; the fixed categories (excluding the 'Other' boxes) being 'White', 
'Black-Caribbean', 'Black-African', 'Indian', 'Pakistani', 'Bangladeshi', and 
'Chinese'. This 'identity conflation' confuses phenotype, geography, and 
perhaps nationality; but in terms of the underlying aims of the Office of 
Population Censuses and Surveys (OPCS) 1 , and the Departments of State 
sponsoring the Census, it 'works' in that it enables the data to be reduced 
ultimately to four categories, namely 'White', 'Black', '(South) Asian' and 
'Chinese and others'. A whole series of ethical and political questions are 
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raised by the question itself (and indeed about the uses to which the data 
may be put), and by the way the question was answered (in particular 
whether it can ultimately be regarded as measuring self-identity - as it is 
claimed), but these are beyond the scope of the present chapter. For 
present purposes the question is whether the data can safely be used for our 
analysis of housing differentials. The answer is 'yes, but with extreme care'. 
The first point to make is that whatever the categories do measure, it is 
not 'ethnicity', at least in any meaningful sociological sense. 'White' 
includes, for example, 'Greek Cypriots', 'Turkish Cypriots' and the 'Irish'. 
'Indians' of East African origin may find themselves in either the 'Indian' 
or the 'Other-Asian' category, depending on how they describe their 
'ethnic group' - a point which is critical for an analysis of the housing 
situation given the radically different experiences of Indian migrants and 
the 'twice migrants' (Bhachu 1985). In addition, all the 'Asian' categories 
conflate the various religious communities. (These problems are com-
pounded by the need for data imputation in the light of a significant degree 
of underenumeration/undercount, particularly serious amongst urban 
minorities.) 
On the positive side, the introduction of the 'ethnic' question in 1991 
coincided with the production, again for the first time, of what Americans 
call 'public use' samples. Fears of a potential loss of anonymity and 
confidentiality resulted in the repeated rejection of the idea prior to 1991. 
The resulting samples, known as SARs (Samples of Anonymised Records) 
take two forms: a 2 per cent sample of individual records and a 1 per cent 
sample of households (which may be used either as a sample of households 
or as a sample of individuals who lived in these selected households). Their 
availability means that for the first time, social scientists can follow their 
own agenda in data analysis terms, rather than being limited to that 
dictated by the OPCS or, alternatively, going through the expensive (and 
often time consuming) procedure of commissioning special tabulations. 
As pointed out earlier, however, the Census still lacks data on some of the 
key housing indicators, most notably in the area of housing quality. This is 
understandable given the potential measurement problems, but it never-
theless weakens any analysis based solely on census data. Despite the 
addition in the 1991 exercise of central heating, current amenity measures 
lack discriminatory power. The potential addition of a new revised 
deprivation index in relation to small area data will give a useful surrogate 
measure of environmental context, but will clearly fail to distinguish 
between (say) two ostensibly similar houses in the same area which are very 
different in terms of structural condition and state of repair. And even if 
this index were to be added to the SAR data files, there would be an 
analytical problem due to the large spatial units which have been intro-
duced to ensure anonymity and confidentiality. 
The English House Condition Survey (EHCS) has routinely collected 
data on repair costs and on such matters as resources - that is, household 
income (again a factor excluded from the Census) - but little attention is 
given in the published reports to the question of ethnicity. We do know 
from the 1986 EHCS, however, that 9 per cent of households with heads 
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born in the New Commonwealth and Pakistan (NCWP) were living in 
dwellings designated as 'unfit', and a further 22 per cent were in property 
deemed to be 'in poor repair'. The corresponding figures for those of UK 
origin were 4 and 13 per cent respectively. Although slightly ambiguous and 
confused by changes in key definitions, data from the 1991 EHCS suggests, 
as will be shown later, that the position has not improved markedly. 
As research has consistently demonstrated a link between poor housing 
and ill health (Audit Commission 1991; Commission for Racial Equality 
1994; S. Smith 1989), housing quality is of prime importance. We cannot 
assess from the Census the relative likelihood of householders (a) having 
the resources (and the inclination) to rectify defects, and/or (b) having 
access to renovation grant aid. Research reported in Ratcliffe (1992) and 
Commission for Racial Equality (1994) suggests, however, that minorities 
are probably less likely than 'Whites' to have either sort of funding. 
Furthermore, and despite strongly worded exhortations from the Commis-
sion for Racial Equality (1984) for local authorities to adopt rigorous and 
active ethnic monitoring, by 1992 a clear majority of authorities (74 per 
cent) still lacked such procedures in the area of service delivery (Commis-
sion for Racial Equality 1994). 
Although the Census did (for the first time) attempt to enumerate the 
'roofless', it did so very patchily; and in any case failed to cast light on the 
more general question of homelessness. As to whether minority groups are 
more prone to homelessness than others, we have to rely on a handful of 
local studies. A recent survey of London Boroughs showed, for example, 
that 'black households are up to 4 times as likely to become homeless as 
white households' and that '40 per cent of London's homeless acceptances 
are either "African", "Caribbean", "Asian" or "Black UK'" (Friedman and 
Pawson 1989: 54). 
Although difficult to quantify, and clearly beyond the scope of the 
Census, racial harassment is a key element of the housing picture. The 
available evidence suggests that such harassment is on the increase, both in 
the UK and on mainland Europe (Skellington 1992). The success in 1993 
of a British National Party candidate in a local council election in east 
London, widely interpreted as having resulted from his playing the 'race 
card' in relation to the council's housing allocation policy, amply demon-
strated the level of 'racial' antipathy. As Phillips ( 1986) showed, allocations 
policy is a key element of the harassment matrix. In Tower Hamlets it 
effectively increased the level of segregation of the Bengali community and 
at the same time lowered their standard of housing by placing them in hard-
to-let blocks of flats. Rather than confronting 'racial' harassment by 
tackling the perpetrators, the authority took the easy option and moved the 
victims. 
THEORISING ETHNIC DIFFERENTIALS IN HOUSING 
POSITION 
In what follows the central aim is to enhance our understanding of the 
housing position of Britain's minority ethnic groups, and in particular to 
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assess, on the one hand, the relative importance of 'ethnicity' and 'racial 
exclusion/marginalisation', and on the other, questions of class, gender, 
life-cycle/-stage, and household type/ size/ structure. As one might imagine 
these issues are rather simpler to state than to actualise. In the final analysis 
it will become clear that the empirical data can only take us so far: further 
research will be needed to test out a number of possibly conflicting 
explanatory schema. 
For reasons of space, the analysis focuses largely on the core issues of 
tenure, dwelling type and location. Starting with housing tenure, the first 
point to make is that there were major differentials between the various 
'ethnic groups' covered by the 1991 Census. Owner-occupation in Britain 
was highest amongst those of Indian origin (82 per cent), followed by 
Pakistani households (77 per cent), Whites (67 per cent) and the Chinese 
(62 per cent). Outright ownership levels were highest amongst the White 
population, as one would expect given the typical length of residence, but 
almost one in five Pakistani households, around one in six Indian 
households and one in seven of the Chinese also belonged to this group. 
Given the general decline in the public sector during the 1980s and the 
consequent rise in owner-occupation and the private rental and housing 
association sectors, it is hardly surprising that the overall level of council/ 
new town rentals was down to 21 per cent (approaching 10 per cent less 
than ten years earlier). The 'true' figure may in fact have been even smaller 
given the suggestion that some respondents whose council properties had 
been transferred to a private landlord appear to have recorded their 
original tenure position (Dorling 1993). Despite this dramatic fall, renting 
from a local authority remained very common amongst all three 'Black' 
groups - 36 per cent for the Black-Caribbeans, 41 per cent for the Black-
Africans and 35 per cent for the 'Black-Other' group. The only South Asian 
group with a similar figure were the Bangladeshis, at 37 per cent. 
This raises a number of issues: first, that of explaining the high level of 
outright ownership amongst Indian and Pakistani migrants. The key lies 
essentially in the type of property purchased, as intimated earlier. Discrim-
inatory mechanisms in the housing market meant that renting property was 
often difficult, and pooling of capital to purchase property (whether a 
conditioned 'choice' or an imperative) was a feasible strategy even in the 
early days of settlement, given the availability of relatively cheap, but poor 
quality, housing in inner urban areas (Karn 1977 /8; Ratcliffe 1981). 
Secondly, there is the question of housing market transformation. 
Owner-occupation in Britain increased from around 59 per cent to over 66 
per cent during the period 1981-91, largely as a result of government 
policy. Amongst minorities, however, the changes were rather different. 
The combination of a high base figure in the early 1980s and few council 
tenancies meant that the picture for Indian and Pakistani households was 
bound to be somewhat different. As Ratcliffe (1994) shows, data from the 
1982 PSI survey (reported in Brown 1984) and the Labour Force Surveys 
of 1984 to 1990 give a consistent figure for the Indian group of77 per cent, 
and a corresponding figure for Pakistani households of 80 per cent (1982) 
falling to 76 per cent by the end of the decade. Allowing for sampling error, 
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it is possible to conclude that tenure levels probably remained virtually 
static over the decade. Not so for the Bangladeshis: from around 30 per 
cent at the beginning of the 1980s, their figure had risen to over 44 per cent 
by 1991. The Chinese exhibited a similarly dramatic rise from approx-
imately 50 per cent to 62 per cent. Without change matrices it is difficult 
to assess the precise character of tenure shifts, but in the former case 
council tenancies have dropped quite sharply (by a similar amount to the 
gain in ownership levels in fact) suggesting for some a change of tenure in 
situ (via Right-to-Buy). In the case of the Chinese, both the private rental 
and council sectors contributed to the observed shift. 
Tenure patterns for the various Black groups appear to have remained 
largely static, except for some evidence of an upward shift in owner-
occupation amongst those of Caribbean origin (around 40 to 48 per cent). 
Of the East African Asians little can be said, on the basis of the Census at 
least, as they are submerged within the 'Indian' and 'Other-Asian' cate-
gories. The best estimate, from Ratcliffe ( 1994) and Jones ( 1993) would put 
the 1991 figure at around 80 per cent, this representing around the same 
level of upward shift as in the general population. 
In sum, with a few notable exceptions, we appear to be witnessing a 
significant narrowing of ethnic differentials in tenure patterns. It was always 
a theoretically dubious argument to suggest that ethnicity (however 
conceptualised) could 'explain' the different tenure patterns of the various 
minority groups. Peach and Byron (1993), for example, using data from the 
General Household Survey (CHS), argued that class explained about 39 
per cent of the tenure pattern of the Caribbean population and adding 
gender to the analysis increased the explanatory effect to 50 per cent, 
family structure also emerging as a powerful explanatory factor. 
Performing a parallel exercise using Census data is fraught with 
difficulties, from conceptual problems with the notion of 'head of house-
hold' to high levels of 'missing data' on variables such as 'socio-economic 
group' and 'social class' (in the event of an individual having had no paid 
employment during the previous ten years). Constraints on space also limit 
the level of analysis. However, looking separately at tenure patterns, 
controlling for 'household type' and sex of 'household head' reveals some 
pointers to the underlying determinants of tenure position. 
Amongst male-headed households in the SAR, the Black-Caribbean 
ownership rate was 58 per cent compared with 73 per cent for White 
households. Making the same comparison for female-headed households, 
the figures were 37 and 52 per cent respectively. For male-headed 
households who were local authority tenants, the Black-Caribbean rate was 
28 per cent compared with a White figure of 16 per cent. The figures for 
female-headed households were 46 and 32 per cent respectively. Even 
amongst those South Asian groups with extremely high ownership rates 
overall, the public sector features significantly when the household is 
female-headed. Thus a quarter of Indian and three out of ten Pakistani 
households in this group rented local authority property. 
It does appear, then, that the gender issue is of some importance here. 
The nature of a female-headed household (taking as read the general 
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definitional problem) varies of course in terms of such factors as age and 
marital status, and the distributions of these variables will differ markedly 
between the 'indigenous' White population and the various minority 
groups. This raises more general questions about the salience of household 
structure. 
Ratcliffe (forthcoming) shows that ownership rates for Black-Caribbean 
and White married col,lple households were uniformly high at over 70 per 
cent. This appears to negate the simplistic ethnic stereotype (supported at 
least implicitly by some of the academic literature) which suggests that 
Caribbean households are pre-disposed to rent rather than to buy property. 
(It also lends further support to the findings of recent research by Peach 
and Byron, which showed, amongst other things, that households of 
Caribbean origin displayed at the very least an equal propensity to Whites 
to participate in Right-to-Buy schemes.) In the case of lone parents with 
dependent children, tenure distributions were once again similar: 60 per 
cent of Whites as against 52 per cent of Black-Caribbeans owned their 
homes and 32 and 39 per cent respectively rented in the public sector. 
It is clear that, for those of Caribbean origin at least, household type 
accounts for much of the variation in tenure structure. Regional differ-
entials in settlement patterns clearly play their part, as do such factors as the 
timing of migration flows and the wealth and class composition of 
migration cohorts (both, of course, beyond the scope of the Census). Thus, 
the relatively recent arrival in the UK of the major part of the Bangladeshi 
population, combined with low levels of personal capital and their 
settlement in large numbers in London, probably contributed greatly to 
their initial dependence on public housing, and to the fact that, despite the 
marked shift towards owner-occupation during the 1980s, their figure was 
still well below that of (say) the other South Asian groups. High concentra-
tions in the metropolis also go a long way towards explaining the tenure 
distribution of those of African origin. 
We have suggested that, in addition to household structure and 
geographical location, a key factor influencing tenure position is social 
class. In the general population there has traditionally been a fairly strong 
positive correlation between class and propensity to buy. Among some 
minority groups (notably those of Indian and Pakistani origin), however, 
the relationship has been weaker or even negative, with ownership levels 
being at their highest amongst the semi-skilled and unskilled working class 
(Brown 1984: lO0;Jones 1993: 144). This has been explained in terms of 
a variety of market constraints, the availability of cheap property in inner 
areas and the desire to maintain cultural and religious ties by buying into 
these spatially well-<lefined locations. With the advent of the SARs we are 
now in a position to explore some of the (empirically accessible) compo-
nents of these hypotheses, and also take the argument one stage further. 
For example, assuming that first-generation migrants did have as part of 
their agenda the desire, for ostensibly 'cultural' reasons, to maintain areal 
homogeneity, would this also apply to the UK-born? Would they perhaps 
move more closely to 'local' norms both spatially (i.e. by becoming less 
segregated, especially from the White population of similar social class 
'RACE', HOUSING AND THE CITY/ 95 
background), and in terms of tenure outcomes? 
Changes in spatial patterns and segregation levels over the last decade 
and, in particular, developments in respect of the UK-born of migrant 
origin, are the subject of current ESRC-funded research by the present 
author and David Owen from Warwick University's Centre for Research in 
Ethnic Relations. As to the question of comparative tenure patterns for 
households with UK-born as against non-UK-born heads, the SARs provide 
useful data in all cases except for the Bangladeshis and Chinese where the 
sample sizes are too small to provide stable estimates. Whereas UK-born 
Whites exhibited an owner-occupation level of 67 per cent, the figure for 
Black-Caribbeans was 34 per cent, for Indians 61 per cent and for Pakistanis 
66 per cent. Parallel figures for the non-UK-born groups were as follows: 
Whites 62 per cent, Black-Caribbeans 55 per cent, Indians 83 per cent, and 
Pakistanis 81 per cent. 
Households with UK-born heads of Indian and Pakistani origin were 
much more likely (than Whites) to be found in private rented accommoda-
tion; 24 and 17 per cent respectively as against 7 per cent for the Whites. 
In the public sector, however, the opposite was true. Whites were more than 
twice as likely to be renting from the local authority as either of these 
groups. For the UK-born South Asians, then, tenure patterns were 
markedly different from those of the first generation. For the latter, renting 
of any kind is quite rare. Black-Caribbeans, irrespective of the birthplace of 
household head, were much more likely (than the Indians or Pakistanis) to 
rent in the public sector; 34 per cent for the non-UK group and 41 per cent 
for the UK-born; and a similar point could be made in the case of the other 
Black groups identified by the Census. 
A completely convincing explanation of these differences is rather 
difficult without additional data. Some points are clear, however. The larger 
number of female-headed households among the Caribbeans and the 
concentration of the other Black groups in London can be linked to the 
relatively high levels of public sector renting. The younger age structure of 
the UK-born cohorts, combined with relatively high unemployment levels 
and a distinctive pattern of household structures, may have led to a greater 
propensity to rent in the public sector. The lack of a 'tradition' of local 
authority tenancies amongst the Indian and Pakistani groups, combined 
with the declining availability of such properties and the lower than average 
prevalence of female-headed ( or lone parent) households, may contribute 
to the under-representation of the UK-born in this sector of the housing 
market. 
It remains to be seen whether renting privately (possibly from family /kin 
in some cases) continues to be an important source of housing for the new 
generation of South Asians: for many it may simply represent a transitional 
state ( on the way to owner-occupation). (It was certainly more common 
amongst the current UK-born Indian cohort aged under-25 than it was 
amongst the 25-34-year-olds - taking over from owner-occupation as the 
most common tenure.) We may be about to witness a levelling out of 
ownership levels overall (as between Indians, Pakistanis and Whites), with 
the gradual fall from the 80 per cent plus figures seen amongst the first 
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generation, accompanied possibly by a rise in the average quality of 
minority owned property ( due to delayed purchase). 
The relationship between class (seen in occupational status terms) and 
tenure still appeared to hold as far as the first generation were concerned. 
The household SARs revealed interesting differences for those with 
UK-born heads, however. Amongst Caribbean households with UK-born 
heads in professional or intermediate occupations, the level of ownership 
was 61 per cent. Rates then fell consistently moving down the occupational 
scale. Cell frequencies were too small to come to firm conclusions about the 
various South Asian groups, but ownership levels appeared to fluctuate 
around the 50 to 65 per cent level. More research is needed here. 
Turning to property type, the academic literature has a great deal to say 
about ethnic differentials and the reasons for them. The Black population 
in general (using the Census definition of 'Black') is seen as being much 
more likely to be accommodated in flats than either Whites or South Asians 
(with the exception of the Bangladeshis). This is argued to be due to their 
significant presence in local authority stock, and a particular sector of it, 
due to discriminatory allocation policies based on class, 'race' and gender 
(Henderson and Karn 1987; Phillips 1986), or in the case of Africans (and 
also Bangladeshis) due to their concentration in London. Households of 
Indian and Pakistani origin are characterised as heavily concentrated in 
inner city terraced housing (for reasons discussed earlier). Of the two 
groups, the former, because of their higher proportion of white-collar 
workers, are seen as being the more likely to acquire semi-detached or 
detached housing Uones 1993). 
The 1991 Census data essentially confirms the empirical propositions 
underlying these remarks (Ratcliffe 1996). Thus, whereas around half of 
GB households lived in semi-detached or detached property, only 17 per 
cent of Black-Caribbeans, 11 per cent of Black-Africans and 13 per cent of 
Bangladeshis did so. The minority with the highest figure was that oflndian 
origin (with just under 40 per cent). Terraced housing was indeed by far the 
most common form of dwelling for Indian and Pakistani households, with 
over three out of five of the latter and more than 40 per cent of the former 
accommodated in this way. The Black groups in general were not only 
much more likely to be living in flatted accommodation but were also much 
more likely to be found in converted dwellings, and in those which were not 
self-contained. Taken together, the last two categories of dwelling accoun-
ted for almost one in five African households and around one in eight of 
the Black-Caribbeans (and incidentally one in ten of the Chinese, who were 
also heavily dependent on flatted accommodation, much of it linked to 
their principal economic niche, i.e. flats over shops, restaurants and take-
away outlets). 
The determinants of these distributions are complex, ranging from 
historical factors concerned with the housing markets in initial settlement 
areas to the behaviour over time of exchange professionals in both public 
and private sectors, and the social class background and structure of 
individual households. One thing is clear from even a cursory reading of 
the literature: within tenures one would expect minorities to be living in 
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very different property types. The relevant SAR table confirmed this, and, 
incidentally, provided further support to the arguments in the literature 
questioning the fairness of many local authority allocation systems 
(Simpson 1981; Phillips 1986; Henderson and Karn 1987; Habeebullah and 
Slater 1990). 
ETHNIC DIFFERENTIALS IN HOUSING QUALITY 
Whatever the evidence on the narrowing of tenure differentials amongst 
certain class groups and household types, this is not to argue either that 
housing market discrimination is a thing of the past (for there is ample 
evidence from CRE investigations and elsewhere that it is not) or that the 
property acquired by minorities is of a similar standard (within tenure 
categories) to that of Whites. 
The 1986 EHCS, as noted earlier, presented clear evidence of global 
differentials between minorities as a whole and the White population. In 
the 1991 EHCS rather more detail on ethnicity was given, with minorities 
being divided into three groups: 'Black', 'Asian' and 'Other'. A simple 
measure of dwelling condition was used: this divided the total stock into 
'worst', 'best' and 'rest', where the 'worst dwellings are the 10 per cent with 
the highest repair cost, the cut-off being £26 per square metre' and 'the 
best dwellings are the 30 per cent of homes with no or minimal repair costs, 
the threshold being £1.45/sqm' (Department of the Environment 1993: 
74). For owner-occupiers (where sample sizes were sufficiently large), 
ethnic differentials mirrored those observed five years earlier. The percen-
tages of both 'Black' and 'Asian' samples in the worst housing (which 
comprised 7 per cent of the total stock) were more than double that for 
Whites. 
Overcrowding levels are clearly a key element of housing standards 
(Ratcliffe 1981, 1994; Jones 1993). If anything the problem worsened 
during the 1980s, such that by the 1991 Census the (admittedly rather 
crude) indicator of over one person per room produced a Black-Caribbean 
figure of 5 per cent, and Pakistani and Bangladeshi figures of 30 and 4 7 per 
cent respectively. Almost one in five of the latter group were found to be 
living at a density of over 1.5 persons per room. The EHCS told a similar 
story. 
Turning to amenities, the Census confirmed the earlier remark that few 
households, of whatever ethnic origin, lacked exclusive access to a bath/ 
shower and/or inside WC. Those lacking central heating varied widely, 
however, with well over a third of Pakistani households but around one in 
five of most other groups in this category. Taken together, these provide 
certain circumstantial evidence of 'relative disadvantage', but even then the 
key issues are whether (a) people can afford to use the central heating, and 
(b) the 'amenities' are ofan acceptable standard. 
A detailed analysis of the household SAR shows that, as far as over-
crowding is concerned, class background and whether or not the house-
hold head was UK-born, are key predictors. (Overcrowding levels were 
markedly lower for households headed by the much younger UK-born 
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cohort.) As far as central heating was concerned the 'social class gradient' 
reappeared, with the UK-born faring slightly worse on average. 
Although of much interest, it should be added that none of this data 
gives an unambiguous picture of differentials in housing quality, or quality 
oflife. Overcrowding levels ignore such vital points as room size and layout. 
The form of heating in a particular dwelling may be a matter of choice, and 
central heating may correlate with flat living. But along with the other 
material discussed earlier, especially that from the EHCS, the data adds 
weight to the general picture of ethnic inequalities. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
To summarise the key points: first, although there remain major disparities 
in the tenure patterns of Britain's majority and minority communities, 
these do not unambiguously reflect inherent ethnic differences in the 
propensity to enter a particular tenure category. Factors such as household 
type/structure, class background and life-cycle/generational status account 
for many of the observed differences. 
Secondly, there remain major housing quality differentials, both 
between majority and minority and between the various minority groups. 
To the extent that these are not 'explained' by class/economic factors, they 
provide continuing evidence of a process of 'racial'/ ethnic exclusion/ 
marginalisation. 'Red-lining', residence requirements, housekeeping stan-
dards, and the blatant refusal to sell or rent property to 'Blacks' may belong 
to an earlier era, but, as recent CRE investigations amply demonstrate, 
discriminatory practices have by no means disappeared. 
In terms of the future policy agenda, the latter issues, combined with 
homelessness and harassment, are the key issues. There is, however, little 
evidence of political will; the will, first, to deal with the housing crisis 
as a whole, as evidenced by the general shortage of properties, the 
shrinkage of the social housing sector ( despite the raised profile of 
Housing Associations) and the failure of urban renewal/regeneration 
policies and, second, the will to address housing inequalities based on 
'race', ethnicity and gender (not to mention disability and sexual 
orientation). 
As to the sociological agenda, there is an urgent need to theorise the 
sociological dimensions of economic, social and demographic change. To 
initiate this project, the current chapter has explored what the SARs can tell 
us about changes in the housing position of Britain's minority populations, 
and in particular the 'new' generations of UK-born. Despite the obvious 
problems created both by small sample sizes and by significant differences 
in age structure between these groups and the first-generation migrants, a 
few tentative conclusions can be reached. 
We may be witnessing a shift towards the equalisation of tenure patterns 
between young White households and minority households with UK-born 
heads; at least ifwe control for social class and household structure. Levels 
of overcrowding appear to be significantly lower amongst the second 
generation. Furthermore, the use of more diverse sources of housing ( than 
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first-generation migrants) may lead on average to higher standards of 
housing than those in evidence hitherto. 
Against this positive scenario, however, it is worth stressing in conclusion 
the limited (and reducing) options in the housing market for such groups 
as single males and the young unemployed ( of whom a disproportionate 
number are of minority origin). Furthermore, the lack of political will to 
intervene decisively in the housing market is mirrored by a similar lack in 
the area of anti-discrimination legislation. The current Race Relations Act 
has remained on the Statute Book for twenty years, and is generally 
regarded as woefully inadequate. At the same time, its policing body (the 
CRE) lacks the funds and the political status to influence the behaviour of 
the key actors in the housing scene. 
NOTE 
The Office of Population Censuses and Surveys organised the 1991 Census. Subse-
quently, in April 1996, it was merged with the Central Statistical Office to form the Office 
for National Statistics. 
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VIOLENCE, SPACE AND GENDER 
The social and spatial 
parameters of violence against 
women and men 
Jayne Mooney 
BACKGROUND 
The North London Domestic Violence Survey - a general population 
survey- involved interviews with 1,000 people (571 women and 429 men) 
in the north London borough oflslington. 1 The first report (Mooney 1993) 
examined women's experiences of violence from husbands and boyfriends. 
This chapter widens the study out to explore the social and spatial 
parameters of violence against both women and men from known and 
unknown persons. It delineates the overall level of violence, the social 
characteristics of victims and perpetrators and its location, in terms of 
public and private space. This enables the testing of various hypotheses 
derived from the theoretical literature about the nature of violence in 
contemporary society. 
Respondents were asked by an interviewer whether anyone, including 
close friends or members of their family, had threatened them or used any 
form of physical violence against them in their home or in a public place in 
the last twelve months. A sample of all violent incidents was then obtained by 
asking about the last incident that had occurred; this facilitated the collecting 
of more detailed information regarding the specific nature of the violence, its 
impact and the relationship of the victim to the perpetrator. Since more 
women than men were interviewed the data were weighted. 
THE FOCUSING OF VIOLENCE AS PRESENTED IN THE 
LITERATURE 
In the literature various positions can be identified on the focusing of 
violence. The main points made by the new administrative criminologists, 
left realists, the family violence theorists and radical feminists are outlined 
below. 
New administrative crlmlnologlsts 
New administrative criminology - which developed around the work of 
researchers associated with the Home Office's Research and Planning Unit 
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- has tended to downplay the problem of crime. The findings of the various 
sweeps of the national British Crime Survey conducted by the Horne Office 
have shown the risk of violent victimisation to be low and less common than 
non-violent property offences which are themselves presented as infre-
quent occurrences (Hough and Mayhew 1983, 1985; Mayhew et al. 1989, 
1993). The 'average' person, it was suggested in the report of the 1982 
survey, can expect 'a robbery once every five centuries, an assault resulting 
in injury (even if slight) once every century, the family car to be stolen or 
taken by joyriders once every 60 years, a burglary in the home once every 
40 years ... and a very low rate for rape and other sexual offences' (Hough 
and Mayhew 1983: 15, 21). And one of the conclusions of the 1984 survey 
was that: 
Offences involving violence are very heavily outweighed by offences 
involving theft and damage to property. Some undercounting of non-
stranger violence in the survey is likely, but present figures show 
wounding, robbery, sexual offences and common assaults to comprise 
only 17 per cent of all BCS offences (Excluding common assaults, the 
figure was 5 per cent). 
(Hough and Mayhew 1985: 16) 
With respect to the focusing of violence the 'typical' victim is presented 
in the British Crime Surveys not as someone who is 'defenceless' or elderly 
but as a man, aged under 30 years, single, widowed or divorced, who spends 
several evenings out a week, drinks heavily and has assaulted others. Victims 
and offenders are, therefore, most likely to resemble each other and in a 
significant number of cases will be known to each other (Hough and 
Mayhew 1983; Gottfredson 1984). For example, in the 1988 survey, victims 
knew their assailants in about half of the cases (Mayhew et al. 1989). Whilst 
it is acknowledged that the surveys undercount domestic violence and 
sexual offences, the risk of violence for women is generally presented by the 
new administrative criminologists as slight. Moreover, in line with the 
apparent maleness of the phenomenon and lifestyle characteristics of the 
victims, violence is seen as a feature of public space, occurring mostly in 
pubs, clubs and other places of entertainment. According to Gottfredson, 
'those who stay in and around the home have lower likelihoods ( of personal 
victimisation) than those working outside the home' (1984: 18). 
Left realists 
On the overall focus of the level of violence, left realists have been critical 
of the incidence figures produced by the national crime surveys. They 
consider crime to be extremely geographically and socially focused in 
certain areas and amongst particular groups of people. Poor areas of the 
city are seen to be more likely to be victimised than rich areas (Kinsey et al. 
1986). Thus, it is argued that to add crime rates for a suburban area to that 
of an inner city area - as the British Crime Surveys have done - produces 
'blancmange figures of little use to anyone' (Young 1992: 50). Surveys of 
local areas conducted by left realists have, therefore, yielded much higher 
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incidence figures of interpersonal violence for women and the elderly, as 
well as for men. Indeed the first Islington Crime Survey uncovered higher 
assault rates for women than men: in the year of study there were 213 
incidents for women, 152 for men per 1,000 households Oones et al. 1986). 
The spectrum of violence experienced by women, particularly young 
women, is seen by left realists to be much wider than that for men, ranging 
from harassment to more serious assault. Violence against men is more 
likely to be experienced at the more serious end of the spectrum. Indeed, 
women encounter harassment on a level that is unknown to most men, as 
Young has pointed out: 
The equivalent of sexual harassment for men would be if every time 
they walked out of doors they were met with catcalls asking if they 
would like a fight. And the spectrum which women experience is all 
the more troublesome in that each of the minor incivilities could 
escalate to more serious violence. Sexual harassment could be a 
prelude to attempted rape; domestic verbal quarrels could trigger off 
domestic violence ... 
(Young 1992: 50) 
On the invisibility of violence, it has been stressed by left realists that 
much violence against women is, in fact, concealed. It does not appear in 
agency statistics and is less likely to be picked up using the conventional 
survey method. This is believed to be particularly true for domestic violence 
and sexual offences (Young 1988, 1992; Crawford et al 1990). 
Finally, from a left realist perspective, people are seen as having a 
differential vulnerability to crime and, therefore, to talk of a general risk, 
the experiences of the 'average' person, assumes that everyone is equal in 
their capacity to resist the impact of such experiences. For left realists there 
is no such thing as an equal victim. People are more or less vulnerable, 
depending on their place in society; those who are poor with little political 
power will suffer the most from crime (Lea and Young 1984; Kinsey et al. 
1986; Young 1992). The relatively powerless situation of women - econom-
ically, socially and physically - is seen to make them more unequal victims 
than men (Young 1988). 
The family violence approach 
The work of Straus and others in the United States is solely concerned with 
emphasising the problem of violence in the family. In the introduction to 
Family Violence, Richard Gelles writes: 
Twenty years ago, when people were concerned about violence they 
feared violence in the streets at the hands of a stranger. Today we are 
aware of the extent, impact and consequences of private violence. 
(Gelles 1987: 13) 
Violence between husbands and wives is seen as part of a pattern of 
violence occurring amongst all familial members. The family violence 
approach is an attempt to look at the whole picture of family violence. As 
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Gelles and Cornell have remarked, 'while it is important to understand the 
nature and causes of ... wife abuse, concentrating on just one form of 
violence or abuse may obscure the entire picture and hinder a complete 
understanding of the causes and consequences of abuse' ( 1985: 11). 
The family violence researchers have conducted two national surveys in 
the United States, in 1975 and 1985 respectively, which have not only 
uncovered high levels of domestic violence but, in terms of focusing, have 
resulted in the highly controversial finding that men are as much at risk of 
violence from their wives, as women are from their husbands (Straus 1980; 
Straus and Gelles 1988). This is seen to contrast to women's behaviour 
outside of the family where it is said they are much less likely to use violence 
(Straus and Gelles 1988). Thus, on the basis of the 1975 survey, Steinmetz 
(1977-8) concluded that there was a 'battered husband syndrome' which 
had not previously been acknowledged, and Straus commented: 
violence between husband and wife is far from a one way street. The 
old cartoons of the wife chasing the husband with a rolling pin or 
throwing pots and pans are closer to reality than most (and especially 
those with feminist sympathies) realize. 
(Straus 1977-8: 488) 
This has had serious policy implications in the United States. It has been 
used against battered women in court cases, cited by men's rights groups 
lobbying for custody and child support, and to argue against funding for 
refuges (Pagelow 1984; Dobash and Dobash 1992; Brush 1993). 
Radical feminists 
Radical feminist research has centred on violence against women. The 
studies conducted by radical feminists in this country, like those of left 
realists, have highlighted the myriad forms of violence experienced by 
women and been used to challenge the figures produced by the British 
Crime Surveys conducted by the Home Office. In the Violence Against Women 
- Women Speak Out Survey carried out in the London Borough of Wands-
worth by feminist researchers, 44 per cent of women, for example, reported 
being the target of a violent attack within the past year. This, together with 
other findings uncovered by the research, was said by its co-ordinator, 
Radford, to, 'cast real doubt on the figures cited in the British Crime Survey 
which reported a very low rate of offences against women' ( 1987: 35). 
On the focusing of violence, feminists have emphasised the gender 
dimensions of violence against women; that is, it is made clear that violence 
is largely perpetrated by men on women. Whilst there has recently been an 
acknowledgement of women's violence against other women, particularly 
in the context of lesbian relationships (Lobel 1986; Kelly 1991; Mann 
1993), female on male violence is presented as rare and when it does occur 
is seen as mainly in self-defence (Dobash and Dobash 1979; Breines and 
Gordon 1983; Kurz 1993). The impact of violence against women in terms 
of psychological trauma, avoidance behaviours, injuries experienced and 
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the difficulties inherent in their structural positions is, in addition, stressed 
by feminists. 
With respect to the relationship to the perpetrator and locality of the 
violence, women are generally seen to be more likely to be assaulted 
by men who are known to them in their homes than by strangers in 
a public space: 
By far, most violence and threat arises from those who are familial and 
familiar. Rather than the street constituting the greatest threat to 
personal security, violence often happens in places such as the home 
or worksite. 
(Stanko 1992: 3) 
This position has led radical feminists to be critical of official crime 
prevention literature which tends to be fixated on the problem of 'stranger-
danger' (ibid.). Violence from known men, however, is seen as less likely to 
be reported to an interviewer due to its intrinsically personal nature 
(Hanmer and Saunders 1984; Radford and Laffy 1984). Indeed when 
Hanmer and Saunders (1984) found that 78 per cent of violence against 
women was by unknown men and more than half of violent incidents 
occurred in public space, they questioned the validity of their own results. 
They noted that when women were asked about violence they had witnessed 
in the neighbourhood, 69 per cent was between people known to each 
other with a higher proportion occurring in the home. And when the pilot 
for the Wandsworth survey, mentioned above, failed to uncover any 
violence on women by their husbands, brothers and boyfriends, Radford 
and Laffy commented, 'our conclusion is not that this has not occurred, as 
that contradicts what we know of domestic violence from Women's Aid but 
rather ours was not the right type of survey to explore such very personal 
and possibly continuing experiences' (1984: 113). On the location of the 
violence in terms of public and private space, Hanmer and Saunders 
further make the point that incidents in public space may not necessarily 
be from strangers: 
Arguments and assaults between acquaintances, friends or married 
couples may begin and/ or end outside the home or in any public 
location ... specific violent events are not sealed off into private versus 
public domains. 
(Hanmer and Saunders 1984: 45) 
FINDINGS 
The various theoretical positions on the focus of violence suggest a series 
of propositions, which are addressed by research data from the North 
London Domestic Violence Survey. The figures in the tables refer to threats 
of, or actual, physical violence. 
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OVERALL LEVEL OF VIOLENCE 
1 The risk of violent victimisation is low in comparison to pmperty crimes (new 
administrative criminology). 
The results already presented in The Hidden Figure: Domestic Violence in North 
London show violence against women from their husbands and boyfriends 
to be a relatively common occurrence. This chapter reveals this to be true 
for violence overall. As Table 7.1 demonstrates, nearly 20 per cent of the total 
sample - comprising both men and women - had experienced a threat or 
some form of physical violence against them in the last 12 months, with 
equal proportions having occurred in the home or in a public place. Three 
women and three men, in addition, had incidents against them in both the 
private and public spheres. This study has, therefore, refuted the finding of 
the British Crime Surveys conducted by the Home Office which show the 
risk of violent victimisation to be low in comparison to property offences. 
It is likely that the use of highly trained, sensitive interviewers together with 
the general emphasis placed on violence in the survey has encouraged the 
reporting not only of domestic but of non-domestic violence. 
Table 7. 1 Overall level of violence by location, per cent of total sample 













*'Both places' does not equal the sum of Home and Public because some people were 
victimised in both spheres 
GENDER AND AGE RELATION OF OVERALL VIOLENCE 
2 Men are the predominant victims of viol,ence (new administrative criminology). 
3 Men are the predominant perpetrators of violence ( new administrative criminol-
ogy, l,eft realism, radical feminism). 
Tables 7.2 and 7.3 show the women and men in this survey to have fairly 
Table 7.2 Overall focus of violence by gender, per cent of total sample 
(N = 1,142, weighted data), survey conducted in 1992 
Victim Home Public Both places 
No. % No. % No. % 
Women 67 11.7 39 6.8 103 18.0 
Men 44 7.7 70 12.3 111 19.4 
All people 111 9.7 109 9.5 214 18.7 
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Table 7.3 Overall focus of violence by gender and locality, per cent of those 
experiencing (N = 214), survey conducted in 1992 
Victim Home Public Both places* 
No. % No. % No. % 
Women 67 60.4 39 35.8 103 48.1 
Men 44 39.6 70 64.2 111 51.9 
All people 111 100 109 100 214 100 
*'Both places' does not equal the sum of Home and Public because some people were 
victimised in both spheres 
equal risks of violence against them. The supposition of the new admin-
istrative criminologists that it is men who are the predominant victims of 
violence is obviously based on an underestimation of violence in the home. 
Respondents were asked further details about the last incident of 
violence that they had experienced. With respect to the perpetrator of the 
violence, the general assumption of radical feminist work, where it is made 
particularly explicit, and that of new administrative criminology and left 
realism, is that the perpetrator is most likely to be a man. The findings for 
the last incident, presented in Table 7.4, confirm this proposition: in 85 per 
cent of cases the assailant was found to be a man. 
Table 7.4 Perpetrators of violence by gender and locality, per cent of those 
















4 Young men are the predominant victims of violence (new administrative 
criminology). 
5 Young women are more at risk of violence than older women (left realism). 
The findings detailed in Tables 7.2 and 7.3 have refuted the new 
administrative criminologist's position with respect to the usual gender of 
the victim. However, as Table 7.5 demonstrates, when men are looked at as 
a category l,y themselves, it is younger men - those aged 16 to 24 years -who 
are most likely to be victimised both in the home and in a public place. 
Further, it is of interest to note that, within this age group, 90 per cent of 
those who had experienced violence in a public place from an unknown 
man estimated his age to be under 25 years. New administrative criminol-
ogy is, therefore, correct when the focus is specifically on young men's 
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Table 7.5 Violence against men by age and locality, per cent of total sample 
(N = 571) 
Age Home Public 
(%) (%) 
16-24 19 27 
25-34 6 11 
35-44 5 13 
45+ 4 9 
experiences: violence on young men is largely perpetrated by other young 
men. 
Table 7.6 displays the age profile for women. In the home the risk for 
women decreases significantly after the age of 45 years which must, at least 
in part, relate to the increased number in this age group who live alone · 
through being divorced, separated or widowed and whose children have 
left home. In public space women of all ages had similar levels of 
victimisation against them. 
Table 7.6 Violence against women by age and locality, per cent of total sample 
(N = 571) 
Age Home Public 
(%) (%) 
16-24 13 7 
25-34 15 8 
35-44 17 7 
45+ 7 9 
LOCALITY OF VIOLENCE 
6 Most violence occurs in public space (new administrative criminology). 
7 Most viol,ence occurs in pubs, clubs and other places of entertainment (new 
administrative criminology). 
As was seen in Table 7 .1, this survey found violence to be equally distributed 
between the private and public spheres. Again the position held by the new 
administrative criminologists is based on an underestimation of violence 
against women, a large proportion of which is domestic. When focusing 
specifically on violence in public places (Table 7.7), the most common 
location for both women and men was found to be the street. Thus neither 
of the above propositions is supported. 
J AV NE MOONEY / 108 
Table 7. 7 Location of violence in public space by gender, per cent of those 




































THE GENDERED DISTRIBUTION OF THE LOCALITY OF 
VIOLENCE 
8 Most violence against men occurs in public space (new administrative 
criminology). 
9 Most violence against women occurs in the private sphere (new administrative 
criminology, left realism, radical feminism). 
10 Men are the predominant perpetrators of violence in public space ( all 
perspectives). 
11 Men are the predominant perpetrators of violence in the private sphere (new 
administrative criminology, left realism, radical feminism). 
This study confirms that most violence against women is private, most 
violence against men is public. However, as is apparent from Tables 7.2 and 
7.3, in neither instance is the focus overwhelming. Table 7.3 shows 36 per 
cent of violence against women was in a public place, while 40 per cent of 
violence against men occurred in the home. Furthermore, it is interesting 
to note that the ratio of violence against women in the home compared to 
the public sphere is nearly equal to the ratio of violence against men in the 
public sphere compared to the home. Propositions 10 and 11 are 
additionally confirmed; as demonstrated in Table 7.4, men are the 
predominant perpetrators of violence in the domestic sphere and to an 
identical level (85 per cent) in public. 
INTER- AND INTRA-GENDER DISTRIBUTION OF 
VIOLENCE 
12 Most male violence is against men (new administrative criminology). 
13 Most female violence is against men (family violence researchers). 
Table 7.8 shows that male violence is directed more against women than 
men although not by a great extent. Twice as much female violence is, 
however, against men than women albeit on a much smaller scale. The first 
proposition is, therefore, refuted; the second is substantiated. 
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Table 7.8 Inter- and intra-gender distribution of violence (N = 206) 
Relationship Home Public Both places 
{%) {%) {%) 
Male to male 26 56 40 
Male to female 59 29 45 
Female to male 13 7 10 
Female to female 2 8 5 
Total 100 100 100 
INTER- AND INTRA-GENDER DISTRIBUTION OF 
VIOLENCE BY LOCALITY 
14 Most male violence in public space is against men (new administrative 
criminology). 
15 Most male violence against women is in the private sphere ( radical feminism). 
16 Most female violence against men is in the private sphere (family violence 
researchers). 
It is apparent from the results presented in Table 7.8 that most male 
violence in the public sphere is against men, although the ratio of 1.9:1 
male to female victims is not perhaps as high as might have been thought. 
The new administrative criminologists position is, therefore, supported. 
Indeed it is of interest to mention that there is a degree of symmetry here, 
with male violence in the private sphere being 2.3:1 female to male victims, 
almost the mirror image of the public sphere. The amount of male violence 
against males in the private sphere is likewise not insignificant. But, overall, 
twice as much male violence against women occurs in the private compared 
to the public sphere. The radical feminist position is thus substantiated. 
Female violence - which is much less common- does not have such a symmetry 
between the two spheres. An equal proportion of female violence in the 
public sphere is against men and women. In the private sphere, however, 
female violence is directed at men ( 6.5: 1), thus the last position is 
validated. 
OVERALL SEVERITY OF VIOLENCE 
17 Most violence is minor (new administrative criminology). 
Respondents encountered a wide range of violent behaviours against them, 
most commonly being punched and slapped. A weapon was involved in 15 
per cent of cases, and 34 per cent resulted in some form of injury. Nearly 
a third of those experiencing a threat of, or any form of, violence had 
experienced more than one incident. On the impact of the violence, a 
significant number sought medical treatment and experienced various 
emotional and psychological effects after the last incident. In the light of 
these findings, violence cannot therefore be considered to be minor. 
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SEVERITY OF VIOLENCE BY GENDER 
18 Violence against men is likely to be mare severe (new administrative criminology, 
l.eft realism). 
19 Viol.ence has a greater impact on women (left realism, radical feminism). 
Overall women and men were found to experience a similar range of 
violence against them and similar injuries. However, in the home women 
were 56 per cent more likely to experience more than one incident than 
men. With regards to impact, whilst men's experiences were not insignif-
icant, violence was found generally to have a greater effect on women. For 
example, 4 per cent of women had stayed overnight in hospital - which 
underscores the seriousness of the injuries inflicted - in comparison to no 
men, and 49 per cent reported feeling depressed or losing self-confidence 
in comparison to 25 per cent of men. The degree of impact experienced 
by women is, of course, hardly surprising given the inter-gendered nature 
of violence against women. Thus, the results fail to support the first 
proposition but substantiate the second. 
SEVERITY OF VIOLENCE BY LOCALITY 
20 Viol.ence is more severe in public space (new administrative criminology). 
21 Viol.ence is mare severe against men in public space (new administrative 
criminology). 
22 Violence is more severe against women in the private sphere (radical feminism). 
With respect to the range of violent behaviours used, the survey found little 
difference between the home and public space. In the home, however, the 
risk of injury was greater (36 per cent) and respondents were 71 per cent 
more likely to experience more than one incident. In public space there 
was a higher risk of the incident involving a weapon. The impact of violence 
was significantly greater in the home. When looking at the psychological 
effects of violence in particular, this is hardly surprising given that the home 
is where one is supposed to feel safe and secure ('a haven in a heartless 
world'). Violence in the home is, in addition, more likely to be carried out 
by a known person and, as indicated by the incidence data, may be part of 
an ongoing experience. Finally there was little difference in the nature of 
the violence experienced by men and women, either overall or in public 
and private space. 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN VICTIMS AND 
PERPETRATORS 
23 . Most viol.ence is committed by someone who is known to the victim (new 
administrative criminology, radical feminism). 
24 Viol.ence against women in public space is more likely to be from an unknown 
man ( conventional wisdom). 
25 Violence against women in public space is likely to be from a known man (radical 
feminism). 
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The new administrative criminologists and radical feminists have suggested 
that the surveys they have conducted undercount non-stranger violence 
due to the methods used. The assumption generally made in their writing 
is that violence from known people is much greater than that revealed. 
The findings presented here in Table 7.9 support the notion that violence 
is usually perpetrated by a known person. This is not to say, however, that 
violence from a stranger is insignificant, Tables 7.10 and 7.11 show that 
it accounts for 20 per cent of violence against women and 32 per cent 
Table 7.9 Overall violence by relationship and gender, per cent of those 
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Table 7. 10 Violence against women: relationship to the perpetrator by locality, per 
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Table 7. 11 Violence against men: relationship to the perpetrator by locality, per 
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of violence against men. The figure uncovered for women is even more 
notable given the extraordinary avoidance behaviours adopted by women 
to avoid such victimisation (see, for example, Painter 1988; Painter et al. 
1990). It is clearly important in highlighting the reality of domestic 
violence that women's experience of violence from unknown men is not 
forgotten. 
Table 7.10 shows women were found to be at greatest risk in the home 
from first their current partner ( 34 per cent), secondly a male friend (18 
per cent) or male acquaintance (18 per cent), and thirdly an ex-partner (13 
per cent). In public, the assailant was most likely to be an unknown male 
(38 per cent), a male acquaintance (29 per cent) or an unknown female ( 12 
per cent). For men, the perpetrator in the home was most likely to be 
another male family member (24 per cent), secondly a male friend (20 per 
cent), thirdly a male acquaintance (17 per cent), and fourthly a current 
partner ( 15 per cent). The 'other male family member' most usually cited 
by men was a brother. In public, men were most likely to be victimised by 
an unknown male (51 per cent) and secondly by a male acquaintance (27 
per cent). 
If we analyse non-stranger and stranger violence in public we find that 
both women and men have about a 50 per cent chance of the attacker being 
a stranger. For men this stranger is invariably male and for women there is 
a three to one chance of the assailant being male. These findings refute the 
notion that violence against women in public space is more likely to be from 
an unknown man - he is just as likely to be known as unknown. And, of 
course, it refutes the opposite assertion often occurring in the radical 
feminist literature. 
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VIOLENCE BETWEEN HUSBANDS AND 
WIVES/BOYFRIENDS AND GIRLFRIENDS 
26 Most violence in the private sphere is between husbands and wives/boyfriends 
and gi,rlfriends ( all perspectives). 
Table 7.12 indicates that most violence in the home was found to be 
perpetrated by a current partner. However, it is important to point out that 
violence in the home from non-family members is not insubstantial, 
particularly by a male friend (19 per cent) or male acquaintance (18 per 
cent). 
Table 7. 12 Overall violence in the home by relationship, per cent of those 
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27 Men are as likely to experience violence from wives/gi,rlfriends as women are from 
husbands/boyfriends (family violence researchers). 
28 Women are more likely to experience violence from their husbands/boyfriends 
than men from their wives/gi,rljriends (radical feminism). 
29 Women use violence against their husbands/boyfriends in self-defence and are 
more likely to be injured and experience a greater degree of impact (radical 
feminism). 
The findings detailed in Tables 7.10 and 7.11 suggest the risk to women 
from their current partners was over three times greater than that for men. 
Moreover, methods used at this stage of the project probably underestimate 
domestic violence against women; that is face-to-face interviews as opposed 
to self-complete questionnaires (seeJ. Mooney 1993, 1994, 1996). Thus this 
data clearly contradicts the findings of Straus and others and undermines 
Steinmetz's notion of the 'battered husband syndrome'. Therefore proposi-
tion 27 is dismissed and proposition 28 confirmed. 
This survey also shows that women were more likely to endure a wide 
range of violent behaviours, be injured and have a weapon used against 
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them by their partners or ex-partners than was the case for men. In fact no 
man was found to have had a weapon used against him by a partner. Women 
were also more likely to experience multiple incidents and the impact on 
them was, not surprisingly, worse. Qualitative work shows further that 
women who experience violence from their partners often use violence in 
self-defence. Thus, as occurred above, the radical feminist position on this 
form of violence is found to be valid. Furthermore, as left realists in 
particular have stressed in their work, there is no such thing as an equal 
victim; people have a differential vulnerability to crime. Thus violence on 
women, because of their structural position, is likely to be worse and have 
a greater effect than that against men. 
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION 
Summary of findings 
This chapter set out to explore the social and spatial parameters of violence. 
Its main findings are as follows. 
• Violence is a relatively common occurrence. 
• Women and men have fairly equal risks of violence against them. 
• Men are the predominant perpetrators of violence. 
• Violence is equally distributed between the public and private spheres. 
• Most violence against men occurs in public, most violence against 
women occurs in private, but in neither instance is the focus over-
whelming. 
• Men are the predominant perpetrators of violence in both the private 
and public spheres. 
• Most male violence in the public sphere is against men, most male 
violence in the private sphere is against women, although male violence 
against women in the public sphere and male violence against men in 
the private sphere is not insignificant. 
• Violence is serious; respondents experienced a wide range of violent 
behaviours against them, injuries and the impact was correspondingly 
severe. 
• Women and men experienced a similar range of violent behaviours 
against them, use of weapons and injuries. Violence had a greater impact 
on women. 
• There was little difference between the home and public space with 
respect to the range of violent behaviours. In the home the risk of injury 
was slightly greater and the impact was worse. 
• Most violence is committed by someone who is known to the victim, 
although violence from a stranger is not insignificant in public space. 
Violence from strangers entering the home is negligible. 
• Women were most at risk from their current partners, followed by male 
acquaintances and then unknown men. 
• Men were most at risk from unknown men, followed by male acquaint-
ances and then male friends. 
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• The perpetrator of violence in a public space is equally likely to be a non-
stranger as a stranger whether the victim is a woman or man. 
• Violence from partners or ex-partners in public space was relatively 
infrequent. 
• Women are at much greater risk of violence from partners or 
ex-partners. Violence against men from partners or ex-partners was 
relatively uncommon. Women are more likely to use violence against 
their partners or ex-partners in self-defence, are more likely to be 
injured, have a weapon used against them and experience a greater 
degree of impact. 
Conclusion 
These findings with regards to the distribution of violence cut across the 
predictions of the major theories, invalidating many whilst supplying 
answers where there has previously only been conjecture. In particular they 
contradict the widespread notion that violence is a relatively infrequent 
occurrence which focuses on men in public space and is perpetrated by 
strangers. On the contrary, violence is a common event and not the 'poor 
cousin' to property offences in the criminological agenda; it focuses equally 
on men and women and occurs in equal proportions in the public and 
private spheres and is frequently committed by non-strangers. 
Patterns of victimisation have been found to be distinctly gendered. For 
a man the public sphere is twice as likely to be the arena of risk in 
comparison to the home; for a woman the pattern is exactly the opposite. 
For a man, strangers are the greatest risk, followed by acquaintances and 
then partners: the risk decreases with intimacy. For a woman the reverse is 
true; partners are by far the greatest perpetrators of violence, followed by 
acquaintances and then strangers. However, for men and women the one 
constant factor is that it is men who pose the greatest threat. Thus, this 
surveY. to a large extent has validated the radical feminist arguments, 
although, in highlighting the problem of domestic violence for women, we 
must not underestimate the danger they face in public space from male 
acquaintances and strangers; this has also proved to be not insignificant. 
NOTE 
The number of households in the survey area was 2,410; one household in two was 
targeted for the sample (i.e. 1,205). At each household an alternative male/female 
respondent, aged 16 years or over, was identified for interview. To ensure a random 
selection within the household a Kish grid was used (Kish 1965). The response rate was 
83 per cent; that is, 1,000 individuals were interviewed. 
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CHALLENGING PERCEPTIONS 
•community' and neighbourliness 
on a difficult-to-let estate 
Janet Foster 
Public housing estates are rarely seen as environments where 'community' 
and neighbourliness flourish. Indeed they are more often characterised by 
rapid tenant turnover, adverse physical design with high levels of crime and 
low levels of tenant satisfaction. The few studies of housing estates 
demonstrate that these generalisations conceal a considerable diversity in 
residents' experiences (see Parker 1983 and Reynolds 1986 as examples), 
but a mixture of nostalgia about communities past (see White 1986; 
Pearson 1983) and the failures of public housing (see Coleman 1985; Power 
1989) have led to continuing assumptions about the patterns of social 
relationships in these settings. 
This chapter, as the title suggests, seeks to challenge some of these 
popular stereotypes. It describes tenants' experiences of community and 
neighbourliness on a difficult-to-let estate in London which emerged from 
ethnographic research for a Home Office funded evaluation of the Priority 
Estates Project (PEP) and its impact on crime and community (see Foster 
and Hope 1993). The study involved eighteen months' overt participant 
observation on the estate and seventy interviews with residents, housing 
staff, police officers and other 'professionals' associated with it (see Foster 
and Hope 1993 for detailed discussion of methodology) .1 
The account begins with a brief history of Riverside (a pseudonym), 
tenants' recollections of the estate when it opened, the intense neighbour-
ing which occurred at the outset and how the estate rapidly went into 
decline. This description forms the framework for subsequent discussion of 
residents' perceptions of community and neighbourliness on the estate at 
the time of the fieldwork and the networks which existed there. 
RIVERSIDE 
Riverside, in the heart of London's East End, was a multicultural estate 
assumed to have many of the problems associated with post-war council 
housing. Opened in the early 1970s it comprised two concrete medium rise 
blocks of flats and maisonettes and was based on Le Corbusier's designs 
(see Eisenham 1972). 'There's no comparison between the estate today and 
as it was then' a tenant remarked: 
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In them days we used to have architectural students from all over the 
world coming to look at Riverside because it was one of the original 
concepts of the 'streets in the sky'. If them same architects came back 
now, I wonder what they'd think. 
Many tenants, irrespective of whether they liked living on the estate or 
not, often referred to it as a 'prison'. 'Let's be honest,' one said, 'Riverside 
always does look like a prison, the design of it.' But this did not prevent 
many tenants moving there at the outset: 'It was lovely,' one recalled, 
'although there was lots of concrete, the estate was nice, it was very clean 
and the flats were lovely' (Foster 1995: 567). When the first occupants 
moved in the fact that the estate was new produced a feeling of pride and 
investment and as there were no established networks people easily 
developed contacts: 
Everybody seemed to be all in together and all trying to be sort of nice 
and stay nice and friendly ... In those days people used to take more 
pride outside their door. They used to take pride in the whole outer 
part ... The place at that stage was a show place so everybody wanted 
to keep it oh so nice. (See Foster 1995: 567.) 
'Believe it or not it was quite nice then,' another said, 'all sort of friendly 
... I moved here just before Christmas and I remember like on the new year 
night I opened the door and I couldn't believe it everyone was dancing up 
the landing you know and inviting you in each other's houses.' 'We had a 
great lot of neighbours' another tenant recollected: 
They made yer feel welcome. It was like you used to have in the houses 
if anybody was ill everybody used to rally round . . . We had a 
neighbourliness which doesn't exist now, not really. 
As in the established working-class neighbourhoods where women 
played a pivotal role (Young and Willmott 1957; White 1986; Whipp 1990), 
neighbouring was most frequent and intense among female tenants: 'In the 
early years a lot of the women didn't go to work', an original tenant 
explained. 'So we'd all sit outside ... gossiping and chatting.' Children were 
also an important link because as the same tenant remarked: 'It was yer 
children who was yer interest, we were all neighbourly because our children 
were the common factor ... children can be great ice breakers between 
neighbours.' 
The initial and intense neighbouring which occurred at the outset soon 
faded (a common occurrence, see Abrams 1980) and within a short period 
of time Riverside went into decline in an all too familiar manner (see Power 
1989; Bottoms et al. 1989). 'A number of factors' contributed to Riverside's 
problems, an estate officer explained: 
One is the sheer physical appearance of the estate, it's forbidding, it's 
ugly ... Two, lettings policies ... Whereas in 1971 you had all the 
original residents and quite a few of those are still around as the[y] 
... filtered out ... people have been dumped here literally- it's one 
offer, take it or leave it and that doesn't exactly help to foster pride. 
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Riverside hasn't been popular with people, it's always been the last 
resort. 
Those tenants who had lived on the estate since it opened argued that 
the process of decline began as the original tenants 'died, moved out to 
better theirselves, or got transfers to bigger places'. They were replaced by 
'different' people, often students and couples without children who did not 
have housing priority (Foster and Hope 1993: 29). Some of these had been 
offered more than one property and therefore still had a degree of choice 
but were not seen to have the same commitment. Consequently they were 
frequently blamed for the estate's difficulties: 
The type of people that they're moving in the flats now, they're calling 
them 'hard to let' which I don't think they are - they're very nice flats, 
but they're just moving in single people who don't go and wipe their 
balconies down or their window sills or put their rubbish out. It is ... 
the ones that are by themselves or new couples who are doing the 
damage, because we've still got a lot of people from when I first moved 
in and we never used to have the rubbish like we do now, and the lifts 
so dirty and the balconies dirty ... That's the type of people they're 
moving in here now. 
One tenant suggested that two distinct groups of people resided on 
Riverside: 'There's people who see being here as a stop gap to going 
somewhere better' (many of whom had been on the transfer list since the 
day they arrived and were reflected in the significant numbers- 55 per cent 
- of tenants who reported in a Home Office survey that they would like to 
move - see Foster and Hope 1993: 23); 'and there's people I suppose like 
us, [who] like our flat, not particularly mad about the state of the lifts, the 
graffiti and the fact that it isn't kept clean, but basically like the flat.' 
As the tenant profile of the estate became more diverse, neighbourliness 
assumed a different character. Those with established networks were often 
reluctant to extend them, and consequently new tenants moving onto the 
estate found it harder to establish links. A woman who moved in just six years 
after the estate was opened said: 'we never saw anybody and I lived here five 
years before I spoke to the ... next door neighbour ... You'd ... see people 
but they just never spoke' (see Foster 1995: 567). Common residence then 
was not enough to create friendly relations especially in circumstances where, 
as on Riverside, the estate came to house an increasingly heterogeneous 
population who perceived themselves to have little in common. 
Given Riverside's poor status, it is unsurprising that approximately a 
quarter of the estate's population were Asian (7 per cent), Chinese/ 
Vietnamese (9 per cent) and Afro-Caribbean (10 per cent) (Foster and 
Hope 1993: 44-5), as it is generally acknowledged that these groups are 
structurally disadvantaged (see Henderson and Karn 1987) and receive the 
worst housing allocations (Commission for Racial Equality 1988; Ratcliffe 
1992). The most recent ethnic minority settlement was the most con-
troversial, involving the allocation of flats to previously homeless families, 
the majority of whom were Bengali (see Forman 1989; Docklands Forum 
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1993). The policy was problematic on a number of fronts, but most 
importantly because it effectively eliminated any tenant choice. Families 
were forced to accept the single housing offer made to them and to settle 
in areas of East London which had previously been predominantly white. 
He was offered this flat ... It was his only offer. He didn't have any 
alternative but to move in here. He did complain ... cos it's too far 
out, concerned about his kids ... [and told the council] 'I don't think 
it's a suitable flat'. [The reply was] 'well you've gotta take it cos there 
isn't any other alternative ... He was a bit angry but because he didn't 
have an alternative he took this flat. 
(Bengali resident, Riverside, speaking through an interpreter) 
Not surprisingly, the Bengalis, coerced into moving to an area which was 
commonly perceived as hostile, were frequently fearful, and the first 
Bengali families moved to Riverside even before the homeless families 
policy was implemented, experienced harassment, including in one case 
'trouble with people putting fires ... through their letter boxes'. 
The rapidly expanding number of Asian households (which by the end 
of the research formed 17 per cent of the population - see Foster and Hope 
1993: 45) led to specifically racialised comments among many white tenants 
about the 'different' people moving to Riverside who were not perceived to 
maintain the same 'standards' and 'values' as original tenants. This was 
aptly demonstrated by a resident who immediately interpreted a question 
about changes on the estate in racial terms: 'Oh it has changed. It's 
changed a lot. Well the people they've put in. They was ever such nice 
people they were when we came here. I know these coloured people aren't 
the same.' Ethnic minority households became a convenient scapegoat as 
this white tenant remarked: '[When] we first moved on the estate we had 
very few coloured or Bangladeshi people or Vietnamese people and there's 
a lot more of them moved in and I feel that most people are talking about 
them ... there is a lot of hostility.' She continued: 
People generally in the East End [of London] are very racist. They 
don't like foreigners at all, they don't want them here ... they feel that 
they're the cause of all the problems. 
(Foster and Hope 1993: 29) 
At face value the description above does not suggest that Riverside tenants, 
whatever their ethnic origin, were either likely to feel positive about the 
estate or to develop patterns of neighbourliness in this context. However, 
during the course of the research it became evident that tenants' percep-
tions of the estate and the patterns of interaction there challenged many of 
the stereotypes conventionally associated with life on such estates. 
PERCEPTIONS OF NEIGHBOURLINESS AND 
"COMMUNITY' ON RIVERSIDE 
Few Riverside residents perceived themselves to be part of a 'community', 
a term which conjured up the kinds of images invoked by this tenant: 
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'People popping in and out of doors, that happened in me mum's day, 
when you had rows of houses and the family lived in the road ... people left 
their keys on a string and doors were never locked- it don't happen now.' 
Some pointed to the abuse of public areas on the estate as indicative of the 
absence of community: 
People have ... a total lack of concern for other people by peeing in 
the lifts or letting their dogs ... foul the landings and not putting 
rubbish out. To me things like that are [signs] that people just don't 
care where they live and don't care who their neighbours are because 
if they did you wouldn't do it. 
Yet, despite these feelings, the same residents also felt Riverside did have 
elements of neighbourliness and 'community' as the tenant quoted above 
continued: 'I think generally that people ... look out for each other and a 
lot of people are very friendly ... I feel this is quite a community.' 'It just 
seems that most people know one another on the estate, if not to talk to, 
to nod to ... there's not a lot of bad feeling ... there's not a lot of animosity' 
(Foster and Hope 1993: 31). This view was not limited to white households 
as the comments of this Bengali man speaking through an interpreter 
demonstrated: 'He thinks it's [Riverside] good ... because he lives in a 
friendly environment [and] local people are all right.' 
More than 50 per cent of respondents in the estate survey 'talk[ed] to 
or were friendly with two or more neighbours', were 'friends with two or 
more households on the estate', and over 60 per cent had 'neighbours who 
kept watch on their property when they were out' (Foster and Hope 1993: 
31). 
Ironically those who had lived on the estate longest seemed least likely 
to feel that Riverside was friendly. This was because they compared their 
current experiences with the period of intense neighbouring when they 
first moved in. For example, one original tenant said: 'I think it's very sad 
that the neighbourliness and friendliness has gone.' Yet she also felt: 
'There's still a community but not like it was.' These contradictions lie at 
the heart of the difficulties of trying to define and understand 'commu-
nity', which as Crow and Allen (1994: 183) point out 'has many meanings; 
it involves different sets of experience for different groups of people, and 
indeed for the same people at different times in their lives'. 
Rather than focusing on those problems here, I want to discuss the 
patterns of social interaction which existed among different groups of 
residents on Riverside, beginning with the established tenants. Despite 
considerable tenant turnover established residents retained a significant 
number of contacts on the estate, especially on their own landing. A female 
tenant, for example, who had lived on the fifth floor of block one since 
1972 knew half of the forty-one households along the landing. The core of 
her network was centred on ten original tenant households. 
Despite the number of tenants involved and the importance of this 
network for providing support, where tenants 'look[ed] out for each 
other', the established participants perceived themselves to be a beleag-
uered minority and felt threatened by the arrival of new tenants with whom 
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they felt unable to identify (although in some cases they did establish 
contacts with them). Original tenants therefore perceived the estate to be 
increasingly occupied by 'strangers': 
There's so many strange faces we don't know who lives there and who 
shares a flat with somebody. But we did know before who was here and 
who wasn't and eventually got to know their relations if they come up 
to visit. 'Oh that's so-and-so's son's wife ... that's so-and-so's young 
son ... all that sort of thing. You had that certain familiarity. 
(Foster 1995: 575) 
The networks of more recently arrived tenants tended to have a more 
diverse base and promoted different perceptions of community and 
neighbourliness. On the eighth floor of block two, for example, an active 
network with the same degree of contact as the original tenant in block one 
(where half the balcony was known to the tenant) was perceived very 
differently. Here tenants saw the estate as 'friendly' and familiar rather than 
a place occupied by 'strangers'. The eighth-floor network was comprised of 
residents of different ages, sexual orientation, class and lifestyles. The 
central figure (Carol) in the network had lived on Riverside for eleven years 
but did not know any other tenants for several years after moving to the 
estate. 'When I had [the baby]', she said, 'I thought enough's enough. 
When new people move in I'm going to introduce myself and that's what 
I do.' Five years after her initial overtures, the network was thriving: 
This balcony has got what the old fashioned streets used to be like ... 
We have got a couple up here that just don't speak ... but I would say 
that half this balcony know each other and at one time or another 
have popped in and had tea and coffee. It's really nice up here ... My 
door and my phone's for ever going. Last week I got called the den 
mother for the eighth floor because if anything goes wrong they 
always knock on me ... A lot of people along here I have their keys 
... for them ... or when they're on holiday I go in and feed ... cats 
. . . [or] pick ... up ... mail and mak [ e] sure there's no leaflets in the 
door. 
I asked Jill and her partner Pete who lived on the same landing how long 
it took to meet their neighbours: 
Quite soon actually ... we were sort of knocking and bashing around 
... the neighbours Terry and Madge next door, they sort of came out 
and were sort oflooking. We said 'We're moving in.' They said: 'That's 
fine, it's just that we heard knocking and wondered what was going 
on.' So we met them and ... I asked her then would she ... have the 
keys for us because the day we were moving in I'd arranged for the 
electricity and gas to be put on. 
When Jill came home the electricity had not been connected: 'I saw a light 
on in Carol's and just took a chance really',Jill said. 'She was really sweet 
- gave us a candle or two. They were the first neighbours really that we sort 
of met. We realised that they were very nice and very helpful indeed.' 
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A gay man on the same landing said he had initiated contact with his 
neighbours: 
My attitude in situations like this is to say hello first and I in fact did. 
Because I'd met Barry (another gay man on the estate) Barry 
introduced me to somebody else and it just went on from there and 
when I met Carol ... we became good friends. It's vital for me to have 
contact like that. 
When I asked how many people he knew on the balcony he said: 
to stand and talk to about nine flats ... but there are different degrees 
of cognisance that I actually know them by. There's Carol, she's the 
major contact on the balcony itself. Barry has left now but he was on 
the fifth floor ... Jill and Pete is next ... then Jo, then again my 
opposite neighbour since they've moved in I've got quite close to 
them. I mean I knocked on their door when I ran out of sugar and 
they knocked on my door when they didn't have any change for the 
meter or whatever. Errol, the black guy next door ... he's a really nice 
fellow ... and his girlfriend ... then Georgina at the end. 
Neighbourliness seemed to be facilitated by the landing itself (as was 
intended in the 'streets in the sky' design) because it provided the 
opportunity for people to meet and talk to one another and made 
interaction between those who might not otherwise have established 
contacts easier, as Carol explained: 
I used to chat to [Georgina's] fella ... Ifhe was out [on the balcony] 
he'd have a walk down and have a cigarette and a chat and then one 
afternoon he said 'Could my girlfriend come down and have a chat 
with you?' ... We really became good friends ... It's like when Justin 
and Scott moved in, we probably would never have spoken to them; 
they'd have probably have [to have] spoken first. It was only that we'd 
had the gas cut and they come along [the balcony] with an electric 
cooker and me and Jo was in such a good mood we was having a laugh 
and joke and that and I said 'Fancy going out and buying an electric 
cooker, the gas is coming on tommorra!' And they started laughing 
and chatting ... They'd only been there a couple of weeks ... and 
Scott said 'Could you have the keys for me?' 
Unlike the established residents who found heterogeneity difficult to 
deal with, diversity was not a problem in itself for more recent tenants, as 
a small fifth-floor network in block one comprised of students, young 
families and elderly tenants, and the eighth-floor block two networks, 
demonstrated. Tenants however were not oblivious to the differences. The 
'den mother', for example, saw herself as 'ordinary' but acted as an 
important support to a diverse range of tenants. 'We're getting some very 
weird people moving into these flats', she said: 
For instance Justin right. The other week he goes to this pub ... He 
walked into the gents toilet and there was a girl in there rolling a joint 
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so he borrowed £20 off her and give her the keys to his flat. Now I 
mean is that weird? ... He was ringing me up every half hour, 'Is my 
door still shut? Have you seen anyone go in? Can you get John [her 
husband] to go in and check? ... I'll ring you back in half an hour.' 
Despite Carol's belief that the balcony operated like 'the old fashioned 
streets', and that she knew many of the tenants along her balcony, she did 
not perceive her neighbourly relations as constituting community: 'I would 
say ... in general, that it's not a community ... People know each other but, 
as I say, we are quite rare up here because we do all get on with each other 
so well and pop in and out of each other's places.' 
PRESSURE ON NEIGHBOURLINESS 
Although neighbourliness appeared to be common, it existed under 
considerable pressure because of mistaken impressions of the estate and 
continuing difficulties in finding common ground. No matter how success-
ful the networks, an underlying suspicion about the potential for hostile 
encounters persisted among most residents and made them reticent about 
establishing contacts. For example the young men, Justin and Scott, that 
Carol met on the balcony invited her in for a cup of tea the day they moved 
in. Carol's immediate thought was: 'I didn't know who they are. They could 
have been murderers for all I knew. I'm not that gullible just to walk in.' 
(See Foster 1995: 569.) While Jill, when she asked her neighbours to hold 
her keys said: 'Bit of a risky thing because you don't know, but they seemed 
like nice and very ordinary and we didn't have that much stuff.' Inter-
actions then were overlaid with the expectation of trouble. 
The perceived differences between tenants also led to assumptions about 
the way they would respond, particularly in neighbour disputes. Tenants 
often anticipated hostility and were consequently on their guard, which not 
unnaturally influenced their willingness to get involved. Neighbour dis-
putes sometimes went unresolved for long periods because residents were 
fearful of intervening. For example, a female tenant was driven to 
distraction by the music being played by a tenant on the landing below and 
finally decided to confront him. He apologised and said he 'didn't know' 
he was causing a disturbance, 'no-one's said anything to me'. His two 
immediate neighbours whose lives were equally disrupted by the noise said 
to her: 'How did you knock on his door? He'll pull a knife on you ... That 
music's driving us up the wall.' 
CULTURAL DIVERSITY AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 
The indigenous white community think oh they're [the Bengalis] 
dirty, they're rubbish ... Those people if they could have had a choice 
they would not have chosen to come to such an estate, they would 
probably have gone to better places but because there is no choice ... 
they're making the best to be there and make a peaceful life. 
(Bengali support worker, Riverside) 
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The preceding discussion outlined the patterns of interaction among 
groups of largely, though not exclusively, white tenants on two landings in 
the Riverside blocks. This section focuses on the burgeoning networks of 
Bengali tenants on the estate and the strength that was derived from these 
alongside the support provided by the PEP initiative (see Foster and Hope 
1993). By the end of the research the Bengalis, initially the most vulnerable, 
perceived themselves to be 'empowered' while their white counterparts, 
especially original tenants, perceived themselves to be a defeated and 
outnumbered minority (see Foster and Hope 1993: 42-4). 
It is well recognised that ethnicity can provide an important basis for 
networks and the Bengalis had a number of factors in common: ethnicity, 
religion, country of origin, and in many cases the same area within 
Bangladesh. Although these commonalities were important, differences 
did exist between Bengali tenants who were more educated and relatively 
financially secure and those families who had little education or income. 
These differences, however, were less important than the desire to improve 
the lives of all Bengali households on the estate and to create an 
environment which would be relatively safe and supportive. 
One young Bengali man with whom I made contact was a member of one 
of the first families to move to Riverside. Before the research began he knew 
all fifteen Bengali households on the estate but knew only one of the 
residents on his landing (the fifth floor of block two). Three years later, with 
the burgeoning Bengali population (which increased by 10 per cent in 
three years, see Foster and Hope 1993: 45) and his active involvement in the 
tenants' association and the Bengali Association which welcomed new 
families to the estate, his network included forty-five households - almost 
a fifth of households on Riverside - but he still knew only four households 
on his landing. While the networks of white tenants tended to be based on 
individual balconies and there was very limited interaction between 
landings let alone blocks, the Bengali networks provided strength and 
support across the estate. 
The network included both Bengali and white households because of his 
involvement with the tenants' association: 'We had white neighbours but I'd 
never actually spoken to them', he explained. 'Through [the] TA we got to 
know them and they got to know us quite well. Better relations as a result. 
Better neighbours' (Foster and Hope 1993: 41). His experiences on 
Riverside led him to suggest that the estate was 'the best estate to live on at 
the moment in the whole of ... Tower Hamlets, in terms of race relations'. 
A perception which was very important given the negative experiences of 
Bengali families moved on to the Isle of Dogs just a short distance away ( see 
Foster 1992, 1996, forthcoming). 'Riverside hasn't had that bad name as 
other [estates],' the Bengali support worker explained, 'where everyone 
wants to move out, very unprotected, alone, defenceless ... Bengalis are not 
coming [ to Riverside] with a great fear now.' 
Many Bengali residents, despite their initial trepidation, felt positive 
about the estate. For example this man said: 'I like the Bengali Society and 
our community, everything's all right you know.' This growing confidence 
and security was reinforced by the fact that most new tenants housed on the 
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estate were Bengali: 'Within the last three or four years a large concentrated 
number have come to settle down in Riverside. And new ones coming every 
day'; this increased familiarity and reduced fear, as the comments of this 
Bengali resident demonstrated: 'If you go out [ of] any flat you see Asian 
faces everywhere ... whereas three years ago you didn't see any ... so they 
feel a lot safer' (Foster 1995: 576). 
Despite the many positive comments about Riverside a small minority of 
Bengalis were dissatisfied because its high rise design was unsuitable, 
especially for children, and the estate's location some distance from the 
mosque and other facilities in Whitechapel created difficulties. Language 
barriers also led to isolation: 'I don't know the language, it's isolating', one 
of the men said through an interpreter. 'He knows the ... white faces and 
black faces living here but he doesn't know them personally because of the 
language problem he's got.' This was even more acute for Bengali women. 
White tenants rarely mentioned the Bengali households who were 
known to them when they described their networks, although they did 
include Afro-Caribbean residents and sometimes the Vietnamese or 
Chinese (though these contacts tended to be relatively superficial). This 
was because many white tenants felt threatened by the burgeoning Bengali 
population and perceived insurmountable barriers in establishing contacts 
with them. 'Different cultures are not friendly', a tenant said. 'They've got 
their way oflife and we've got ours.' Another said: 
They outnumber us in here now ... I love my flat ... they're nice flats, 
I wouldn't like to move [but] ... if they give me the opportunity to 
move out of here I would go .... I feel I'm being pushed out ... by 
who's sort of coming in ... they're just driving other people out. 
(Foster and Hope 1993: 43) 
Such negative responses were not unique to Riverside (see Cornwell 1984; 
Holme 1985). Although white tenants may have perceived themselves to be 
in the minority they still formed the largest group on the estate. However, 
in three years their relative position had changed from 73 per cent of the 
population to 58 per cent (see Foster and Hope 1993: 45). 
When white tenants were highly sensitised to the Bengali population on 
Riverside, and underlying distrust and hostility was openly expressed 
towards them, why did the Bengalis feel positive about the estate? Part of 
the explanation lay in their networks because as the Bengali support worker 
observed: 
among their own group there's a welcoming, ... so they ... settle 
down and feel quite comfortable. [They are] confident that some-
body [is] at hand, that their children will not be alone, there will be 
other children at school and if they have a problem there is someone 
to help. 
(Foster and Hope 1993: 41) 
These feelings of relative security may also have been due to the response 
of white tenants too. 'We are tolerant of each other I suppose in our 
backhanded sort of way', one explained. 'We do [think] they're here to stay, 
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that's it, end of story, so live and let live. Our resentment we keep more or 
less to ourselves, hence we became apathetic' (Foster and Hope 1993: 44). 
CONCLUSION 
This short chapter has outlined the patterns of interaction among residents 
on a London housing estate where, despite adverse physical design and a 
changing tenant profile, networks had been established. In the case of the 
original Riverside residents, despite their dwindling numbers, a support 
network survived but was perceived to be increasingly threatened. By 
contrast, Bengali households, despite their initial vulnerability, formed a 
successful community of 'interest' (Willmott 1986) across the estate where 
common factors such as ethnicity and residence combined with fears about 
their safety and the intense stage of neighbouring to encourage the 
development of links. 
Although common factors were key elements in both the established and 
Bengali networks, diversity was not a problem in itself, especially where 
networks were facilitated by design or the energies and enthusiasm of key 
individuals. The differing types and composition of networks on Riverside 
aptly demonstrate that different forms of neighbourliness can occur in the 
same setting simultaneously among different groups of people. These 
networks played an important role in an environment where Asian, white, 
black and Chinese/Vietnamese households alike lived with an underlying 
suspicion about their neighbours and expressed concerns about their safety 
(see Foster 1995). 
The very existence of these networks suggests that popular perceptions 
of council housing - and the very poorest and most difficult-to-let estates 
in particular - as alienating environments in which there is little tenant 
interaction and support, are too simplistic. Instead of condemning such 
places as 'dreadful enclosures' (Darner 1974) we should look more closely 
at the patterns of interaction between tenants in these contexts. We need 
to understand more about how they are characterised, in what ways they 
influence tenants' perceptions of the estates on which they live, and how 
different individuals and groups, who have had little or no choice in their 
housing allocation, manage to co-exist. 
NOTE 
Survey research (before the PEP initiative began and three years later) was also 
conducted for the Home Office (see Foster and Hope 1993) and the data are included 
here where appropriate, but it is important to note these figures refer to the whole 
experimental site in London and not simply to that part of the estate discussed here. 
Part Ill 





HEGEMONY AND REGIME IN 
URBAN GOVERNANCE 
Towards a theory of the locally 
networked state 
Chris Col/Inge and Stephen Hall 
INTRODUCTION 
The recent proliferation of inter-agency 'networks' and 'partnerships' at 
the local level in Britain has now reached a point where these are seen as 
a primary vehicle for urban policy development and implementation. This 
process has been associated with increased fragmentation of the local state 
through the internalisation of the market and the transfer of responsibili-
ties to centrally appointed quangos. It has also been associated with the 
commodification of urban policy through the establishment of a market in 
regeneration funding. In each case these changes have conditioned a phase 
of experimentation, with new institutional roles and relationships arising in 
and around urban governance. 
The newly emerging pattern of urban governance has recently been 
theorised in terms of the transition from Fordist to post-Fordist modes of 
regulation or state forms ( e.g. Tickell and Peck 1992). But, whilst historical 
changes have been described in regulationist terms, much less attention 
has been given within this school of thought to identifying the causal links 
through which gross transformations of society are supposed to have 
occurred (see Goodwin et al. 1993). The appearance during the 1980s of 
promising strands of theory from within American political science, and 
from within Gramscian state theory, does however suggest certain alter-
native formulations which may allow the processes involved in macroscopic 
change to be specified more clearly. Regime theory, for example, has 
emerged from within the pluralist tradition as a model for the analysis of 
urban politics and local state restructuring, focusing upon the crystallisa-
tion of interests in urban coalitions with particular emphasis on powerful 
representatives of private capital ( e.g. Stone 1993). Progress has also been 
made from within the Marxist tradition in the development of neo-
Gramscian theory of hegemony, to the point where (despite the national 
focus of much writing, and despite its association with the regulation 
approach) it is possible to investigate the spatial diversification of hege-
monic projects and accumulation strategies, and to analyse the 
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co-ordination of locally specific power blocs Uessop 1983b; Cox and Mair 
1988; Peck 1995). 
This chapter reviews the development of regime theory and the theory 
of hegemony, compares and contrasts these approaches, and identifies 
their implications for the analysis of the state and society at the local level. 
It then examines these theories by reference to the elaboration in recent 
years of urban policy networks and partnerships as part of the restructuring 
of the local state, politics and civil society. This is investigated through a case 
study of regeneration policies in Birmingham since the early 1980s. 
THEORIES OF HEGEMONY AND REGIME 
The theory of hegemony derives from the humanistic reading of Marx and 
Engels undertaken by Gramsci during the 1920s and 1930s. It also derives 
from the anti-humanist, structuralist appropriation of this analysis in the 
writings of Althusser and Poulantzas, and subsequent reactions to this 
structuralism. Regime theory has been developed from within the liberal 
pluralist tradition of political science, in opposition to neo-classical eco-
nomic models oflocal government, to provide a method for the analysis of 
political processes in US cities. 
Neo-Gramscian theories of hegemony 
During the 1980s neo-Marxist state theory was reformulated by Hirsch, 
Jessop and others in order to relate it to more substantive concerns, and to 
draw upon emerging regulation theory (e.g. Hirsch 1983). The regulation 
approach takes up the Gramscian notion of a hegemonic apparatus, which 
combines political and civil power in the process of social regulation, and 
places this within a theoretical framework reminiscent of Althusserian 
structuralism. The state is viewed as the central core of a constellation of 
social institutions and relationships (the 'mode of regulation') that 
orchestrates arrangements between production and consumption within a 
given 'regime of accumulation' to ensure their mutual compatibility 
(De Vroey 1984). 
In a broadly regulationist context, Jessop develops an account of the 
formal properties of the state, together with the substantive character of 
'hegemonic projects' and 'accumulation strategies', which is intended to 
resist the extremes of structuralism and instrumentalism. The state gives 
form to social power but also constrains this through, for instance, the 
differential representation of social interests. There are three formal 
features of the state that are decisive in mediating the rule of capital: forms 
of representation, forms of intervention, and the form of the state as an 
ensemble of institutions Uessop 1983a: 154). Jessop distinguishes three 
different forms of political representation (clientelism, corporatism and 
parliamentarism), each of which links the state to the interests of capital 
and helps to 'manage' anti-capitalist interests, but each of which contains 
its own drawbacks. The effectiveness of these different forms of representa-
tion in reproducing the circuit of capital (the value form) and the 
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institutional integrity of the state is, according to Jessop, not given by capital 
but is a contingent matter that depends, for instance, upon the substantive 
articulation of hegemonic projects and accumulation strategies. 
Jessop defines hegemony as the 'interpellation and organisation of 
different "class relevant" (but not necessarily class conscious) forces under 
the political, intellectual and moral leadership of a particular class ( or class 
fraction) or, more precisely, its political, intellectual, and moral spokesmen' 
(Jessop 1983b: 100). He argues that successful leadership requires the 
development of a hegemonic project which asserts a general interest 
behind activities that advance the long-term requirements of the hege-
monic class or fraction, and opposition to activities which might confound 
these interests (Jessop 1983a: 155). For example,Jessop et al. (1984) argue 
that Thatcherism succeeded in replacing the old 'one nation' Tory 
hegemonic project by a 'two nations' project of divide and rule between the 
productive market core and the less productive periphery. A hegemonic 
project involves the granting of concessions to non-hegemonic classes and 
fractions, and differs from an accumulation strategy in that it is directly 
concerned with wider social or political themes 'such as military expansion, 
moral regeneration, social reform, or political stability' (Jessop 1983a: 
155). Jessop views hegemony as provisional and allows for the possibility 
that it may fall into crisis or encounter opposition in particular places at 
particular times. An accumulation strategy is described as an economic 
'growth model' together with the means of its achievement (Jessop 1983a: 
149). Accumulation strategies may be articulated by business leaders, or by 
other agents including politicians, academics or bureaucrats (Jessop 1983a: 
160). Just as the substantive reality of the value form in each context is 
contingent upon (for instance) the particular accumulation strategy that is 
adopted, so the substantive reality of the state form depends in part upon 
the hegemonic project that is pursued (Jessop 1983b: 107-8). 
The preceding theorisation takes the nation-state as its focus but in 
recent years efforts have been made to extend and adapt this analysis to 
subnational power structures and state apparatuses. Following Harvey's 
concept of 'structured regional coherence' (Harvey 1985), Cox and Mair 
have analysed urban politics in the USA in terms of 'local dependence'. 
Capital and the local state cannot escape dependence upon local resources, 
customers or taxpayers, and so they must confront it through mutually 
beneficial accumulation strategies which, typically, take corporatist forms 
(Cox and Mair 1988: 309). A pro-development coalition will, for instance, 
seek to co-opt class interests behind a hegemonic project supportive of its 
objectives. This project may assert that class-based resistance will discourage 
investment and employment in the locality and that sacrifices are required 
if this area is to compete effectively with others. Cox and Mair thus argue 
that the hegemonic project, by appealing to community loyalty, displaces 
local class conflict into a competitive rivalry between localities (Cox and 
Mair 1988: 318-21). 
From the late 1980s there have been various attempts to develop a 
regulationist account of the local state and 'local spaces of regulation' 
(Tickell and Peck 1992: 209; Goodwin et al. 1993). Goodwin et al., for 
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instance, argue that following the post-war settlement the local state 
assumed a central role in organising production and reproduction, and 
establishing new forms of consumption via the welfare state. Since the 
1970s, however, the class alliances underpinning local Fordism have been 
broken down, and the state nationally and locally is being restructured as 
part of the preparation for a new mode of regulation. Most local authorities 
have adopted a 'new realism' involving compliance with the central 
government agenda, but in some areas there is positive emphasis upon 'a 
two-nation model based on private provision for the affluent worker, with 
only a minimal "social security state" for those excluded from this' 
(Goodwin etal.1993: 81). 
Peck has also developed a structural, 'institutionally embedded' analysis 
of business elites. He points to a contradiction in Thatcherism between the 
ideological centrality of business leadership in urban redevelopment, and 
the practical dependence of this leadership upon (central) state sponsor-
ship and a centrally established framework of local institutions. Local 
business leadership is not to be understood as a spontaneous expression of 
the interests oflocal capital, but as a force that is constituted and sponsored 
through action by the nation-state in the creation of a non-elected tier of 
local government: '"business interests" are currently being mobilised, given 
their form and presented with their function by the state' (Peck 1995: 17). 
For old style macroeconomic tripartism, Thatcherism has substituted a 
bipartite corporatism based on 'partnership' between government and 
individual 'maverick' or disorganised capitals at the local level. An 
important element of political discourse in late Thatcherism was that of 
'localism', and through institutional changes business leaders have been 
encouraged to see themselves as speaking for their city as a whole, creating 
a situation in which the interests of business are hegemonic (Peck 1995: 
30). 
Neo-plurallst regime theory 
Regime theory developed as part of a broader response within US political 
science to economistic analyses of urban development, the most important 
being Paul Peterson' s seminal City Limits (1981). Peterson acknowledges 
that conflicts over policy do occur but argues that they are theoretically 
unimportant; it is the economic system as a whole that constrains the choice 
of policy-makers. The most important function of city government is to 
preserve the economic vitality of its territory and thus its fiscal base. 
Peterson regards cities as unified entities, competing with each other to 
secure economic investment. This basic competitive dynamic precludes the 
possibility that city governments might pursue redistributive, social welfare 
strategies. 
Clarence Stone (1984: 289) argues that Peterson is correct to suggest 
that economic development enjoys popular support, but he underestimates 
the extent to which the actual process of economic restructuring is subject 
to conflict. Sanders and Stone (1987: 528) suggest that the debate is based 
on a dichotomy between those who regard cities as unitary entities and 
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those who regard cities as complex entities through which political and 
economic competition is mediated. Regime theorists fall into the latter 
category. They reject economic determinism and argue that politics 
matters because different cities have responded differently to economic 
change (Swanstrom 1988: 107). Policy grows out of the characteristics of 
the governing coalition, so politics produces policy (Sanders and Stone 
1987:538). 
Regime theory is concerned essentially with local power structures, 
although some more recent formulations have stressed the importance of 
economic restructuring and inter-governmental fiscal support. Regime 
theory agrees with pluralism that, given the highly fragmented nature of 
modern society, it is unlikely that any one group could monopolise power 
but argues that the threat of monism is so negligible that it is uninteresting 
(Stone 1993: 8). Consequently, regime theory adopts a social production 
model of power in contrast to conventional pluralism's social control 
model. The social production model addresses the power of local elites to 
achieve certain policy outcomes rather than to exercise control over the 
public, and regime theory, therefore, emphasises 'power to' rather than 
'power over'. Stoker and Mossberger argue that conventional pluralism 
addresses the well-known question 'who governs?', whereas regime theory 
is also concerned with the capacity to govern ( 1994: 197). 
Traditional pluralism assumes that political authority is adequate for the 
state to achieve its objectives and economic factors are largely absent from 
its analyses. Regime theory, on the other hand, adopts the familiar neo-
pluralist dictum that there exists a fundamental division oflabour in liberal 
democracies between state and market (Lindblom 1982; Elkin 1985: 11). In 
this con text, the state must co-opt non-governmental actors (Elkin 1985: 
12), and public policy choice is constrained fundamentally by the need to 
build and rebuild governing regimes. A regime is the set of agreements ( or 
perhaps substantive policy dispositions) by which the division of labour 
between political and economic institutions is managed (Stone 1993: 2) or, 
as Swanstrom (1988: 110) puts it, how a compromise is reached between 
economic and political logic. 
Non-governmental resources are of course skewed strongly towards 
capital, not least in the massive discretionary powers of corporations to 
invest and disinvest in particular localities (Stone 1984: 294). Government 
cannot command economic performance, it can only induce it (Elkin 
1985: 13), and the private sector, therefore, occupies a particularly 
advantageous position in urban regimes. This is reinforced in the United 
States by a number of factors, including the instrumental control of city 
government by business interests and the lack of equalising federal grants 
to local government (Harding 1994: 359). However, regime theorists are 
not (generally) as pessimistic as Lindblom (1982) regarding the 
constraints imposed on public policy by the market (Logan and Swanstrom 
1990: 6). 
Regime theory is, therefore, as DiGaetano and Klemanski (1993: 368) 
put it, an amalgam of urban political economy and the community-power 
paradigms. It is American in origin but ethnocentricity is not necessarily a 
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problem. Harding (1994: 366), for instance, suggests that the fundamental 
division of labour between state and market in liberal democracies makes 
the variations in institutional structure between nations of secondary 
importance. Nevertheless, the activities of urban regimes differ spatially 
and temporally and the approach, therefore, lends itself to the construction 
of ideal types to facilitate empirical analysis. For a number of regime 
typologies see Stone (1993: 18-22), Elkin (1985: 15-24) and Swanstrom 
( 1988: 108). 
Comparisons and emplrlcal Implications 
Neo-Gramscian theory and regime theory clearly demonstrate a degree of 
convergence, and the similarities between these are substantially greater 
than those that attended previous generations of Marxists and pluralists. 
They include the following: 
1 A rejection of economism as it appears in their respective traditions. 
Both perspectives therefore agree that 'politics matters'. 
2 Both theories resist 'instrumentalism' by recognising the impossibility 
of monistic control and emphasising the participation of a plurality of 
interests within the political process, forming a ruling coalition or 
hegemonic bloc. 
3 Both theories stress the necessity of building and rebuilding political 
alliances to achieve and sustain the capacity to govern. Both recognise 
the importance of ideology in forming and cohering these alliances. 
4 Despite their resistance to economism, both approaches acknowledge 
the impact of economic interests (particularly the requirements of 
capital) upon political processes. 
Beyond these similarities, however, there are some fundamental differ-
ences between the two perspectives which stem in part from the traditions 
in which they are embedded: 
1 Although regime theory postulates the separation but interdepend-
ence of politics and economics, this is taken as given and is not 
theorised to any depth. Neo-Marxism views the separation of 'politics' 
and 'economics' as problematic and subject to renegotiation according 
to the development of class conflict. 
2 Neo-Marxism acknowledges a plurality of 'groups' and 'categories' 
within or around the state but it suggests these are underpinned by 
class relations and the interpellation or displacement of class interests 
and identities. Regime theory has a more pluralistic concept of 
community interest and pressure groups. 
3 Neo-Marxism deals with the articulation of 'projects' and 'strategies' in 
the co-ordination of 'categories', 'groups' and 'class fractions' into 
hegemonic blocs. Regime theory deals with interest groups and parties, 
and their composition into coalitions which have a stable policy 
orientation referred to as a 'regime'. 
4 Neo-Marxism generally is less committed than regime theory to the 
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empirical investigation of hegemony ( of hegemonic projects, accumu-
lation strategies and the building of hegemonic blocs) and in particular 
to the examination of case studies in urban politics. 
5 Neo-Marxism regards the form of the state as an important determi-
nant of its relationship to class interests and its ability to serve these 
interests. Regime theory tends to take these two formal features as 
given and to examine the dynamics of coalition formation against this 
background. 
6 Neo-Marxism postulates a structural relationship of the state both to 
class struggle and to the development of capital, with different degrees 
of relative autonomy or contingent causation for the state. In regime 
theory the causal emphasis is placed upon the political composition of 
the ruling coalition and the importance of system or structural 
variables is, therefore, down-played. 
There is, then, an underlying difference between neo-Marxist theories of 
hegemony, with their formal analysis of the state and its relationship to the 
structures of capital and class in which empirical .investigation is neglected, 
and regime theory with its more open-ended investigation of political 
process in which there is greater empirical emphasis, but in which the form 
of the state apparatus and its structural relationship to economic interests 
are neglected. 
URBAN GOVERNANCE IN BIRMINGHAM 
The next step is to investigate these rival theoretical perspectives through 
a brief case study of the governance of regeneration activities in Birming-
ham. As Britain's second largest city, with a population of approximately 
one million people, Birmingham is the centre of the West Midlands region. 
The city has suffered disproportionately from industrial decline since the 
1970s, losing more than half its manufacturing jobs during the decade and, 
by 1980, unemployment exceeded 20 per cent (Wright 1994: 1). In the 
space of two decades Birmingham has declined from a thriving prosperous 
city to one of the most deprived in Europe (Martin and Pearce 1992: 500). 
The West Midlands County Council moved politically to the left from the 
late 1970s and responded to the economic crisis with a range of inter-
ventionist initiatives targeted at indigenous industry. However, the right-
ward shift in national politics brought conflict between ( especially) 
metropolitan counties and the Thatcher government, which intensified to 
the point where in 1986 the upper-tier councils in the English conurbations 
were abolished. Birmingham City Council's response to the economic crisis 
contrasted with that of West Midlands County Council and local authorities 
in other major cities. Under the leadership of Sir Richard Knowles, the City 
pursued a strategy linked explicitly to civic 'boosterism' and place-
marketing. This strategy has been extensively documented, critically 
(Loftman and Nevin 1992) and less critically (Carley 1991; Martin and 
Pearce 1992). However, the government's programme of disciplining, 
fragmenting and de-democratising urban governance was proceeding, and 
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by the late 1980s there was a proliferation of local development agencies. 
Davies (1993), for instance, identifies no fewer than fifty-three local 
'executive bodies' (including Heartlands Development Corporation and 
Castle Vale Housing Action Trust) in Birmingham. This is a conservative 
estimate, however, as it excludes joint bodies created after the abolition of 
the County Council and, crucially, a number of key economic players (the 
Chamber of Commerce, the Training and Enterprise Council). Moreover, 
several territorial levels of the state in and beyond the UK are active locally. 
The European Commission, for instance, is involved through its Structural 
Fund policies, from which Birmingham has benefited more than most 
British cities (Martin and Pearce 1992: 500). Central government's pres-
ence takes the form of a number oflocally specific direct measures (e.g. a 
City Action Team, a Task Force), and it operates several grant regimes from 
which Birmingham has benefited (Regional Assistance, City Challenge, 
Single Regeneration Budget). On the other hand, the city has suffered 
from the Conservative government's fiscal austerity regime. The Govern-
ment Office for the West Midlands is responsible and centrally accountable 
for the management of the regional European Operational Programme, 
and the Single Regeneration Budget. Finally, there is Birmingham City 
Council which, as noted above, has often pre-empted the Thatcher 
government's agenda for urban regeneration and has, itself, established 
quasi-autonomous agencies and partnerships. 
The next step is to illustrate how regeneration policies have evolved in 
Birmingham. The present phase of development activity dates from the 
early 1980s. The City sought to develop a remedial strategy in response to 
the catastrophic industrial decline of the preceding decade, and was 
strongly influenced by the experience of cities on the east coast of the 
United States (Loftman and Nevin 1992; Wright 1994) which constructed 
'flagship' projects and developed business tourism initiatives. Accordingly, 
in 1983, Birmingham City Council voted to develop Britain's first conven-
tion centre, and a number ofrelated projects (The National Indoor Arena, 
Symphony Hall and the Hyatt Hotel) in the city centre. This development 
strategy was executed in a closed, corporatist manner. Indeed, it was not 
until 1992 (after the completion of the projects) that public consultations 
were conducted (Loftman and Nevin 1992). The total cost of the develop-
ment package was some £276 million, part of which was met by a £40 
million grant from the European Commission and part by Birmingham 
City Council and the National Exhibition Centre Ltd (a joint venture 
between the Council and the Chamber of Commerce). Development costs 
were, therefore, substantially underwritten by the public sector, and funds 
were apparently diverted from other activities including housing and 
education (Loftman and Nevin 1992). 
In March 1988, the City Council and the Birmingham City Action Team 
convened the 'Birmingham City Centre Challenge Symposium', known as 
the 'Highbury Initiative'. The symposium included representatives from 
local and national government plus participants of the private and 
voluntary sectors. It proposed a programme of pedestrianising Birming-
ham city centre and down-grading the city's inner ring road. More 
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importantly, for our purposes, it resulted in the creation of Birmingham 
City 2000, a private sector umbrella organisation, representing some 150 
financial and property sector firms within the City, which exists to promote 
a boosterist ethos within Birmingham. City 2000's interests were, therefore, 
synonymous with those of the City Council at the time. A second symposium 
involving similar interests was held in September 1989 and resulted in the 
establishment of another key organisation. The Birmingham Marketing 
Partnership was formed to further the promotion of Birmingham as a 
centre for business tourism through its slogan 'Birmingham: Europe's 
Meeting Place'. The Birmingham Marketing Partnership was the brainchild 
of City 2000, and its board comprises representatives of the Council, the 
Chamber of Commerce, City 2000, Birmingham Airport, British Airways, 
the Midland Association of Restaurants, Caterers and Hotels, Midlands 
Independent Newspapers, NEC Limited and the West Midlands Develop-
ment Agency. 
Regeneration activities in Birmingham have also focused on districts 
beyond the city centre. In 1986 the City Council designated East Birming-
ham as a regeneration area and, with the support of the Chamber of 
Commerce, persuaded the Environment Secretary against imposing an 
Urban Development Corporation (Cherry 1994: 208). Subsequently, in 
1987, the Birmingham Heartlands initiative (a joint property development 
project) was established in the area by the City Council, the Chamber and 
five leading building companies. Three of these firms were locally based 
(Bryant, RM Douglas and Gallifords) and two (Tarmac and Wimpey) were 
national concerns (Carley 1991: 107). However, the initiative became 
difficult to sustain due to the recession and the failure of a City Challenge 
bid for the area, and central government assistance was sought. The 
Birmingham Heartlands Development Corporation (a UDC) was duly 
established in May 1992 but continues to work closely with the City 
Council. 
Alongside boosterism the Council has sought to engage local commu-
nities in policy and services through a series of area offices and consultative 
committees around which council-community networks have been fos-
tered. The boosterist ethos that characterised Birmingham during the late 
1980s and early 1990s has moderated somewhat since the election, in 1993, 
of a new leadership committed to social and community services. However, 
the Council remains a fully committed member of the Birmingham 
Marketing Partnership and responded enthusiastically to the government's 
City Pride initiative, producing with its partners the first Prospectus in 
1994. 
The core partners of Birmingham City Pride are the Council, the 
Chamber, City 2000, the TEC and the Voluntary Service Council. The 
fundamental objective of the City Pride Prospectus is to halt the out-
migration of businesses and professional workers by 2005. To this extent, it 
represents a continuity with the boosterist ethos that characterised Bir-
mingham's immediate past. However, the Prospectus also stresses the need 
to tackle deprivation in the city. It is possible to pursue the apparently 
conflicting goals of wealth creation and distribution through City Pride 
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because it is not supported by specific government funding commitments; 
divisive policy decisions can, therefore, be deferred (though not indef-
initely). City Pride, by its very nature, enables Birmingham to project a 'one 
city, many people' message (Hall et al. 1995: llO). 
THE FORM AND DIRECTION OF URBAN GOVERNANCE 
There is no single policy on the part of local agencies, or indeed the City 
Council itself, towards the regeneration of Birmingham, but a range of 
policies related to different needs which together constitute what might be 
called the direction of urban governance. Nevertheless, it is possible to 
identify a surprisingly persistent strategy and vision on the part of the 
Council and other bodies throughout most of the 1980s and into the 1990s. 
This vision was born in response to the shock of decline of the previously 
vigorous Birmingham economy during the 1970s. It was developed and 
taken forward in a neo-corporatist manner by a relatively small number of 
politicians, officers and co-optees. It was driven by the desire to restore 
prestige and civic pride to the city and its residents, and to boost the city's 
position as a location for events and for inward investment. As such it 
constituted a distinctly 'civic' hegemonic project, led by the City Council rather 
than the private sector, and harnessed to a boosterist accumulation strategy 
(Bonefeld 1986: lll). Formulated in the mid-1980s, this strategy in many 
respects prefigured the shift at national level towards place-marketing. 
Although broadly consistent with the neo-liberal thrust of Thatcherism, it 
grew from different soil and contradicts neo-liberalism in its reliance upon 
local state sponsorship and investment (cf. Peck 1995). There has, since 
1993, been an attempt by the majority party in the City Council to shift the 
emphasis towards community rieeds and towards education, housing and 
social services. This change has brought a greater stress upon what might 
be called the 'one Birmingham' strand of the Council's message. But whilst 
changing the flavour of Council policies, strengthening their appeal to 
Labour Party activists and to working-class residents, the strategies of civic 
pride and boosterism appear to remain in place. 
Recent experience in Birmingham also illustrates, however, two impor-
tant trends in the form of urban governance - the emergence of a complex 
web of urban regeneration agencies, and the growth of 'privatism' - that 
might appear to contradict the civic project. The urban governance 
apparatus now contains informal networks between people and agencies as 
well as formal partnerships between public and private (and to a lesser 
extent voluntary) sector bodies. In some cases it includes secondary 
partnerships, in which one or more component agency is itself already a 
partnership. Despite appearances to the contrary, however, these networks 
are still constituted by and indeed centred upon the state, or rather upon 
an increasingly partialised state system in which there is separate but related 
involvement of several territorial levels. The second key trend in urban 
governance is the growth of 'privatism', involving the proliferation of non-
elected quangos that emulate private enterprise, and the incorporation of 
a set of private companies and business associations into the development 
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of urban policy. Each of these trends - which together comprise the neo-
corporatism of con temporary governance - has since the 1980s been driven 
by central government. But each was also embraced spontaneously by the 
City Council in the mid-1980s and has been pursued vigorously since then 
as part of its own restructuring strategy for the local state. This strategy has 
sought to mobilise wider business opinion in support of a local hegemonic 
project based on civic pride and boosterism, and to manage relations with 
central government and Europe. It has sought to forestall or to reduce the 
resistance of local residents through an identification with Birmingham 
and through the promise of jobs and services, a strand of policy which has 
been re-emphasised since 1993. Despite recent changes this new apparatus 
of local governance remains in place, and the process of reforming urban 
regeneration policy is now constrained by the existence of the networked, 
privatised local state form. 
Neo-Gramscian state theory does therefore provide a useful basis for 
interpreting the restructuring of the local state. But there remain several 
unanswered questions within this framework concerning, for instance, the 
relationship between the form and direction of urban governance -
questions that are raised by regime theory. The original development of the 
civic project and of boosterism in Birmingham reflected a desire on the 
part of key actors within and beyond the City Council to redress economic 
decline and the associated loss of prestige. In this context the restructuring 
strategy for the local state was devised not only to build support for the civic 
project but also to build the capacity for local governance in the pursuit of this 
project within a city such as Birmingham, against a background of central 
government pressure. The Council's influence, and the direction of 
regeneration policy, is now constrained and channelled by the form of this 
regime and the capacity for local governance which it establishes. Recent 
adjustments to City Council policies reflect changes in the political balance 
of the Council, which together with its partners from the private sector 
constitutes the governing regime in urban regeneration activities. These 
adjustments may be expected to produce further changes in the structure 
of urban governance. To understand both the direction of urban regenera-
tion policy and the (re)form of urban governance it is therefore necessary, 
as regime theory suggests, to investigate the intermediation of these 
through the political process, to examine the changing political balance of 
the regime that sustains and is sustained by the institutional ensemble, and 
the capacity this provides for urban governance which is more or less 
effective at meeting the needs of capital. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Conclusions may be derived from this case study regarding the relative 
strengths and weaknesses of our rival theoretical positions. Neo-Gramscian 
theory provides a cogent structural framework within which to locate the 
capitalist state, a framework that is largely missing from regime theory. It 
also addresses in a more adequate fashion the formal properties of the state 
(modes of representation, of intervention, of articulation as an ensemble 
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of institutions), properties which underpin and constrain the state's 
activities. Finally, it introduces a novel set of dynamic concepts, such as 
hegemonic project and accumulation strategy, which help us to specify the 
direction of urban governance. But paradoxically neo-Gramscian theory 
tends in practice to play down the significance of political processes such 
as coalition building between factions or agencies, and neglects the 
important practical question of creating the organisational capacity and 
resources to govern effectively in the interests of capital. Signs of this lacuna 
may perhaps be detected in the failure to prioritise empirical analysis of the 
relationship between hegemonic projects and accumulation strategies, or 
the relationship between these and the formal properties of the state as an 
institutional ensemble. 
Neo-Gramscian theory has not yet furnished an adequate account of the 
origins of projects or strategies or the articulation of institutional forms and 
policy directions in urban governance. The foregoing case study, though 
limited in scope, suggests that one way around this difficulty is to draw upon 
the lessons of regime theory. A stronger emphasis upon political dynamics 
would help neo-Gramscian theory to pinpoint the origins and agents of 
hegemonic projects and accumulation strategies and, in particular, to 
illustrate the way in which politics mediates between strategies and 
structures, between the direction and form of urban governance. 
Neo-Gramscian theory provides a powerful overall framework for 
understanding urban governance. But this approach can usefully be 
developed and extended by addressing the issues raised by regime theory, 
its demonstration that politics matters, its concern with capacity building 
and with the investigation of case studies. Our understanding of the locally 
networked state, and of the patterns that are summarised under the broad 
headings of 'Fordist' and 'post-Fordist', can be advanced by opening a 
dialogue between neo-Marxism and neo-pluralism. 
10 
URBAN PARTNERSHIPS, 
ECONOMIC REGENERATION AND 
THE "HEALTHY CITY' 
Mike Sheaff 
URBAN POLICY AND SOCIAL POLARISATION 
After years of widening social divisions within the city, reliance upon the 
market as the prime mechanism for urban regeneration has been tempered 
by a new interest in local partnerships. Simultaneously, the manifest failure 
of the poorest groups in society to benefit from wealth expansion in the 
1980s (e.g. Joseph Rowntree Foundation 1995), has prompted renewed 
debates over the compatibility of economic growth, social justice and social 
inclusion. Health status has taken a prominent position in some of these, 
as in the statement that, 'in a just society, everyone should be able to enjoy 
the best possible health' (Commission on Social Justice 1994: 285). This is 
frequently accompanied by a readiness to accept evidence that there is a 
causal relationship between deprivation and health. 
It is not my intention to interpret the character of such a relationship, 
although that there is one is implicit in much of what is said. Analysis in 
this area has attracted important contributions (e.g. Blaxter 1990), but 
much remains controversial, open to variant interpretations, and 
consequently ambivalent for policy formation. Policy must however be 
premised upon some understanding of the relationship between the 
economic, social and personal spheres. How this is interpreted, and the 
discourses through which it is expressed, forms the underlying theme for 
this chapter. 
The city has long been an important focus for understanding health and 
disease. From Edwin Chadwick and the early sanitary reformers, to more 
recent initiatives under the 'healthy city' programme, they have also been 
important sites for intervention. This has been expressed in the rationale 
for the healthy cities project in the following terms: 'Cities, as politically 
accountable and local units of population with the power to determine or 
influence policy in many of the areas of day-to-day life which affect health, 
were a very practical level at which to operate' (Ashton 1988). 
If cities enjoy sufficient autonomy to make policy intervention effective, 
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they also provide a context which participants can find meaningful. For 
Castells: 
The labour movement generated by the capitalist mode of production 
has largely lost its capacity to control the economy ... and the labour 
process and the welfare state are increasingly out of the control of the 
labour movement that was the key social actor of the class struggle of 
the last hundred years ... People ... may be unable to control the 
international flows of capital, but they can impose conditions on any 
multinational wishing to set up in their community ... when people 
find themselves unable to control the world, they simply shrink the 
world to the size of their community. 
(Castells 1983: 329-31) 
In this view the city becomes a locus for social and political engagement 
because its spatial boundaries appear to provide a sufficiently manageable 
context for practical outcomes to be realised. Equally, a city is not a unitary 
phenomenon; indeed, urban regeneration strategies have potentially 
reinforced social and spatial cleavages from the outset through the 
delineation of discrete 'inner city' boundaries. This has been an important 
and long-standing element of government policy, although its significance 
and meaning has changed with other shifts in urban policy since the late 
1980s. 
Of these shifts, three have had a particular impact on framing the 
relationship between economic and social objectives. The first has been the 
increased emphasis upon economic objectives, with a concomitant reduc-
tion in the role of social and environmental schemes. Associated with this, 
competition between cities over anticipated outcomes began to replace 
needs-based systems of assessment for resource allocation purposes. 
Secondly, local authorities found themselves playing a new role in these 
processes. Expectations that they enter into 'partnerships', particularly 
with the private sector, as in City Challenge, Urban Partnership and 
subsequently the Single Regeneration Budget, followed the introduction 
of government appointed bodies, notably Development Corporations, 
which were granted power over many traditional local authority 
responsibilities within designated areas. Thirdly, as in several other areas 
of government policy, greater emphasis came to be placed upon self-help, 
personal responsibility and individualism counteracting a more 'collectiv-
ist' culture. 
Tensions and contradictions between economically oriented urban 
regeneration strategies and health and social objectives arise independently 
of the city but find their expression within particular social settings. A local 
study provides an opportunity to consider connections between economic 
and social objectives on the one hand, with national and local relationships 
on the other. 
This chapter considers some experiences in the city of Plymouth, 
predominantly focusing upon the relationship between urban partner-
ships, economic regeneration and the 'healthy city'. It begins by locating 
the latter within a broader health promotion context, before going on to 
ECONOMIC REGENERATION: THE 'HEALTHY CITY'/ 143 
describe developments in Plymouth since the late 1980s. The final section 
considers some of the ways in which both health and economic behaviour 
may relate to wider discourses, notably those around claims concerning 
'rights' and 'duties'. 
HEALTH PROMOTION AND 'HEALTHY CITIES' 
The heterogeneity of health promotion joins a diverse array of practices in 
its name, and several means of interpreting similarities and differences are 
available (see Bunton et al. 1995). One aspect is the 'collective-individual' 
continuum (Davison and Davey-Smith 1995), within which the healthy city 
project has affinities with the 'new public health' perspective: less collectiv-
ist than Fabian or Marxist perspectives, but not as individualist as either 
'Health of the Nation' or, especially, 'free-market' perspectives. 
Important though this is, the 'collective-individual' continuum is only 
one relevant dimension, as is acknowledged by Beattie (1991) in his two-
dimensional typology incorporating the focus (individual-collective) and 
mode (authoritative-negotiated) of intervention (see Figure 10.1). 
Beattie locates the healthy city project within the 'legislative action for 
health' tradition, concerned with the development of 'healthy public 
policies'. As one early British advocate of the project explained, it was based 
on a recognition of, 'the necessity for social as well as individual action and 
for explicit policy with legislation where appropriate' (Ashton 1988). 
However, Beattie notes that support came mainly from Labour authorities, 
several of which were dismantled in 1986 while others were hit by capping 
restrictions. What is more, whereas the model being espoused attended to 
issues of equity, this was a period when the government sought 'to forestall 













Figure 10.1 Alternative models of health promotion strategies 
Source: Beattie ( 1991 ) 
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and eliminate unwelcome public attention to health inequalities' (Beattie 
1991: 173). Elsewhere, the assessment of one American-based initiator of 
the project was that 'The temptation in many programmes has been to 
avoid the healthy public policy issues' (Duhl 1992). 
Moreover, critics of this kind of focus were not restricted to the right. 
Others saw it as a form of 'collectivist authoritarianism', lacking a necessary 
wider community engagement. In contrast to a more traditional 'personal 
counselling for health', with its emphasis on personal autonomy, self-
determination and 'self-empowerment', this view stressed 'community 
development for health' through 'self-organisation and mutual assistance 
within groups oflike-minded people' (Beattie 1991: 176). 
Consequently, since its launch in Lisbon in 1986, the healthy city 
initiative has been far from uniform. Indeed, one of the original objectives 
made clear an intention to seek models of good practice which would 
provide 'a variety of entry points to action depending on the city's 
perceived priorities' (Ashton 1992). These might range from major 
environmental action to support for individual lifestyle changes. To some 
extent, this all-embracing approach appears to re-introduce the 'collective-
individual' continuum as the key category, although another aspect of this 
is the scope for constructing health in terms of 'rights' or 'duties'. 
The relationship between rights and duties is a familiar one in the 
sociology of health, most obviously in the Parsonian sick-role. Of relevance 
here is its extension in the 'late modern regime', where it has been 
suggested: 'The contemporary citizen is increasingly attributed with 
responsibilities to ceaselessly maintain and improve her or his own health' 
(Bunton and Burrows 1995: 208). In many ways this accords with much 
conventional health promotion in which personal responsibilities tran-
scend notions of health as a right, and individual lifestyle rather than the 
social environment provides the focus for intervention. 
Although the healthy city initiative adopted a very different perspective, 
a renewed emphasis upon personal responsibilities is emerging within 
current dominant political discourse, as in Tony Blair's claim that the 'clear 
dividing line in British politics ... [is] the notion of duty ... the rights we 
receive should reflect the duties we owe' (Blair 1995). 
Re-evaluating the traditional rights-based discourse of the left reflects a 
broader reassessment of the relationship between the individual and 
society, including post-war models of health and welfare services. However, 
although 'bureaucratic paternalism' must bear its share ofresponsibility for 
disempowering individuals, the view that rights are contingent upon 
personal behaviour can evolve into a far uglier form of authoritarianism. As 
the founding programme of the Nazi party clearly identified, personal duty 
can become the means of achieving the goals of the state: 'The state must 
apply itself to raising the standard of health ... and increasing bodily 
efficiency by legally obligatory gymnastics and sports, and by extensive use 
of clubs engaged in the physical training of the young' (quoted in 
Carpenter 1980). 
The objective of 'better health' is thus a highly malleable one, with its 
distinguishing features being fashioned by the discourses through which it 
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is expressed. In this the healthy city project has potentially a significant role 
to play, although not independently of other social processes within the city. 
The following account of experiences in Plymouth, describing aspects of 
urban regeneration and the healthy city initiative, illustrates some of the 
competing pressures which confront cities. 
PLYMOUTH, URBAN REGENERATION AND THE 
"HEALTHY CITY' 
Using data drawn from the 1981 census, Levitt ( 1986) argued that Plymouth 
was not a deprived city when compared to England as a whole. Even on this 
data, however, it could be shown that, when disaggregated, 'certain areas of 
Plymouth, on certain indicators, are highly deprived compared to the 
national average' (Dunkerley 1991: 175-6; see also Abbott 1988). 
In any event, by the second half of the 1980s irresistible change came as 
centuries of naval dominance were brought to an end. This had a dual 
significance. The Admiralty had historically influenced the broader charac-
ter of the local economy, with some evidence indicating it had discouraged 
more diverse employment (Chalkley and Goodridge 1991: 79-80), but 
while undermining scope for this to continue the more immediate impact 
of naval decline was upon employment within Devon port dockyard. 
In 1961 the dockyard employed nearly 19,000 civilian workers, represent-
ing almost one in five of all local jobs. A gradual decline occurred during 
the following two decades, although by 1981 employment was still over 
15,000. The decline soon accelerated however, and by the later years of the 
decade little more than 10,000 dockyard jobs remained. In addition, 
alternative sources of employment- particularly in 'producer services' such 
as banking, insurance, finance and other business services - were not 
growing as elsewhere (by 3 per cent in Plymouth compared to 15 per cent 
in the UK as a whole from 1984-7). The result was that Plymouth became 
the only major town in the South West to experience a net fall in 
employment in the middle 1980s (Bishop 1988). 
The city became an 'Urban Priority Area' (UPA) in 1987, with Urban 
Programme funding rising from an initial £433,000 in 1987 /8 to £1,267,000 
by 1990/1. However, this failed to halt economic decline. Employment in 
the dockyard plummeted to around 5,000 as the city's rate of unemploy-
ment rose faster than in any of the other fifty-seven UPAs. 
Using 1991 census data, the Department of Environment's newly 
introduced measure of deprivation, the 'Index of Local Conditions' (ILC) 
(Department of Environment 1994), ranked Plymouth forty-second out of 
360 districts, but twelfth in terms of the severity of disadvantage in the worst 
wards. Notwithstanding the difficulties associated with such indices, the 
consequences of economic decline in the 1980s are readily apparent. This 
was reflected in the city's Single Regeneration Budget (SRB) bid which 
described the priority area as largely corresponding with: 
the city's three worst wards, as identified in the DoE's Index of Local 
Conditions, which on a national ranking indicates that the area 
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contains a greater intensity of deprivation than any other local 
authority outside London and Birmingham. 
(Plymouth 2000 Partnership 1994) 
Although historical constraints on economic diversification were being 
weakened through dockyard decline, new curbs on local autonomy came 
with government urban policy requirements. One obvious example of this 
has been the encouragement of a discrete spatial focus for economic 
regeneration. Boundaries have not always been coterminous - with those of 
the Task Force, the Development Corporation and the SRB priority areas 
being somewhat different - but together they form a distinct area which 
incorporates the three most deprived wards in the city. 
One result is that many areas of deprivation fall outside of this 'inner 
city' boundary. Six of Plymouth's twenty wards in the city account for 41 per 
cent of households in the city without a car, 42 per cent of the city's 
unemployed, 50 per cent of children in low income households and 64 per 
cent of 'unsuitable accommodation' (each of these are indicators used in 
the ILC). The area covered by these six wards extends considerably beyond 
the SRB priority area, outwards towards the north and west fringes of the 
city. In several respects, the spatial distribution of deprivation reflects an 
east-west divide across the city rather than a concentration within a 
distinctive 'inner city'. 
An emphasis on spatial location may divert attention from the social 
processes involved in regeneration towards a focus on pieces of land, 
although to some extent this tendency has been tempered by newer 
elements of government policy. This is evident in the encouragement of 
local partnerships, but also in the desire to facilitate a more entrepreneurial 
culture. Each of these has in turn been influenced by the increased 
economic focus. 
The local partnership taking responsibility for determining urban 
regeneration, 'Plymouth 2000', is a tripartite one, embracing the local 
authority, the 'private sector' and the 'community'. In practice, the private 
sector, and especially the 'community' are sufficiently heterogeneous to 
make direct representation difficult to achieve. Three closely related 
consequences flow from this. First, central directive has been a highly 
significant influence upon development proposals; secondly, those sections 
of the private sector perceiving advantage in joining the partnership are 
most likely to utilise the opportunity; and thirdly, a relatively undeveloped 
community sector has found itself in a weaker position than other elements 
of the partnership. More significantly, the expectation that urban funding 
is used to attract other money puts local community groups at a distinct 
disadvantage. Efforts to strengthen community influence in the partner-
ship have to confront these inherent power imbalances. 
It is also noteworthy that partnership arrangements are required to 
administer £950,000 in the first year of SRB funding, even though this is 
considerably less than the £1.25 million Urban Programme funding 
received by the city in 1990/1. At the same time, the Development 
Corporation and Task Force are not subject to the same obligations but do 
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experience more direct central control. 
The other new element in government policy, the enhancement of 
individual responsibility, has also confronted difficulties. In part these arise 
from the accumulated impact of three centuries of naval dominance, which 
hardly created a flourishing environment for a strong entrepreneurial 
culture. Intentions to overcome this are most evident in proposals from the 
Task Force which, in a list of local 'weaknesses', identified: 'Endemic 
parochialism and lack of confidence among local people. Initiative and 
energy are low and business culture is lacking' (Plymouth Task Force 
1995). 
Several initiatives have been encouraged to stimulate self-employment 
and small business ventures. Alongside these have been attempts to develop 
'community enterprise', through community economic development 
trusts, co-operatives, credit unions and the like. The differences between 
these are considerable, even though each represents a response to the call 
for a more entrepreneurial culture in which individual, or small-group, 
endeavour replaces traditional employment relations and expectations. 
This sketch of aspects of economic regeneration is inadequate to convey 
the full character of current developments, but provides a context for 
appreciating the bifurcation of 'economic' and 'social' policy spheres. To 
a degree this separation mirrors shifting organisational areas of engage-
ment, particularly those oflocal government and the health service. 
Plymouth was declared as a 'healthy city' by the city council in 1989, 
although by 1991, when political control of the council passed from 
Conservative to Labour, an officer's report noted, 'little real progress has 
been made over the last two years'. A proposal to create two new posts to 
take the project forward subsequently foundered as the city experienced a 
reduction in its Standard Spending Assessment. Ironically, in the very same 
year the local health authority acknowledged that an additional £2 million 
being made available to it, 'is justified by recognition of the needs of those 
in Plymouth living in areas of social and economic deprivation and of the 
substantial number in the lower income groups' (Plymouth Health 
Authority 1992). These centrally determined resource issues were sig-
nificant in shifting some of the initiative from local government to the 
health service. 
In May 1992, for example, the health authority introduced a project to 
pilot new health schemes in St Peter's ward, which has the highest levels of 
deprivation in the city and the worst health status. But however innovative 
these might be, they inevitably reflect areas of health service involvement 
rather than those of local government, such as housing and employment, 
and as such tend to avoid some of the 'healthy public policy' issues. Despite 
opportunities for developing a complementary relationship between eco-
nomic and health initiatives, the separate organisational arrangements 
around funding sources and regimes has meant responses to deprivation 
have been substantially divorced from one another. 
At the same time, national policy frameworks can have a powerful 
impact on the determination of local priorities. This is illustrated in 
Plymouth's receipt of £1.8 million capital funding under the 'Urban 
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Partnership' programme in 1993/4 for road and parking improvements. 
For this the government required evidence of private sector support, but 
more tangibly demanded that the city council match it with £1.8 million 
from capital receipts, which were then subject to a temporary 'relaxation' 
of restrictions. 
In contrast, Plymouth's City Challenge bid had sought £7 million for 
housing improvements, but this was unsuccessful and a more modest £1.3 
million was sought in the SRB bid. However, due to limits upon the city's 
capital programme, it was not possible to match even this and no housing 
schemes were included in the first year of the SRB programme. Given the 
well-documented association between housing and health (and between 
traffic and health for that matter), the priorities encouraged by govern-
ment policy are illuminating. 
A reduction in the importance of social and community development is 
evident in other comparisons between the City Challenge and SRB 
submissions. Against a £4.4 million bid in the City Challenge submission for 
projects intended to 'enhance community life and improve social fabric' 
(of which £533,000 was identified for specifically health-related projects), 
£1.3 million was sought in the SRB submission for those designed to 
'enhance the quality of life of local people, including their health and 
cultural and sports opportunities' ( of which £200,000 was for health-related 
projects). 
Despite all this, with additional deprivation-related funding available to 
the health service came an opportunity for several projects, which might 
previously have sought Urban Programme money, to secure financial 
support. This may have served to reduce conflict over diminishing 
resources available through urban regeneration funding, even if the result 
has been to further reinforce a division between the 'economic' and the 
'social' and the shift from local government to the health service. 
A need for closer inter-organisational co-operation for the healthy city 
project was recognised in 1993 with the establishment of an officer-based 
steering group, including city council and health service staff. However, 
boundaries do not solely arise between organisations. Professional dis-
ciplines and departments, whether in the health service or local govern-
ment, reflect and reinforce variant approaches towards the relationship 
between health objectives and other aspects of service delivery and 
management. 
One factor contributing to these differences is the way in which health 
is conceived in relation to rights and duties. For example, the 'Healthy 
Plymouth charter' has formally adopted an emphasis upon rights, although 
somewhat ambiguously seeks to avoid a dichotomy with personal duty by 
expressing a commitment to: 'The right to health: recognising that health 
is a basic human right, the responsibility for which is both social and 
individual' (Healthy Plymouth 1994). Interestingly, in later versions of this 
document the word 'individual' was replaced with 'organisational'. 
The charter reflects the all-encompassing approach of the Lisbon 
conference, and also implicitly requires an equally wide range of partici-
pants. In this connection it was soon acknowledged that the officer-based 
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steering group was too narrow and its compos1uon was broadened to 
include a majority of members from community organisations. Further 
moves towards a partnership approach are reflected in the creation of a 
wider-based Healthy Plymouth Forum, open to all organisations supporting 
the charter. Although several features of the project correspond with the 
community development for health model, other pressures work in 
different directions. In particular, evaluation requirements of funding 
agencies raise greater difficulties for longer-term projects, such as those 
using a community development approach, than those for which changes 
in individual behaviour can be more readily identified. This issue may come 
to have growing importance because of continued restrictions on local 
government resources, even though an element of SRB money has been 
identified for the healthy city project. 
This money comes under the overall control of the primarily economic-
ally focused SRB partnership which is substantially independent of the 
partnership around the healthy city initiative. In both cases there is genuine 
evidence of a broadening of involvement beyond traditional structures, but 
the potential appears for the creation of two rather distinct sets of 
'partners', focused around 'economic' and 'social' spheres respectively. 
This may reflect difficulties of going beyond the establishment of a 
partnership capable of endorsing a set of specific development proposals 
for a distinct spatial area. It is much harder to achieve a broad consensus 
around wider policy objectives. An illustration of the potential difficulties 
came in a survey of city centre employers conducted by Plymouth Business 
School in 1994which noted: 
the majority of respondents do not feel able to either revise recruit-
ment practices to give priority to minority/special need groups or 
participate in customised training schemes targeted at specific groups 
such as inner city unemployed persons. 
(Chaston and Mangles, n.d.: 15) 
If the healthy city project is to embrace 'public policies' then issues such 
as employment can hardly be neglected, for whatever the precise causal 
processes the close association between unemployment and poor health 
status is undeniable (e.g. Bartley 1994). And yet major partners within the 
new urban policy-making processes may be less willing to accept some of the 
consequences of this. The possibility arises of a divergence between urban 
groups around a private sector/ economic axis on the one hand and a 
public service/social axis on the other, with many points of tension between 
them. Alternatively, new routes to reconciliation may emerge and possible 
forms these may take are explored in the final section. 
HEALTH, THE ECONOMY AND POWER IN THE CITY 
Despite an incipient fragmentation of economic and social policy ini-
tiatives, a potentially unifying theme has been a shift from what Beattie 
described in health promotion strategies as 'authoritative' to 'negotiated' 
styles (Beattie 1991). A similar framework can be applied to economic 
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development strategies, allowing parallels to be drawn between community 
development for health and community economic development, or 
between legislative action for health and traditional economic planning 
strategies. 
A rather more theorised version of the 'authoritative-negotiated' 
dimension contrasts modernist and post-modernist paradigms for healthy 
city projects. The modernist project, which envisages a 'superior rationalist 
solution to a set of hitherto insuperable problems', is challenged by 'the 
truly post-modern conception of healthy cities ... with its emphasis on the 
values of locality and community, aestheticism, relativism and private 
behaviour' (Kelly et al. 1993: 166). 
However, as experiences in Plymouth indicate, a simple dualism cannot 
accommodate the complexities and subtleties involved. Partly this is 
because the modernist project itself incorporated alternative ways of 
conceptualising the city. From a belief in an 'invisible hand' ordering its 
complex arrangements, these extended through the 'medical paradigm' of 
Chadwick and others to Engels's view of the city located within wider social 
relations of production (Donald 1992). 
The second of these paradigms, which asserted the power of human 
intelligence to diagnose and cure urban ills, gained the greater influence, 
although the idea that the market offers a better mechanism for regulation 
has been more evident recently. The idea of the city as a total system is 
replaced by one in which urban spaces became parcels of land (Donald 
1992). 
Despite such differentiation, modernity is undoubtedly characterised by 
a search for systemic solutions to the problem of achieving social order, 
integration and equilibrium. Whether planning or the market provides the 
mechanism for regulation, each assumes harmony to be a realisable 
objective. Such optimism may be naive, but the alternative prospect of 
urban disintegration and decay seems far more threatening, bringing to 
mind Abrams's image of 'The Hobbesian quality of urban life - a war of all 
against all contained within a continued and precarious domination' 
(Abrams 1978: 33). 
People may want to 'shrink the world to the size of their community' 
(Castells 1983: 331), but local strategies cannot be entirely autonomous, as 
is evident in the greater acceptance of the exigencies of the capitalist 
market in local economic strategies compared to a decade ago. But the 
sheer failure of market mechanisms successfully to regenerate cities has 
prompted a renewed search for alternatives. New urban partnerships, 
seeking social and economic order while avoiding the perceived excesses of 
bureaucratic planning and unfettered markets, nevertheless reflect rather 
than replace prevailing power relations. For even though greater self-
reliance and personal responsibility may extend the economic and social 
participation of individuals, they do little to alter the social forces within 
which this occurs. As Donnison noted in his account of Glasgow, 'policies 
which assume that stricken cities and their most deprived areas can, with a 
little help, solve their own problems are bound to fail' (Donnison 1987: 
273). 
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It is in the context of prevailing power relations that the earlier 
distinction between health being considered as a right or duty gains 
significance. More specifically, where it is viewed as a right it is likely that 
equity will be an important goal. This is incorporated into the Plymouth 
healthy city charter, as elsewhere within healthy cities, marking it apart from 
more individualistic and market-oriented alternatives. The goal of equity, 
however, implies a need for processes of observation, measurement and 
regulation: that is, forms of social surveillance which may themselves 
conflict with individual rights. This is the contradiction described by 
Turner (1987) as the 'Foucault paradox' and implicit in attempts to reduce 
health inequalities. 
Challenges to 'authoritative' approaches may reflect a necessary rejec-
tion of unwarranted bureaucratic or professional control systems - and 
post-modern celebration of diversity may provide a welcome alternative to 
drab uniformity - but there is another side to all of this. This is the risk of 
legitimising the status quo and the unequal distribution of power and 
resources which it sustains. 
Power operates at many different levels but if it is treated as an 
undifferentiated and unitary concept then its particular meaning in 
specific social contexts can go unacknowledged. Governments, local 
authorities, markets and partnerships do not operate in identical ways. 
They reflect differing social interests, sometimes of a conflicting character, 
which are almost invariably grounded within imbalances of power. Thus it 
would be mistaken to regard urban partnerships with a kind of naive 
pluralism which assumes they incorporate a wide diversity of local interests, 
each balanced in social strength and able to negotiate freely. The reality is 
very obviously different, although 'structural' inequalities can be strength-
ened or weakened by the form that social dialogue takes within the city. 
Recent debates about the so-called underclass demonstrate the continu-
ing capacity for explanations of social phenomena in terms of individual or 
group psychological characteristics to gain currency. Where this is accom-
panied by the prioritisation of personal duty, the prospect emerges of 
exacerbated local conflict as certain groups are identified as worthy of 
blame. Whether family poverty, and accompanying childhood illness, is 
attributed to the growth of lone-parenthood - or whether the target is the 
long-term unemployed, council tenants or whoever - opportunities will 
always exist to absolve more powerful social actors of culpability. An 
important question for the healthy cities project is whether it is capable of 
bringing poverty, inequality and exclusion to the centre of urban policy. 
Several practical implications flow from this. One concerns striking the 
optimum balance between independence and incorporation of healthy city 
projects and urban regeneration strategies and partnerships. Tensions 
between the 'economic' and the 'social' - and between the spheres of 
production and reproduction - also have important consequences for 
understanding the relationship of gender and urban social processes, an 
aspect beyond the scope of this chapter. It has been around issues 
concerning health, housing, social and other public services that many 
urban movements have arisen. In whatever ways these may develop in the 
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future, the claims to which they give rise are unlikely to be satisfied by 
solutions reliant upon either personal responsibility or market forces. 
In their place, principles of rights, equity and justice may achieve a 
renewed relevance. Because their meaning is open to dispute, itself 
reflective of conflicting social interests, and because they are fundamentally 
relational claims, they may presage a social vision for the city in ways 
unavailable to more individualistic solutions. The language and symbols 
which are used can themselves prefigure different social relations, giving 
rise to alternative conceptions of how the city might be. In this, unravelling 
the 'specific complexes of domination in which particular cities are 
embedded' (Abrams 1978: 33) represents an essential starting point for an 
analysis of urban regeneration. For things to be made better, power 
imbalances arising both within and outside of the city must be challenged. 
1 1 
POLICING LATE MODERNITY 
Changing strategies of crime 
management in contemporary 
Britain 
Gordon Hughes 
The term 'crime prevention' is often narrowly interpreted and this 
reinforces the view that it is solely the responsibility of the police. On 
the other hand, the term 'community safety', is open to wider 
interpretation and could encourage greater participation from all 
sections of the community in the fight against crime. 
(Home Office 1991) 
INTRODUCTION 
The above statement provides us with a typically vague definition of 
community safety from the most influential report to date in Britain on the 
potential significance of the concept for crime management strategies. This 
chapter is based largely on current research on one such strategy in an 
English Midlands county, 'Middleshire'. A key aim is to contextualise the 
specific policy processes at work in the rural/urban mix of 'Middleshire' in 
terms of the points of both convergence and divergence between develop-
men ts in this locality and the broader trends on crime management 
emanating from the central state. However, the scope of this chapter is 
restricted to what may be termed routine policing and crime prevention. It 
does not comment on 'paramilitary policing' ijefferson 1990) nor on 
international trends in policing in the context of 'Fortress Europe' 
(McLaughlin 1994) , although I would suggest that there is some evidence 
of a latter-day 'convergence thesis' in discourses on crime prevention and 
community policing around the world. 
Much contemporary research into the 'policy process' has emphasised 
the strong possibility of a 'gap' between the stage of policy formulation at 
the centre and that of policy implementation at the level of subnational 
government (Marsh and Rhodes 1992). This chapter will explore this 
crucial research issue and, in the process, critique two dominant socio-
logical interpretations of policing/ crime prevention trends, namely 
Radical Totalitarianism and Sceptical Pluralism, which are neglectful of 
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local, countervailing forces at work in this contested terrain. 
Before this, I outline in brief some of the major policy developments in 
'routine' policing, crime prevention and consultation/accountability issues 
during the last two decades from central government in Britain. All this is 
in advance of the third section which focuses on local trends and recent 
developments in the county of 'Middleshire' which may point to a more 
complex and contested terrain on law and order matters than is often 
assumed in the literature on national trends. 
THE WIDER PICTURE: THE NATIONAL POLITICS OF 
LAVV AND ORDER AND 'COMMUNITY SAFETY' 
During the last two decades, the problem of law and order may be said to 
have held centre stage in British politics. From being an issue marked by 
cross-party consensus, policing and the 'management' of crime in Britain 
have been thoroughly politicised since the 1970s (Reiner 1992). It would 
not be appropriate to enter into this whole debate here. Instead, the more 
modest purpose of this section is to place local developments regarding 
'community safety' in the context of the wider structuring and constraining 
but not necessarily determining initiatives and legislation emanating from 
recent national government policy. The actual impact of central govern-
ment diktats on 'sub-national government' (Gray 1993) should not be read 
as one-way domination from the centre with no room for manoeuvre and 
negotiation but nor can national pressures be ignored in any evaluation of 
local and 'subnational' policies and strategies on crime management. 
Home Office concerns about the costs of policing 
In recent years, the government litany of the three 'E's - economy, 
efficiency and effectiveness - together with the ideology of managerialism, 
has come to affect the organisation and operational work of the police 
(McLaughlin and Muncie 1994). 'Policing by objectives' has now become 
the established canon of modern policing in Britain and elsewhere 
( Goldstein 1990; Reiner 1994), further evidence of convergent, institu-
tional trends in the era of 'late modernity' (Giddens 1991). Of particular 
importance to the fate of community safety initiatives is the recent decision 
by the British government to establish measurable, national objectives for 
policing. These may marginalise yet further social crime prevention 
strategies, given the difficulty of 'measuring' their success in terms of 
readily quantifiable performance indicators. The future mandate of the 
British police may be much more focused on quasi-militaristic public order 
control and serious crime investigation at the cost of the 'social service' 
dimension to British policing. In the current situation of uncertainty, the 
British police appears, almost for the first time in its history, to be a public 
service desperate for allies outside of central government. 
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Home Office Initiatives on •partnerships against 
crime· and •community safety~ 
At the same time as we have witnessed pressure for the police to be more 
business-like and focused in their activities, the last decade has also seen a 
growing concern in the Home Office for the police and other agencies of 
social control to work together and form 'partnerships' with the public. In 
passing, it should be noted that there is a seeming contradiction between 
this drive towards 'community policing' and 'community safety' and the 
developments both noted immediately above and in the Home Secretary's 
'get tough on crime' and 'prisons work' statements in 1994 and 1995, 
inspired by the current American policy drift to penal retribution (Rose 
1995). Jones et al. (1994) may be correct in their thesis that recent years 
have seen the rise of a new paradigm regarding crime prevention. The view 
that the only proper response to crime is punishment is replaced in 
academic and official circles by the belief that retribution and punishment 
will not reduce the aggregate level of crime, and so the reduction of crime 
must be seen as a separate objective from the punishment of offenders. Out 
of this paradigm shift emerges the current discourse on crime prevention/ 
community safety. However, Jones et al. go on to argue that this way of 
thinking has had comparatively little influence on popular culture and 
'[p]oliticians of all parties find it easy and convenient to appeal to the old 
way of thinking' Oones et al. 1994: 302-3). Thus, alongside the new 
discourse on crime prevention, the old approach continues to be a central 
plank oflaw and order politics in Britain. 
To return to the discourse on partnership, such partnerships between 
the police, the public and other agencies are, arguably, part of what has 
been termed the 'Government's accountability package' (Morgan 1992). In 
effect, this package has bypassed any democratic structures of account-
ability and, instead, 'espoused a model of police accountability as steward-
ship with the police consulting more widely before taking decisions and 
providing fuller ex post facto explanations of events' (Morgan and Swift 
1988: 427). 
The key developmental stages to this· 'partnership' initiative will be 
briefly outlined in chronological sequence. The 1984 Joint Circular on 
'Crime Prevention' may be seen as a watershed, given its emphasis on the 
principle that crime prevention must be accepted as a significant and 
integral goal of public policy, both centrally and locally (Home Office 
1984). In this circular, particular stress is placed on the need for a 
co-ordinated approach and joint strategies involving partnerships against 
crime. Although more often rhetoric than reality around the country 
(NACRO 1991; Jones et al. 1994), the idea of 'partnership' had clearly 
arrived. 
By the end of the decade, the circular Tackling Crime (Home Office 1989) 
showed the further development of the partnership and community 
orientation to crime prevention in the Home Office. Particular attention 
was given in the circular to the problem of co-ordination, or rather the lack 
of it, between agencies which made up the criminal justice system. This 
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circular led the way for what was to prove the key inspiration for much of 
the subsequent local government social crime prevention schemes of the 
1990s - namely, the so-called Morgan Report of 1991. 
The main thrust of the Morgan Report is that the concept of 'crime 
prevention' is somewhat limiting in scope and has generally been police-
driven, with other agencies having only a marginal stake in it. Effectively 
community safety as a guiding idea is heralded as a way of moving beyond 
a 'situational' definition of crime prevention to a broader 'social' definition 
of crime prevention. Whilst acknowledging that the case for a partnership 
approach is hardly tested, Morgan notes strangely that the case for 
partnership is 'virtually unchallenged'. Crime prevention at the time of the 
report was seen as a peripheral issue to the major agencies and a 'truly core 
activity for none of them' (Home Office 1991: 3). 
The Morgan Report then goes on to suggest that the local authority is 
'the natural focus for coordinating, in collaboration with the police, the 
broad range of activities directed at improving community safety ... Any 
meaningful local structure for crime prevention must relate to the local 
democratic structure' (Home Office 1991: 4). Morgan thus supports the 
notion that local authorities be given the statutory duty to co-ordinate 
crime prevention/ community safety strategies for their locality. The report 
also argues that sufficient resources to make this change must be forth-
coming from central government. In passing, we may note that the 
recommendations regarding both local authorities' statutory role and 
resourcing have not been taken up by central government. 
Like many reports in the past, the Morgan Report has been shelved by 
government or, at best, used quite selectively. This is not, however, to deny 
its significant effect on local authorities, including Middleshire, since its 
publication. It may be noted that the Morgan Report comes across for the 
most part as a report written by officers for officers. In particular, the 
discussion of how these officer groups relate to issues of democratic 
accountability is cursory in nature. In particular, the role of the Police 
Authority in community safety is largely noticeable by its absence in the 
report. 
It was suggested above that central government has been selective in its 
use of the Morgan Report. In explicit terms, no further mention has been 
made of it in subsequent circulars from the Home Office. However, the 
language and rhetoric of both partnership and community safety are very 
prominent in the most recent pamphlet on crime prevention (Home Office 
1994). If taken seriously, the pamphlet seems to be calling for what may be 
inelegantly termed 'the citizenisation of crime control'. Once more, there 
is an appeal to the much vaunted but ill-defined 'active citizen' to play a key 
role in both surveillance and policing. The implications for professional 
policing with a clear legal mandate are potentially worrying. This noted, the 
pamphlet confidently asserts that 'the power of partnerships in beating 
crime' is proved but no convincing evidence, other than a few highly 
selective examples, is given. Undaunted, three complementary partner-
ships are presented as initiatives to be launched nationally in 1995: the 
already well-established Neighbourhood Watch Schemes, Street Watch and 
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Neighbourhood Constables. It is Street Watch which is the most con-
tentious, and, in some eyes, humorous and ill-conceived 'community 
partnership'. The catchword, according to the pamphlet, is 'vigilant' -
although critics may fear that an extra 'e' on the end of vigilant is a great 
risk. The vagueness of the scheme is perhaps best captured in the Home 
Secretary's 'soundbite' that the work involves 'walking with a purpose'. 
Perhaps the most telling feature of this latest Home Office initiative is that 
all the schemes are voluntary and low cost. 
The future of _pollce authorities and consultation 
with the public 
As a result of the debates surrounding the eventual Police and Magistrates' 
Courts Act (1994), there has been much uncertainty about the future role 
and make-up of police authorities. The fear of what is now often called 'the 
democratic deficit' (McLaughlin 1994), epitomised by the appointment of 
non-elected individuals to sit on 'quangos' and other democratically 
unaccountable bodies, has been to the fore in public debate (see Reiner 
and Spencer 1993). In particular, the original proposals for the restructur-
ing of police authority membership to tip the balance firmly in the 
direction of Home Secretary-approved appointees appear to have cast an 
important shadow over local policing and consultative arrangements across 
the country, to which I shall return below. 
The Police and Magistrates' Act has the stated aim of creating more 
powerful and business-like police authorities which will give more leader-
ship to the local police service. This greater autonomy is in turn balanced 
by the police authority now having the statutory responsibility for the 
performance of the force. It is widely recognised that police authorities in 
the past have been somewhat toothless and ineffective, in part due to the 
calibre of the membership and also because of Home Office domination 
(Morgan and Swift 1987; Jones et al. 1994). Viewed positively, the current 
changes may help invigorate local democratic influence over policing 
policy. From April 1995, police authorities are responsible for the establish-
ment of the local policing plan, which in turn will be the basis of local 
accountability. Of particular importance here, consultation with the public 
will be a crucial formal concern of the police authorities. A particular 
emphasis, then, is on the question of how to improve accountability by 
improving local consultation with the public. Local developments in 
Middleshire and elsewhere, with regard to policing and crime prevention 
initiatives, cannot be understood outside of this wider national context of 
the debate on police accountability. 
A BRIEF EXCURSUS ON TWO SOCIOLOGICAL 
ORTHODOXIES ON 'COMMUNITY' INITIATIVES IN 
CRIME CONTROL 
The broad-brush sketch of 'community'-based crime control initiatives 
outlined above has been descriptive in character. This is not to imply that 
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such developments in the 'crime control industry' (Christie 1993) have 
been immune from sociological analysis. Indeed, two perspectives are 
worthy of further comment and appraisal. I term the two major 
orthodoxies 'Radical Totalitarianism' (see also Ericson 1994) and 
'Sceptical Pluralism'. 
Radlcal Totalltarlanlam and the •surveillance 
society~ 
Radical Totalitarianism is a body of work associated with the authors of a 
radical disposition, particularly influenced by both Marxism and, increas-
ingly, Foucauldian theory (see Foucault 1977; Cohen 1985; Davis 1992 and 
Poster 1990, among others). What unites this body of work is a shared 
concern over the broad trends at work in social control whereby the late 
twentieth-century period is witnessing an evermore penetrative, all-seeing 
'panoptical' system of social surveillance. Such developments as commu-
nity policing and community safety schemes are but specific manifestations 
of this broader, globalising process. 
Accordingly, the 'partnerships' described above would be viewed as but 
one manifestation of the immersion of civil society in the ever-expanding 
social control machine, thus confirming the grand thesis of the 'extension 
of social control'. Community safety, I would suggest, would be seen by such 
theorists as an ideological category which offers us a dystopian vision of an 
authoritarian or neo-fascist communitarianism. In turn, the appeal to 
community in the context of the penetrative social control machine feeds 
off, and contributes to, a further chilling of the climate of 'risk' and 
'danger'. 
The attractions of this grand theory are hard to resist. Glimpses of 
dystopia have a powerful appeal, not least to intellectuals who, doubtless, 
gain vicarious pleasure from being on the 'edge', compared to the 
supposedly slumbering masses. With the coming fin de siecle, the concern 
over an apparently growing anomie, together with the onward march of 
impersonal control processes, is not confined to radical criminology (see 
Reiner I 994: 757). It would indeed be ill-conceived to write off the analysis 
offered by Radical Totalitarianism. However, there are some difficulties 
with the radical approach to social control initiatives which limit its salience 
to the sociological study of such specific examples as the emergent 
community safety initiatives in a county like Middleshire. First, there is the 
problem of theoretical foreclosure, associated with the grand theories of 
Marxism and Foucauldian discourse analysis, whereby the answers to 
questions are already known without recourse to empirical testing. There 
is also little scope for the specifics of locality and difference in such broad 
deterministic theorising as is found in Radical Totalitarianism. The grand 
design offered by radical totalitarian theory may thus both exaggerate the 
dystopian tendencies at work and the power of the intrusive social control 
machine, whilst simultaneously underestimating the scope for local resis-
tances, manoeuvring and negotiation from countervailing alliances in 
particular localities. Put briefly, the present and the future may be more 
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open-ended and complex than implied in the radical totalitarian vision of 
trends in social control, including that of crime prevention. 
Sceptical Pluralism 
Most mainstream sociological research on crime prevention is both 
sceptical about the achievements of such policy and practice initiatives and 
avoids any strict adherence to a monocausal theory, preferring the appeal 
of an unspoken pluralist approach for the interpretation of these trends. 
The body of work is empirically driven and speaks with a fairly uniform 
voice of scepticism, if not impossibilism, about both British and inter-
national trends in crime prevention, community policing and consultation 
(see, for example, Bottoms 1990; Jones et al. 1994; Morgan 1992; Pease 
1994; Weatheritt 1986). According to this perspective, the achievements of 
community policing are very limited to date, with success largely rhetorical 
in character rather than tangible. On crime prevention initiatives, certain 
commentators such as Bottoms and Pease do highlight the tangible 
achievements of primary prevention in particular, but, again, the overall 
message is that crime prevention of a more ambitious 'social' kind remains 
both marginal to the work of most agencies and unproven as a success. An 
even clearer message is conveyed about police consultation with the 
community on crime and policing. On this front, the academic 'audit' gives 
an unambiguous thumbs-down, with Scarman's consultative committees 
pronounced as mere 'talking shops' of a very unrepresentative nature. 
Little comment has been made, as yet, on the idea and practice of 
community safety. Pease, perhaps, speaks for this tradition in his recent 
critical aside on the Morgan Committee's promotion of the term commu-
nity safety as a replacement for the concept of crime prevention: 'The 
extreme vagueness of the Morgan Committee's definition of community 
safety gives little confidence that a revised definition will prove a satisfactory 
focus for the work' (Pease 1994: 687). 
In many ways, it is difficult to dissent from this overall negative verdict 
which emanates from the sceptical pluralist tradition of research. However, 
this national, and international, picture may, like that of Radical Totalitar-
ianism's globalising theory, inevitably underplay certain specific local 
developments which may presage trends of a potentially important kind. 
Comments, such as Pease's above, may also underestimate the radical 
potential of such notions as community safety when they are appropriated 
by local networks in opposition to, or at least in negotiation with, central 
government's strategies of crime management. Accordingly, Pease's verdict 
on the term 'community safety' may itself be flawed in that it neglects how 
such a vague and seemingly empty idea may have potential to be 'filled' with 
radical proposals which the 'centre' may find difficult to manage and 
control. 
I will now attempt to build on the work of this sceptical pluralist tradition 
by arguing for the importance of studying subnational government 
initiatives, within the context of specific localities with their own traditions 
and histories. 
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LOCAL ALLIANCES AND CONFLICTS OVER 
COMMUNITY SAFETY AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN 
MIDDLESHIRE 
The research findings summarised in this chapter are based on a study of 
policy formulation and implementation in an English Midlands county, 
Middleshire, from 1991 to the present day. They cast light on both the 
conflicts and alliances involving local 'policy networks' and the 'local 
governmental inner circle' with regard to the interwoven issues of 
community safety, crime prevention and democratic accountability of 
public service deliverers. 
The current situation in Middleshire (April 1995) would appear to be 
something of a cease-fire. A compromise has been reached whereby a 
progressive managerialism (associated with officers committed to multi-
agency corporatism) is uneasily merged with social democratic commu-
nitarianism (associated with an influential elected member elite from the 
centre/left). However, the picture is even more complex when the 
machinations of all seven district authorities which make up the county are 
considered. In truth, the situation varies across the county, with the more 
rural and Conservative-led authorities resistant or obdurate towards what is 
at times considered either a Labour-driven policy or an example of a county 
council off-loading responsibilities for financial reasons. The full account 
of this local drama falls outside the remit of this chapter. In general terms, 
it should be noted that the story which unfolds from the research is not a 
simple one of unified local resistance to centrally developed trends but nor 
is it one of supine obedience to the centralist agenda. 
Community safety strategy for Mlddleshire: an 
officer vision of inter-agency corporatism 
Put briefly, the strategy developed in the early 1990s had four key objectives 
- namely, to provide a communication framework for all agencies; to assist 
in the integration of community initiatives; to enhance co-ordination 
through corporate policies; and to reduce the cost of crime. The philoso-
phy of the strategy was clearly indebted to the Morgan Report and was 
largely 'social' crime-prevention-driven and sought to broaden out the 
notion to take on wider community issues regarding fear of crime and sense 
of safety. If successful, the strategy was meant to enable a co-ordinated 
approach to the management and amelioration of social problems and also 
help realise the ambition of making community safety a 'truly core activity' 
of all relevant agencies. 
The corporate community safety structure, produced in 1993, was 
certainly hierarchical in nature and officer-driven. As with the Morgan 
Report, the Police Authority was noticeable for its absence. The top of the 
structure was occupied by the Interdependency Group (IDG) for Middle-
shire. The IDG has been in existence since 1985 following, according to its 
own report in 1993, the success of the multiagency juvenile bureaux for 
which Middleshire became famous in the 1980s. It is made up of the most 
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senior officers involved in Criminal Justice and Community Safety, such as 
the Police, relevant County Council services, Probation, Courts, Crown 
Prosecution Service, Prison Service and, of late, the Health Authority. Its 
stated aim is to act as an information exchange and as a means of pooling 
resources when identifying the need for a joint approach to solving 
problems. Attendance is not delegated. Such a group would seem to be an 
unusual, if not unique, feature ofMiddleshire. Its lines of accountability are 
unclear and it is best viewed as an ad hoe corporate and corporatist executive 
group, created as a result of Home Office as well as local managerialist 
concerns over the lack of co-ordination between the various parts of the 
criminal justice system (Tuck 1991). 
According to Pratt, corporatism refers to 
the tendencies to be found in advanced welfare societies whereby the 
capacity for conflict and disruption is reduced by means of the 
centralisation of policy, increased government intervention, and 
cooperation of various professional and interest groups into a 
collective whole with homogeneous aims and objectives. 
(Pratt 1989: 245) 
This description of corporatism certainly helps us to analyse the work of 
such groups as the IDG and, indeed, groups 'lower' down the community 
safety strategy structure. Like Pratt, I remain ambivalent about any simple 
judgement as to either the oppressive or humane consequences of such 
developments. 
Beneath the IDG, the strategy placed Crime Reduction/Community 
Safety Groups. In formal terms these groups had the task of liaising, 
communicating, facilitating and directing resources. Their membership 
was that of senior officers, with no member involvement. Their formal 
constitution involved the following objectives: to formulate a strategic plan 
for community safety within one local authority area; to provide the 
co-ordination of effort from relevant statutory agencies and enhance the 
potential of already existing measures. From these objectives certain actions 
were intended to follow - namely, to maintain and regularly update the 
community safety profile of the area and consider crime levels; to promote 
local interest in community safety; to ensure that community safety issues 
are integral to the future planning process; and to agree projects with the 
Action Against Crime groups and provide suitable resourcing. 
Next in line down the structure sat Action Against Crime groups. These 
groups replaced the previous Crime Prevention Panels which were viewed 
as lacking focus. The terms of reference of these groups were: to consider 
local and national initiatives; to initiate topic and neighbourhood-based 
project teams; to receive reports from the latter and prioritise actions in 
respect of project team recommendations; and to maintain linkage with 
the parent Crime Reduction Group (CRG). The membership would 
normally include business, local councillors and the Area Police 
Commander. Such groups would also be expected to liaise with the local 
community. This structure bears close resemblance to that proposed in 
the Morgan Report. 
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The strategy then specified the role of Police/Community Consultative 
Committees (PCCCs) and public consultation. PCCCs and the like would 
assist in the identification ofissues oflocal concern. No formal links with local 
democratic structures were made in this model. This view of PCCCs accords 
with the traditional model, since Scarman's recommendations, but not with 
recent Middleshire Police Authority's proposals to be discussed shortly. 
The above offers a brief description of the officer-driven policy. 
Although complicated at first sight, highly corporatist in character and 
democratically flawed due to the lack ofrecognition of the Police Authority 
role, there may be much to recommend in this attempt at a co-ordinated 
and local government-led strategy of crime prevention/community safety. 
According to some of the participants, it envisaged a key 'enabling 
authority' role (Stewart 1_986) for local government which may offer one 
positive antidote to the threat of local government withering on the vine. 
The strategy was also driven by the recognition that criminal justice 
agencies alone are unable to make much impact on crime levels. However, 
the prospects for the smooth implementation of this multi-agency corpo-
rate strategy in 1994 were to be drastically affected by the rather different 
'vision' and concerns of an alliance of some crucial 'elected' players in the 
Police Authority. 
Changes in community consultation In Mlddleshire 
in the mid-"1990s: the politicised response to fears 
of the ~democratic deficit' 
Arising out of the expressed concerns over the 'democratic deficit' 
regarding the future of police authorities and the need to improve 
consultation, the Chair of the Middleshire Police Authority proposed and 
succeeded in gaining the agreement of all members of the Police Authority 
for a radical restructuring of consultative arrangements whose impact was 
quite profound on the Community Safety Strategy for the county. Drawing 
explicitly on Brighton Borough Council's model of a 'Police and Public 
Safety sub-committee' and discussions arising out of seminars organised by 
the Association of County Councils, the Middleshire Police Authority 
decided in Spring 1994 to devolve PCCC arrangements down to the district 
authority level to be led by local elected councillors. The suggested 
organisation of the new Community Safety Committees is as follows. The 
groups would have elected councillors as the voting members with some 
non-voting 'co-opted' representatives, relevant district and county officers 
together with the appropriate senior police officer(s). Two police authority 
members would act as observers and report back to the police authority. It 
would seem that much of the impetus for this unusual arrangement, in 
national terms, arose out of the combined concern to invigorate quite self 
consciously the democratic input into the previously rather dormant and 
unrepresentative PCCCs, to link these arrangements to resource centres at 
the district level and to give local government an axial role in community 
safety initiatives, given the backdrop of the Local Government Review and 
Police and Magistrates' Courts legislation. 
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It is, as yet, early days in the life of the new arrangements for consultation 
between the police, other relevant public agencies and the public in 
Middleshire. The seven district authorities which make up the county are 
themselves distinct localities with differing traditions, political allegiances 
and needs which cannot be ignored. Such differences are reflected in the 
differential response to implementing new consultative arrangements from 
the county-wide and perceived Labour-driven initiative from the Police 
Authority. The once calm lily pond of PCCCs in this county is currently 
choppy, and for some, shark-infested. 
The uneven nature of the 'take up' from the various district authorities 
of the Police Authority's social democratically informed policy regarding 
the merging of community safety and consultative initiatives under the 
auspices of local lines of formal democratic accountability reflects the 
conflicts and alliances at work at both the district/borough and county 
council tiers of the local state. Any detailed discussion of this complex 
picture would require a separate research paper. It does, none the less, 
confirm the importance of local and comparative research on policing 
trends and crime prevention measures, albeit with a recognition of the 
crucial national and international trends and pressures at work. 
Community safety as a late modern movement? 
As it currently stands, consultation with, and participation of, the public in 
Middleshire on community safety initiatives remains very limited, as the key 
participants are well aware. Although there is scope for increasing the level 
of public participation with localised and targeted meetings, the key players 
- arguably 'knowledge brokers' in this specialist area of activity (Ericson 
1994: 151) - are not too ambitious in their hopes for popular involvement 
in issues which most people will happily leave to 'professionals and 
politicians'. Given the sheer size and complexity of our society, any hope of 
a return to the direct participation of the citizenry in the democratic 
process on Athenian lines (Day and Klein 1987) is pure 'pie in the sky' 
thinking, even if dressed up in the market language of the consumer. The 
involvement of the citizen is a much-lauded goal in public policy but it may 
seriously overestimate loyalty and obligation to place. As Giddens notes, 
'[i]n the sense of an embedded affinity to place, community has indeed 
largely been destroyed' (Giddens 1991: 256). It would again be misguided 
to view any community safety strategy, however well-conceived and imple-
mented, as a panacea for such historical shifts. Such sociological insights 
are not lost on both the officers of public service agencies and a small but 
influential minority of elected councillors who were interviewed. Indeed, 
the research participants' 'discourses' on crime prevention are, to para-
phrase Giddens again, theorised by the lay agent in ways pervaded by 
sociological thinking (Giddens 1991: 43). There is not the space in this 
chapter to develop these issues regarding the interface oflay and academic 
sociological accounts of the world (see Hughes 1994: 263-8). Suffice to say, 
during the research process I was struck by the regularity with which 
research participants appropriated sociological concepts within their 
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behaviour and reflections on current policy and practice in their orbit of 
specialism. Concepts such as 'net-widening', 'democratic deficit', 'asymme-
tries of power and knowledge' between the public and specialist services 
(versus the cult of partnership) were employed routinely by some of the 
research participants and again challenged the patronising image of lay 
participants which is often prevalent in academic commentaries. Thus, 
reflecting back on the old PCCC arrangements in his locality, a local 
authority officer was of similar opinion to that purveyed in much socio-
logical commentary: indeed, sociological insights seem close to the 
'common sense' of some of the research participants interviewed: 
there had been very little thought given to what they [PCCCs] were 
there for. Very little came out of the meetings. It wasn't community 
consultation ... certain members of the public and crime prevention 
group member types came along. There was one voluntary sector 
person but she wasn't representing anybody but herself. The extent to 
which there was any communication with the wider public was very 
limited. 
However, it did appear to this researcher that the very looseness and 
emptiness of the concept of community safety - itself a source of criticism 
from sceptical pluralists such as Pease (1994) and a 'free-floating signifier' 
in McLaughlin's view (McLaughlin 1994) - offers the opportunity for 
creative ideological appropriation by local, progressive alliances and 
networks which could challenge centralist tendencies. As a backlash to the 
numbing mundanity of managerially driven strategies on crime manage-
ment, is it fanciful to view the appeal of the idea of community safety to 
radical and social democratic communitarians as a means of rekindling 
concerns over social solidarity and collective control over the wider social 
environment? (See also Tuck's (1991) self-consciously utopian meditation 
on 'joint communal living' and its potential lessons for criminal justice.) 
The situation appears fluid and although the contest between localities and 
the central state is profoundly uneven, the hegemonic capacity of the post-
Thatcherite agenda on law and order should not be overestimated in the 
manner that radical totalitarians are apt to do. In the words of one chief 
executive officer from a Labour-controlled borough with a high level of 
deprivation, the looseness of the meaning of the concept of community 
safety was not necessarily a barrier to its creative use in local politics: 
I don't know what it means. All I can say is it means whatever you want 
it to mean in your particular setting and to us I suppose it means a 
fairly broad sort of thing to do with the quality of life in relation to the 
way people feel ... Do they feel safe or do they feel intimidated about 
what's happening around them that's detracting from the quality of 
life ... I think it is for us to define what is meant by safety. 
A big question facing such policy initiatives as the revised Community 
Safety Strategy for Middleshire in this era of the audit is how do you 
measure its success? The most obvious measure would be that of a 
reduction in crime and a concomitant increase in security and safety among 
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Middleshire people. This difficult issue is certainly not amenable to 
measurement in any short-term manner, again as acknowledged by the 
participants in this research. Given the complex mixture of demographic, 
cultural and technological factors which come into play in any explanation 
of the shifts in the sense of (in)security and in the material reality of crime 
and disorder, the chances of ever 'measuring' in a quantifiable manner the 
impact of a community safety/ crime prevention strategy on these phenom-
ena is difficult to envisage. However, a more reasonable 'test' may be to ask 
how do the 'good intentions' associated with inter-agency-driven commu-
nity safety work end up as tangible, practical and anti-despotic outcomes. 
On this question, the research to date is able to point to some tangible 
outcomes across the county, albeit unevenly spread at this early point in the 
implementation phase. Community safety, with its emphasis on an inter-
agency approach to the social problems of crime and insecurity, is now 
clearly part of the agenda of the public services in Middleshire. Under the 
umbrella of this new rallying call, some significant policy and practice 
initiatives are emergent; for example, with regard to the problems of 
domestic violence and the diversion of offenders from custody. Community 
safety initiatives are not part of a popular movement but may be best 
understood as a policy network of knowledge brokers, whose actions may 
make some difference. If successful, the current developments may 
improve both the effectiveness of public service delivery in this broad policy 
area and also inject some much needed impetus into the local democratic 
process. 
12 
POVERTY AND PARTNERSHIP IN 
THE THIRD EUROPEAN POVERTY 
PROGRAMME 
The Liverpool case 
Robert Moore 
ANTI-POVERTY STRATEGIES 
Poverty Three addressed issues concerning the economic and political 
integration of over 12 per cent of the European population before the 
unification of Germany. The European Community had a population of 
350 million of whom 44 million were deemed to be living in poverty, 
defined as less than 50 per cent of average earnings. This population is 
today estimated to be 52 million. 
The poor were not consuming the goods that European manufacturers 
were producing. Even if consumer-led recovery was to be based on imports, 
the poor were not contributing to the generation of wealth through 
consumption. They were, however, consuming tax revenues through social 
security and other benefits (Commission of the European Communities 
1993a: eh. 9). This form of consumption was regarded as a burden on the 
state, corporations and taxpayers. Apart from any humane concern, poverty 
was a drain on investment and production (see Hutton 1992). Beyond this 
there lay a concern with the social and political marginalisation of the poor 
and the threat posed to social order (Commission of the European 
Communities 1993b: 20-1). 
The question of the single European market was also an important 
background element to the Third Poverty Programme, 'social exclusion is 
not only a problem of injustice, or a problem of human rights, but can also 
place a brake on economic integration' (Quinton 1990). 
The Third Poverty Programme addressed an agenda current throughout 
the UK. 1 During the 1980s the Child Poverty Action Group and other 
pressure groups, Mrs Thatcher's 'moaning minnies', had drawn attention 
to rising poverty and inequality and the part played by taxation and welfare 
policies in reinforcing them. The churches also kept poverty on the agenda, 
through Faith in the City and Living Faith in the City. By the early 1980s 
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poverty was no longer a problem on the margins of society. The increased 
unemployment that resulted from economic policy created demands for 
the public expenditure that the government were committed to cutting. 
Government was faced with steeply rising benefit bills. Later cuts in these 
benefits were an attempt to stem the increases in public spending, but they 
too had the effect of increasing poverty. 
Local authorities encountered rising poverty when increasing numbers 
of people qualified for Housing Benefit and, at the end of the decade, many 
of the poorest were unable to pay their contribution to the Poll Tax. So a 
number of cities established committees to examine the problem of 
poverty. The Association of Metropolitan Authorities (AMA) created an 
Anti-Poverty Network through which discussion of anti-poverty strategies 
took place (Balloch and Jones 1990). The most striking feature of Balloch 
andJones's review of local authority anti-poverty strategies is the extent to 
which in the 1980s local authorities were trying to cope with the effects of 
government disinvestment. Balloch and Jones cite the Cleveland study For 
Richer for Poorer which suggested that over £20 million in benefits may have 
been lost to the County each year. Over 5 million people in the UK lost help 
with rents and rates. This and the freezing of child benefit, reduced the 
incomes and increased the poverty of the poorest (Balloch and Jones 1990: 
67). Many of these poor then became debtors to the local authorities. 
In the early 1980s about 12. 2 per cent of Merseyside's income was based 
on benefits and these benefits created one job for roughly every £106,000 
of payments (Madden and Batey 1983). Without social security transfers to 
the local economy unemployment would have been higher (ibid.: 326). 
Local authorities needed more effective policies to cope with rising poverty. 
Notably they needed to be able to deal with indebtedness in ways that did 
not reduce their chances of recovering debts. However, the impact of 
poverty was experienced by local authority departments with different 
perceptions of priority groups and different approaches to the poor. It was 
the need for a more coherent and co-ordinated local approach to poverty 
that had driven local anti-poverty strategies and the collective efforts of the 
AMA. 
THE LIVERPOOL ANTI-POVERTY STRATEGY 
In the late 1980s an official wrote a report on poverty in Liverpool. A 
councillor sent a copy to the Prime Minister. This started an inconclusive 
debate with 10 Downing Street, from whence came the suggestion that 
Liverpool might consider applying to the forthcoming Third Poverty 
Programme. 
Liverpool City Council were eager to pursue an initiative that promised 
greater prominence for poverty-related issues. The bid was made in July 
1989 and a statement of intent to work in partnership was signed by 
representatives of the City Council, the Merseyside Community Relations 
Council (MCRC), the Merseyside Task Force, the churches and the 
Liverpool Council of Voluntary Services. By the beginning of 1990 the 
partnership also included the Granby Toxteth Task Force, the university 
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and the Liverpool Health Authority. Representatives of these eight agencies 
were to found the Management Committee of the Liverpool Poverty 
Programme. 
The Merseyside Task Force, which was effectively the Department of the 
Environment office for Merseyside, provided most of the public money for 
projects in Liverpool through the Urban Programme. It saw Poverty Three 
as a means of complementing the economic policies it was promoting. The 
Poverty Programme offered a means for creating a 'social' dimension to 
urban policies which had been developed in a political climate in which 
social considerations were subordinated to the economic. 
The membership of the Management Committee was in part a reflection 
of political instability on Merseyside. The Militant Tendency had been the 
source of conflict with central government. This has led to the setting of an 
illegal rate and the disqualification of councillors. The city's Poverty sub-
committee was dominated by the Militant Tendency. Central government, 
represented by the Merseyside Task Force, were unwilling to have funds 
pass to Militant control. Means had to be found to keep European funds out 
of the hands of the City Council and the Poverty sub-committee in 
particular. As a neutral party to the city's conflict the Vice-Chancellor of the 
University of Liverpool was asked to chair the group making the bid. He 
had personally committed the university to the project as an opportunity to 
further the university's contribution to Merseyside, in accordance with the 
university's mission statement. In February 1990 the partners were 
informed that their bid had been successful. 
TOWARDS THE CONCEPT OF PARTNERSHIP 
The need to establish partnership did not derive solely from responses to 
the poverty programme in the peculiar circumstances of Liverpool. Since 
the mid-l 970s there had been a reappraisal of the role of local government 
and a recognition that it needed to be more responsive to diverse publics 
and to work closely with other service providers. The CDP earlier 
underlined the need for change when they reported that: 
The need for responsive local government and for people to 
participate was a constant theme of many of the official reports of the 
1960s. 
(CDP 1977: 56) 
Gyford (1991: 30-45) suggests that this was part of the breakup of the 
old local political order characterised by exclusive coalitions of either 
businessmen and the Conservative Party or trade unions and the Labour 
Party. Both excluded women and ethnic minorities. Both controlled highly 
centralised and bureaucratic administrations. The 'post-Fordist' local 
political order needs to be more open, with widespread pressure group 
and voluntary sector participation. Moreover these active groups have 
themselves pressed for participation in the formulation and implementa-
tion of policy. This was not unwelcome in conditions of economic decline 
where local government was increasingly unable to deliver the services that 
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were expected. Partnership offered a means to tap into the knowledge 
and experience of the voluntary sector and to incorporate the public into 
policy implementation, and by implication to make them share 
responsibility for failures. 
The changes from 1979 have also been changes made in accordance with 
a radical Conservative agenda. They have been part of a programme of 
centralisation. City councils, furthermore, were a government target 
because they came to embody a workable alternative agenda to the plans of 
the Thatcher governments, to which it was said there was no alternative. 
But local government would have been a political target whether or not 
it was the source of an alternative agenda. Firstly, it was a major spender and 
able independently to raise taxes when central government was committed 
to reducing public spending and taxation. Secondly, the city was the 
location of collective provision - notably housing, education and social 
services - in circumstances where the government wished to eliminate 
collectivism and dependency.2 Thirdly, urban administration was the locus 
of powerful trade unions and professions with a vested interest in the 
welfare state and its growth. The Conservatives were determined to 'free' 
Britain from trade unionism and to 'deprivilege' the professions. Unions 
and professions were, in Conservative eyes, a target of equal merit to the 
welfare state itself; in local government the three targets became one. 
The idea of elected councillors tied by the reciprocity of community to 
a local population was, ideally, to be replaced by the cash nexus; citizens 
become customers and local government a series of businesses (for an 
introduction to these ideas see Butler et al. 1985). Commercial values were 
to replace social values and business was to be encouraged to bring about 
regeneration. But in this changed relationship is a significant change in the 
balance of power between the governors and the governed, because the 
political structure comes to reflect market inequalities rather than to offset 
them (Brownill 1990; Forman 1989; Moore 1992). 
Labour emerged from the local elections of 1981 with control of all the 
metropolitan authorities and nine shire counties. In four cities electorates 
voted for the 'new urban left' alternatives to the Conservative vision and 
spending plans. In London especially, alternative strategies for economic 
regeneration and employment began to be put in place. In these circum-
stances the problem for central government increasingly became one of 
imposing their will. There were a range of strategies open for doing this of 
which the most extreme would have been to abolish the vote. This is a high-
risk strategy. Simpler, therefore, was to remove from local control that for 
which voters voted. The 1980s saw the growth of unelected quangos. 
Nominees from the business community were placed on the Boards of 
Development Corporations or seconded to Task Forces. Compulsory 
Competitive Tendering, local management of schools and the privatisation 
of services reduced local authority control. Schools 'opting out' and a series 
of financial measures increased central government control of local 
spending and services. In the case of the most recalcitrant metropolitan 
authorities, where voters persisted in electing councils unacceptable to 
central government, the final logical step was taken; namely, to abolish the 
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authorities (Duncan and Goodwin 1988: eh. 6). 
In addition to considerations of efficiency there is an ideological 
problem for government in squaring the reduction of local control of 
services and the centralisation of decision-making with the stated aim of 
setting the people free and making services responsive to local need. This 
was tackled with Citizens' Charters and by stressing the citizen's role as a 
consumer free to make his or her own choices. But increased centralisation 
of education and housing finance exacerbated and clarified the problem of 
representing local needs to the centre. In 1995 parents were brought into 
direct conflict with central government over education budgets. Action by 
parents and teachers entailed new alliances, including elected members. 
Local government is now less effective in shielding government from the 
consequences of its policies. 
Local representation and partnership have been notable themes of 
government rhetoric from early in the 1980s, especially with the establish-
ment of Development Corporations and Task Forces. Government's mind 
was also concentrated by the urban uprisings of 1981 which saw the 
mobilisation of some of the most marginalised and impoverished sections 
of urban populations. These were largely people who had historically 
lacked any effective representation at all. Thus, having created agencies to 
circumvent local elected councils, government had to create means of 
reincorporating local interests in the development and implementation of 
urban policy. 'Partnership' became the buzz-word. 
ESTABLISHING PARTNERSHIPS IN LIVERPOOL 
The effects of the restructuring of relations between central and local 
government were amplified by the 'Liverpool factor'. Relations between the 
Merseyside Task Force and the City Council were good at the officer level 
but politically weak. Relations between elected councillors and the Mersey-
side Development Corporation (MDC) had ceased soon after the MDC was 
established (National Audit Office 1990: Figure 3). Task Forces and 
Development Corporations were seen as central government agencies 
devised to circumvent local democracy and to impose the government's 
shift from social to economic objectives in urban policy. But they were fail 
accompli. Political opposition was mounted as a matter of principle, with 
little reflection upon the quality of local Liverpool democracy or the 
opportunities that might be afforded by the presence of local offices of 
central government. 
In addition to being in conflict with central government, the Labour 
party and its own workforce, Liverpool City Council had been in dispute 
with the black population. It had engaged in a bitter dispute in attempting 
to impose a Community Relations Officer unacceptable to the black 
population, and its discriminatory policies in housing and employment 
were apparently intractable (Liverpool Black Caucus 1986; Moore 1994). By 
contrast the Third Poverty Programme in Liverpool (the Granby Toxteth 
Community Project) addressed issues of poverty, race and exclusion mainly 
in the Granby Ward. The achievements of this project will be reported 
POVERTY AND PARTNERSHIP: THE LIVERPOOL CASE / 171 
elsewhere: the focus of this chapter is the experience of partnership. 
The population of Granby have seen many projects, especially since the 
uprising of 1981 (see Jacobs 1992: 188). The ward had many expert 
opinions expressed on its problems. It had its own (DTI) Task Force. But 
nothing seemed to change. Meanwhile the pattern of project funding had 
created competition leading to local rivalry and fragmentation. Was Poverty 
Three to be another parachuting in of 'experts' and cash that would leave 
the local situation unchanged? Thus, whilst the idea of partnership was not 
new to the members, the Liverpool partnership had unique features: it was 
a partnership of old protagonists with a new forum in which their hostility 
and distrust could either be overcome or re-enacted. 
The churches, the university and the voluntary sector did not appear to 
be party to the old enmities but were seen as being politically neutral and 
financially reliable. The university was also to be a significant funder whilst 
the voluntary sector, represented by Liverpool Council for Voluntary 
Services (LCVS), was intended to be a link to trusts and charitable funds. 
The first two objectives set by the project were: 
1 The establishment of a partnership of central and local government 
agencies, the voluntary and private sectors, and the less privileged 
groups, based on a joint analysis of the nature and causes of poverty, 
and the adoption of common objectives and targets. 
2 The development of a co-ordinated and integrated anti-poverty strategy 
which addresses all dimensions of poverty by linking economic, social 
and environmental action. 
In terms of implementing these objectives, three prior, practical and 
interrelated issues needed to be tackled. First there was the need to develop 
an operational definition of the task that could be taken to target groups 
in order, second, to establish their participation. Third, the participating 
target groups would then contribute to the establishment of an operational 
team which would work with target groups in refining, redefining and 
pursuing the objectives of the Project. The problem was circular; something 
had to be on offer to invite participation but without pre-empting likely 
responses. In order to get the project to this stage an operational team was 
needed that would be acceptable to future but as yet unconsulted 
participants. 
Failure to break out of this circle was a feature of the first year of the 
Programme in Liverpool. One problem was that the Management Commit-
tee comprised senior members of the partner agencies and was too large to 
undertake the day-to-day development of the project. Even more impor-
tantly individuals lacked the time to attend regular meetings and work on 
the project between meetings. By the end of 1990 it was said that the 
Management Committee was not managing. The reasons for this will be 
expanded in the history of the Granby Toxteth Community Project, which 
is currently being written. 
Liverpool was not unique amongst the three UK Programmes in 
encountering problems in establishing partnership. In Brownlow a small 
partnership had been established earlier but it had problems deriving from 
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the uneven distribution of power between the partners, and questions of 
representativeness. In Pilton the initiative was taken by the local authority, 
and as a result suspicion and tension characterised the early life of the 
project. A major problem facing all projects was the European time-scale. 
There was a very short interval between the announcement of the 
programme and the closing of applications. Successful bidders then 
needed to establish projects very quickly in order to start spending 
substantial sums of money before the end of the first budget period. It was 
to be expected, therefore, that the public sector would take an early lead. 
But in order to win funding they had to create paper partnerships. The real 
partnerships would then be formed even as the first of the European money 
was being spent. The term 'shot-gun partnership' occurs in the discussions 
of the arrangements in Pilton and to some extent characterised all the local 
arrangements. Thus in a programme concerned with the most marginal 
sections of the population the time-scale ensured that the most organised 
sections of the localities - public and voluntary sectors - would take the 
lead, and then have to sell 'their' programme back to the marginalised. 
Who were 'the less privileged groups' that Poverty Three was meant to 
address on Merseyside? It was agreed that one unique feature of the 
Liverpool project, in contrast with other EC projects, was that it addressed 
'race' and poverty. Women were also identified as being especially vulner-
able to poverty and marginalisation. Invitations were extended to the Afro-
Asian Caribbean Standing Committee, the Consortium of Black 
Organisations (CBO) and the Federation of Liverpool Black Organisations 
(FLBO) to join the Management Committee. The Afro-Asian Caribbean 
Standing Committee and the FLBO never seemed to be more than shell 
organisations. The Consortium of Black Organisations was set up to 
overcome the fragmentation of minority organisations in the aftermath of 
1981. Community groups go through phases of activity and quiescence; the 
CBO had been a powerful representative body but by 1991 it was a 
moribund coalition. Participation in the Third Poverty Programme, and 
access to funds, might have revived its fortunes, but did not do so, probably 
because the wider community were not convinced of the benefits of the 
Poverty Programme. The Management Committee never saw a constitution 
or membership list of the CBO, even though it was required to do so by the 
terms of the EC grant. 
None the less the accession of local people to the project, a year after it 
began, was greeted with relief by the Management Committee and a six-
strong operational team with strong local connections was appointed. The 
project was immediately redefined as a 'black' project centred on the 
Granby ward. This narrowing of the geographical base had, inter alia, the 
effect of making private sector participation unlikely because it excluded 
those parts of Liverpool's central business district that were included within 
the original project boundaries. 
The question of the representativeness of the community members of 
the Management Committee was never seriously raised within the manage-
ment committee, although it was raised in the wider community. Effective 
membership of the Management Committee was confined to (male) 
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representatives of the Consortium of Black Organisations. It was drawn 
from a network centred on the local Law Centre. Whilst the Law Centre was 
a key agency in the locality, it is only one of many. The question of 
representativeness and accountability to the local community thus became 
a problem, and a potential weapon in the hand of partners in the statutory 
sector and critics of the project. 
Whilst the resources available to the project may have been small 
compared to the budgets of central and local government in Liverpool, 
they were substantial in comparison with those that had previously been 
given to the local community. In theory they created the 'political and 
economic incentives for groups to cooperate' Uacobs 1992: 160). But the 
original partners should not have expected the community agencies to 
widen the base of representation on their own volition. A community group 
gaining access to resources and to policy-makers has a strong incentive to 
pursue a policy of closure against other groups. Only outside partners could 
have intervened to secure wider representation, but in so doing they may 
have precipitated conflict within the Management Committee which they 
wished to avoid. Representatives of the local community (however narrowly 
based) faced with confrontation within the committee could have called 
upon outside support and threatened to extend the conflict. The percep-
tion that this could have been the case was important for civil servants who 
did not wish to jeopardise wider aspects of their Merseyside programme 
through conflict of the kind that had occurred in 1981. Not least, such 
conflict would have damaged the image of Liverpool which was being 
promoted by central and local government and the business community. 
Broader representation was thus never achieved on the Management 
Committee. 
As university representative, the author was the most inexperienced 
member of the Management Committee, having only recently arrived from 
Aberdeen. His past experiences were thought to make him a suitable 
member, but it did not enable him immediately to understand specific 
aspects of the locality. This immediately became a problem when the 
university's participation was challenged by the community representatives; 
the university was portrayed as an agency which exploited the black 
community. Academics enriched themselves by doing research and writing 
books whilst putting nothing back into the community. The record in 
Liverpool is to the contrary, but a dialogue of the deaf ensued on this 
challenge. LCVS dropped out of the project at an early stage. The project 
had become a waste of time for the organisation, especially as the 
development of the SRB and Objective One status promised a wider scale 
of intervention. The Health Board was so engrossed in problems of service 
reorganisation that it was never able to become a fully effective partner. The 
MCRC was wracked by disputes. It was on its way to formal dissolution and 
made no serious contribution to the project as an organisation and signally 
failed to represent the local community in the early days of the project. Its 
status as representative of the local black community was challenged by 
black organisations. In an early flexing of community muscle, the churches' 
representative was forced to leave the Management Committee. 
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Central government officers were plainly unhappy about the representa-
tiveness of the Management Committee. They had misgivings about some 
of the individuals involved in the Third Poverty Programme and plainly 
harboured concerns about financial management, especially given that 
previous projects had suffered from financial irregularities. The civil 
servants were also subject to 'next thingism' as new schemes for inner city 
regeneration were developed (City Challenge, Single Regeneration 
Budget, Merseyside 2000) and the civil service continued its own reorgani-
sation. Reorganising, responding and bidding became nearly full-time 
activities. The City Council did not achieve full political stability at any time 
in the life of the Third Poverty Programme but the administration was 
reorganised under a new chief executive. Furthermore, in both govern-
ment and city offices, officials were subjected to the pressures created by the 
processes of 'deprivileging' and by public expenditure restrictions. 
LESSONS TO BE LEARNT 
Some lessons may be learnt from this early experience in Liverpool: where 
there is a history of projects with few tangible benefits, or where there is a 
history of hostility between potential partners, effective partnership 
becomes increasingly difficult to establish. Establishing partnership itself 
becomes the major problem of the project. In the Liverpool circumstances, 
there were disincentives for the public sector agencies to work on the 
question of partnership. By 1992 they were, in effect, keeping the project 
ticking over in a passive manner. Had Poverty Three been a project with a 
wider constituency and funds which formed a significant percentage of 
total local expenditure, then there would have been an incentive to make 
partnership work. Where funds are for truly new initiatives (as in the other 
UK projects) then a low level of pump-priming funding may be effective in 
stimulating local activity. But once there is a history of such activity, further 
small-scale funding is less likely to be effective. Early funding changes the 
circumstances in which future funding may take place by calling into being 
potentially competing interest groups and creating a history which may be 
a barrier to later initiatives. 
Both the Task Forces and the City Council needed the participation of 
local people in regeneration projects in the Granby area. The project 
seemed to promise one means for participation. It is unlikely that the 
Granby Toxteth Community Project will have made a significant input to 
policy development, but it ensured that a local voice was heard in devising 
regeneration strategies for the area. Perhaps its most notable success was in 
articulating local fears that demolition in Granby was part of a covert 
scheme to destroy the black community. The demolition programme was 
modified as a result of the representations made by the director of the 
project. 
The project had other successes and these have been, and will be, 
described in reports. A Welfare Rights Project was very successful and its 
results may be generalised beyond Merseyside. The project showed the 
benefits to individuals and the local economy that could be derived from 
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the provision of effective advice services at the points where people made 
contact with an agency which might not itself be directly involved in 
allocating benefits. Overshadowing this successful demonstration project 
was the suspicion that if benefits take-up increased the Treasury would seek 
further reductions in benefit levels and entitlements. No amount of local 
partnership can overcome these risks. 
The Welfare Rights Project raises an important question at the core of 
the poverty programme. However successful the project may have been in 
its aim of 'bending' the budgets of the big local spenders, benefits, one of 
the most important inputs to the locality, were decided elsewhere beyond 
the influence of any of the local actors. From this perspective it might be 
said that the Third Poverty Programme itself was marginal. It is important 
to note the lack of direct representation of the Department of Social 
Security, the UK sponsoring department for the Third Poverty Programme 
on the Management Committee. 
A major shortcoming of the project itself was the failure to develop a 
strategic dimension through a systematic critique of the impacts of local, 
national and European policy on the locality. This had a knock-on effect in 
the failure to develop a locally based agency with popular support that 
would command the attention of the public sector in its responses to the 
Single Regeneration Budget and Objective One. However important it may 
be to get money into the local economy it is, in the longer run, more 
important to use one-off resources to build local capacities to contribute 
and respond to policy development. The benefits of such a strategy may not 
be immediately obvious to local people and so a balance has to be struck 
between local short-term and strategic needs. In conditions where commu-
nity groups have traditionally competed for limited funds, this is especially 
difficult to manage because programmes need to show early and tangible 
results. 'Money in pockets', was how one activist expressed it. Project 
workers also need to avoid giving the impression that they are withholding 
public funds from the community in order to finance their own pro-
fessional activities. The professionalisation and incorporation of commu-
nity representatives facilitates the relationship between government 
agencies and the local community, but threaten to alienate the latter from 
its representatives Uacobs 1992: 161,171). 
Partnership failed at crucial junctures. For example, the Granby Toxteth 
Task Force had promised to keep the project informed of the development 
of the Economic Development Trust. But, once the Task Force lost 
confidence in the project, it failed to do so and thus reinforced negative 
local attitudes to public servants. Collectively the funding partners failed to 
exert sufficient control to ensure timely and acceptable bids to continue 
important aspects of the project's work at the end of Poverty Three 
funding. There was no effective exit strategy. This is in sharp contrast to the 
other projects where teams based upon the original partnerships are 
continuing some of the work started by Poverty Three. 
What might have been the result had the project grasped the sig-
nificance of its limited life and sought to establish permanent benefits for 
the local community none the less? 
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The Single Regeneration Budget marked the end of short-term small-
scale projects sponsored by a diversity of departments pursuing parallel 
policies. A more coherent urban policy with consolidated resources and 
co-ordinated management demands coherent and united responses from 
potential partners. The project's outcome could have been the creation of 
a powerful advocacy and negotiating agency for the community. The 
agency would have had information resources, trained capacity to evaluate 
policy, and the means to communicate with the local community. Such an 
agency could have grasped the agenda of the Single Regeneration Budget 
and Merseyside's Objective One Programme. This might have enabled the 
community to make the major budgets responsive to the needs of an 
excluded black community, in accordance with one of the objectives of the 
project. 
At the end of the Third Poverty Programme Granby was left with the 
organisations and processes that were appropriate to the more fragmen-
tary, and fragmentising, phase of urban policy. It could be argued that the 
project has contributed to this by providing training for local organisations 
which enabled them to compete with one another. 
The obstacles to be overcome in achieving any other outcomes would have 
been substantial; any attempt to create what would look like a single 
representative agency for the community would have sparked rivalries 
between those who already claimed to speak for much of the community. It 
would have entailed creating partnership within the community in conditions 
where competition was endemic. It seems that these problems were never 
seriously addressed and that after 1992 they were unlikely to be addressable by 
the project, given official attitudes to the existing partnership. 
From the point of view of the university, the experience of partnership 
was one oflost opportunities. For example, a survey was organised in which 
the analysis required by its sponsors made it virtually unusable. Had the 
university been involved, further analysis would have made the data useful 
both to the sponsors and the local community. The lack of technical 
capacity in local management and administration is also a problem which 
the university could address. Suggestions for building local research and 
evaluation capacity in the community by the university were rebuffed 
locally. The university made considerable informal inputs of census data to 
the project, but the project produced its own report on the census without 
consulting those involved in the university. The question of 'ownership' of 
initiatives seemed to be paramount and there was therefore a marked 
reluctance to be seen to be in any way dependent upon university resources. 
As a result access to these resources was lost. 
Another failure of the university as partner was in controlling the quality 
of evaluation which was required at all stages of the project by the European 
Commission. The first evaluator had appropriate professional skills and 
experience and was appointed from within the university system. His 
presence and the Commission's requirements for evaluation were resented 
by certain activists and he became unable to do the job for which he was 
appointed. His replacement was a local activist. This had the effect of 
reducing the prqject's credibility in the eyes of the funding partners and 
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others. The evaluation reports became the occasion for the repetition of 
historical resentments, with little apparent interest in accuracy or systematic 
analysis. Assertions made at the beginning of the project were repeated at 
the end, without evidence of intervening enquiry. In sum, the evaluation 
was that the black population could not trust the public authorities. There 
was no recognition of the changes that had taken place within the partner 
agencies and their practices or the rapidly changing circumstances in which 
the agencies' representatives were operating. There was, in other words, no 
analytic evaluation. 
The first 'final' evaluation report was not submitted to the Management 
Committee for approval. It was printed with glossy covers and widely 
distributed locally. The document was repudiated by the Management 
Committee who refused to accept it as fulfilling the terms of the evaluation 
contract. In the rhetoric of community politics, the report could be said to 
have been a 'disempowering' document because it obscured the changing 
relationships between and within local agencies. The story of the report is 
an important indicator of the problems of partnership in an intensely 
conflictful inner city context. It showed that over a period of five years there 
had been no real meeting of minds. No one had been prepared to put him 
or herself into another's position, to see the institutional and interpersonal 
constraints within which the other works. Putting yourself in the other's 
shoes is an essential element both of partnership and of developing a strong 
bargaining position. In the Granby Toxteth Community Project, prejudge-
ment was the order of the day. An acceptable evaluation report was 
produced nine months after the completion of the final year's extension to 
the project. 
The out-turn of the Granby Toxteth Community Project was, perhaps, to 
underline the importance of an early objective of the project. It had been 
recognised from the beginning that the limited funds could bring little 
direct benefit to the locality. The project needed to act locally and think 
strategically. What was needed, firstly, was an extension of the base of the 
partnership. Consensus could not be built in circumstances where only one 
effective local partner was included. Secondly, it was necessary to build a 
wide range of capacities that would have made the local community an 
effective strategic voice in responding later to large-scale funding initiatives. 
The only proposal to extend the project came in the dying weeks of the 
project. It was for a consultancy built on the same narrow community base 
as the project itself. The proposal never commanded the support of the 
management committee and its proponents did not modify their proposal 
given the lack of support for it. The Granby Toxteth Community Project 
wound up with nearly £100,000 in its bank account. 
That the exit strategy for Poverty Three should have been a priority from 
the beginning is illustrated by the Merseyside Objective One programme. 
This includes an initiative called community involvement, 'designed to help 
local people with the costs of setting up, designing and monitoring their 
own initiatives'. This is an opportunity to which the population of Granby 
will be less capable of responding because of the failure of the partnership 
in Poverty Three. 
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NOTES 
The full title was Community Programme to Foster Social and Economic Integration of 
the Least Privileged Groups. This title derived from the refusal of the UK government to 
participate in any initiative using the word 'poverty'. 
2 'Local government is a net to catch the unfortunate' was how Councillor Forsyth, a future 
Scottish Education Minister and Secretary of State for Scotland, put it. 
Part IV 





AND COMMUNITY RESISTANCE 
An international perspective 
Mike Beazley, Patrick Loftman and 
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INTRODUCTION 
The 1980s witnessed the global proliferation of prestige project and urban 
mega-project property developments both as a tool of local economic 
development and as a means of securing the physical regeneration of 
declining urban areas (Harvey 1988). Prestige projects are defined as large-
scale, high profile, self-contained development schemes which are prima-
rily justified as catalysts for urban regeneration (Loftman and Nevin 1995). 
Examples of prestige projects include convention centres, festival market-
places, major office complexes and leisure and sporting facilities. Urban 
mega-projects are defined as much larger mixed use developments, or 
events, which contain prestige projects as component parts of the overall 
scheme. These are much more common in North America than the UK. 
Both types of developments are often achieved through public/private 
sector partnerships and massive public sector investment, with the public 
sector creating a conducive climate for private sector investment through 
subsidies, tax abatements, and loan arrangements. Such projects are 
predominantly located in, or adjacent to, localities which offer the greatest 
private sector development potential and financial returns - in most cases 
the central business district (CBD) or down town area. 
There is, however, a considerable body of research examining the 
distributional consequences of CBD-focused regeneration models, which 
suggests that such approaches to local economic development have 
concentrated on cultivating and supporting service sector interests at the 
expense of deprived inner urban areas and services on which dis-
advantaged residents depend (Barnekov et al. 1989; Hambleton 1990; Neill 
1991). Consequently, there have been varying degrees of resistance to 
these projects from impacted low income communities. Moreover, public 
opposition to, and community mobilisation against, such projects has in 
many cases been undermined by the absence of an open debate of the 
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costs and benefits of these developments. The powerful interests in favour 
of the developments universally justify them to the public in terms of job 
creation, increased wealth generation and economic development. In 
contrast, those groups which oppose them often refer to the potential 
negative impacts such as eviction, rising land values jeopardising 
community-oriented development, increased traffic, and the poor quality 
job opportunities. 
This chapter provides a brief overview of the response of deprived 
communities to the development of prestige projects and mega-projects 
near, or adjacent, to their neighbourhoods, focusing on the extent oflocal 
community resistance to such developments in three cities: Vancouver 
(Canada), San Francisco (USA) and Birmingham (UK). Utilising the three 
case study cities the chapter focuses on the extent of community participa-
tion in the development process and the success of those communities in 
minimising disbenefits and maximising the benefits that flow from this type 
of development. 
PACIFIC PLACE, VANCOUVER 
Vancouver is located on the Pacific Rim of North America in the Province 
of British Columbia, Canada. During the 1980s and 1990s, the city 
experienced considerable urban mega-project activity. One such develop-
ment was the Pacific Place scheme facilitated by the holding of Expo '86, 
a World Fair that celebrated transportation as its main theme. The use of 
world fairs as a redevelopment tool has been well documented (Wachtel 
1986; Olds 1988). The Pacific Place planning process was initiated in 1988, 
following the sale of the Expo site by the British Columbia provincial 
government to a major Hong Kong developer, Li Ka-shing, and his 
Vancouver-based development company Concord Pacific Developments 
Limited. 
The Pacific Place site is located on the North Shore of False Creek and 
is approximately 204 acres in size. The site represents about one-sixth of 
Vancouver's downtown peninsula, and is currently recognised as one of the 
most valuable and desirable redevelopment sites in North America. The site 
is adjacent to the Downtown Eastside, an area of about 10,000 residents that 
has been designated as one of the poorest neighbourhoods in Canada. The 
redevelopment process for the site was launched by the holding of Expo 
'86, promoted by the provincial government and administered by the Expo 
'86 Corporation. Expo was initially resisted by the City Council, but the idea 
was sold to them on the basis that it would put Vancouver 'on the map', and 
would attract major international investment and tourism. 
A central feature of Expo, and the subsequent Pacific Place redevelop-
ment, was the building ofa covered sports stadium, BC Place, costing $125 
million (Canadian). Construction work on the stadium, which started in 
the early 1980s, coincided with a major economic recession. The result was 
a severe cut-back in social programmes, the abolition of fair rents, the 
freezing of welfare payments, and hundreds of redundancies (DERA 
1987). 
WHOSE DOWNTOWN IS IT ANYWAY? / 183 
Moreover, the Expo Board also decided to award building contracts to 
non-union companies, which was seen by many trade unions and commu-
nity groups as a provocative act, as there was a high level of union 
membership in the Vancouver construction industry. This brought about 
concerted resistance both from labour and community groups - and the 
formation of the Solidarity Coalition (an alliance of the labour and 
community groups) which succeeded in bringing the province within a few 
hours of a general strike in 1983 (Ley et al. 1992). Their opposition, 
however, was resisted by the provincial government and subsequently 
collapsed. The building work continued and other major development 
projects were added at huge public expense, including Skytrain, Canada 
Place, etc.; Expo '86 went ahead as scheduled. 
No impact studies assessing how Vancouver's neighbourhoods would be 
affected by Expo, or the subsequent development, were undertaken by the 
City Council. Nor was there any public debate or consultation about what 
Vancouver citizens' goals and aspirations were for the site or the city as a 
whole. Instead, unilateral decisions regarding the site and Expo '86 were 
made in secret by the provincial government (Gutstein 1986). 
Community groups based in the neighbourhoods adjacent to the Expo 
site asked for impact studies to be undertaken. Activists working for the 
Downtown Eastside Residents Association (DERA) warned the provincial 
government of the potential risk of housing displacement as Expo 
progressed. Many of the people in the Downtown Eastside had lived in 
hotel rooming houses, mainly on welfare benefits, for many years. These 
warnings, however, were ignored amidst a reluctance by the provincial 
government to acknowledge the potential negative impacts of major 
development projects. 
The result of this public neglect was resident evictions. Conservative 
estimates suggest that between 500 and 850 long-term residents were 
evicted from hotel rooming accommodation in the area. Community-based 
housing organisations operating in the area estimated that the figure was 
closer to 1,000. Most alarmingly, DERA argued that a number of deaths 
could be directly attributed to the trauma of eviction on elderly tenants. For 
example, on 18 April 1986, longtime Downtown Eastside resident Olaf 
Solheim (aged 88 years) died six weeks after being forcibly evicted from the 
Patricia Hotel, his home for 62 years. 
The idea of hosting Expo in Vancouver was 'sold' to the public in terms 
of the potential benefits it would bring to the city. In reality the World Fair 
cost the taxpayers of British Columbia about $1.5 billion (Canadian) to put 
on and it ran up a deficit of$400 million (Canadian) (DERA 1987), leading 
to cuts in social programmes to pay for it. Furthermore, many of the jobs 
generated by Expo were low paid and temporary, and many of the financial 
benefits in terms of contracts and franchises went to firms located outside 
of the city. 
In 1988, the city embarked on the Pacific Place mega-project. The final 
development proposal for the site, approved in 1989, included 7,650 
housing units, which will house up to 13,000 people ( of these units 20 per 
cent were to be allocated for social housing units, but no mechanisms were 
MIKE BE A Z LEY ET AL. I 184 
in place to ensure that these would be provided); 2 million square feet of 
office development; 650,000 square feet of retail and service development; 
42 acres of parkland; and hotel, cultural, recreational uses and public open 
space (City of Vancouver Planning Department, October 1989; City of 
Vancouver Planning Department,January 1990). 
The plan was said to contain the largest package of public benefits ever 
negotiated by the City of Vancouver ( City of Vancouver Planning Depart-
ment, January 1990). As part of the package the developer is required to 
pay for the provision of parks, a continuous waterfront walkway around 
False Creek, shoreline improvements, circulation and utility systems, a 
community centre, eight day-care centres, a library, community meeting 
rooms, public art facilities, and bus shelters (City of Vancouver Planning 
Department,January 1990). 
As with Expo, little impact work was undertaken. This is an omission that 
was freely admitted by City ofVancouver officials, although two studies were 
commissioned by the city from consultants. The first was from the 
University of British Columbia's Centre for Human Settlements (CHS) to 
look at the issue oflow rent housing in the central area and how this would 
be impacted by developments like Pacific Place. The report concluded that 
the Pacific Place development would have a negative impact on home-
lessness and the stock of low income housing in the central area. However, 
the report's recommendations were largely ignored by the City Council. 
The second was a Housing and Economic Impact Study commissioned 
from private sector consultants called Burgess, Austin & Associates. This 
report was less critical of the potential impact of Pacific Place. Whilst 
acknowledging that 1,500 low income housing units would be lost, the 
report's authors argued that the development would lead to the upgrading 
of the low income areas adjacent to the site. 
The findings of the Burgess report conflicted not only with the CHS 
report, but also with those of the community-based housing organisations 
operating in the area. These groups feared that the project would have a 
devastating impact on neighbourhoods like the Downtown Eastside. Fears 
of gentrification and potential displacement were expressed. Despite 
constant pleas, local community-based organisations were given no resour-
ces to demonstrate their concerns via the commissioning of their own 
impact assessment work. 
Generally the government institutional and policy frameworks were 
favourably disposed to mega-project development. This made community 
opposition very problematic in terms of gaining political support and 
winning allies. There was some resistance on the City Council to Pacific 
Place from the Committee of Progressive Electors (COPE) councillors, but 
these were outnumbered by the Non-Partisan Association (NPA) - a pro-
development business faction and led by a mayor who was a former 
property developer. This was set within a provincial and federal political 
context that welcomed and promoted overseas investment and that saw 
great financial rewards attached to mega-project developments like Pacific 
Place. These interests set out to market Vancouver's location on the Pacific 
Rim to maximise opportunity for South-East Asian investment. This was 
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seen in very positive terms in contributing to economic growth and the 
future well-being of the city. 
There was very little effective public participation in the planning 
process leading to the commencement of development on the Pacific Place 
site. Local community groups had from the outset attempted to input into 
the decision-making process relating to the Expo and Pacific Place 
developments, but generally to no avail. In relation to Pacific Place there 
were mechanisms in place to facilitate public participation (i.e., there were 
public meetings, exhibitions, and public hearings), at which community 
representatives consistently made their concerns known, but these were not 
acted upon. In relation to Expo, there had been concerted resistance from 
the community and trade unions, but this had been successfully resisted by 
the provincial government. 
Community groups involved in the Pacific Place planning process had 
little access to any legal or technical support. DERA had become a 
knowledgeable and sophisticated campaigning body, but openly admitted 
that they lacked technical expertise. They had requested that the City 
Council fund a planner to work with them on examining the issues 
surrounding the mega-projects to enable them to participate more effec-
tively. This request was denied putting them in a disadvantaged negotiating 
position compared with the developers and both the provincial and city 
governments. 
DERA spearheaded much of the community resistance to Expo and the 
subsequent Pacific Place proposals. DERA represented the 10,000-strong, 
mostly low income, Downtown Eastside community that lived in the area. 
DERA was composed of, and controlled by, the residents themselves. They 
opposed the Expo evictions and have consistently campaigned against the 
negative impacts they feared the mega-projects would have on their 
neighbourhood. However, they were as consistently dismissed by the NPA 
majority on council as being 'too political', or being opposed to change and 
development. This was clearly not the case. DERA has, since Expo, become 
a major social housing developer and has built a number of successful 
housing projects in the area; they have provided an important welfare 
advocacy role for local residents; won a seven-year fight to provide the only 
recreational facility in the neighbourhood, the well-used Carnegie Centre, 
a library and community centre; worked in a campaign to provide a 
waterfront park for local residents; and dealt proactively with drug and 
alcohol problems in the neighbourhood. As a result of DERA's efforts the 
Down town Eastside has become one of the most stable neighbourhoods in 
the city in the context of a rapidly changing central area. 
VERBA BUENA, SAN FRANCISCO 
San Francisco, like Vancouver, is also located on the Pacific Rim of North 
America and has experienced considerable development pressure, partic-
ularly within its downtown area. It is a city that is attractive to major 
developers keen to exploit its economic and locational potential. The 
87-acre Yerba Buena site proved to be one such development opportunity, 
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located in the South of Market area of the city close to its downtown and 
financial heart. Until the 1960s the South of Market area was largely an 
industrial and service commercial area, but had a substantial residential 
population. 
Plans for redevelopment of the Yerba Buena site can be traced back to 
1953, when Ben Swig, a San Francisco-based developer, put forward his 
redevelopment proposals for the area in his plan entitled the San Francisco 
Prosperity Plan. The plan covered four city blocks and included a convention 
centre, a sports stadium, high rise office buildings and parking for 7,000 
cars. This plan was expanded in 1955 to include two additional city blocks 
and proposals for a large transportation terminal, a luxury hotel with 
convention facilities, an auditorium and theatre, moving sidewalks, a 
shopping centre, and increased parking for 16,000 cars. Swig's plan for 
Yerba Buena was never adopted, but it set the tone for subsequent 
development proposals for the area (Hartman 1974). 
In 1964 the San Francisco Redevelopment Agency (SFRA) unveiled its 
first general plan for Yerba Buena - this led to a major confrontation over 
the site between development interests and the local community. A major 
impact of the redevelopment proposals was that in the South of Market area 
several thousand people (mostly retired people) would be forced out of 
their apartments and homes to enable demolition to occur to facilitate the 
plans. 'In downtown redevelopment cliches the common justification for 
pushing working class residents, including the elderly, off their land is that 
the land can be put to a "higher and better use"' (Feagin 1983: 174). 
In 1970 the Executive Director of the SFRA stated the position most 
clearly with regard to the Yerba Buena site: 'This land is too valuable to 
permit poor people to park on it' (Hartman 1974: 19). Such views were 
commonly replicated in the San Francisco press: 
Common sense suggests that something sensible is going to have to be 
built here. There will be no low cost housing for the dregs of society. 
There is no profit in that and there is little evidence that the dregs 
really want to sleep in precious, clean, well lighted places. Misery loves 
misery,just as capitalists adore profits. 
(Twombly 1975) 
The official justification given for the Yerba Buena development was that 
it would increase the city's tax base, create employment opportunities and 
enhance convention and tourist business -with concomitant benefits for all 
(Hartman 1974; Feagin 1983). 
The SFRA played a key role in the Yerba Buena redevelopment from the 
mid-l 960s onwards. The SFRA was a major renewal agency that had the 
power to co-ordinate private and public action and to carry out its plans and 
proposals with little citizen input. In the late 1960s, a series of redevelop-
ment projects were undertaken in the area displacing about 4,000 people 
( mostly working-class black people and people of Japanese origin) from the 
area (Feagin 1983). It was estimated that over 4,000 units of housing would 
be demolished, but only replaced with 276 units of low income housing 
(Weinstein 1970). 
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The Verba Buena plans were altered over the years in order to overcome 
the objections of numerous community groups. The developers added 
various amenities including public gardens, a fountain, open space, a 
children's centre, and other facilities ( San Francisco Weekly 1989). By 1993, 
after nearly thirty years of controversy over the site, a number of 
developments had been completed including the Marriott Hotel ( opened 
in 1989); The Moscone Centre (opened in 1981); ANA Hotel (opened in 
1983); the Visual Arts Centre, the Museum of Modern Art and the 
Esplanade (a 5.5-acre garden). Development projects still to be completed 
include a children's centre; a retail complex; a Jewish Museum; and 
additional housing, hotel space and office development (San Francisco 
Chronicle 1993). 
Local and federal governments supported the Verba Buena redevelop-
ment proposals and formed a powerful alliance with the city's larger private 
corporations, hotel owners and others in the convention and tourist 
industry, the building and construction trade unions and the newspapers 
and other media (Hartman 1974). The project was seen as a means of 
further promoting San Francisco as a major international city. 
The San Francisco city government has been supportive of the corporate 
community and played an important facilitative role. The individuals 
elected and appointed to major positions in the city government over-
whelmingly had links with the business community. The decision-making 
process relating to the Verba Buena development was largely determined 
and controlled by these interests. Hartman argues: 
This involved no large-scale secret conspiracy but was a confluence of 
powerful and influential people acting in their class interest. The 
results of this elitist decision-making process are that the costs and 
benefits of a project presumably designed for the public good are 
distributed in a highly regressive manner. 
(Hartman 1974: 212) 
While there was little formal public participation in the 'official' 
planning process in relation to Verba Buena, there was considerable 
community activity outside this process that impacted on the development. 
Extensive use was made of the judiciary system in this regard, causing delay 
in the development. There was the 1969 Tenants and Owners in Opposition 
to Redevelopment (TOOR) law suit; state and federal suits were brought in 
1972 by Alvin Duskin, the Sierra Club, San Francisco Tomorrow and others 
alleging failure to comply with the California Environmental Quality Act 
and National Environmental Policy Act; and there were also a number of 
lawsuits filed against the financing of the project. These legal actions 
resulted in positive outcomes: the TOOR law suit ultimately produced 
commitments to construct 2,200 units of permanent new and rehabilitated 
low rent housing units on-stream; whilst the various financing law suits 
stopped the development of the costly sports arena, and scaled down the 
convention centre subsidies (Hartman 1984). 
Community opposition to the Verba Buena plans, therefore, had 
resulted in a number of important concessions. However, it could be 
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argued that these changes did not alter the fundamental basis of the 
development as 4,000 people were still displaced, 700 businesses were lost 
(with 7,600 blue-collar jobs), and a low income community destroyed 
(Levering and Roberts 1975). 
One important factor that can be identified in explaining the ability of 
residents and community groups in San Francisco to challenge pro-growth 
development interests is the diverse and well-informed citizenry prepared 
to become involved in planning and development issues. There is a long 
history of community action in the city. Community and neighbourhood 
organisations in the city have had some influence on city planning and are 
known for the strength of their challenge to corporate interests (Barton 
1985). 
BIRMINGHAM 
Birmingham, located in the heart of England's industrial West Midlands 
region, is Britain's second largest city with a population of just under one 
million people. During the late 1970s the city and regional economy, 
traditionally dependent on manufacturing industry (particularly the auto-
motive and engineering sectors), was devastated by economic recession and 
the restructuring of industry. Between 1971 and 1987 Birmingham lost 
191,000 jobs, amounting to 29 per cent of total employment in the city. In 
1991 Birmingham was the poorest free-standing English city according to 
the government's Index of Local Conditions. In response to the city's 
pressing economic problems, Birmingham's ruling Labour administration 
in the early 1980s sought to broaden its economic base through the 
nurturing of service sector investment, most notably business tourism. To 
facilitate this process, the City Council has sought to promote a new 
national and international image for Birmingham and provide a framework 
for facilitating private sector investment within its CBD. 
In this context the City Council adopted a CBD-focused model of 
regeneration as its primary vehicle for securing the city's economic future, 
promoting Birmingham as an international centre for business tourism, 
leisure and culture, and attracting footloose inward private sector invest-
ment and jobs (Loftman and Nevin 1992). Birmingham's mega-project is 
focused on the Broad Street redevelopment area adjacent to the CBD. Four 
developments provide the focus of this strategy: 
• the £180 million International Convention Centre (ICC), opened in 
April 1991, with a maximum conference capacity of 3,700 delegates and 
inclusion of a 'world class' symphony hall; 
• the £60 million National Indoor Arena (NIA), built to enhance the city's 
position as an international centre for sport, and seating up to 12,000 
people; 
• the £31 million Hyatt Hotel, built as an integral part of the ICC 
development; 
• the £250 million privately financed Brindleyplace festival marketplace 
scheme. Recently revised plans for the scheme include the development 
WHOSE DOWNTOWN IS IT ANYWAY? / 189 
of 850,000 square feet of offices, 123,000 square feet of retail space and 
143 houses. 
Birmingham City Council's £300 million investment in its CBD projects 
has been justified by local politicians largely in terms of diversifying the 
city's local economy, attracting mobile private investment, and putting 
Birmingham on the international map. However, the prime justification for 
Birmingham's investment in prestige projects has been the creation of jobs 
and the generation of an income boost to the local and regional economy. 
The City Council has claimed that the ICC has helped to attract £2 billion 
of public and private sector investment to Birmingham (Birmingham City 
Council 1992). Additionally, consultants commissioned by the City Council 
have estimated that the expenditure generated by business tourism 
associated with the ICC and NIA projects supports around 4,600 full-time 
equivalent (ITE) jobs. Of this total, however, only 1,800 ITE jobs were 
estimated to be filled by Birmingham residents, emphasising the extent of 
leakage from the city's local economy (KPMG 1993). 
The perceived success of Birmingham's prestige project developments 
has been acclaimed by the local and national media, professional bodies 
(The Plannr::r 1991; Planning 1991) and some academic commentators 
( Carley 1991; Martin and Pearce 1992). In the context of the widely 
accepted success of Birmingham's prestige projects, a climate of media, 
official and public optimism was created within the city which mitigated 
against public debate about potential negative impacts. Several criticisms of 
Birmingham's approach to urban regeneration have subsequently been 
made and are summarised below. Firstly, it is argued that many of the jobs 
created in the facilities and generated in the associated sectors are of low 
quality. In September 1991, 42 per cent of the 275 permanent jobs at the 
ICC and 73 per cent of the seventy-one permanent jobs at the NIA were jobs 
within the cleaning, catering and security occupations (Loftman and Nevin 
1994). 
Secondly, that disadvantaged groups in the city gained few of the benefits 
from Birmingham's prestige projects via the trickle-down process. For 
example, relatively few of the permanent staff employed in Birmingham's 
prestige projects were from black and minority ethnic groups. In 1992 of 
the 346 permanent staff employed in the ICC and NIA only 8 per cent were 
from black and minority ethnic groups. By comparison, these groups 
accounted for 17.5 per cent of the city's economically active population 
(Loftman and Nevin 1994). 
Thirdly, that the City Council's investment in prestige project develop-
ments also resulted in the diversion of scarce public resources away from 
'basic' services, such as public housing and education services, which are 
particularly depended on by the city's disadvantaged groups. For example, 
the city's education service was deprived of capital resources during the 
ICC and NIA construction period with capital spending falling by 60 per 
cent between 1984/5 and 1988/9. In addition, in 1991/2 it was estimated 
that £64 million was 'diverted' from education revenue support to cover the 
interest charges on projects such as the ICC (Loftman and Nevin 1992). 
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The massive diversion of capital and revenue resources from housing 
and education towards prestige project property developments in Birming-
ham will have a disproportionate long-term impact upon disadvantaged 
groups in Birmingham. It has been estimated that in April 1993, 81,251 
homes in Birmingham were unfit for human habitation and the out-
standing repair bill for the public sector housing stock was around £1.3 
billion (Birmingham City Council 1993). In addition, it has been estimated 
that an investment of £200 million over the next five years is needed to 
rectify the disrepair in school buildings in the city (Birmingham Education 
Commission 1993). 
Despite the huge physical and socio-economic impacts which the 
development of prestige projects have had in Birmingham, there was only 
limited public opposition to the developments, or an informed debate 
about the costs or benefits resulting from the projects, over the decade in 
which the policies were pursued. This lack of debate was the result of a 
political consensus within the city (both within the City Council and 
between the public and private sectors), a supportive local media, and 
because there was no requirement to have a public referendum on the 
bond issue which part-financed the developments. This can be contrasted 
with the more liberal freedom of infmmation laws which exist in North 
America. 
The political consensus emerged in Birmingham during the early 1980s 
around the need to pursue 'an aggressive pro-development strategy to 
manage the concurring problems of structural decline and cyclical down-
turn' (DiGaetano and Klemanski 1992: 16-17). The basic goal of this pro-
development strategy was 'to promote projects that would protect the City's 
industrial base while facilitating the growth of downtown office and 
commercial sectors' (ibid.: 17). 
In Birmingham, there has been little public involvement or debate 
concerning the development of the city's CBD-focused regeneration 
strategy and the formulation of the vision of Birmingham as 'the world-class 
City' (Kosny and Loftman 1991). The first major forum in the formulation 
of Birmingham's vision for the development and promotion of its CBD was 
the Highbury Initiative, two symposia (in 1988 and 1989) which brought 
together the experience of public officials, private sector interest and an 
international group to bear on the problems faced by the city. However, the 
initiative was marked by the absence of any members of the public at these 
meetings (The Highbury Initiative 1989). 
The first major opportunity for the residents of Birmingham to have an 
input into the formulation of the city's urban regeneration strategy came 
with the preparation of the Birmingham Unitary Development Plan (UDP) 
in the late 1980s after construction work on the ICC and the NIA had 
begun. However, public involvement in the process was limited by the need 
to produce the plan quickly in order to comply with central government 
advice and provide a framework for private investment decisions. The 
relatively low level of public debate was reflected in the fact that only twenty-
five written responses on the draft plan were received by the City Council 
relating to the proposals affecting the city centre area, and only seven 
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relating to the broad strategy outlined in the report (Kosny and Loftman 
1991). 
The UDP was followed by a public conference 'The Future of Your City 
Centre' in February 1992. However, this public debate took place almost 
four years after the first High bury Initiative Symposia, and once again after 
construction work on many city centre projects had started (for example, 
the city centre pedestrianisation and reconstruction of Victoria Square) or 
had been completed ( the ICC, NIA, Hotel and Centenary Square). 
Public debate of Birmingham's CBD regeneration strategy has been 
further constrained by the paucity of information regarding the 'real' 
financial costs of this strategy. Much of this information has remained on 
confidential council committee agendas under Sections 8 and 9 of the 
Local Government Act 1985. In Birmingham, therefore, it may be argued 
that the city's residents have had little real opportunity to influence the 
development of the City Council's urban regeneration strategy. Rather, a 
veneer of public involvement in the process was created without full access 
to information relating to the extent of the opportunity costs involved. 
Against a backdrop of a minimalist public participation strategy relating 
to city centre development in general, a local poli~ical consensus, a pro-
development local media and limited access to information laws, public 
opposition to the development of Birmingham's prestige projects was 
negligible. There are a number of reasons which may explain the lack of 
community action when compared to the two North American case studies. 
Firstly, unlike in the Vancouver and San Francisco examples, there was 
no displacement of local residents as a direct result of the Birmingham 
developments, thus reducing the immediacy of the projects on the local 
people. Secondly, initial potential community resistance in a deprived 
council estate (Central Ladywood), located adjacent to the prestige 
projects, was partially offset by the City Council's utilisation of central 
government Estate Action funds to undertake a £13 million refurbishment 
of the area's housing stock. Thirdly, the manner in which Birmingham's 
prestige projects were funded meant that the most prominent negative 
impact on the most marginal groups occurred at the city level, rather than 
being more narrowly focused on an adjacent poor neighbourhood. 
CONCLUSIONS 
A major conclusion to emerge from this brief review of prestige project and 
mega-project activity in the three case study cities is that democratic, 
representative, responsible local government may seek to prioritise pro-
growth interests over the needs of disadvantaged communities. Powerful 
forces are at work which can skew democratic decision-making processes in 
favour of those who control the economic and political life of the city. 
Generally community groups are no match for powerful development 
interests and growth coalitions that exist within cities in Canada, the United 
States and Great Britain. In many cases the most community groups can 
achieve from challenging such developments is to win concessions from 
developers, in an attempt to make the development proposals more 
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sensitive to community needs. The concessions gained, however, do not, in 
most cases, have a major bearing on the final outcome and impact of the 
development. Moreover, it could be argued that many of the community 
benefits included in the prestige and mega-project developments are often 
tangential to the pressing needs of the urban poor, and marginal in scale 
when compared with the benefits which accrue to other more affluent 
residents from the rest of the city or the broader region. 
There appeared to have been little effective community participation in 
the planning processes attached to the developments in each of the three 
cities. In respect of the Pacific Place development, a comprehensive public 
participation process was set up to input community viewpoints. However, 
this process was not amenable to the community setting the terms of 
reference. The communities' input was limited to reacting to development 
proposals rather than being able to influence its form, nature and impact 
at the outset. In San Francisco, community opposition was channelled 
through other mechanisms outside of the planning process, and particular 
use was made of the courts which resulted in amendments to the plan. In 
both of these examples organised community resistance, often in conjunc-
tion with liberal professionals, was able to generate positive outcomes, such 
as commitments to provide some low income housing. However, there are 
still unresolved questions as to how these commitments will be honoured. 
In the case of Birmingham, there was a complete absence of a public debate 
about the costs and benefits of this type of development. The lack of 
publicly available information relating to the redevelopment of the city 
centre effectively constrained any community resistance to the regenera-
tion proposals. 
It is evident from the three case studies that the outcomes of the North 
American projects to date have been more brutal and socially regressive. 
Evictions resulted from both the Expo experience and the early days of the 
Yerba Buena project. No such direct negative outcome resulted in Birming-
ham, but potential negative impacts on low income neighbourhoods and 
groups are being experienced in terms of the reduction of scarce local 
authority resources. Vancouver and San Francisco have become the 
epitome of the 'entrepreneurial city' in recent years, marketing their 
attractive quality and their good location on the Pacific Rim. It is clear from 
examples such as Birmingham that local economic policy in Britain is 
moving in the same direction. 
14 
RELIGION, EDUCATION AND CITY 
POLITICS 
A case study of community 
mobilisation 
Wendy Ball and James A. Beckf'ord 
INTRODUCTION 
A relatively new, and under-researched, dimension of the political life of 
British cities has emerged where sizeable communities of Muslims, Hindus, 
Sikhs and Jains have developed since the 1950s. These ethno-religious 
communities have now established their own buildings and organisations, 
often in networks of ties with similar communities in other cities, and have 
begun to explore ways of exercising political influence at least partly 
through the medium of religion. In other words, collective interests and 
identities are crystallising around actors and associations with explicitly 
religious significance. 
The main aim of this chapter is to describe ongoing research into the 
processes by which political activity, at least in part, follows the contour lines 
of ethno-religious communities in Upton, a large, pseudonymous English 
city. 1 Our project is designed to assess the variable significance of religious 
collectivities as vehicles of political activity. To give the project a sharper 
focus, issues of school-level education are examined as the site on which the 
interaction between religious and political forces takes place. 
The term 'ethno-religious' requires some discussion at this point 
(Wilpert 1988). Ethnicity and religion are two partially overlapping 
symbolic markers of collective identity (Knott 1986). The former emphas-
ises feelings of solidarity, a common name, a shared culture, association 
with a shared territory of origin, and presumed descent from common 
ancestors (Smith 1986). The latter denotes shared beliefs and practices 
relative to questions of ultimate significance. The relationship between 
them can take different forms. In the case of groups such as Jews and Sikhs 
in the UK the markers are virtually coterminous, but the relationship 
between ethnicity and religion is more varied in the case of Muslims and 
Christians. 
The combination of religion and ethnicity can serve as a basis for, inter alia, 
political mobilisation, social protest or campaigning activity (Modood et al. 
1994). Our main reason for using the compound adjective 'ethno-religious' is 
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therefore to underline the fact that local political activity sometimes follows 
the contours of communities which define themselves in terms of religion and 
ethnicity, usually in subtle and shifting combinations. Of course, the relative 
salience of the two terms varies from situation to situation. Moreover, finer 
gradations of ethnic and religious difference, which are complicated by 
further differentiations in terms of age, class or gender, may come into play 
on some occasions, but not on others. For example, differences which 
occasionally come between Muslims of varying ethnic background, national 
origins or theological tradition may nevertheless be put aside for the sake of 
joint participation in, say, unitary campaigns to preserve single-sex secondary 
schools or to challenge the existing law against blasphemy. We believe it is 
essential to pay special attention to the precise shades of ethnic and religious 
significance that actors attach to their own political activity and to that of 
others in particular situations. 
The idea of examining the ethno-religious dimension of the politics of 
education at the city level arises from current debates about the changing 
character of politics in societies marked by ethnic diversity and conflict. 
There is a long tradition of inquiry into the voting behaviour, party loyalties 
and class identity of the communities founded by African-Caribbean and 
Asian migrants to the UK (Anwar 1986; Fitzgerald 1984; Layton-Henry 
1984). There is also a body of knowledge about the involvement of ethnic 
minorities in local politics (Newton 1975; Reeves 1989). Other studies have 
explored the development of interest groups and other associations formed 
by ethnic minorities (Rex 1991; King 1993). What has so far tended to 
escape the attention of researchers, however, is the extent to which religi,on, 
either in association with or analytically separated from 'race' or ethnicity, 
can serve as a medium or vehicle for local politics in the widest sense of the 
term (but see Ellis 1991a, 1991b; Nielsen 1992). 
Our main reasons for positioning the issue of education at the centre of 
the project are that it is known to be both a constant, long-running site of 
political struggle at local level and a topic which elicits strong responses 
from ethno-religious communities. As a Birmingham city councillor 
remarked to Newton (1975: 203), 'On education you've got a night of the 
long knives every night.' 
Our reason for devoting an unusually large amount of attention to 
religion in relation to the politics of education is that it is a relatively under-
researched topic which is nevertheless of increasing importance in the UK. 
The growing salience of the topic is partly to do with the long-term 
maturation of ethnic minority communities with distinctive religious 
traditions and partly to do with the responses of many different religious 
groups to a whole series of educational reforms since the 1960s. 
We deliberately chose to limit the project's geographical scope to a 
single, large, ethnically diverse city in order to obtain a fine-grained picture 
of the entire range of political contributions arising from ethno-religious 
communities. We are confident that this is more likely to be achieved in a 
single location than by a necessarily less intensive study of more than one 
city. We also chose to analyse not only ethno-religious communities' 
collective involvement in the politics of education but also the other 
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relevant actors in Upton's political life. They include elected councillors, 
local government officials, key personnel in the Education Department, 
community relations specialists, and representatives of political parties or 
trade unions. Our aim was to place the public debates about education in 
their local political context and thereby to examine the distinctiveness and 
relative significance of input from ethno-religious communities. 
In an effort to move beyond the conventional understanding of 'local 
community' we wanted to capitalise on Meg Stacey's (1969) insight into 
'the local social system' but to adapt her conceptualisation to the circum-
stances of a large, multi-ethnic and religiously diverse city. This adaptation 
requires greater sensitivity to (a) the fragmentary nature of the system and 
(b) the situational or episodic activation of the social networks. In 
particular, we concentrate on how and why religious factors are central to 
some mobilisations of political action but not to others, even when school-
level education is selected as the sole focus of the action. 
LOCAL AUTHORITY POLICIES AND RELIGIOUS 
DIVERSITY: RELIGIOUS EDUCATION, RACIAL 
EQUALITY AND COMMUNITY LIAISON 
Our historical analysis2 of the relationship between Upton Local Authority 
and the diverse faith communities in the city during the period 1945-95 
revealed three broad foci for further exploration. They offer a framework 
for comparing our case study with developments in other localities with a 
population which is diverse in religion. There are three areas of Local 
Authority policy which are likely to influence how ethno-religious collectiv-
ities mobilise over educational issues. First, the provision of religi,ous 
education and collective worship in schools elicits strong responses. Second, 
the racialisation of city politics and the development of policies for racial 
equality and equal opportunities impact directly on ethno-religious com-
munities. Third, attempts by Local Authority officials and politicians to 
liaise with members of faith communities and to offer opportunities for 
communication of views and demands are very revealing about the local 
political system. 
In relation to all three areas, the complex relationship between ethnicity 
and religious identity is a central problematic at both a theoretical and 
methodological level and makes it difficult to isolate the specifically religi,ous 
dimension of city politics. From a different angle, the concepts of equal 
opportunities, racial equality and religious pluralism embedded in Local 
Authority policies may set boundaries for responding to ethno-religious 
demands and preferences, with potential tensions between meeting the 
goal of equal treatment in service delivery and respecting the religious 
interests of diverse groups. 
Aellglous education and collective worship 
Upton LEA's approach to religious matters and relationships with local 
faith communities over the post-war period has been dominated by the 
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legal duties of all LEAs, enshrined in the 1944 Education Act concerning 
religion. First was the duty to provide religious education (RE) in all schools 
and to ensure the school day included an act of collective worship. The 
second requirement was to work in partnership with church schools; that 
is, the voluntary aided and voluntary controlled school sector. Put another 
way, Upton LEA never formulated a coherent and comprehensive policy for 
dealing with religious diversity. Instead, provision was virtually confined to 
meeting the expectations of schools laid down in law. They can be outlined 
as follows. 
According to the 1944 Education Act, religious education in state 
schools had to be in accordance with an Agreed Syllabus developed at the 
LEA level through an Agreed Syllabus Conference consisting of four 
panels. These panels were to ensure representation of the following groups: 
the Church of England, the Local Authority, the teachers' associations, and 
other religious denominations chosen by the LEA according to the 
particular circumstances of the area. Whilst the Act offered LEAs scope 
regarding the content of religious education and in choosing which 
religious groups should be involved in drawing up an Agreed Syllabus, it 
was taken for granted at this stage that both religious education and the 
daily act of worship would be based on Christianity. As Parsons comments: 
The constitution of the Agreed Syllabus Conferences reflected this 
assumption and, significantly, made no specific provision for repre-
sentatives of religions other than Christianity. Christianity clearly, it 
was assumed, was the historically predominant and crucial formative 
influence in British religious life. An undenominational Christianity, 
therefore, was the obvious basis for the religious worship and 
education of schoolchildren. 
(Parsons 1994: 166) 
These assumptions also underpinned the continuation and consolida-
tion of the dual system of state schools and church schools following the 
1944 Education Act. As Leslie Francis claims, 'the 1944 Education Act 
designed an educational system appropriate for a Christian or church-
related society' (1993: 159). The passing of the Education Reform Act in 
1988 (and subsequent Circulars from the Department for Education) 
brought the issue of religious provision in schools to the forefront of 
political debate. The new Act reaffirmed the requirements that schools 
must provide religious education and hold a daily act of collective worship. 
However, it also went further than the earlier legislation by reducing the 
scope for flexibility in the interpretation of these requirements at the local 
level. All LEAs were required to establish a Standing Advisory Council on 
Religious Education (SACRE) with responsibility to review the Agreed 
Syllabus for RE in use in the area and with a duty to report on an annual 
basis. However, it is the place accorded to Christianity in the Act which is 
of particular concern here. As Parsons explains: 
The particular religions which were to be included in the religious 
education and worship provided in schools were now specified -
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whereas the 1944 Act had said nothing on this point ... the 
requirements that the daily collective worship should be 'wholly or 
mainly of a broadly Christian character', and that the Agreed 
Syllabuses should 'reflect the fact that the religious traditions in Great 
Britain are in the main Christian', meant that Christianity was now 
formally and officially given a prominence which it had not enjoyed 
under the previous legislation. 
(Parsons 1994: 185) 
The membership of the SACREs was to consist of the same four panels 
referred to in relation to the Agreed Syllabus Conference in the 1944 
Education Act; that is, the Church of England, the local authority, local 
teachers' associations and 'such Christian and other religious denomina-
tions as, in the opinion of the authority, will appropriately reflect the 
principal religious traditions in the area'. Whilst the criteria for member-
ship of the fourth panel do allow for the recognition of diverse religious 
traditions where they are present in the area, the local authority retains the . 
power to select them, and they will still be in a minority. Similarly, the 
Agreed Syllabus for RE may also take 'account of the teaching and practices 
of the other principal religions represented in Great Britain', but Christian-
ity is to be given priority. 
The priority accorded to Christianity in law is mirrored at the local level 
in Upton. In our case study, the spirit of partnership and consensus 
between the LEA and the local church authorities appeared to be strong in 
the decades following the 1944 Act. The Church of England, the Roman 
Catholic Church and the Free Church Council each had the right to 
nominate a representative to the Education Committee and they were also 
represented on the Local Standing Advisory Council for Religious Matters 
(LACRM) set up in the late 1940s. It was during this period that many 
voluntary aided and voluntary controlled schools for the Church of 
England and the Roman Catholic population were built, and the regular 
discussion of religious matters by the Education Committee was confined 
mainly to the management of this sector. The LEA was highly supportive of 
the need to provide denominational schools for a growing Roman Catholic 
school population. 
We aim to explore how this apparent consensus and partnership 
between the LEA and the Christian Church authorities was influenced by 
the migration to the city during the 1950s and 1960s of people from the 
Caribbean and South Asia, many of whom came from different religious 
traditions and organisations. We want to know how far the framework which 
had developed for discussing religious matters shifted from the unspoken 
assumption that these should be confined to mainstream Christianity 
towards a broader based and inclusive approach. Furthermore, to what 
extent did the tendency to confine educational discussion over religious 
matters to the specific issues of religious education, collective worship and 
courses for teachers extend to a wider set of concerns of potential interest 
to religious collectivities? 
Our evidence shows that, until the late 1980s, policies for Religious 
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Education remained largely untouched by these changes in the character 
of the city's population. This is remarkable, given that from the early 1970s 
onwards there was increasing discussion of the educational needs of ethnic 
minority pupils and the organisation of ethnic minority groups in the city. 
We consider this in more detail below. 
The raclallsatlon of city polltlcs and the demands 
of ethno-rellglous groups 
A great deal has been written about the response ofLEAs to issues of 'race', 
ethnicity and racism and the development of policies on multicultural and 
anti-racist education especially since the early 1980s (Dom 1983; Gill et al. 
1992; Mullard 1982; Troyna 1993). Beyond the educational arena, local 
authorities have introduced policies on equal opportunities which include 
initiatives to tackle racial inequality in employment and service provision 
(Ball and Solomos 1990; Braham et al. 1992; Jenkins and Solomos 1987). 
The importance of political mobilisation by black and ethnic minority 
community groups as well as by anti-racist organisations at the local level 
has also been considered in this context (Cheetham 1988; Goulbourne 
1987; Ramdin 1987; Reeves 1989; Solomos 1989). 
These processes signify the racialisation of political debate at both local 
and national levels in recent decades. According to Ball and Solomos, an 
understanding of the local politics of 'race' requires an historical per-
spective for 
Over the past two decades the racialisation of local politics has 
undergone a number of transformations. The processes which have 
resulted in the racialisation oflocal politics are complex, and to some 
extent they have been determined by the specific histories of 
particular localities. 
(Ball and Solomos 1990: 6) 
In Upton, from the mid-l 960s onwards, meetings of the Education 
Committee referred more frequently to responses to the educational needs 
of ethnic minority children. The period from the mid-l 960s to the early 
1970s was one in which the LEA defined the needs of •immigrant' children 
in terms of English as a Second Language support. Teachers were also 
encouraged to attend conferences concerned with the putative 'problems' 
faced by 'immigrant' children. During the early 1970s the LEA began to 
consider proposals for staff to be funded through Section 11 of the Local 
Government Act, 1966 which further encouraged a 'special needs' 
approach to the educational support of ethnic minority children. Upton 
LEA's approach corresponds closely to the assimilationist model which 
generally underpinned the policies and practices of schools at that time 
(Mullard 1982). 
Our analysis reveals a slight shift in the approach of the LEA and its 
relationship with community groups following the reorganisation of local 
government in 197 4, although they were still fragmented and ad hoe. On the 
one hand, for the period from the mid-l 970s onwards, we found evidence 
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of the growing mobilisation of ethnic minority community groups and 
communication with the LEA. The local Community Relations Council 
became active during this time, and membership of the LEA Education 
Committee was extended to a representative of 'non-Christian' religions. 
On the other hand, this was also the period when bidding for funds under 
both Section 11 and the Urban Programme acquired a momentum and 
became a considerable and regular part of the LEA's responsibilities. 
Funding under Section 11 was secured in the late 1970s to appoint a team 
of ESL teachers and an adviser for multicultural education, and therefore 
established the institutional framework within which the LEA would 
respond to a multi-ethnic population in the future. 
Section 71 of the Race RelationsActofl 976placed a general statutory duty 
on local authorities 'to eliminate unlawful racial discrimination and to 
promote equality of opportunity and good race relations'. Upton's Council 
responded by setting up an inter-departmental working party to consider a 
corporate approach to race relations, and its report was considered by the 
Education Committee in 1979. As for many other local authorities, this 
marked the beginning of a more co-ordinated approach to racial equality 
through the adoption of policies and procedures which continued during 
the 1980s. The City Council adopted an Equal Opportunities Statement in 
1980, and in 1985 the Education Committee began to discuss whether it 
should prepare a policy statement on multicultural education. Further policy 
initiatives from both the City Council and the LEA followed after this. 
The period from 1985 onwards signalled a further shift in the local 
politics of 'race' in the city. Whilst policy development for equal opportun-
ities continued, it was in a context of greater pressure on the LEA in terms 
of new legislation and economic constraints, including the tightening of 
Home Office regulations concerning the allocation of Section 11 funding. 
A trend towards the greater mobilisation of sections of the community 
around educational provision can be clearly discerned in this period of 
constraint. 
Our periodisation of the LEA's approach towards issues of 'race' and 
ethnicity revealed that, both in terms of the initial focus on meeting the 
needs of ethnic minority pupils and the subsequent shift to promotion of 
a policy for equal opportunities, there is an apparent reluctance to 
acknowledge the diversity of religi,ous preferences. Despite the racialisation 
of city politics there has been little debate about the issue of equal 
treatment on religious grounds and about appropriate responses to 
religious diversity. It is clear from other local case studies that the question 
of how far to go in respecting religious diversity is one area of policy that 
LEAs have found particularly difficult to address. 
For example, in her case study of Coventry City Council's response to 
Muslims and the request of one section of the community for a Muslim 
community centre, Ellis comments: 
the early official response to the demands for a Muslim centre 
included an influential view against putting public funds into 'pro-
moting the interests of any religious group or organisations', the 
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argument being that it would 'generate sectarianism, draw scarce 
resources from categories of needy groups'. 
(Ellis 1991a: 362) 
In this context Ellis points out that it is the different groups within the 
Asian communities in Coventry which have pressed to gain recognition of 
their religious and cultural identities. Similarly, in her study of Muslims in 
Birmingham, Joly comments 'Muslims are remarking that there is a 
reticence on the part of the authorities to award grants for religious projects 
and some have voiced their discontent on this matter' (1987: 22). This 
compares with the greater willingness of the local authority to make grants 
for mother-tongue teaching and support for community centres. It would 
seem, therefore, that whilst there may be a willingness to meet certain 
wishes of ethnic minority groups, there is often reluctance to recognise and 
sponsor specifically religi,ous demands. 
In view of this, we will move on to consider the extent to which the 
various ethno-religious communities themselves have been able to propose 
an alternative agenda. We shall discuss this in terms of available channels 
of communication with the LEA. 
Channels of communication: community llalson and 
consultation 
The mobilisation of ethno-religious communities over educational issues 
depends partly on how far LEAs attempt to liaise with those communities 
and offer accessible channels for communication. Other studies have 
provided evidence of the limited nature of consultation exercises under-
taken by Local Authorities with ethnic minority communities (Ball 1987; 
Ben-Tovim et al. 1986; Gibson 1987). With reference to communication 
with diverse faith communities the signs are that Local Authorities prefer 
to evade any focus on religi,ous groupings and religi,ous preferences. Instead, 
they prefer to use the language of 'race' and ethnicity (see, for example, 
Ellis 1991a, 1991b). Our evidence from Upton shows a preference by 
officers and councillors to approach the communication process within the 
context of a generalised commitment to consultation with local citizens. 
Community liaison is informed by the City Council's equal opportunities 
policy and declared commitment to tackling poverty, deprivation and 
discrimination. As one senior officer explained, liaison 'tends to be on a 
broad basis and it doesn't tend to be religious led'. 
With respect to opportunities for religious representation on LEA commit-
tees the Church of England, Roman Catholic and Free Church authorities 
have enjoyed the right to send a nominee to the Education Committee 
since 1945. In 1974 that right was extended to a nominee for 'non-
Christian' religions. This has been a source of irritation in some ethno-
religious communities, however, given the obvious difficulties of 
nominating a single individual to represent all such groups in Upton. 
Following the establishment of the local SACRE, Upton Education Commit-
tee has used this forum as the mechanism for nominating that representa-
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tive, now referred to as the 'representative of Asian religions'. In practice, 
this position has rotated between the Muslim, Hindu and Sikh members of 
the SACRE. However, it is fair to suggest that apart from the link with 
SACRE the city's strategies for communication with local faith communities 
are fragmented, unco-ordinated and tend to minimise the issue of religious 
identity. 
ETHNO-RELIGIOUS MOBILISATION AND 
EDUCATIONAL POLITICS 
In their case study of the local politics of 'race' in Wolverhampton, Ben-
Tovim and his colleagues (1986) identify three forms ofanti-racist struggle; 
namely 'spontaneous protest', 'pressure for community resources' and 
'planned political struggle'. Applying this framework to Upton, we argue 
that it will be difficult for ethno-religious collectivities to pursue strategies 
of 'planned political struggle' as they enjoy only limited opportunities for 
this in terms of the existing communication process. It can be argued that 
the demands of ethno-religious groups take two broad forms in view of 
these limitations. First, there is demand for Local Authority support for self-
help projects run by particular sections of the community. Here 'pressure 
for community resources' is the preferred form of 'struggle'. Second, there 
are demands that mainstream educational provision should take account of 
ethno-religious needs. In this case the limitations of LEA communication 
processes referred to above may leave 'spontaneous protest' as the only 
strategy available to faith communities. 
Our evidence so far indicates that mobilisation has been reactive rather 
than proactive, is of an episodic nature and is more likely to be successful 
where it relates to issues of concern to a broad spectrum of ethnic groups 
rather than of concern to a particular religious group. We will conclude this 
section with an example of each kind of demand. 
Requesting local authority support for a self-help 
project 
Upton Education Committee received a request in 1992 from an organisa-
tion which provided Koranic classes to be granted free lettings at a local 
school. The Committee refused the request and reaffirmed its policy on this 
matter: whilst it was willing to provide free lettings in schools for groups to 
run community language classes, a fee should be charged for classes held 
by religious organisations. Whilst the LEA is willing to support certain 
forms of self-help by community groups, this example appears to support 
our hypothesis that it is reluctant to support specifically religious needs. 
Reacting to changes In mainstream educational 
provision 
The preference of parents from some ethno-religious groups for single-sex 
schools for girls became an issue of concern in the mid-l 980s when the LEA 
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was faced with the need to reorganise educational provision in a climate of 
declining enrolment and economic cutbacks. This review involved exten-
sive consultation including public meetings, meetings with interested 
parties and written responses to its consultative documents. The proposals 
included several school closures, and in this context the LEA received sixty-
five responses arguing the need to retain the single-sex schools in the city. 
In its report on the public consultation exercise, the Committee made the 
following comments on this issue: 
We reaffirm the principle that a truly comprehensive system should 
not include single sex schools and our intention to work towards all 
schools being mixed. 
However, we have taken note of the views of those who have 
supported retention of single sex schools in arriving at our proposals. 
Most of those favouring single sex provision . . . do so for girls on 
religious grounds. 
At this stage the Committee were willing to accede to parental preference, 
and their revised proposals included the retention of the single-sex schools. 
However, the comments above show clearly how the conception of equal 
opportunities favoured by the LEA not only fails to be clear about how this 
relates to religious rights and preferences but may actually be seen to be in 
direct conflict with the notion of separate provision on religious grounds. 
The issue re-emerged in 1992 when the LEA initiated public consultation 
on its proposal to change a single-sex secondary school for girls to a 
co-educational school. Whilst 26 per cent of the responses were in favour 
of retaining single-sex status, the LEA was still able to use the consultative 
exercise to argue that the majority favoured the change and it resolved to 
proceed with the proposal. A closer analysis of particular organisations 
involved in the consultation shows that there was a clear division between, 
on the one hand, those in favour of the transition to co-education, which 
comprised mainly secular educational organisations including the main 
teaching associations, and, on the other, those who wished to retain the 
single-sex status of the school, which comprised mainly ethno-religious 
groups from both the Muslim and Sikh communities. In addition a list of 
individuals from the Asian communities had been forwarded to the LEA 
stating that they wanted the school to consider the option of opting out of 
LEA control. This case provides a second example of how ethno-religious 
mobilisation to secure LEA recognition for religious preferences in 
education failed to achieve a positive response. The debate over provision 
of single-sex schooling for girls and the related debate over whether Muslim 
schools should enjoy the same right to be granted voluntary aided status 
enjoyed by Christian and Jewish schools (Ball and Troyna 1987; Parker-
Jenkins 1991), or to use school opt-outs to create separate religious schools 
(Cumper 1990; Modood 1993), has gone on for many years. A decade has 
passed since the Swann Committee ( 1985) considered the case for separate 
religious schools. Whilst the Swann Committee acknowledged that the 
pressure from some ethno-religious groups to set up religious schools with 
voluntary aided status took place in a context in which the established 
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churches had been able to take full advantage of the law in this area, it 
nevertheless rejected the case on the following grounds: 
In view of our overall aim of schools offering a full education for all 
our children it is hardly surprising that we cannot favour a 'solution' 
to the supposed 'problems' which ethnic minority communities face, 
which tacitly seems to accept that these 'problems' are beyond the 
capacity and imagination of existing schools to meet and that the only 
answer is therefore to provide 'alternative' schools for ethnic minority 
pupils thus in effect absolving existing schools from even making the 
attempt to reappraise and review their practices. 
(Swann Committee oflnquiry 1985: 510) 
This response appears to gloss over the potential for conflict between the 
provision of education for all children in an environment which respects 
religious pluralism and the wishes of some parents for their children to be 
educated in line with their own specific religious faith (see, for example, 
Ashraf 1986). Our further research will provide an opportunity to explore 
these potential dilemmas in more detail. 
CONCLUSION 
We have focused this chapter on some of the obstacles which may face 
ethno-religious groups trying to elicit a response from local authorities to 
their religious preferences over school education. The preliminary findings 
from our research in one religiously diverse city point to the following 
conclusions. First, the issue of religious diversity is one area where the LEA 
has failed to develop a coherent policy or to ensure its channels of 
communication are open to the many religious groups present in the city.3 
Second, whilst reappraising educational provision in relation to the needs 
of ethnic minority groups and the policy on equal opportunities, the LEA 
has retained the power to define those needs and to avoid addressing 
explicitly the religious dimension of those needs. Indeed, a simplistic 
interpretation of the goal of offering equal treatment to all pupils can be 
used to rule demands for separate or different provision out of court. 
Drawing on the work of Bachrach and Baratz ( 1962), Dorn and Troyna 
have argued that we should take account of the '"politics of non-decisions"; 
that is, the exercise of power in education through the neutralisation and 
marginalisation of potentially contentious issues' (1982: 175). The LEA 
stance on religious matters appears to be a clear example of this process. 
Nevertheless, it should be acknowledged that, with the establishment of 
the local SACRE, there is now a forum within Upton which draws together 
members of the main faith communities to discuss matters of religion and 
education in schools. How far this will help to open up channels of 
communication with the LEA and will be able to address issues beyond that 
of the Religious Education syllabus and acts of collective worship in schools 
remains to be seen. 
Our argument in this chapter is not intended to deny the value of the 
racialisation of city politics and the introduction of equal opportunities 
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policies. Indeed, we recognise that their introduction is largely a result of 
the campaigning activities of ethnic minority and anti-racist organisations 
over many years. Rather, we wish to stress that these policies and procedures 
tend to gloss over the most contentious and complex elements of race 
equality and to underplay the issue of religious difference. However, 
following the Rushdie affair there is growing recognition of the need to 
address the complex relationship between racial equality and ethno-
religious identity. According to Modood (1993) it was in this context that 
the Commission for Racial Equality included consideration of blasphemy, 
incitement to religious hatred and religious discrimination in its Con-
sultative Paper Second Review of the Race Relations Act 1976 (1991) for 'it had 
to consider the issue of religion and the law when it was plain for many 
ethnic minorities their religious identity and the reaction of the rest of 
society to that identity, were of utmost importance' (Modood 1993: 513). 
Our continuing research in Upton aims to throw further light on these 
issues at the local level. 
NOTES 
We are grateful to the professional officers, elected councillors and members of the 
various faith communities in Upton who have generously shared their expertise and 
experience with us. 
2 This is based on the Minutes of Upton's Education Committee and semi-structured 
interviews with key actors in the Local Authority and various faith communities. 
3 However, a new Advisory Teacher for RE has recently implemented her commitment to 
breaking down the barriers between faith communities by arranging for schoolchildren 
to visit different places of worship and other communal resources in the city. 
1 5 
POVERTY, EXCLUDED 




This chapter is based on a research paper written for the Commission for 
Local Democracy, and also draws on research on Local Strategies to 
Combat Poverty on Peripheral Estates funded by the Barrow and Geraldine 
S. Cadbury Trust. I am grateful to both for their support. 
INTRODUCTION 
Economic and social trends in recent years have significantly increased the 
numbers of those marginalised or excluded from the mainstream of 
representative democracy at the local level. These problems are particularly 
acute in areas like peripheral housing estates, where disadvantaged groups 
are concentrated and where physical isolation and the sparseness of 
community facilities reinforce social exclusion. A feature of recent dis-
turbances on a number of such estates was the perception that they had 
been abandoned by the traditional representative democratic process and 
the institutions oflocal government ( Campbell 1993). 
This chapter outlines the growth of poverty and social exclusion in the 
UK, and then reviews the implications for the political participation of 
disadvantaged groups of a number of policy approaches to local concentra-
tions of poverty and exclusion, from urban regeneration programmes to 
local anti-poverty projects and neighbourhood decentralisation initiatives 
by local government. It concludes that the more effective representation of 
excluded communities is a vital issue for local democracy. 
THE GROWTH OF POVERTY AND 
SOCIAL EXCLUSION 
The growth of poverty and social exclusion has been one of the major 
features of the political economy of the UK in the 1980s and the 1990s. This 
has been the result of four broad groups of linked factors (Mingione 
1994). 
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Economic and Industrial restructuring 
The globalisation of trade and industry under the banner of the free 
market has been associated with successive recessions punctuated by fragile 
periods of economic growth; with a shift from manufacturing to service 
employment and a 'casino economy' of financial dealing; and with new 
capital-intensive production methods which have expelled workers from 
employment. The result has been high and long-lasting unemployment and 
a major increase in low-paid, part-time, temporary, casual and insecure 
work which means that poverty is now experienced by a significant number 
of those in work as well as those without jobs. Not only has the income gap 
between those with earnings and those dependent on benefits widened; 
differences in incomes from work have also grown rapidly Uoseph 
Rowntree Foundation 1995). 
Poverty remains relatively concentrated in the economically weaker 
regions, and the growth of poverty in South East England, for example, has 
so far weakened but not eliminated such patterns (Cutler et al. 1994). But 
while traditional regional disparities still remain, unemployment and 
poverty are now far more widespread: in formerly prosperous as well as 
traditionally depressed regions; in the urban periphery as well as in the 
inner city; in small and medium-sized towns as well as large cities; among 
senior citizens and claimants in southern seaside towns as well as in old 
industrial areas. The implication of this is that poverty and social exclusion 
now pose a much more general challenge to local democracy nation-wide, 
not just in a limited number of specific areas. 
Demographic and social change 
The disappearance of many traditional male jobs and the feminisation of 
the workforce have been primary factors contributing to the weakening of 
the traditional nuclear family dependent upon the family wage of the male 
breadwinner. Alongside this are other trends which have attracted sig-
nificant public attention: increasing homelessness; the growing numbers of 
lone-parent families, especially young single jobless parents; demographic 
trends such as the ageing of the population, resulting in growing numbers 
of infirm elderly people often living on fixed incomes. Together these 
mean that there are new social groups experiencing poverty and depriva-
tion, creating new pressures on the supportive capacities of families and 
communities. Unemployment and poverty in association with social change 
and the cultural emphasis on individualism, consumption and competition 
have resulted in higher levels of crime and fear of crime, intensifying social 
stress especially in deprived communities (Beynon 1994). 
The reshaping of the welfare system and public 
services 
While demographic and social trends therefore place greater demands on 
welfare systems, the collapse of stable economic growth and high levels of 
unemployment have undermined the tax base of post-war welfare regimes, 
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the 'safety net' against the worst effects of poverty, which were predicated 
upon the mass of the working population supporting a containable 
minority of dependants. Squeezed between growing demands and con-
strained resources, welfare systems have simultaneously undergone a 
turbulent period of restructuring driven by principles of privatisation, 
marketisation and business methods. These pressures have stretched public 
agencies to, and sometimes beyond, the limits of their ability to meet needs. 
In some places the crisis of public provision has been an important factor 
in community breakdown, expressed most clearly in periodic outbreaks of 
riot and disorder. 
Changing modes of polltlcal representation 
The marginalisation of poor and excluded groups has been exacerbated by 
the challenge which economic and social change has posed to established 
patterns of political representation. The decline of traditional industries in 
the West and the collapse of communism in the East have weakened the 
political parties of the left while neo-liberalism has now equally been 
discredited by its manifest failures. The inadequacies of the major political 
ideologies have contributed to the decline in public confidence in the 
formal political process as a whole, especially among the young. The 
struggle against the Criminal Justice Bill, for example, has helped to 
crystallise the view among many politicised young people that the main-
stream political process offers little support for their campaigns or 
understanding of their culture. At the local level (the most likely arena of 
political involvement for most people) the erosion of the powers and 
resources of local government through centralising trends and the un-
elected 'new magistracy' of quangos has emptied local democracy of much 
of its meaning (Lamb and Geddes 1995: eh. 1). 
From poverty to social exclusion? 
The growth of poverty has of course not been a solely British phenomenon: 
poverty has increased throughout the European Union, and even more 
globally. Within Europe, the numbers of households in poverty grew by 
about 1.2 million to a total of 14 million between the mid-1970s and the 
mid-1980s, adding up to about 50 million people in poverty. More recently, 
the UK stands out with a larger growth of poverty than any other EU 
country, and a more rapid increase than any other 'old industrial' country 
(Gaffikin and Morrissey 1994a). 
Many commentators see more in common between the UK and US 
experiences than between the UK and most other European countries, 
pointing to the way in which neo-liberal economic policies have accen-
tuated the polarisation of the labour market to a greater extent than in 
many other European countries (Gaffikin and Morrissey 1994b). In 1979, 
the richest 20 per cent in the UK had a disposable income (after housing 
costs) of 35 per cent of the national total; but by 1989 this had grown to 41 
per cent and by 1990/1 to 43 per cent. At the same time the share of the 
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poorest 20 per cent fell from 10 per cent to 7 per cent to 6 per cent. 
Growing poverty in Britain is therefore associated with widening socio-
economic differentials and polarisation. The previous long-term trend 
towards greater equality in the distribution of income has been reversed 
(Wilkinson 1994), and the growing gap between rich and poor is widely 
seen to be damaging to economic competitiveness (Dahrendorf et al. 
1995). 
The association of growing poverty with a more divided society has led 
to a considerable shift in the terms of policy (if not yet public) debate from 
the previous concept of poverty to the idea of social exclusion, which refers 
not only to the material deprivation of the poor but also to their inability 
to fully exercise their social, cultural and political rights as citizens - to 
employment, health, education, a minimum level of income. This takes as 
a starting point the existence of poverty, but goes on to explore its effects 
and consequences in terms of the capacity of individuals and groups to 
participate effectively in society. The concept of social exclusion brings with 
it notions of individual citizenship, rights, and obligations (Ditch 1993), 
which find some reflection in, for example, the perspectives on social 
justice and injustice adopted recently by the Commission on Social Justice 
(1993). But it has become particularly influential within European Union 
policy circles, so that for example the 1993 Green Paper on Social Policy 
argues that 'social exclusion ... by highlighting the flaws in the social fabric 
... suggests something more than social inequality, and, concomitantly, 
carries with it the risk ofa dual or fragmented society' (Commission of the 
European Communities 1993b). 
While for some at least on the neo-liberal right inequality plays a positive 
role as a spur to growth and change, for those like the authors of the Green 
Paper social exclusion carries major threats to social cohesion and hence 
to economic prosperity. 
There are some dangers in a broader - and potentially more amorphous 
- concept of social cohesion. It can distract our attention from the 
traditional concerns with low income, and the material gulf between 
poverty and affluence. If embracing the notion of social exclusion implied 
abandoning or watering down values of community, collectivity and 
equality, it brings obvious dangers, but there seems no compelling reason 
why this should be the case (Cohen 1994). Indeed, it is argued that the 
notion of social exclusion is helpful in recognising that disadvantage is 
experienced by individuals within local communities, and can be either 
reinforced by the degeneration of community or moderated by its network 
of mutual support (Room 1994). The advantages ofa wider conception of 
social exclusion are the recognition that exclusion is a phenomenon not 
restricted to the lowest income groups, but that it differentially affects 
different social groups (young people, the elderly, single parents) and all 
those subject to discrimination, segregation and the weakening of tradi-
tional forms of social relationships. It points to an analysis of the causes of 
exclusion as a process dependent on the interplay of many factors, from the 
rapid pace of industrial change to the decay of some family structures, and 
the decline of traditional forms of solidarity and the rise of individualism. 
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This may make it easier to recognise poverty and marginalisation as a 
central component of contemporary political economy, not a residual 
phenomenon, a relict not yet mopped up by progress. 
Polltlcal excluslon 
The concept of exclusion is helpful in enabling us to recognise that 
problems of poverty and deprivation may be compounded by political 
exclusion - the isolation of poor people and communities from the 
mainstream of the political process, and the making of decisions about 
their lives elsewhere by others. This is particularly the case where geo-
graphical concentrations of poverty and deprivation exist - in inner cities, 
on peripheral housing estates, or in poor rural communities. Recent 
research shows that the concentration of intense poverty has increased 
during the 1980s (Green 1994). Such 'excluded communities', which can 
number tens of thousands of residents, are often largely composed of social 
groups - from single parents to the young, the old and the unemployed -
who are alienated from mainstream political activity, or for whom political 
involvement is problematic. For single parents, child care and domestic 
responsibilities militate against active political involvement. Unemploy-
ment breaks the link which is crucial for many working people between the 
workplace and organised politics. For many poor people, even the costs of 
a bus fare to a community meeting can be hard to find or justify, especially 
if their neighbourhood has seen a succession of 'community initiatives' 
yielding little obvious change. Residents of poor estates can find both their 
neighbourhoods and the social groups to which they belong condemned 
and stigmatised in the local paper and the national media. 
Problems of poverty, social and political exclusion have been docu-
mented in inner city areas for some considerable time now (Harrison 1983; 
Robson 1988). The case of more peripheral housing estates is more recent 
and less well documented but just as serious. On peripheral estates the 
sparseness of community facilities, and physical isolation compound the 
problems of unemployment and the ghettoisation of the poor. Many such 
estates were built to house the workforces of particular factories or factory 
estates, and as these have closed job prospects have disappeared. The initial 
relocation of residents to peripheral estates often broke up existing 
patterns of political activity and representation along with family and 
community networks. In 1991 outbreaks of violence and riot occurred on 
a number of such estates, from Cardiff to Oxford to Tyneside. In her 
powerful account of the causes and consequences of these events, Beatrix 
Campbell argues that these estates had been effectively abandoned by both 
the political parties and by local government and other agencies of the local 
state, which, in particular, had failed to support attempts - largely by 
women - on the estates to organise community solidarity and self-help. 
State agencies, Campbell suggests, don't like such neighbourhoods: they 
feel challenged and hurt by them, and so they disengage and become 
estranged from them, rather than providing the political representation 
and statutory services which a functioning community needs (Campbell 
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1993). These are disturbing questions both for officials and for traditional 
politicians and their parties. 
Excluded communities and local democracy 
Excluded communities such as peripheral estates therefore raise serious 
issues for democracy, and for local democracy in particular. Some of these, 
such as whether the national political parties can seriously address the 
concerns of the excluded, are beyond the scope of this chapter. Neither 
does it discuss those national welfare and social policies which are the 
primary response of the state to poverty and inequality. The concern here 
is with local political and policy processes, and the extent to which they 
offer excluded communities access to the local democratic process. 
Consequently the second part of the chapter assesses various locally focused 
initiatives, from urban regeneration projects to anti-poverty strategies and 
decentralisation initiatives within local government which purport to offer 
new approaches to the problems of excluded communities. 
EMPOWERING EXCLUDED COMMUNITIES? 
"Partnership with the community'? 
Two concepts which today permeate discussion of the regeneration of 
deprived areas are 'partnership' and 'community', and unpacking the 
baggage which these words carry is an important objective of what follows. 
In the UK (Roberts et al. 1995), and increasingly in the European Union 
( Geddes 1995) the partnership approach to local area-based economic and 
social regeneration is now firmly established. Led by large and high-profile 
government programmes such as City Challenge and the more recent 
Single Regeneration Budget Challenge Fund, and EU programmes such as 
Poverty Three, the concept and practice of partnership has now percolated 
widely through the policy communities in both central and local govern-
ment, other agencies such as Training and Enterprise Councils, and among 
voluntary sector agencies. Even among many of those who have their 
reservations about government-inspired programmes in which business is 
offered a leading role, there is a growing acceptance of the need to work 
critically but constructively within partnership frameworks to secure a 
variety of objectives (de Groot 1992). For local government particularly, 
subject to stringent resource constraints and erosion of powers and 
responsibilities, there now often seems little alternative to partnership. 
Moreover, the involvement and 'empowerment' of local communities 
has now become an accepted dimension of the partnership approach. 
'Partnership with the community' in local area-based regeneration and 
anti-poverty initiatives is becoming an important element of local govern-
ance as a preferred method of enabling local communities to voice their 
needs, become involved in decision-making, and to hold agencies account-
able for their actions. This new 'corporatist localism', as it has recently been 
described (Stewart 1994), has a number of versions. 
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Urban regeneration 
In the 1980s Conservative governments, while defeating the attempts by 
some Labour local authorities to pioneer 'municipal socialist' local eco-
nomic policies, introduced their own innovations in the form of Enterprise 
Zones and Urban Development Corporations. These programmes repre-
sented an attempted privatisation of urban policy, in which large-scale 
government funding was used to attract private sector investment. They 
reflected a fairly explicit rejection by government of the ability of elected 
local government to promote effective urban regeneration, especially 
where this was seen to require collaboration with the private sector. The 
role of local authorities and local communities in these schemes was 
therefore strictly limited: local regeneration and local democracy were seen 
to be antagonistic. 
The manifest limitations of a policy which did little more than hand 
'those inner cities' to the property development industry on a plate were 
however increasingly obvious in the later 1980s, and governments have had 
to react to at least some of the criticisms. More recent urban regeneration 
programmes have increasingly sought to return some role to both local 
government and local communities in planning and implementing urban 
regeneration projects (Mabbott 1993). 
Foremost among these has been City Challenge. Launched in 1991, by 
the end of the second (and last) allocation of funding in 1992 thirty-one 
major urban regeneration projects had been approved across the country, 
with a total resource allocation of £1,160 million over five years. While the 
nature of the competitive bidding process for City Challenge money means 
that many areas recognised by central government as suffering from 
multiple deprivation have not received funding, there is considerable 
overlap between the geographical spread of City Challenge projects and 
those areas of 'concentrated poverty' and social exclusion identified by 
recent research (Atkinson and Moon 1994). 
Like its predecessors City Challenge remains committed to a business-led 
concept of urban regeneration, but has offered space for local government 
and local communities to participate within a partnership framework in two 
main ways. First, individual representatives or nominees oflocal authorities 
have been offered (and have generally accepted) places on project 
management structures, alongside representatives of business interests, 
other public bodies and quangos. Secondly, some City Challenge projects 
have promoted the formation oflocal 'community forums' as structures for 
neighbourhood residents to express their views, and have formed or 
supported Community Development Trusts or similar bodies to undertake 
'community' projects funded by City Challenge monies. 
However, programmes like. City Challenge can confirm the margin-
alisation of socially excluded neighbourhoods and communities, rather 
than empower them in a meaningful way. Evidence from some areas 
suggests that the involvement of community representatives on 'partner-
ship' structures offers only very limited control over the decisions, 
processes and expenditure of Boards and Executives. Even access to 
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information may be strictly limited, and the nature of the policy processes 
can lead to the 'discursive marginalisation' of community representatives 
who are inexperienced in bureaucratic procedures (Robinson and Shaw 
1991). This may not always be the case - some City Challenge projects argue 
that their approach has been more genuinely empowering, with strong 
community representation and efforts made to ensure that decision 
processes are open and flexible enough to enable those representatives to 
play a serious role. Even where such an attempt is made, though, the 
timetables and targets imposed by the DoE on all City Challenge projects 
make this difficult. 
Others have suggested that the sponsorship by bodies such as City 
Challenge of 'community forums' and the like can create a 'tame' 
community, marginalising (whether or not by design) more critical voices, 
but at the same time undermining local government and representative 
local democracy by establishing a parallel and potentially competing 
structure of local political representation in deprived neighbourhoods 
(Barnes and Colenutt 1993), with apparent access to more bountiful 
resources than cash-strapped local councillors can offer. The danger this 
brings is that a growing patchwork of unco-ordinated area-based regenera-
tion initiatives, combining local managerialism with a pseudo-democratic 
and participatory veneer, may undermine democratic control and account-
ability ( Geddes and Erskine 1994; Davoudi and Healey 1995). 
The main features of City Challenge are present in the current Single 
Regeneration Budget Challenge Fund. The essence of both programmes is 
that they are resource-limited rather than needs-led, emphasising competi-
tion rather than collaboration between local authorities and deprived 
communities, and leading to a loss of resources and hope in those areas (by 
far the majority of course) not funded. So although these large-scale, area-
based urban regeneration programmes have been promoted as the way to 
both revive urban economies and deal with urban concentrations of 
poverty, deprivation and social exclusion, there seems little likelihood that 
they will have any more than a marginal effect on poverty in a few chosen 
areas in the foreseeable future. 
Alternative proposals for urban regeneration have been made by local 
government. The Association of Metropolitan Authorities' pamphlet Urban 
Policy: The Challenge and the opportunity (1993) set out an agenda whereby 
local government would become the lead agency for urban regeneration, 
with the emphasis of urban policy on equality of access for all to 
employment, housing, education and training, healthcare and other 
leisure, social and cultural facilities. Local communities would be given 
access to seedcorn funding for regeneration projects (Association of 
Metropolitan Authorities 1993). Rather similar proposals were made by the 
Labour Party's Cities 2020 initiative (Vaz 1993) and the Labour Planning 
and Environment Group (LPEG 1994). Another recent set of proposals 
advocates a radical change in national policy, with the creation of a National 
Community Regeneration Agency and the replacement of the DoE's Inner 
Cities Directorate by a new Directorate of Community Affairs. These 
changes would be intended to facilitate people-led rather than property-led 
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regeneration schemes, empowering the community to take the lead role 
and bring in other partners - local government as well as the private sector 
- on its terms. The NCRA would be controlled by representatives of 
deprived communities, community development professionals and repre-
sentatives of local government. It would fund local regeneration schemes 
through local Community Regeneration Units and a new Community 
Regeneration Grant which would be allocated on criteria of need, not 
through the competitive bidding of City Challenge (Nevin and Shiner 
1993). In some versions of this kind of approach, regeneration projects 
would be managed not by local authorities but through a national network 
of 'neighbourhood trusts' which would dispense money to local groups. 
Holman, for example, envisages a national fund of £750 million per 
annum, distributed to about 250 trusts (Holman 1995). 
These various proposals illustrate the current problems of formulating 
a modernised social democratic or centrist response to the problems of 
deprived neighbourhoods. Can there really be 'equal partnerships' 
between local communities and developers, or indeed between local 
communities and local authorities, let alone all three? In particular, the 
debate is evidence of the uneasy relationship between the representative 
democracy of local government, and the advocates of grassroots local 
community leadership. Many of the latter are suspicious of the willingness 
oflocal councils to 'forge new partnerships' with local communities except 
on the council's terms. Councillors question the democratic credentials of 
unelected 'community activists' and ad hoe community forums, while 
community leaders and representatives themselves may struggle to repre-
sent divided communities. 
Local anti-poverty strategies 
The above issues are ones that have been prominent in many of the local 
anti-poverty initiatives in different parts of the UK in recent years. Anti-
poverty strategies have been developed by many local authorities, by 
charities (Barnardo's 1994), and in some cases by ad hoe partnerships of 
public and voluntary sector agencies (Strathclyde Poverty Alliance 1994). 
An important recent development has been the establishment of more 
effective national co-ordination and networking of local government anti-
poverty initiatives, through an Anti-Poverty Unit supported by the local 
authority associations, and a National Local Governm·ent Forum Against 
Poverty which is a politically led campaigning organisation (Wheeler 1994). 
One important point of reference for such local initiatives has been the 
successive anti-poverty programmes funded by the European Community, 
which have supported innovative and experimental local initiatives across 
the member states of the Community (Benington 1989). The EC's Third 
Programme to Combat Poverty, 1989-94, was a transnational programme 
(European Commission 1994) which funded over forty local initiatives 
across Europe, including projects in the UK in Brownlow, Northern 
Ireland; Pilton, Edinburgh; Granby-Toxteth, Liverpool; and Bristol. The 
first three of these were area-based initiatives, but the project based in 
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Bristol was specifically concerned with the needs of single parents (Duffy 
1994). 
The Poverty Three projects were specifically concerned with combating 
poverty and social exclusion (in contrast to the urban regeneration focus 
of City Challenge and the SRB), and the programme emphasised three key 
concepts: partnership, participation, and a multidimensional approach to 
dealing with the causes of poverty and social exclusion. The empowerment 
of poor communities and socially excluded groups, such as single parents, 
has been central to the objectives of the Poverty Three projects, and the 
resources available from the programme (which are much more restricted 
than the levels of funding available through programmes such as City 
Challenge, and did not really permit the projects to make a major impact 
on the material causes of poverty) have been used by local projects as much 
with the process of empowerment in mind as 'hard' outcomes, although 
the projects have funded a wide range of activities from social and 
community facilities to training schemes. 
In all of the projects, the aim of enhancing the capacity of socially 
excluded communities themselves has meant that the organisational 
structures of the projects have offered fuller representation to local people 
than we have seen to be the case in most urban regeneration projects. In 
Brownlow, representatives of the community and community organisations 
were in a majority on the Management Board. In Pilton, a leading role was 
played by local government and other agencies, but with very full 
representation of community interests. In both projects there was a 
considerable investment of resources, not just at the beginning but 
throughout the project, to broaden the representation of excluded groups, 
to modify the initial remit in order to reflect local demands (often at the 
cost of considerable conflict with the European Commission), to find ways 
of accommodating differences of view between different social groups 
within the community, and to promote effective dialogue between commu-
nity and agency representatives in the partnerships. 
The aim of empowering excluded communities can take a number of 
forms. One, as in Pilton, is to focus on the economic access of excluded 
groups to jobs and training. In Brownlow, where private sector employment 
opportunities are extremely limited, and where economic development was 
the responsibility of a separate agency, the Community Trust gave priority 
to the access of particularly deprived groups - women, the unemployed, 
young people - to the services provided by public agencies. In Granby-
Toxteth, the strategy adopted was a response to racism and the exclusion 
of the black and ethnic minority communities, and emphasised political 
access to decision-making bodies and the control of resources, from which, 
indirectly, employment and access to public services might come (Duffy 
1994). Not surprisingly, the Poverty Three projects have experienced 
different degrees of success and failure (Moore, Chapter 12, this volume). 
In some cases, projects have made significant steps towards their objectives 
of using the limited resources - of money and of time - to establish long-
term processes of change in their areas and empowerment of the 
communities. In others obstacles to change, either within the communities 
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themselves or in the partnership framework of agencies and organisations, 
have inhibited significant success. 
Publlc services, soclal exclusion and local 
democracy 
We have seen that for poor communities, excluded from commodity 
consumption, public services are of especial importance. Yet the extent and 
form of public provision in deprived neighbourhoods is often very 
deficient, a problem compounded by the squeeze on resources and the 
fragmentation of service provision through privatisation that has been the 
dominant feature ofrecent years (Robbins 1992; Varelidis et al. 1994). Too 
frequently, the local state has provided services and resources which poor 
communities need, but has done so in ways which confirm existing relations 
of power and oppression (London Edinburgh Weekend Return Group 
1979). 
The quality of public services is a particularly important issue for women, 
and especially for women in deprived and marginalised neighbourhoods 
and communities. Women tend to be disproportionately represented 
among marginalised sections of the population such as the elderly, single 
parents and carers. In most cases, despite the growth of female employment 
and male unemployment, it is women who take responsibility for 
co-ordinating the family's needs and securing access to goods and services, 
which for the disadvantaged involves time-consuming and frequently 
frustrating dealings with numerous public agencies. In undertaking such 
roles, many women suffer from low mobility, reliance on public transport, 
and often need to take with them, or schedule their working days around, 
small children. To the extent that lack of access to key services and 
opportunities perpetuates economic and social exclusion, in many cases 
women have less access and choice in critical respects than men, and 
women living on low incomes have poorer access than women from more 
prosperous or comfortable backgrounds. It is also the case that women are 
strongly represented as workers in public (as well as private - and 
privatised) service employment, in jobs at the client-provider interface, 
such as nursing or social work or benefits administration, but also in 
support occupations such as cleaning and catering. This type of employ-
ment can often mean low pay, low skill levels, poor working environments 
and high stress levels. For many women, therefore, the primary reality of 
public services is a double oppression: as both users and workers (Conroy 
and Flanagan 1992). 
The deficiencies of local public service provision in meeting the needs 
of deprived communities and excluded groups such as women and ethnic 
minorities are now increasingly recognised by many local authorities, and 
a number of them are now actively grappling with the dilemmas which are 
posed by the combination of rising levels and intensity of poverty, 
increasing public expectations and a shrinking resource base. If it is the 
case, as research has seemed to show, that on the whole it has been the 
better-off who benefit more from local authority services (Bramley and 
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Le Grand 1992), this may mean rethinking the traditional approach of 
unselective universal provision. Some authorities are moving towards a 
more strategic approach which tries to combine a greater emphasis on 
charging for those who can afford to pay with targeting and subsidisation 
for the poor and those in need, for example through 'passport' or discount 
schemes ( Charteris and Wheeler 1993). Some authorities are trying to take 
action both to make their own buildings and decision-making processes 
more accessible to excluded groups, and to get to grips with the growing 
problem of control oflocal public services by unaccountable and unelected 
quangos; for example, by opening them up to examination through 
'scrutiny committees' of the council or other similar mechanisms (Kirklees 
MBC 1994). 
Some of the most interesting of such initiatives are those which combine 
a number of dimensions at a local neighbourhood level: improving the 
delivery of public services in the area to better meet residents' priorities, 
through consultation with and involvement of local people; and bringing 
together at the local level different service providers both from different 
council departments and also from other public authorities (health, police) 
and local voluntary sector providers. In Wood End in Coventry, for 
example, another of the locations of disturbances in 1991, an area 
management initiative by the City Council in partnership with the local 
community has attempted with some success to recognise the complex and 
interrelated causes and effects of poverty, to support local community 
initiatives and to find better organisational arrangements and ways of 
working, both corporately within the authority and between public agencies 
(Hayden 1994). 
Similar objectives underlie the growing interest on the part of a widening 
group of local authorities, of different types and under different party 
political control, in administrative or political decentralisation to an area or 
neighbourhood level. Recent research shows that such decentralisation 
initiatives can take a variety of forms and that not infrequently they exhibit 
some confusion between various possible objectives, which may range from 
improving the efficiency and/or the accountability of service provision, to 
empowering disadvantaged neighbourhoods or communities through a 
more participatory local political process, or strengthening the local 
representative democratic process by building closer links between council-
lors and their wards and electorates (Wahlberg et al. 1995). Decentralisation 
initiatives can undoubtedly pose a number of problems. By opening up new 
political arenas at the local level for social groups whose means of political 
expression may have been frustrated for a long period, they can give space 
to the prejudiced or parochial political allegiances which can develop 
among sections of excluded communities where oppression has resulted in 
one group of the excluded turning against another, as recently in Tower 
Hamlets. Decentralised neighbourhood forums can also lead to expression 
being given to a level of pent-up demands and needs that are beyond the 
ability of local agencies to respond to effectively. This means that local 
authorities pursuing initiatives which open up new political spaces to 
excluded communities must be aware of the likely results, and have 
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formulated a strategic approach to such questions. It is surely preferable, 
however, that such problems should be given expression in open and 
democratic political arenas rather than fester as repressed needs and 
intensifying alienation from democratic politics. If decentralisation ini-
tiatives can 'turn grumbles into politics' (Corrigan 1994) they are making 
a valuable contribution to local democracy. 
CONCLUSION: SOCIAL EXCLUSION, LOCAL 
DEMOCRACY AND THE LOCAL STATE 
The challenge to local democracy to represent more fully the needs and 
interests of socially excluded groups could hardly be a more vital one. If 
democracy cannot do this, it forfeits its main progressive claim to offer 
something other than the market can deliver. 
This chapter has reviewed a range oflocal initiatives which are intended 
to regenerate depressed areas, improve the material conditions of deprived 
communities, and empower the socially excluded. Some of these initiatives 
- the large-scale, government-controlled urban regeneration schemes -
deploy substantial resources, but the regeneration processes which they set 
in train are frequently tangential to the needs of deprived communities, 
and the politics of such schemes can manipulate rather than empower 
them. Other initiatives are focused more directly on problems of poverty 
and social exclusion (not just on the areas where they are found), and these 
may be able to do more to refocus local policies on deprived neighbour-
hoods - but they are mostly constrained by limited resources and power 
over crucial determinants of poverty and deprivation. 
Meanwhile, the fact is that many of the poor and excluded in deprived 
communities up and down the country remain untouched by such 
initiatives. If poverty and social exclusion are not to continue to limit our 
local democracy to the status of a privilege of the relatively affluent, there 
needs to be much more systematic political representation of poor 
communities within the democratic system. The current review of the 
structure of local government in England - if it is moving in any clear 
direction - is tilting towards larger local authorities. The political repre-
sentation of poor neighbourhoods, on the other hand, suggests the need 
for movement in the other direction - towards the strengthening of local 
democracy at the grassroots, neighbourhood level, drawing on the positive 
features of the recent experiments in neighbourhood decentralisation and 
anti-poverty projects and bringing their lessons into the mainstream. 
A more systematic framework for the political representation of exclu-
ded communities will be uncomfortable for local government. Poor people 
will use such structures to make demands of the local state which it finds 
difficult or even impossible to meet. Local government has two aspects: on 
the one hand, it is responsible to local society; it fulfils 'caring' functions; 
it can 'enable' or empower its citizens. If this were all, the achievement of 
social justice for poor communities would in principle be in the grasp of 
local authorities, even if it might sometimes require a very substantial shift 
in the emphasis and priorities of policies. But local government is also part 
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of a wider structure of government, and of power beyond government. Its 
powers, duties and resources, the limits to them, and the way they are 
performed, reflect other interests than those oflocal communities. Because 
of this, local government often finds itself negotiating the imposition of 
quite other priorities, from those of a charge-capping government to those 
of the unelected leaders oflocal quangos, on its local community. 
The effective political representation of the interests of poor commu-
nities will therefore often mean an ambivalent attitude by those representa-
tives to local government, and requires a recognition by policy-makers in 
local authorities that local democracy must be rooted both in and against 
the local state. 
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